A more aggresive and focused Italy

This idea has been sitting at the back of my head for maybe a week now, and I thought I might throw it out there to see if there was anything to it.

OTL, Mussolini deployed significant forces in 1940 against France along the Alps, against France in western Libya, against Greece in Albania and against the British in eastern Libya and Italian East Africa, something that was way beyond the capabilities of Italy's armed forces.

Also, instead of attacking immediately in Egypt and east Africa and trying to catch the British off guard, he basically sat back (except for the disaster in the Alps) and waited for a quick end to the war and then, when peace was not forthcoming, he finally invaded Egypt and Greece with well-known results.

Now, my question is how could the Italians have put on a better show with their existing resources ? Could they have taken Egypt before the British had a chance to build up ?

Maybe the POD could be that Mussolini listens to Balbo more. He seemed to be a man who understood the effect of modern technology on warfare and was more keen on having an adequately supplied and armed force rather than a mass of useless and impossible to supply poorly-armed conscripts.

Here's a quote from him: "It is not the number of men which causes me anxiety but their weapons ... equipped with limited and very old pieces of artillery, almost lacking anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons ... it is useless to send more thousands of men if we cannot supply them with the indispensable requirements to move and fight."

Here are some ideas, without any particular order of importance, on how the Italians might do better in the short term:


  1. Focus on Egypt and East Africa
  2. Scrap the invasion of Greece. Send whatever quality material gathered in Albania OTL to the 10th Army in Cyrenaica. Greece can be taken later, once the British are neutralized
  3. Scrap the attack on the French Alps. May not be possible because of political reasons.
  4. Keep only a skeleton force in Tripolitania to guard against an unlikely French attack. Send their best men and equipment east for the invasion of Egypt.
  5. Have a more aggressive commander in charge of the 10th Army
  6. Plan ahead for the invasion of Egypt. Have it be the surprise knock-out blow Balbo envisioned
  7. Organize a way to get at least a trickle of supplies into Abbisinia. This may include a small airstrip in south-east Libya or maybe tiny caravans heading through the desert and somehow across the Nile.
  8. Send most of the colonial soldiers used in Africa home. Only use them for garrisoning fortified locations or counter-insurgency operations. This should improve the logistical situation at least a little bit
  9. Exception to the above: the Somalian Dubats and Eritreean Askaris.
  10. Compensate for the lack of motorized transport available to the 10th Army for its invasion of Egypt by employing the 600 mules Graziani at one point requested, and also about maybe twice as many camels taken from the local Libyans.
  11. Launch airstrikes against British targets (airfields, depots, command & control centers) immediately after the declaration of war. OTL something like this had some success in Kenya.
  12. Invade Malta on day 1
  13. Mine the Red Sea both sides of the Bab el Mandeb as well as the entrance to the Persian gulf before the British can react
  14. More submarines and commerce raiders in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean
  15. Build up substantial supply depots close to the Egyptian border prior to the outbreak of war
  16. Put pressure on the British in Egypt and make use of the overwhelming advantage in numbers. Try to minimize the effects of their superior mobility. (maybe something like the Brusilov offensive - strike everywhere at once ?)
  17. Have the Germans force the Vichy government sell most of its trucks in NA to Italy ASAP.
  18. Send a squadron of ships filled with troops to take over Port Sudan on day 1 ala German operations in Norway. Then blow up whatever you can, scuttle a ship or two to block the entrance and then head back for Massawa. This should seriously hamper British attempts to build up a force in southern Sudan for an invasion of Abbisinia.
  19. Conduct small raids against British outposts in Sudan, Kenya and Aden, but nothing major, in order to preserve supplies. Invade British Somaliland after the French surrender
  20. Offer as much support as quickly as possible to Iraq once it rebels against the British. It might just turn the tide in favor of the Iraqis. OTL efforts were too little to late.

Now, are these things in any way useful ? Are they enough to get the Italians to the Suez ?

Assuming they are, and the Italians somehow do manage to reach Suez, gain Iraq as an ally and cause some serious headaches to the British in East Africa and the Indian Ocean, how does the situation evolve ? Obviously their position is untenable in the long term, but what kind of an effect might such a success generate in other theaters ?

Barbarossa 2 weeks early ? Nazi conquest of Leningrad with the help of the forces that OTL went to NA ? Fall of Churchill's government to a no-confidence vote ?

Also, how long would it take for the British to kick them out ?

Finally, what other ideas do you guys have ? Also, what kind of measures might be required in the medium and long term to make the Italian army at least decently effective ?
 
This idea has been sitting at the back of my head for maybe a week now, and I thought I might throw it out there to see if there was anything to it.

OTL, Mussolini deployed significant forces in 1940 against France along the Alps, against France in western Libya, against Greece in Albania and against the British in eastern Libya and Italian East Africa, something that was way beyond the capabilities of Italy's armed forces.

Also, instead of attacking immediately in Egypt and east Africa and trying to catch the British off guard, he basically sat back (except for the disaster in the Alps) and waited for a quick end to the war and then, when peace was not forthcoming, he finally invaded Egypt and Greece with well-known results.

Now, my question is how could the Italians have put on a better show with their existing resources ? Could they have taken Egypt before the British had a chance to build up ?

Maybe the POD could be that Mussolini listens to Balbo more. He seemed to be a man who understood the effect of modern technology on warfare and was more keen on having an adequately supplied and armed force rather than a mass of useless and impossible to supply poorly-armed conscripts.

Here's a quote from him: "It is not the number of men which causes me anxiety but their weapons ... equipped with limited and very old pieces of artillery, almost lacking anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons ... it is useless to send more thousands of men if we cannot supply them with the indispensable requirements to move and fight."

Here are some ideas, without any particular order of importance, on how the Italians might do better in the short term:


  1. Focus on Egypt and East Africa
  2. Scrap the invasion of Greece. Send whatever quality material gathered in Albania OTL to the 10th Army in Cyrenaica. Greece can be taken later, once the British are neutralized
  3. Scrap the attack on the French Alps. May not be possible because of political reasons.
  4. Keep only a skeleton force in Tripolitania to guard against an unlikely French attack. Send their best men and equipment east for the invasion of Egypt.
  5. Have a more aggressive commander in charge of the 10th Army
  6. Plan ahead for the invasion of Egypt. Have it be the surprise knock-out blow Balbo envisioned
  7. Organize a way to get at least a trickle of supplies into Abbisinia. This may include a small airstrip in south-east Libya or maybe tiny caravans heading through the desert and somehow across the Nile.
  8. Send most of the colonial soldiers used in Africa home. Only use them for garrisoning fortified locations or counter-insurgency operations. This should improve the logistical situation at least a little bit
  9. Exception to the above: the Somalian Dubats and Eritreean Askaris.
  10. Compensate for the lack of motorized transport available to the 10th Army for its invasion of Egypt by employing the 600 mules Graziani at one point requested, and also about maybe twice as many camels taken from the local Libyans.
  11. Launch airstrikes against British targets (airfields, depots, command & control centers) immediately after the declaration of war. OTL something like this had some success in Kenya.
  12. Invade Malta on day 1
  13. Mine the Red Sea both sides of the Bab el Mandeb as well as the entrance to the Persian gulf before the British can react
  14. More submarines and commerce raiders in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean
  15. Build up substantial supply depots close to the Egyptian border prior to the outbreak of war
  16. Put pressure on the British in Egypt and make use of the overwhelming advantage in numbers. Try to minimize the effects of their superior mobility. (maybe something like the Brusilov offensive - strike everywhere at once ?)
  17. Have the Germans force the Vichy government sell most of its trucks in NA to Italy ASAP.
  18. Send a squadron of ships filled with troops to take over Port Sudan on day 1 ala German operations in Norway. Then blow up whatever you can, scuttle a ship or two to block the entrance and then head back for Massawa. This should seriously hamper British attempts to build up a force in southern Sudan for an invasion of Abbisinia.
  19. Conduct small raids against British outposts in Sudan, Kenya and Aden, but nothing major, in order to preserve supplies. Invade British Somaliland after the French surrender
  20. Offer as much support as quickly as possible to Iraq once it rebels against the British. It might just turn the tide in favor of the Iraqis. OTL efforts were too little to late.

Now, are these things in any way useful ? Are they enough to get the Italians to the Suez ?

Assuming they are, and the Italians somehow do manage to reach Suez, gain Iraq as an ally and cause some serious headaches to the British in East Africa and the Indian Ocean, how does the situation evolve ? Obviously their position is untenable in the long term, but what kind of an effect might such a success generate in other theaters ?

Barbarossa 2 weeks early ? Nazi conquest of Leningrad with the help of the forces that OTL went to NA ? Fall of Churchill's government to a no-confidence vote ?

Also, how long would it take for the British to kick them out ?

Finally, what other ideas do you guys have ? Also, what kind of measures might be required in the medium and long term to make the Italian army at least decently effective ?

Simple: abolish Fascism, starting with its chief.
 
Too many of the proposals require a dramatic change in the supply/logistics situation which could not exist and especially could not exist without the British being fully aware of the changes well in advance.

Providing the naval forces proposed for the Red Sea and Indian Ocean would have a serious impact on the Italian fleet as there is a limit on how many destroyers or cruisers could be spared from the Med.

There is no way for Italy to support the Iraqi rebels as there is very little means of getting any support through by air and none by sea. Neither was there much chance of the Iraqi rebellion succeeding given the poor results historically against a surprisingly limited British response.
 
The problem was that the Italian military was simply not prepared for a war in 1940. I think I heard that they were preparing for a war by 1942.

The impending collapse of France and maybe a ceasefire with Britain came as a surprise to Mussolini and he knew that he had to enter the war NOW to get anything at the conference table.

So he had to attack France along the Alps to justify any scrap of French territory. Invading Egypt was more symbolic than practical as Britain was supposed tobe collapsing soon while taking Somaliland was seen as too easy a target to ignore.

When they realized that the Battle of Britain was ending in a German failure the British had already sent extra tanks and reinforcements to Egypt and so pressing on with invading Egypt was bound to fail. Mussolini probably thought that the situation in Egypt was a stalemate and the British would be more worried about protecting their own country than in attacking him.

So he felt he could invade Greece. He wanted to prove that Italy could conquer in Europe just like the Germans had done. Also he probably thought that the Greek army which had done little in the last war and had been beaten by the Turks was a much easier proposition than fighting the British.

The fact that Mussolini failed at almost everything doesn't mean that his strategy was wrong. The poblem was just that his military couldn't carry out the limited tasks Mussolini gave them.

Finally the fact that the enemy didn't behave as they were supposed to didn't help.
 

Hkelukka

Banned
The Italian military failed because of two major principles.

Two many soldiers

And too few guns.

Most units were undersupplied, understrength and fighting with obsolete equipment.

It didnt help none that they were also fighting at sometimes far less than 2/3rds of their enemies relative strength.

Had the Italian realized their military situation sometime in the 1930 and followed a "Strong, limited and small" they could have potentially done significantly better.

IF they reduce the number of men in their force, increase the equipment and training that the remaining men get. Improve logistics and focus on one enemy at a time and actually prepare for it. They will most likely tip the war in the Axis favor. Might still lose ofcourse but they would do phenominally better if they actually prepared for a smaller mechanized/motorized/motivated force with good training and gear and sent those into war.

It is significantly easier to supply 1000 men with good gear and motivation, than it is to supply 10.000 men with ok gear and motivation at the same expense.

If you reduce the number from 70-80 divs they had, to something akin to 30 good divs and the rest in coast defence and so on. You will have a force that is on a entirely different footing than the historic Italian military. Perhaps to such a point where both AfrKorp as well as Ger intervention in the Balkans might not even be neccesary. Either way, for sure they had the possibilities for better planning, too bad they had the exact wrong leader for the job.
 
Too many of the proposals require a dramatic change in the supply/logistics situation which could not exist and especially could not exist without the British being fully aware of the changes well in advance.

Any particular reason why you are so sure of this. The British did not brake the Italian codes until November 1940. Also, according to wiki, in the late 30s "British intelligence concerning what was going on in Libya was woefully inadequate".

It's not like I proposed moving the entire Italian army west of Tobruk. The total number of men would be about the same, the main difference being that they would also receive most of the good stuff that OTL was held in western Libya or Greece (especially arty and trucks) plus a bunch of mules and camels to help with logistics somewhat.

As to the idea of building some supply depots relatively close to the border, I'm sure it's not that difficult to hide the true extent of them.


Providing the naval forces proposed for the Red Sea and Indian Ocean would have a serious impact on the Italian fleet as there is a limit on how many destroyers or cruisers could be spared from the Med.
Who said anything about more destroyers and cruisers ? I was advocating more effort be put in asymmetric warfare (more subs, torpedo boats and more commerce raiders, as in ships that look like merchantships but are actually armed)

The attack on Port Sudan can be carried out with the stuff they already had in the Red Sea. Maybe one extra cruiser tops.



There is no way for Italy to support the Iraqi rebels as there is very little means of getting any support through by air and none by sea. Neither was there much chance of the Iraqi rebellion succeeding given the poor results historically against a surprisingly limited British response.
The Italians had to wait for the Germans to invite them before deciding to contribute. In doing so, they even managed to somehow smuggle light tanks to the Iraqis. An earlier, determined contribution might see an Iraqi victory at Habbaniya, greatly complicating things for the British.


Invading Egypt was more symbolic than practical as Britain was supposed tobe collapsing soon while taking Somaliland was seen as too easy a target to ignore.
Even in this scenario, one could argue that taking Egypt early would give Mussolini a great bargaining position, whereas taking Greece early achieves little. Again, Greece isn't going anywhere. It can always be taken at a later date. Meanwhile, the British presence in Egypt is incredible weak in June, but just keeps growing stronger.



Anyway, am I to assume that none of my ideas has any value to it and that they're all useless ?:(

Good thing then that I didn't start writing a short story based on them like I planned initially.
 
The Italian entry in the war was certainly badly planned.

A large part of the merchant fleet (iirc 1/6th) was outside the mediterrennean, and thus lost once war was declared.

Two battleships were in drydock and would not be ready for a forthnight.

and basically no plan existed.

One major problem for the italian army was massive rearmaming in the twenties and early thirties, leaving them with tons of obsolete equipment and little money for new stuff.


But the one thing they could have managed was to invade Malta.
In may '40 the British had basically given up on Malta, air defences were down to 6 Gloster Sea Gladiators (with 6 more in crates), sea forces were a monitor and a few smaller ships...
 

Flubber

Banned
Any particular reason why you are so sure of this. The British did not brake the Italian codes until November 1940. Also, according to wiki, in the late 30s "British intelligence concerning what was going on in Libya was woefully inadequate".


Logistics involves both supplies and the means to distribute them. You can hide a supply dump. You cannot hide a new railway, improved port facilities, widening surface roads, herds of draft animals, and so forth.

I was advocating more effort be put in asymmetric warfare...

I know asymmetric warfare is the new cool buzzword bandied about by the press and others but, in a war like WW2, asymmetric warfare doesn't do much beyond discomforting your opponent. The nations in 1940 are not making decisions about whether dealing with an insurgency means staying in Afghanistan is worthwhile, the nations in 1940 are making decisions dealing with national survival.

More Italian subs and MTBs in the Med won't effect UK naval movements because warships are supposed to steam in harm's way. The same won't effect UK merchant traffic because that has already quit the Med for the route around the Cape. More Italian subs and MTBs in the Red Sea only exacerbate the Italian supply situation and provide the RN with more targets.

The Italians had to wait for the Germans to invite them before deciding to contribute. In doing so, they even managed to somehow smuggle light tanks to the Iraqis.

Tell us, how do you smuggle a tank? Either before or during the war?

Anyway, am I to assume that none of my ideas has any value to it and that they're all useless ?

I wouldn't say they're useless, far from it actually. I would say they're expanded a little bit past plausibility however.

Good thing then that I didn't start writing a short story based on them like I planned initially.

Please write that story and post it to the fiction board. The requirements for good fiction are not the same as the requirements for a good timeline.
 
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