The POD for this would have to be in the late 50s early 60s, and involve the Brits backing themselves; TSR2, Belfast, CVA01 and the like. A conventional Phantomesque plane to jointly replace the Sea Vixen/Javelin/Lightning would be the go, instead of risky SS-PCB-VTOL. That would be replaced in turn by something Super-Hornetish in about the 90s.
A modern day British jet fighter
- Thread starter DMA
- Start date
There's a plane that looks a lot like a single finned Hornet in one of Tony Butler's books. A pre-Eurofighter proposal for a post-Tornado fighter.
I'd put the POD in 1945 if not earlier. Britain had some brilliant designs that were frittered away by incompetence in government and industry, for a start that idiot Sandys and his manned fighters are obsolete nonsense
.A bit of clear thinking about where the aviation industry was heading and a bit of faith in British engineering is what's needed. Of course I'm sure the usual suspects will be along soon to tell us all how Britain was bankrupt in 1945 and how we could never do anything on our own again.
Well first the Harrier II has already been built.
Link
Also building a supersonic stealth fighter isn't as easy as just scaling up a subsonic attack aircraft.
For a start you need to develop a brand new engine. Then you need to design an airframe that allows you to take off and land vertically and fly at supersonic speeds in level flight.
I'm not saying it's impossible or beyond the capabilities of BAe but it's a big project.
Despite its poverty Britain was a leader in jet aircraft up to and beyond 1957 and had a good captive market in its former colonies. A bt of a push could see Australia with Hunters rather than Avon Sabres, most of the mid east with British aircraft post 1956 and the Comet selling in big numbers after its problems were quickly addressed. In this climate it is easy to see few US aircraft entering service in the Brit forces and the industry strong enough to offer competitive alternative to US and cooperative aircraft through the cold war.
Thats the Hawker P 1121 shown here in its proposed form. This was actually a pre Tornado design from 1954 to replace the Hunter, with a design speed of mach2+. This was abandoned 1n 1957 when in the construction stage of the prototype and the fuselage and engine still exist, see here.
I'd put the POD in 1945 if not earlier. Britain had some brilliant designs that were frittered away by incompetence in government and industry, for a start that idiot Sandys and his manned fighters are obsolete nonsense
I'm glad you put the POD necessary for Great Britain to remain a contender in military aircraft construction back in 1945. I put it at 1965 but that does leave out a lot of designs from the late 40s and the 50s so 1945 would be a far better POD.
Glad I'm not the only one with this opinion.
I seem to remember, before the eurofighter project was officially launched, BAE developing a one-off prototype fighter to fulfill the same purpose as the Eurofighter. We are talking coming on for 25-30 years agao so I have a hazy memory of it but I seem to remember it looking quite a bit like the Eurofighter we know today.
That wouldn't be surprising, since BAe had the largest influence on the design of the Typhoon out the entire consortium. Especially since the French had their little tantrum and walked out of the project.
In his book 'Project Cancelled', Derek Wood says
'The 1121 was to all intents and purposes the British Phantom and it was in the right time scale. In fact it had advantages over the basic Phantom design, in that the structure was much tougher and in true Camm tradition. It would have been able to stand up to the buffeting of low level operation far better than the Phantom which has had to go through a long series of beefing up modifications. If the 1121 had been ordered in 1958 it couod have been in production in 1964 to provide a sound basis for the RAF intercept/strike missions.'
This bit from another site
It would however have been difficult for the FAA to operate a marinised version with is its 67ft length, RN lifts on Ark Royal and Eagle are 56ft long forward lift, 54ft long aft lift.
HMS Hermes has the longest lift at 58ft on her deck edge, but it was limited to 37,000lb weight.
Mid 50's CV designs seem to have 60ft long lifts none of which where built though.
A nose fold alone just won't cut it, so either one has to shorten the plane back to P1103 style length of 62ft, or you have to be very brave, and place the fold behind the cockpit but ahead of the ventral inlet, which would be a very substantial task, and quite unique for a Fighter, though some Transport aircraft concepts have had such a feature.
'The 1121 was to all intents and purposes the British Phantom and it was in the right time scale. In fact it had advantages over the basic Phantom design, in that the structure was much tougher and in true Camm tradition. It would have been able to stand up to the buffeting of low level operation far better than the Phantom which has had to go through a long series of beefing up modifications. If the 1121 had been ordered in 1958 it couod have been in production in 1964 to provide a sound basis for the RAF intercept/strike missions.'
This bit from another site
It would however have been difficult for the FAA to operate a marinised version with is its 67ft length, RN lifts on Ark Royal and Eagle are 56ft long forward lift, 54ft long aft lift.
HMS Hermes has the longest lift at 58ft on her deck edge, but it was limited to 37,000lb weight.
Mid 50's CV designs seem to have 60ft long lifts none of which where built though.
A nose fold alone just won't cut it, so either one has to shorten the plane back to P1103 style length of 62ft, or you have to be very brave, and place the fold behind the cockpit but ahead of the ventral inlet, which would be a very substantial task, and quite unique for a Fighter, though some Transport aircraft concepts have had such a feature.
That was the EAP back in 1986.
This was the agile combat aircraft demonstrator made to test Eurofighter systems before it's final configuration was decided.
It was effectively a "proof of concept" testbed which is remarkably similar to both Typhoon and also the Rafale.
If Britain had gone it alone, as France did, something along these lines would have emerged.
Last edited:
Project cancelled - Derek Wood
Mistakes in UK aerospace
1945-1954
Initial cancellation of supersonic aircraft setting back industry by five years.
Abandonment of transonic aircraft.
Too many design offices with limited resources.
Too many civil and military projects initiated of little value and consuming too much time and money.
Duplication of effort in Whitehall and in industry.
Lack of understanding by the RAF of export requirements.
1955-1957
Long-range jet market abandoned. The USA takes over permanently.
British aerodynamics and structural research reaches its peak with excellent designs, followed immediately by the disastrous Sandys White Paper on defence, which wrecks British aircraft development for a decade and stops manned military aircraft for five years.
Too many guided missile projects initiated.
1958-1964
The attempt to rationalise the aircraft industry by means of a shotgun and without a balance of aircraft projects.
Research only for specific purposes – of which there are too few.
Variable geometry know-how frittered away.
Loss of the short- and medium-haul jet airliner export market through BEA ordering the wrong size of aircraft.
Lack of conventional fighter and ground-attack aircraft.
Concentration on the over-complex OR.339/TSR.2 to the detriment off other projects.
Abandonment of Britain’s place in the light- and medium/heavy-lift helicopter market.
1965-1972
Cancellation of the three key British military projects – P.1154, HS.681 and TSR.2. V/STOL transports and supersonic fighters dropped.
Denis Healy’s panic purchases in America going; ‘cap in hand’ to Europe to buy a way into any project, whether or not suitable.
The ill-conceived Plowden report calling for Britain not to produce any more major national aircraft projects.
Britain goes into and retires from the European Airbus.
British Airbus cancelled.
Mistakes in UK aerospace
1945-1954
Initial cancellation of supersonic aircraft setting back industry by five years.
Abandonment of transonic aircraft.
Too many design offices with limited resources.
Too many civil and military projects initiated of little value and consuming too much time and money.
Duplication of effort in Whitehall and in industry.
Lack of understanding by the RAF of export requirements.
1955-1957
Long-range jet market abandoned. The USA takes over permanently.
British aerodynamics and structural research reaches its peak with excellent designs, followed immediately by the disastrous Sandys White Paper on defence, which wrecks British aircraft development for a decade and stops manned military aircraft for five years.
Too many guided missile projects initiated.
1958-1964
The attempt to rationalise the aircraft industry by means of a shotgun and without a balance of aircraft projects.
Research only for specific purposes – of which there are too few.
Variable geometry know-how frittered away.
Loss of the short- and medium-haul jet airliner export market through BEA ordering the wrong size of aircraft.
Lack of conventional fighter and ground-attack aircraft.
Concentration on the over-complex OR.339/TSR.2 to the detriment off other projects.
Abandonment of Britain’s place in the light- and medium/heavy-lift helicopter market.
1965-1972
Cancellation of the three key British military projects – P.1154, HS.681 and TSR.2. V/STOL transports and supersonic fighters dropped.
Denis Healy’s panic purchases in America going; ‘cap in hand’ to Europe to buy a way into any project, whether or not suitable.
The ill-conceived Plowden report calling for Britain not to produce any more major national aircraft projects.
Britain goes into and retires from the European Airbus.
British Airbus cancelled.
Project Cancelled Scenario 1952
How does the scene look with a P.1081 type given top priority by the RAF and the Fleet Air Arm? The time is summer 1952. The RAF has three squadrons of P.1081s in service and the Royal Navy one, with a further unit forming. Naval jet experience has been gained with three squadrons of Sea Vampires and the straight wing, tail wheel undercarriage Sea Attacker has been abandoned. An RAF
Squadron is operating alongside F-86’s in the Korean War and the naval squadron is preparing to embark on HMS Eagle for service in Korean waters. The P.1081 proves itself a match for the Mig15 in dog fighting over the Yalu River and with rockets and bombs does useful work in the ground attack role. The Fleet Air Arm cross-operates with US Navy carriers and for a period flies from the land base alongside the RAF.
The results are far-reaching. There is a massive inflow into the Air Ministry of up-to-date data and many young pilots are rotated through the Koran squadron to gain combat experience. Eight RAF squadrons in Britain and Germany are equipped with P.1081s and the type forms the spearhead of Fighter Command until the full advent of the Hunter in 1955-56. The vital decision is to re-equip the Royal Auxiliary Air Force squadrons with P.1081s and, for export, Government finance is made available for the P.1081 to be re-engined with the up-rated Rolls Royce Tay engine with afterburner. Impressed with the P.1081’s performance, the first nation to order the type is Australia. Thereafter a total of 250 are sold abroad.
The P1081’s successor, the Hunter, is chosen as the basis for long-term development. After the introduction of the Avon Hunter into RAF service, a prototype of the P.1083 variant, with 50-degree sweep and fully variable afterburning, is flown in the autumn of 1953. It is ordered into production. The P.1083 Hunter enters service in late 1956, and the RAF has its first genuine supersonic aircraft at the same time that the US Air Force introduces the Convair F-102 delta. The P.1083 proves capable of 800mph at sea level and around 780mph at 36,000ft. Export sales boom and a further development is ordered, with a twp per cent thinner wing and equipped with either air-to-air missiles or ground attack weapons. Production of single or two-seat Hunters continues into the 1970’s, mainly for export.
How does the scene look with a P.1081 type given top priority by the RAF and the Fleet Air Arm? The time is summer 1952. The RAF has three squadrons of P.1081s in service and the Royal Navy one, with a further unit forming. Naval jet experience has been gained with three squadrons of Sea Vampires and the straight wing, tail wheel undercarriage Sea Attacker has been abandoned. An RAF
Squadron is operating alongside F-86’s in the Korean War and the naval squadron is preparing to embark on HMS Eagle for service in Korean waters. The P.1081 proves itself a match for the Mig15 in dog fighting over the Yalu River and with rockets and bombs does useful work in the ground attack role. The Fleet Air Arm cross-operates with US Navy carriers and for a period flies from the land base alongside the RAF.
The results are far-reaching. There is a massive inflow into the Air Ministry of up-to-date data and many young pilots are rotated through the Koran squadron to gain combat experience. Eight RAF squadrons in Britain and Germany are equipped with P.1081s and the type forms the spearhead of Fighter Command until the full advent of the Hunter in 1955-56. The vital decision is to re-equip the Royal Auxiliary Air Force squadrons with P.1081s and, for export, Government finance is made available for the P.1081 to be re-engined with the up-rated Rolls Royce Tay engine with afterburner. Impressed with the P.1081’s performance, the first nation to order the type is Australia. Thereafter a total of 250 are sold abroad.
The P1081’s successor, the Hunter, is chosen as the basis for long-term development. After the introduction of the Avon Hunter into RAF service, a prototype of the P.1083 variant, with 50-degree sweep and fully variable afterburning, is flown in the autumn of 1953. It is ordered into production. The P.1083 Hunter enters service in late 1956, and the RAF has its first genuine supersonic aircraft at the same time that the US Air Force introduces the Convair F-102 delta. The P.1083 proves capable of 800mph at sea level and around 780mph at 36,000ft. Export sales boom and a further development is ordered, with a twp per cent thinner wing and equipped with either air-to-air missiles or ground attack weapons. Production of single or two-seat Hunters continues into the 1970’s, mainly for export.
Project Cancelled Scenario 1957
Back-tracking once again, the possible right decisions are about to be taken. Clearly not all the projects can be proceeded with; apart from cost, the duplication of types will lead to lack of standardisation and multiplicity of spares. Inevitably, the big high altitude bomber, the Avro 730, has to go but to ensure long-term supersonic know-how; design and research contracts are issued to A V Roe for a Mach 2.5-Mach3.0 experimental aircraft with sufficient fuel tankage for sustained supersonic flight. On the vehicle many of the problems of Concorde are destined to be sorted out. A replacement for the Canberra is essential and obviously it will be wasteful not to use the Blackburn NA.39, which is intended to fulfil a high-speed low-altitude strike role. After much soul searching the RAF agrees to participate in NA39 provided that a digital rather than an analogue system is ultimately employed, and a new Rolls-Royce engine is installed to improve take-off and radius of action in the Mk2 version.
With the supersonic Hunter already available and the P.1B on the production line, the big question remains to sort out the SR.177, the hawker P.1121 and the Fairey FD.2. Operational requirement No.329 for a big twin engined high altitude fighter is abandoned as being too complex. Instead, a requirement is issued for a supersonic single/two-seat fighter/strike aircraft, which is to become a worthy rival to the American Phantom. The contract is placed with Hawkers as Kingston and the Gyron- powered prototype P.1121, hitherto a private venture, is completed under official auspices.
Flight trials are successful and the long-term decision is taken to develop the P.1121 as a two seat all weather aircraft with continuous-wave radar and a semi-active guidance air-to-air missile developed by Fairey. The missile overcomes the serious gap in British technology where concentration has hitherto been only on infra-red fighting weapons, which are unsuitable for low/medium altitude operations in bad weather. The chosen power plant for the production P.1121 is the Rolls Royce RB140 Medway engine with fully-variable reheat. The Government also persuades BEA, in 1958-59, to keep its proposed Trident airliner as a 111-seater with three Medways rather than scaling it down with a smaller power plant. The Medway is thus established in both military and civil fields, and in the latter becomes a key rival to the P + W JT8D, powering the Trident, the Boeing 707 and a second generation V.1000 airliner with underwing pods in place of buried engines. The Medway begins life at 10,000lb thrust and is steadily developed to 12,000lb, 14,000lb and then 17,000lb – keeping pace with both military and civil demands for increased power. For Rolls Royce there is an additional bonus as the P1121 installation gives the company vital ‘hot back end’ experience, which is read across into the ‘Super Conway’, which eventually emerges as the RB211.
The Mk1 P1121 goes into RAF service in 1962, and sells extremely well abroad. The development cycle is maintained with greatly increased weapons load and range as more thrust become available. A version with completely up –dated avionics, new weapons and short field performance is a standard RAF squadron type in 1976. Sorting out the FD.2 and the SR.177 proves to be a more difficult problem. It is realised that Britain cannot go it alone for ever with rising costs and budget limitations, and that the European industry is re-establishing itself. At top level the Government decided to use both types as the start of ‘collaboration’ and as a means of combating the tremendous sales efforts being made buy the US.
Negations with the federal German Republic (begun in 1956) are completed for the joint development and production of the SR.177 rocket-plus-turbojet interceptor. As Armstrong Whitworth is to be the main UK production centre, the aircraft side of Saunders Roe is taken over by Hawker Siddeley and the de Havilland Engine company. Two variants of the SR.177 are agreed upon: the basic mixed power, rapid-reaction, high altitude interceptor for air force/naval use, and a medium to low altitude strike/fighter variant with turbojet only, rocket fuel tankage being used for kerosene and a four per cent thickness wing being employed. German pressure leads to the adoption of a Rolls Royce turbojet in place of the Gyron Junior. The MoD agrees to three RAF squadrons in Germany being equipped with SR.177’s, while the type becomes the standard FAA fighter. Both the Luftwaffe and the German Navy adopt the SR.177 a standard and the joint production programme becomes the largest in Europe. The Lockheed bid with the F-104 Starfighter comes to nothing.
In the case of the FD.2, Whitehall opens discussions with the French on a collaborative agreement between Fairey and Dassault. Information is pooled and joint airframe development started. A batch of six aircraft is ordered in both France and Britain, the former with the SNECMA Atar engine and the latter with the reheated Avon. The outcome is a basic Mach 2.0 aircraft, which becomes standard in France and in Britain, begins to replace the Hunter in 1962. With steady development, the production lines keep rolling to meet export orders, right through to the seventies.
Back-tracking once again, the possible right decisions are about to be taken. Clearly not all the projects can be proceeded with; apart from cost, the duplication of types will lead to lack of standardisation and multiplicity of spares. Inevitably, the big high altitude bomber, the Avro 730, has to go but to ensure long-term supersonic know-how; design and research contracts are issued to A V Roe for a Mach 2.5-Mach3.0 experimental aircraft with sufficient fuel tankage for sustained supersonic flight. On the vehicle many of the problems of Concorde are destined to be sorted out. A replacement for the Canberra is essential and obviously it will be wasteful not to use the Blackburn NA.39, which is intended to fulfil a high-speed low-altitude strike role. After much soul searching the RAF agrees to participate in NA39 provided that a digital rather than an analogue system is ultimately employed, and a new Rolls-Royce engine is installed to improve take-off and radius of action in the Mk2 version.
With the supersonic Hunter already available and the P.1B on the production line, the big question remains to sort out the SR.177, the hawker P.1121 and the Fairey FD.2. Operational requirement No.329 for a big twin engined high altitude fighter is abandoned as being too complex. Instead, a requirement is issued for a supersonic single/two-seat fighter/strike aircraft, which is to become a worthy rival to the American Phantom. The contract is placed with Hawkers as Kingston and the Gyron- powered prototype P.1121, hitherto a private venture, is completed under official auspices.
Flight trials are successful and the long-term decision is taken to develop the P.1121 as a two seat all weather aircraft with continuous-wave radar and a semi-active guidance air-to-air missile developed by Fairey. The missile overcomes the serious gap in British technology where concentration has hitherto been only on infra-red fighting weapons, which are unsuitable for low/medium altitude operations in bad weather. The chosen power plant for the production P.1121 is the Rolls Royce RB140 Medway engine with fully-variable reheat. The Government also persuades BEA, in 1958-59, to keep its proposed Trident airliner as a 111-seater with three Medways rather than scaling it down with a smaller power plant. The Medway is thus established in both military and civil fields, and in the latter becomes a key rival to the P + W JT8D, powering the Trident, the Boeing 707 and a second generation V.1000 airliner with underwing pods in place of buried engines. The Medway begins life at 10,000lb thrust and is steadily developed to 12,000lb, 14,000lb and then 17,000lb – keeping pace with both military and civil demands for increased power. For Rolls Royce there is an additional bonus as the P1121 installation gives the company vital ‘hot back end’ experience, which is read across into the ‘Super Conway’, which eventually emerges as the RB211.
The Mk1 P1121 goes into RAF service in 1962, and sells extremely well abroad. The development cycle is maintained with greatly increased weapons load and range as more thrust become available. A version with completely up –dated avionics, new weapons and short field performance is a standard RAF squadron type in 1976. Sorting out the FD.2 and the SR.177 proves to be a more difficult problem. It is realised that Britain cannot go it alone for ever with rising costs and budget limitations, and that the European industry is re-establishing itself. At top level the Government decided to use both types as the start of ‘collaboration’ and as a means of combating the tremendous sales efforts being made buy the US.
Negations with the federal German Republic (begun in 1956) are completed for the joint development and production of the SR.177 rocket-plus-turbojet interceptor. As Armstrong Whitworth is to be the main UK production centre, the aircraft side of Saunders Roe is taken over by Hawker Siddeley and the de Havilland Engine company. Two variants of the SR.177 are agreed upon: the basic mixed power, rapid-reaction, high altitude interceptor for air force/naval use, and a medium to low altitude strike/fighter variant with turbojet only, rocket fuel tankage being used for kerosene and a four per cent thickness wing being employed. German pressure leads to the adoption of a Rolls Royce turbojet in place of the Gyron Junior. The MoD agrees to three RAF squadrons in Germany being equipped with SR.177’s, while the type becomes the standard FAA fighter. Both the Luftwaffe and the German Navy adopt the SR.177 a standard and the joint production programme becomes the largest in Europe. The Lockheed bid with the F-104 Starfighter comes to nothing.
In the case of the FD.2, Whitehall opens discussions with the French on a collaborative agreement between Fairey and Dassault. Information is pooled and joint airframe development started. A batch of six aircraft is ordered in both France and Britain, the former with the SNECMA Atar engine and the latter with the reheated Avon. The outcome is a basic Mach 2.0 aircraft, which becomes standard in France and in Britain, begins to replace the Hunter in 1962. With steady development, the production lines keep rolling to meet export orders, right through to the seventies.
Project Cancelled Scenario 1964
Once again we enter the realms of what might have been. Ignoring all the prophets of doom and the left-wingers who want to turn aircraft works into jam factories, the cabinet thrashes out a workable policy. A team goes to Washington determined on maximum ‘buy back’ for any orders placed. McDonnell Phantoms for the RAF and the RN are ordered as standard, off the line, with General Electric and not Roll-Royce engines. This cuts the ultimate bill by two thirds and allows re-ordering to take place at a later date. In return, the US Government agrees to collaborate on financing supersonic V/STOL development in the UK and to the purchase of an agreed list of electronic and other equipment.
To meet the transport requirement a licence agreement is concluded with Lockheed for the manufacture in Britain of the Hercules with improved STOL performance and powered by Rolls-Royce Tyne engines. The licence includes the right to sell military and civil Hercules to specified territories. With the money saved on the Phantom deal and the dollar research cash from the US, the V/STOL programme is initiated. The Harrier Mk1 goes into production while, at the same time, three prototypes P1154’s are built using Pegasus engines with plenum chamber burning. These are followed by a further three modified aircraft equipped with the BS.100 engine. Following extensive trails, the P1154 is ordered as the successor to the Harrier. It is used by the FAF, FAA, the USN and the USMC. A British-designed nav/attack system including volumetric radar is fitted to the P1154.
Finally, the thorny problem of the TSR.2 is resolved. So much money has been spent and so much effort put in, it is obvious that the project must go on. Sixty TSR2s are ordered, but initially with less sophisticated equipment than originally envisaged. The weapons system package is built up gradually, allowing for an easier flight test programme. TSR2 becomes the most potent strike/recce aircraft in the NATO armoury. A further 25 are ordered and Australia, thoroughly disenchanted with delays and price rises on the F-111 cancels its order for that type and turns to TSR2, with major sub-contracts being placed with Australian companies.
In 1968, after NATO has abandoned the ‘Trip Wire’ policy of nuclear retaliation, it becomes clear that the Soviet conventional build up will require the operation of a very long range air-to-air missile/gun-equipped fighter capable of CAP as far North as the Arctic Circle. The TSR2 with its massive internal and external fuel/weapon capability is the obvious choice. An initial batch of 50 ‘Air Defence Version’ TSR2’s is ordered and at the same time a further batch of strike aircraft is put in hand specifically for maritime operations.
In order not to waste all the variable geometry know-how accumulated in Britain, an experimental TSR2 is flown with VG incorporated and research is kept up. At the same time negotiations are begun with a group of European nations, including West Germany, for a variable-geometry fighter/ground attack aircraft to be the ultimate successor to the F-104.
Once again we enter the realms of what might have been. Ignoring all the prophets of doom and the left-wingers who want to turn aircraft works into jam factories, the cabinet thrashes out a workable policy. A team goes to Washington determined on maximum ‘buy back’ for any orders placed. McDonnell Phantoms for the RAF and the RN are ordered as standard, off the line, with General Electric and not Roll-Royce engines. This cuts the ultimate bill by two thirds and allows re-ordering to take place at a later date. In return, the US Government agrees to collaborate on financing supersonic V/STOL development in the UK and to the purchase of an agreed list of electronic and other equipment.
To meet the transport requirement a licence agreement is concluded with Lockheed for the manufacture in Britain of the Hercules with improved STOL performance and powered by Rolls-Royce Tyne engines. The licence includes the right to sell military and civil Hercules to specified territories. With the money saved on the Phantom deal and the dollar research cash from the US, the V/STOL programme is initiated. The Harrier Mk1 goes into production while, at the same time, three prototypes P1154’s are built using Pegasus engines with plenum chamber burning. These are followed by a further three modified aircraft equipped with the BS.100 engine. Following extensive trails, the P1154 is ordered as the successor to the Harrier. It is used by the FAF, FAA, the USN and the USMC. A British-designed nav/attack system including volumetric radar is fitted to the P1154.
Finally, the thorny problem of the TSR.2 is resolved. So much money has been spent and so much effort put in, it is obvious that the project must go on. Sixty TSR2s are ordered, but initially with less sophisticated equipment than originally envisaged. The weapons system package is built up gradually, allowing for an easier flight test programme. TSR2 becomes the most potent strike/recce aircraft in the NATO armoury. A further 25 are ordered and Australia, thoroughly disenchanted with delays and price rises on the F-111 cancels its order for that type and turns to TSR2, with major sub-contracts being placed with Australian companies.
In 1968, after NATO has abandoned the ‘Trip Wire’ policy of nuclear retaliation, it becomes clear that the Soviet conventional build up will require the operation of a very long range air-to-air missile/gun-equipped fighter capable of CAP as far North as the Arctic Circle. The TSR2 with its massive internal and external fuel/weapon capability is the obvious choice. An initial batch of 50 ‘Air Defence Version’ TSR2’s is ordered and at the same time a further batch of strike aircraft is put in hand specifically for maritime operations.
In order not to waste all the variable geometry know-how accumulated in Britain, an experimental TSR2 is flown with VG incorporated and research is kept up. At the same time negotiations are begun with a group of European nations, including West Germany, for a variable-geometry fighter/ground attack aircraft to be the ultimate successor to the F-104.
That was the EAP back in 1986.
This was the agile combat aircraft demonstrator made to test Eurofighter systems before it's final configuration was decided.
It was effectively a "proof of concept" testbed which is remarkably similar to both Typhoon and also the Rafale.
If Britain had gone it alone, as France did, something along these lines would have emerged.
Thanks, that was it.
I could imagine that Britain could build her own jet fighter, with a fairly recent POD.
Sweden and Taiwan have much smaller economies than Britain and both build their own combat jets. The Saab Gripen is probably well known to most posters but this Taiwanese jet might be not http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AIDC_F-CK-1_Ching-kuo
To me the question seems to be not if Britain could, but why should she?
There seem to be some good economic reasons for an international collaborative effort, namely that it can be ensured that the costs for research and tooling up can be spread over a larger number of planes. In theory, the same effect could be achieved if Britain develops the jet fighter alone, and then a lot of other countries obligeingly buy British. But then, of course, who says that it is Britain they have to oblige? These other countries might buy from the French or Americans, or they may have the same bright idea as the British, develop their own plane and hope that a lot of others will buy from them, and not the British.
By the way, Britain is by no means the only country to develop jet aircraft and then cancelling them. Canada (Avro Canada Arrow), Germany, (with at least 3 VTOL jet projects that flew in the Sixties), Israel (the Lavi fighter), Switzerland, .... the list could probably be continued.
From what I have read in Derek Wood's Project Cancelled the TSR. 2 was indeed an impressive plane. I admit that I am a layman, but I still wonder if there is any real reason to lament the cancellation of the Saunders Roe SR. 177. Isn't a rocket engine, even in a mixed powerplant design, very uneconomical as far as range is concerned? Have there been any rocket or rocket / turbojet powered fighter projects after the Fifties? Have any ever seen service (apart from the desastrous Messerschmitt 163)?
Sweden and Taiwan have much smaller economies than Britain and both build their own combat jets. The Saab Gripen is probably well known to most posters but this Taiwanese jet might be not http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AIDC_F-CK-1_Ching-kuo
To me the question seems to be not if Britain could, but why should she?
There seem to be some good economic reasons for an international collaborative effort, namely that it can be ensured that the costs for research and tooling up can be spread over a larger number of planes. In theory, the same effect could be achieved if Britain develops the jet fighter alone, and then a lot of other countries obligeingly buy British. But then, of course, who says that it is Britain they have to oblige? These other countries might buy from the French or Americans, or they may have the same bright idea as the British, develop their own plane and hope that a lot of others will buy from them, and not the British.
By the way, Britain is by no means the only country to develop jet aircraft and then cancelling them. Canada (Avro Canada Arrow), Germany, (with at least 3 VTOL jet projects that flew in the Sixties), Israel (the Lavi fighter), Switzerland, .... the list could probably be continued.
From what I have read in Derek Wood's Project Cancelled the TSR. 2 was indeed an impressive plane. I admit that I am a layman, but I still wonder if there is any real reason to lament the cancellation of the Saunders Roe SR. 177. Isn't a rocket engine, even in a mixed powerplant design, very uneconomical as far as range is concerned? Have there been any rocket or rocket / turbojet powered fighter projects after the Fifties? Have any ever seen service (apart from the desastrous Messerschmitt 163)?