A more effective Crittenden Compromise

The "Crittenden Compromise" was a series proposed amendments meant to forestall secession of the southern states by more or less agreeing to slavery in perpetuity.
Read more here -> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crittenden_Compromise
Obviously the northerners didn't go for it. But given an earlier attempt at compromise and adequate protection of northern interests in the text as well, could a watered down resolution have pushed back secession, and if so for how long? Would an attempt at compromise need to come much earlier, and what specific assurances would both sides need to prevent outright military hostility?
 
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Like you said it needed to be modified to address Northern concerns as well as Southern. As is it should have been called the Crittenden Ultimatum. This would have to go Congress would provide full compensation to owners of rescued fugitive slaves. Congress was empowered to sue the county in which obstruction to the fugitive slave laws took place to recover payment; the county, in turn, could sue "the wrong doers or rescuers" who prevented the return of the fugitive as that infringed on Northern rights. This would have to go as well That all state laws which impeded the operation of fugitive slave laws, the so-called "Personal liberty laws," were unconstitutional and should be repealed as it infringed on Northern Rights.

This would have to be changed to cover slavery only to "now held" and deleting "Hereafter required" Slavery would be prohibited in any territory of the United States "now held, or hereafter acquired," north of latitude 36 degrees, 30 minutes line. In territories south of this line, slavery of the African race was "hereby recognized" and could not be interfered with by Congress. Furthermore, property in African slaves was to be "protected by all the departments of the territorial government during its continuance." States would be admitted to the Union from any territory with or without slavery as their constitutions provided.

The North may go for this but I am not sure about the South. As it was it was pretty one sided Only these two things would have looked at Northern interests .

That the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 should be amended (and rendered less objectionable to the North) by equalizing the fee schedule for returning or releasing alleged fugitives and limiting the powers of marshals to summon citizens to aid in their capture.

That laws for the suppression of the African slave trade should be effectively and thoroughly executed.[
 
The "Crittenden Compromise" was so one-sided that it could hardly be called a compromise at all. (It guaranteed slavery in all territories "hereafter acquired" south of the Missouri Compromise line--which could mean anything from the Rio Grande to Tierra del Fuego.) At https://groups.google.com/d/msg/soc.history.what-if/MGfWnxt-WEs/jETKBWGrAS8J I discussed the Peace Conference proposals as an alternative. As I noted, "Of course by the time the Peace Conference met, the secession of the Lower South was a *fait accompli* and no proposal would be enough to lure that section back into the Union. The real question is this: Suppose the more conservative Republicans had proposed something like this *before* the Lower South states seceded--and Lincoln had approved the proposals" (Or if you say Lincoln was unlikely to do so, maybe a President Seward might be more willing.) " It would have no effect on convinced secessionists, but for those who might be wavering, it would be evidence that the North was willing to make *some* concessions--even if not all the South wanted--on the territorial question. I'm sure this would not have stopped South Carolina from seceding, but given the narrowness of the "immediate secessionist" victories in most other Lower South states,
it might at least temporarily confine secession to South Carolina alone, or to, say, South Carolina and Mississippi. Or even those states and Florida--the point is that two or three disconnected states cannot very well form a Southern Confederacy. Under those circumstances, Lincoln might agree to an evacuation of Fort Sumter to prevent further secessions. Once a Southern Confederacy had been formed, it became much harder to abandon Fort Sumter without it looking like de facto recognition of the Confederacy."
 
The "Crittenden Compromise" was so one-sided that it could hardly be called a compromise at all. (It guaranteed slavery in all territories "hereafter acquired" south of the Missouri Compromise line--which could mean anything from the Rio Grande to Tierra del Fuego.) At https://groups.google.com/d/msg/soc.history.what-if/MGfWnxt-WEs/jETKBWGrAS8J I discussed the Peace Conference proposals as an alternative. As I noted, "Of course by the time the Peace Conference met, the secession of the Lower South was a *fait accompli* and no proposal would be enough to lure that section back into the Union. The real question is this: Suppose the more conservative Republicans had proposed something like this *before* the Lower South states seceded--and Lincoln had approved the proposals" (Or if you say Lincoln was unlikely to do so, maybe a President Seward might be more willing.) " It would have no effect on convinced secessionists, but for those who might be wavering, it would be evidence that the North was willing to make *some* concessions--even if not all the South wanted--on the territorial question. I'm sure this would not have stopped South Carolina from seceding, but given the narrowness of the "immediate secessionist" victories in most other Lower South states,
it might at least temporarily confine secession to South Carolina alone, or to, say, South Carolina and Mississippi. Or even those states and Florida--the point is that two or three disconnected states cannot very well form a Southern Confederacy. Under those circumstances, Lincoln might agree to an evacuation of Fort Sumter to prevent further secessions. Once a Southern Confederacy had been formed, it became much harder to abandon Fort Sumter without it looking like de facto recognition of the Confederacy."

It might work, at least it wouldn't be entirely one sided.
 
It might work, at least it wouldn't be entirely one sided.

What of the clause that stated that the compromise could never never be amended? Even the more moderate Republicans wished to see the institution die out over time but that clause effectively perpetuated slavery permanently. I doubt the Northerners would go for it unless that stipulation is removed, the question is if that would be a deal breaker to the south?
 
What of the clause that stated that the compromise could never never be amended? Even the more moderate Republicans wished to see the institution die out over time but that clause effectively perpetuated slavery permanently. I doubt the Northerners would go for it unless that stipulation is removed, the question is if that would be a deal breaker to the south?

The Corwin Amendment stated that "No Amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will authorize or give to Congress the power to abolish or interfere, within any state, with the domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons held to labor or service by the laws of said State"--and that was approved by moderate Republicans, including Lincoln.

Actually, whether you can have a truly unamendable constitutional provision is philosophically dubious anyway. See Peter Suber's *The Paradox of Self-Amendment: A Study of Law, Logic, Omnipotence, and Change.* http://legacy.earlham.edu/~peters/writing/psa/index.htm
 
The "Crittenden Compromise" was so one-sided that it could hardly be called a compromise at all. (It guaranteed slavery in all territories "hereafter acquired" south of the Missouri Compromise line--which could mean anything from the Rio Grande to Tierra del Fuego.) At https://groups.google.com/d/msg/soc.history.what-if/MGfWnxt-WEs/jETKBWGrAS8J I discussed the Peace Conference proposals as an alternative. As I noted, "Of course by the time the Peace Conference met, the secession of the Lower South was a *fait accompli* and no proposal would be enough to lure that section back into the Union.

Of course the "compromise" was one-sided. His intent was to save the Union by saying to the South, "please. please. oh please stay! We nawtherners will keep our yankee hands off your slaves if you do; please, please stay." Of course, after Lincoln's election to the presidency, the secession of the lower south was all but inevitable. Even if Critttenden's proposals had been crafted into and adopted as a proposed Constitutional amendment and sent to the states for ratification in December 1860, I doubt it would have been enough to douse the fire of rebellion spreading through the deep south.

The real question is this: Suppose the more conservative Republicans had proposed something like this *before* the Lower South states seceded--and Lincoln had approved the proposals" (Or if you say Lincoln was unlikely to do so, maybe a President Seward might be more willing.) " It would have no effect on convinced secessionists, but for those who might be wavering, it would be evidence that the North was willing to make *some* concessions--even if not all the South wanted--on the territorial question. I'm sure this would not have stopped South Carolina from seceding, but given the narrowness of the "immediate secessionist" victories in most other Lower South states, it might at least temporarily confine secession to South Carolina alone, or to, say, South Carolina and Mississippi. Or even those states and Florida--the point is that two or three disconnected states cannot very well form a Southern Confederacy. Under those circumstances, Lincoln might agree to an evacuation of Fort Sumter to prevent further secessions. Once a Southern Confederacy had been formed, it became much harder to abandon Fort Sumter without it looking like de facto recognition of the Confederacy."

What does an 1860 "conservative" Republican look like? I doubt that any Republican is going to propose legislation along the lines of the Crittenden/Peace Conference proposals in Dec-'60/Jan-'61 if Lincoln is President-elect. I don't believe that it would happen with a President-elect Seward around either.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
Actually, whether you can have a truly unamendable constitutional provision is philosophically dubious anyway.

Quite so. Article VI says specifically that no future amendment can be made which would deny equal representation for each state in the Senate. Okay, fine. But what's to stop an amendment from changing what Article VI says?
 
Quite so. Article VI says specifically that no future amendment can be made which would deny equal representation for each state in the Senate. Okay, fine. But what's to stop an amendment from changing what Article VI says?

Actually, it's the last clause of the last sentence in Article Five and it states "that no state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate." Note that this clause is not an unamemdable or unalterable provision to begin with.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
Actually, it's the last clause of the last sentence in Article Five and it states "that no state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate." Note that this clause is not an unamemdable or unalterable provision to begin with.

Of course it is. I was just seeing if anyone was paying attention. :rolleyes:

You believe me, right? :confused:

:eek:
 
Of course the "compromise" was one-sided. His intent was to save the Union by saying to the South, "please. please. oh please stay! We nawtherners will keep our yankee hands off your slaves if you do; please, please stay." Of course, after Lincoln's election to the presidency, the secession of the lower south was all but inevitable. Even if Critttenden's proposals had been crafted into and adopted as a proposed Constitutional amendment and sent to the states for ratification in December 1860, I doubt it would have been enough to douse the fire of rebellion spreading through the deep south.



What does an 1860 "conservative" Republican look like? I doubt that any Republican is going to propose legislation along the lines of the Crittenden/Peace Conference proposals in Dec-'60/Jan-'61 if Lincoln is President-elect. I don't believe that it would happen with a President-elect Seward around either.

What does an 1860 "conservative" Republican look like? Well, like Thurlow Wed or *maybe* like William Seward. There is a controversy as to whether a President-Elect Seward might have been willing to make territorial concessions to the South. I summarize the arguments in a recent soc.history.what-if post:

***
It is true that Seward seemed more conciliatory than Lincoln during the Secession Winter. This is primarily because he thought that the election of Lincoln had meant that the Slave Power *had already been defeated.* As he put it, "I implore you to remember that the battle for Freedom has been fought and won. Henceforth forget that Freedom ever was in danger, and exert your best influence now to save the Union." http://books.google.com/books?id=IjJCAAAAIAAJ&pg=PA31

James Oates concludes in his *Freedom National: The Destruction of Slavery in the United States, 1861-1865,* http://books.google.com/books?id=nysbPZ_VulUC&pg=PT52 that whatever he may have privately assured Upper South Unionists, at no time did Seward--in Senate speeches, in public statements or in private correspondence, hint at a willingness to allow slavery expansion by restoring the Missouri Compromise line and allowing slavery in territories to the south of that line.

And yet, in November Thurlow Weed did suggest extension of the Missouri Compromise line:

"But the earthquake that truly shook [Republican] party confidence came from an entirely unexpected quarter: Thurlow Weed, the undisputed ruler of the New York State organization and alter ego of Senator William H. Seward. On November 24 [,1860], Weed's Albany Evening Journal flouted Republican dogma by proposing not just a strengthening of the Fugitive Slave Law but also a re-extension of the old Missouri Compromise line . . .. Although it had been the Kansas-Nebraska Act's repeal of that line six years earlier that had led to the founding of the Republican coalition, from early on the party had rejected its reinstitution, insisting on nothing less than barring slavery from all federal territories. But now, Weed explained, the Republicans' accession to the White House marked the end of the controversy over slavery in the territories. There was no need to legislate against slavery in federal territories because the lands remaining would not support a slave-based economy anyway. The executive branch could easily keep slavery out through regulation; in the meantime reestablishing the line would assist the cause of union by granting a meaningless concession." http://books.google.com/books?
id=Qpx2PSrRexwC&pg=PA57


Would Weed really have floated a trial balloon like this without at least the tacit support of Seward? It is hard for me to believe. Anyway, the reaction from Republicans was so vehement that if Seward were ever tempted to call publicly for the restoratrion of the Missouri Compromise line, the response to Weed's editorial would be enough to dissuade him.

In any event, let's suppose that President-Elect Seward did call for restoration of the Missouri Compromise line. This would have fallen far short of secessionist demands. Senator Douglas was probably right in saying that the Crittenden Compromise if adopted speedily would have prevented the secession of every state but South Carolina. But the Crittenden Compromise--at least as Republicans saw it--went far beyond restoring the Missouri Compromise. The Missouri Compromise had simply dealt with the Louisiana Purchase territory and had merely said that slavery was prohibited north of the Compromise line; Crittenden's proposition insisted on not merely tolerance but positive federal protection for slavery everywhere south of that line (regardless of the wishes of the people of the territory), not only in existing territory but in any territory the US would hereafter acquire--which could mean anything from the Rio Grande to Tierra del Fuego! Lyman Trumbull stated indignantly that "The proposition known as the 'Crittenden Proposition' is no more like the Missouri Compromise than is the Government of Turkey like that of the United States."
http://books.google.com/books?id=PaYBAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA131

So even if he wanted to, President-Elect Seward could not possibly endorse the Crittenden Compromise without alienating his entire party. And yet the Deep South would insist on nothing less. Admittedly, the victories of "immediate secessionists" over "cooperationists" in some Deep South secession conventions were quite narrow--see https://groups.google.com/d/msg/soc.history.what-if/Rvz7CiH3QMU/_e1cUioLJi0J for some of the figures--and it is conceivable that even concessions short of the Crittenden Compromise could have prevented immediate secesion in Georgia and Louisiana. But in the first place, as the reaction to Weed's proposal shows, Seward would have a hard time getting Republicans to agree even to relatively moderate concessions on the territorial issue; and in the second place, without more far-reaching concessions, a defeat of immediate secessionists in Louisiana and Georgia would probably just mean A Southern Confederacy Later rather than A Southern Confederacy Now.

***

On the whole I stand behind what I wrote in that post, yet there are two caveats: (1) Before concluding that no Republican would support restoration of the Missouri Compromise even as applied only to *currently held* territory of the United States, we should not only remember that Weed was after all one of the leading Republicans, but also that many Republicans (including Lincoln) were willing to see New Mexico admitted to the Union as a slave state (at least nominally). This underlines that their real concern was *future* territorial accessions, and something like the Peace Conference proposal *might* allay such concerns by requiring a majority of northern members of Congress to agree to such accessions. (2) While I still believe that any concessions short of the Crittenden proposals would merely slow secession down rather than prevent it, we can never be totally sure that even delaying secession would not be fatal to the secessionist cause (at least outside South Carolina). Once the South had the experience of living under Lincoln for a while and finding it not so horrible, southerners *might* become more moderate in their demands. In any event, the immediate secessionists certainly feared that this might be so; that is why they were in such a hurry to get their states to leave the Union before the hysteria engendered by Lincoln's election had died down.
 
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