A Mediterranean Focus from 1943?

Brit/US disagreement over stratigic focus reached a climax at the January Symbol confrence. The questions was settled for 1943 when Roosevelt decided for the British proposal of a Mediterranean strategy. Marshal felt this a waste, refused to commit significant addition ground forces to that front in 1943, and agreed to more material sent to other theatres vs the allocations outlined in early planning of 1942.

So, the question here is; if Marshall or some other US CoS had thrown his whole hearted support to the 'Mediterranean first' strategy how would that have played out? There are a number of directions that may lead, but I'd think the core point is would Germany be defeated any faster?
 
That is actually totally agaisnt what Brooke wanted.

His goals were simple:

1) Open the Med and save 1 million in transport
2) Tie down German forces on a North-South axis in Italy
3) Prevent them from getting to Normandy fast on internal East-West lines
4) THEN do Ovelord

For this to work, Brooke will have to be sold on a "soft belly" strategy, which he was not keen on.

The joker in the pack is of course our friend Admiral King.

Even if Italy is occupied fully in 1943, the next step, breaking into the Reich, is not so easy. The Alps are sort of in the way in many instances. Then it would have to be a detour around Wienna, but then a Caporetto is looming.

Italy was excellent as a trap as Brooke anticipated. He was convinced that Hitler would never give ground but rather sustain a lost cause (as he did).

It leaves Southern France or Adriatic. Adriatic might not be popular with Stalin.

Southern France, as far as I know, was not particular well-developed in terms of roads. Northern France was industrialised with proper roads and railways. I am guessing a bit here.

But fighting from Southern France all the way to Berlin seems an awfully long route.

Ivan
 
It might have meant an earlier decision to attack Sicily, and also a quicker follow up mainland attack - rather than a 'what do we do now?' attitude.

The axis were allowed too easily to withdraw their forces (men & equipment) across the Straits of Messina.
Whilst at that time, a Salerno landing would be too ambitious - seizing Taranto and striking north-west to block the western coast road seems feasible.
 
Wasnt claiming Brooke opposed a eventual attack in NW Europe.

That is actually totally agaisnt what Brooke wanted.

His goals were simple:

1) Open the Med and save 1 million in transport
2) Tie down German forces on a North-South axis in Italy
3) Prevent them from getting to Normandy fast on internal East-West lines
4) THEN do Ovelord

Do you have any references showing this stuff specifically from Brooke. I have some material from the 1942 conferences between the senior Allied leaders, and the 1943 Symbol conference. Something from Brookes hand beyond those would help clarify this.

Southern France, as far as I know, was not particular well-developed in terms of roads. Northern France was industrialised with proper roads and railways. I am guessing a bit here.

My Michilen road map dating to 1940 & reprinted by the US Army in 1944 shows a well developed road net in southern France. The mountains of the Central Masif and the western Alps create some barriers, but the Rhone river valley roads are capable of a lot of traffic. More important the railroads from the coast to the north and to western France were robust and could handle a lot of traffic.
 
It might have meant an earlier decision to attack Sicily, and also a quicker follow up mainland attack - rather than a 'what do we do now?' attitude.

Originally (at the Symbol conference) the British staff proposed picking off Sardinia/Corsica first, as early as March 1943. Scilly was to follow. Brooke thought the reverse better. I cant remember anything about his preference for securing Tunisia before moving on to anywhere else. Scilly as the next objective is suposed to have been decided before the Symbol conference was concluded in January 1943. I've run across this version in both WGF Jacksons 'The Battle for Italy' and Atkinsons 'Army at Dawn' & 'Day of Battle'. Pogue referes to it in less detail in his biography of Marshal.
 
Brooke's papers - published by Trent - contain several references. Brooke saw Italy as a trap and the first step of the re-entry and Overlord as the last step.

Marshall had it the other way around. He saw Overlord as the first step.

There is a reference (I will look i tup) where Brooke is asking Marshall: "So, now we have got ashore. then what? do we go North, South or East? or do we sit down and play chemin de faire on the beach?

Marshall did not have any idea at that point.

Brooke is quite explicit on Italy as a strategic trap.

Ivan
 
The 'soft underbelly of Europe' expression was only applicable in the Italian political sense. Geographically it was not the place to conduct a mechanized war - as the Allies found out.

Yes, I agree that the priorities were to secure both sides of the Med - Sicily was the obvious target. Sardinia & Corsica could follow (as they did OTL), there was any advantage in doing in the other way around.

Next by 'knocking' Italy out of the war, it forced Germany to send forces south - away from France, to ensure that happened a landing on the mainland seems IMHO essential.
Questions though how much force allocated and when!
For example seems plausible for the British to land on Western Sicily, to be successful enough to establish secure airfields, then the US lands at Taranto - secures the Port, rapidly deploy north-west to cut the road to Messina.
Next the Free French land at Sardinia!
The Germans - don't know what's next!
While the British carry on to finish off Sicily, the US reinforces Taranto - and drives in fits and starts up the east side - secures the Foggia airfields. Next the Free French liberate Corsica.
The Germans - don't know what's next!
Do the Allies land in South of France, further up the Italian mainland, or on the eastern side of the Adriatic?

Yet, even with OTL, how far could the Allies have got if Mk Clark had follow orders, rather than do sight seeing in Rome!
 
Brooke's papers - published by Trent - contain several references. Brooke saw Italy as a trap and the first step of the re-entry and Overlord as the last step.

That on the face of it is a contradiction, making no sense. In the context of the several other accounts I've read it can be twisted into making sense, but it still leaves me wondering at what point Brooke thought a necessary 'first step' went and where the stratigic trap started. When the Italians offered to quit was Brooke objecting to entering Italy, or recommending

There is a reference (I will look i tup) where Brooke is asking Marshall: "So, now we have got ashore. then what? do we go North, South or East? or do we sit down and play chemin de faire on the beach?

Please, There were multiple confrences in 1942 & 1943 where the invasion of NW Europe was discussed. The context of that or any other remarks among the hours of discussion is important. Strictly speaking Brooke already had a answer to that question as the British had a number of studies and invasion plans already prepared by mid 1942. I dont know if Marshall had seen those, or how much of those plans the Yanks had actually seen.
 
Brooke feared that a landing in South of France would take German forces away from Italy and North of the Alps; hence he was not keen on that development.

It is a valid point if Italy became a goal all by itself or just a trap.

I don't think Trent really gets into that one.

Carl, yes, context is important.

Let us look at the points of invasion of Germany from the Med:

1) Southern France: can work
2) Italy: through the tunnels through the Alps: Not great
3) Adriatic: Can work, but will it be through Yoguslavia, etc?

As far as I can see, only S. France can work

Will it be difficult to keep up the logistics train?

Insofar as 1943 Normandy was cancelled due to lack of too many things (landing craft, etc), would the same have been factors in 1943 in the Med?

Ivan
 
what okh and i proposed in the desert god is among the best possible allied scenarios in the med

1. either have a more ambitious torch (with landings at tunis/bizertte) or more decisively victorious 2nd alemain so the n. african campaign goes better
2. in conjunction with the huskey landings; land a division and a couple of tank battalions at calabria on the "toe" of italy to cut off axis formations (minus the pittance they can fly out)
3. Italian landings much farther north (citiavecchia north of rome) to trap all axis formations in the south; total allied air and naval supremecy allows this
4. instead of broken back campaign through mountains, amphibiously leapfrog german defensive lines (both on the med and adriatic sides) until the po river line is reached

then invade southern france and make decisive effort through that direction... southern france does have some good terrain for armored ops; but better yet its less built up than northern france, so the germans have less places to hide for the allies to bomb the shit out of them
 
There is a reference (I will look i tup) where Brooke is asking Marshall: "So, now we have got ashore. then what? do we go North, South or East? or do we sit down and play chemin de faire on the beach?
...
Ivan

Rich in connotations, in a couple of ways, mostly unintended.

1) presumably he's talking about the card game, chemin de fer. 'Chemin de faire' could be construed as mangled British French for 'what road to take (or make!)', which would make sense.

2) 'chemin de fer' is, of course, French for 'railroad', which you really need for logistics.

It would be fun if Brooke, an educated, subtle Brit actually meant all those layers of meaning, which mostly pasted over the head of a bluff american....
 
Insofar as 1943 Normandy was cancelled due to lack of too many things (landing craft, etc), would the same have been factors in 1943 in the Med?

Well, from March though May the Allies managed to undertake a offensive with two large armies in Tunisia, in July they invaded Scilly with a army group size force, from September there were several more army & corps size amphibious ops and a army group was swiftly built up in Italy. Along the way the Allies air forces in the med were effectively tripled. Also it is found ncessary to ship large quantities of grain, coal, & other essentials to keep famine from the Italian population of Allied occupied Italy.
 
OH, Never rely on misguided memory and ability to spell. It would have been better just to grab the book and spend those extra minutes to find the exact reference.

Carl, that is actually correct. However, Overlord was bigger than Torch and Husky?

The question still is: As much as Italy was a strategic trap for Germany, it would have been a similar strategic trap for W-Allieds.

Southern France, it seems, is the only logical place to nvade if it has to be through the Med. However, it also seems awfully far away from the most important targets like Rhur, Berlin, etc.

Ivan
 
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