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Totally agree, I doubt that the RN were being ironic, in choosing the names for CVF, that were slated for the 1960's CVA-01.
Since that design tried to do too much, on an artificially limited displacement, made worse by 'eccentric' choices as a Sea Dart SAM (whose firing arc was right in line of returning airgroup aircraft, as well as space, weight and manpower issues), a propulsion system that would be non standard with the rest of the fleet not long after they would have been commissioned, manpower demands that even the then 1st Sea Lord admitted would pose serious problems.
We may regret the passing of the RN big carriers then, but not that CVA-01 was cancelled.
The 1957 review that did so much damage, was not really wrong in general, but took some ideas to an extreme.
The minister responsible was likely the key here, Duncan Sands had been a minister in the wartime coalition government.
He was involved in the defence against V1 flying bombs in 1944, that line of AA batteries, clearly influenced him, saying at the time 'this is the future of warfare'.
(But he ignored the contribution of fighter aircraft here).
So clearly, what tipped him over the edge on this issue, must have been what followed, the uninterceptable V-2's.
However, there was another factor too in 1957, the then Tory government was desperate to end conscription, which was both increasingly unpopular, as well as a drain on the nations ability to have enough skilled manpower.
'Never had it so good', well maybe, yes at last with wartime rationing and austerity gone, but compare UK growth, industrial modernisation, with our major, well recovered competitors then.
Even on the Grouse moors popular with much of the cabinet then, this was apparent.
Enter the successful deployment of the UK nuclear deterrent just then, with the NATO 'tripwire' doctrine, the case was made for a radical, cost cutting reform.
The review did not totally rule out manned aircraft, the Navy kept the carriers, as part of the plan to have deployable forces to argument those based 'out of area', Suez be dammed!
A RAF element too here, but the large conventional forces in Europe, were just to be that, a 'tripwire'.
The review was published just before the launch of Sputnik 1, even so, Soviet missiles were to be the main threat to the UK, fighters could not stop them, future advanced SAM's might, but the deterrent force was really seen as the real defence.
Lightning only survived because in words of the review, 'unfortunately it is too advanced in development to cancel'.
But it was an act of stupidity to cancel the potentially P-8 version.
There would however, be no room for another type in same general catergory as that type, so Hawkers P.1121 never really stood a chance.
But P-8, with it's wings free of the main gear retraction, could have done.
So, how to have maintained an exportable, viable combat aircraft industry?
Procure Lightning P-8, later versions adapted as a strike platform.
Force the RAF to accept the Buccaneer S.2 from the start.
Into the 60's, add in the Harrier, an early RAF commitment might just have interested others in NATO, larger production sooner, bringing the price down.
For transports, 30 Belfasts might be too many for the RAF's needs, procure 20, offer the balance to France and/or civil operators.
Buy the proposed BAC 222, a licenced build, Tyne engined, improved short field ability version of the C-130.
Develop and procure the Fairey Rotordyne for service use.
Even then, with the RN dead set on getting the F-4, the RAF would inevitably cast envious looks at this type, so RAF procurement would have gone ahead.
It would supplement the P-8, providing more capabilty too, especially in air defence, as it became clear under the mid 1960's NATO change to 'Flexible Response', that conventional improvements were needed.
As for the rest, as things did turn out in reality, multi national programmes were inevitable.
Also inevitable, was the withdrawl East Of Suez, by the mid 60's it was just too much of a drain on a still underperforming economy, worse, in some cases they were an irritant.
UK forces might have saved Kuwait from an Iraqi invasion in 1961, but the Kuwaitis would not accept a permanent UK presence in country, so they were based in Bahrain.
But, a (peaceful) campaign in Bahrain for the UK forces to leave, was financed by the Kuwaiti government!