A march into India, 1942

[Cryptic]

Why? A collapse in morale presupposes some sort of large-scale public success against the Indian Army, which is not very likely given the conditions you're proposing;

I think there would be large scale Japanese successes in India during 1942. Please consider the following:

- The Human Factor: First string IJA divisions in 1942 were lean, mean and very lethal against opponents who did not have a large technological or recesource advantage. Indo British forces in 1942 did not have anywhere near the recesources that they had in 1944-45.

-Morale: The Japanese had just been victorious in Singapore / Malaysia, Burma and The Phillipines. Meanwhile the British were out of breath and reeling. After the defeats in both Europe and Asia, Indian confidence in the U.K. to be the winning power was shaken.

- U.S. help along way off: The U.S. was not going to send partially trained units. After Baatan, even trained units would be sent only after the front stabilized (British trade space for time) for fear that a possible collapse would lead to U.S. units getting "swallowed".

The Result: After a series of local defeats or forced retreats, the British high command decides to imitate the Soviets and the Tsars. Space is traded for time. British and Indian units considered reliable retreat out of range of the mostly footborne Japanese. Distance stabilizes the front.

Months later / Allied Counter attack: The Japanese set up puppet governments (Manchukuo) in the "liberated" areas. U.S. units and U.S. logisitics reinforce and resupply Commonwealth forces. The British, fearful of losing India to the Indians and/or the Japanese insist that an allied counter attack in India be given absolute priority over Torch or the Southwest Pacific.

 

[Hyperion]

I think there would be large scale Japanese successes in India during 1942. Please consider the following:

- The Human Factor: First string IJA divisions in 1942 were lean, mean and very lethal against opponents who did not have a large technological or recesource advantage. Indo British forces in 1942 did not have anywhere near the recesources that they had in 1944-45.

-Morale: The Japanese had just been victorious in Singapore / Malaysia, Burma and The Phillipines. Meanwhile the British were out of breath and reeling. After the defeats in both Europe and Asia, Indian confidence in the U.K. to be the winning power was shaken.

- U.S. help along way off: The U.S. was not going to send partially trained units. After Baatan, even trained units would be sent only after the front stabilized (British trade space for time) for fear that a possible collapse would lead to U.S. units getting "swallowed".

The Result: After a series of local defeats or forced retreats, the British high command decides to imitate the Soviets and the Tsars. Space is traded for time. British and Indian units considered reliable retreat out of range of the mostly footborne Japanese. Distance stabilizes the front.

Months later / Allied Counter attack: The Japanese set up puppet governments (Manchukuo) in the "liberated" areas. U.S. units and U.S. logisitics reinforce and resupply Commonwealth forces. The British, fearful of losing India to the Indians and/or the Japanese insist that an allied counter attack in India be given absolute priority over Torch or the Southwest Pacific.

The US would never send troops to India, let alone the whole freaking Operation Torch force. Though seeing as you never studied it, I'm not surprised. Several of the divisions from Operation Torch came directly from the US, the only time during the war that a major amphibious operation involved forces that came directly from US ports.

Simply put, Japan doesn't have the logistical support to do this, and come the end of 1942, they are going to have bigger problems after the US starts a full on counter offensive.

You've already shaved 6 months to a year off of US westward advance by withdrawing first line units from New Guinea, Rabaul, the Marshals and Gilberts, Guam, the Marianas, the Phillipines, Okinawa, and Iwo Jima.

Heck, you've probably shaved off two years to the US advance.

 

[perfectgeneral]

As someone who has studied logistics, as I'm sure you haven't, I have to say that idea is the stupidest thing I have ever heard of.

I had a feeling it wouldn't just be stupid, Hyperbole.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japan/IJN/JANAC-Losses/JANAC-Losses-6.html

Most losses are in 1943 onwards. Rudeness detracts from your reasoning.

 

[Cryptic]

The US would never send troops to India, let alone the whole freaking Operation Torch force. Though seeing as you never studied it, I'm not surprised.

And what was so important aboout Torch? The German foprces in North Africa were going to get slowly strangled even if Torch was delayed.

You do not have a good understanding of the social aspects of the war. In 1942, the U.S. was not a super power and needed full and active British commonwealth participation in the war.

If the Japanese occupation of a portion of India threatened that full and active participation, or if the British felt that it would or even claimed that it would due to multiple uhmmm "motives", then the first U.S. offensive would be in India. At the end of the day, every willing Indian combat division meant one less needed U.S. or British division. The U.S. was going to protect that recesource.

Simply put, Japan doesn't have the logistical support to do this, and come the end of 1942, they are going to have bigger problems after the US starts a full on counter offensive.

True, but the Japanese lacked strategic logistics and were militarily doomed after December 07, 1941 regardless of what action they took.

You've already shaved 6 months to a year off of US westward advance by withdrawing first line units from New Guinea, Rabaul, the Marshals and Gilberts, Guam, the Marianas, the Phillipines, Okinawa, and Iwo Jima.

Heck, you've probably shaved off two years to the US advance.

No, the U.S. society would not tolerate uneeded casualties so the advance across the Pacific was going to slow and methodical. Also, the Japanese were not only defending, but would still be heavily dug in. Determined second line troops can still cause very heavy casualties in these situations as there are no manuver tactics nt counter etc. This concept was demonstrated in the Pacific (New Guinea), the Eastern front and Hutergren Forest.

 

[Hyperion]

And what was so important aboout Torch? The German foprces in North Africa were going to get slowly strangled even if Torch was delayed.

Torch was vital for giving the US first hand experience fighting the Germans and developing operations and tactics that proved useful in Sicily, Italy, and most importantly, on D-Day.

Politically it was a huge success in essentially destroying Vichy French power outside of France proper, and recruitment from forces in French North Africa later resulted in the Allies being able to field an entire army of French forces later in the war.

More importantly, despite El Alamein, Rommel was in no way defeated. The British had defeated him in the past and he managed to recover after moving closer to his logistics base in Tripoli, while the British moved further from their logistics base in the Canal Zone.

Operation Torch essentially assured that even if Rommel outran the British 8th Army, the Americans and what French forces switched sides would still be able to hit him from another direction. He could survive solely against the British, but not the British and an inexperienced but capable and large American force attacking from the west.

Politically, Operation Torch also helped to ensure that the key British bastion at Malta would be removed from danger of invasion or blockade. Even late into 1942, there where periods of time when the loss of Malta was a very serious, and very real concern. Torch helped to make sure Malta was not lost.

Logistics wise, Operation Torch gave the Allies North Africa, went a long way to driving Italy out of the war, and helped to insure the downfall of Mussolini. It also greatly simplified British and US supply lines to India

Before the Allies controlled North Africa and the Meditteranean, all supplies had to go through the South Atlantic and around the Cape of Good Hope, a prime hunting ground for U-boats and German merchant raiders which did quite a bit of damage.

Any defense of India becomes far easier with North Africa clear and the Meditteranean reduced to a de facto Allied lake.

Using the Torch troops to reinforce India directly would take months do impliment, as the US didn't have the shipping to move that many men that far, assuming none of the ships where sunk by a U-boat, and in 1942 the US could not spare many major capital ships from the Atlantic, as at the time, it was percieved that the Germans still had a capable, if small, surface fleet that was could still cause real damage if they wanted.

No, the U.S. society would not tolerate uneeded casualties so the advance across the Pacific was going to slow and methodical. Also, the Japanese were not only defending, but would still be heavily dug in. Determined second line troops can still cause very heavy casualties in these situations as there are no manuver tactics nt counter etc. This concept was demonstrated in the Pacific (New Guinea), the Eastern front and Hutergren Forest.

Words fail me.

Your POD, by your own words, involved the Japanese Army pulling most if not all of their first rate troops and equipment out of the Pacific islands for the attack on India.

This means some islands will either not have any troops on them, or the troops will be second or third rate units, ie not as good as the ones that the US fought in OTL. I'm no expert, but I would think if better trained and well equipped US troops fought Japanese forces of inferior quality compared to OTL, casualties among US forces would not be as bad to begin with. If that is the case, I would think, and this is just my opinion, that if the US has an easier time, relatively speaking, compared to OTL, some of the concerns about casualties and taking it slow may not be as much of an issue, especially if the US doesn't take near the casualties.

I fail to see what the Eastern front or the Hurtgen Forest has to do with the Pacific, seeing as the US and Japanese where not involved in the former, and the Hurtgen Forest gave the Germans a superior tactical position with which the US had to tend with.

I had a feeling it wouldn't just be stupid, Hyperbole.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japan/IJN/JANAC-Losses/JANAC-Losses-6.html

Most losses are in 1943 onwards. Rudeness detracts from your reasoning.

Nothing personal, but the idea is still terrible. That and the fact that such a large operation would take so long and need such a large period of time to organize that it probably wouldn't really get going until 1943 or 1944, if such a plan was even thought of and carried out, by that time US submarines would be coming into their prime and doing all sorts of damage to Japanese shipping.

Stripping factories, railyards, shipyards, and other industrial assets and loading them on slow transports to China simply allows the US to literally kill two birds with one stone. Blow up Japanese merchant shipping, and wipe out the Japanese industrial base all in one go. A terrible way to fight a war, but an excellent way to loose a war and probably set back post war recovery by a good five to ten years.

 

[Elfwine]

Hyperion (& others): To what extent do the Japanese have the logistical ability to even attempt an invasion of India?

As in, would they run out of fuel just trying to make it there? Would it be possible only with major sacrifices elsewhere?

What kind of forces do the Japanese have to work with that could be put there without abandoning already-held places, basically, in general.

Asking as someone whose knowledge of the capacities of the IJA is so limited a thimble could contain it with room left over.

 

[Cook]

You do not have a good understanding of the social aspects of the war. In 1942, the U.S. was not a super power and needed full and active British commonwealth participation in the war.

By 1942 the United States was the most powerful industrialised nation in the world whose armed forces were gearing up for an enormous expansion. American industry already supplied the bulk of the Anglo-American war and a large part of the Russian and Chinese wars. The greatest impediment for the Americans was simply the limited shipping available to move their forces to the theatres of war in Europe and Asia. Consequently the British constituted the largest allied army (excluding the Russians of course) in the European theatre until mid 1944 and the Australians the largest allied army in the Pacific (if you exclude the Chinese) until the end of 1943.

It is worth noting that while the Americans had troops available to send to both Europe and the Pacific, for every single division sent to Australia (and on to New Guinea and Guadalcanal), 5 divisions could be shipped to Europe in the same time frame with the same amount of shipping.

When in a meeting in 1944 of the joint chiefs the Americans said that they were going to mobilise a further million men, General Alan Brooke commented that there was simply no point because the shipping was not available to move and supply them in any realistic time frame for their use in the war.

 

[Hyperion]

Hyperion (& others): To what extent do the Japanese have the logistical ability to even attempt an invasion of India?

As in, would they run out of fuel just trying to make it there? Would it be possible only with major sacrifices elsewhere?

What kind of forces do the Japanese have to work with that could be put there without abandoning already-held places, basically, in general.

Asking as someone whose knowledge of the capacities of the IJA is so limited a thimble could contain it with room left over.

To get the number of divisions required for the proposed India offensive in place would take several months, and require a massive amount of Japanese merchant shipping. Realistically, to have a chance at succeeding, the Japanese would have to probably cancel some operations, such as building up on Guadalcanal, and probably have to withdraw completely from the Aleutians, which in the long run would be a huge plus for the US.

In OTL an entire division that was originally planned to be deployed to North Africa and Italy was reassigned for amphibious landings in the Aleutians. This could have some direct impact there. Perhaps another division to add to the Anzio landings, and maybe free up some shipping to move the division perhaps.

There where not a lot of good airfields in Burma, and for such a large operation, the Japanese would benefit from air superiority, and would realistically need to conduct amphibious landings. This would be a problem as given that the Japanese had lost five aircraft carriers and a purpose built seaplane carrier since May 1st, aircraft carriers would be in short supply.

Any naval air units pulled to fight in the attack on India would be that many fewer facing the US Pacific Fleet, which while small actually managed in OTL to build up a pretty impressive force just prior to the meatgrinder of the Guadalcanal campaign.

Factor in also the monsoon season, which would turn streams into rivers and rivers into lakes, and overland travel would become a nightmare late in the year and into 1943. Any troops on the wrong side of the river could see themselves running out of supplies and risk being captured or destroyed if the British try any counter attack.

Another thing, that isn't considered. While most British attention was focused in North Africa at the time, the token number of British submarines in the region where starting to do damage to Japanese forces, particularly in the Strait of Malacca. The last thing the Japanese would want to do is send dozens of transports into the area against submarines with torpedoes that aren't useless.

 

[M79]

A collapse of the CBI corridor and forced capitulation of the Kuomitang government via strangulation of supplies would be feasible with a strike into India, that frees up large numbers of Japanese troops for use elsewhere. If India can be made obedient to the Japanese afterwards they have a massive manpower advantage and the means to cut off the Persian corridor to Russia if not directly threaten Baku and Soviet Central Asia. That alone will cause the war to shift, especially if the supplies into Russia can be cut off before Stalingrad - any alterations in that battle, especially ones that allow the Germans to take the whole of the western bank. So there's more going on here besides the PAcific islands (which will still probably have some sort of garrison of note and American leadership will still pay a high price for cleaning out the islands) and just the Burma area.

 

[Hyperion]

I had a feeling it wouldn't just be stupid, Hyperbole.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japan/IJN/JANAC-Losses/JANAC-Losses-6.html

Most losses are in 1943 onwards. Rudeness detracts from your reasoning.

Something else I found interesting, and it adds to my opinion.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/USN-Chron/USN-Chron-1942.html

Between June 25 and July 5 of 1942, US submarines managed to sink three Japanese destroyers, and sent two more back to Japan for repairs.

Prior to this, Japan had lost a grand total of six destroyers over the whole war, five early on through February, and a single destroyer at Coral Sea.

That and quite a number of Japanese ships had a habit of being lost to air attack and accidents, and in more than one case minefields.

 

[hg42]

Ok, why not...

I think there would be large scale Japanese successes in India during 1942. Please consider the following:

- The Human Factor: First string IJA divisions in 1942 were lean, mean and very lethal against opponents who did not have a large technological or recesource advantage. Indo British forces in 1942 did not have anywhere near the recesources that they had in 1944-45.

They were certainly lean; they were with a very few exceptions light infantry forces. Now, that's exactly what you want in Burma or Malaya; it lightens your logistical load, and gives you the ability to go off-road and use forest to conceal your movement, which means your firepower-focused opponent can't make effective use of it. This is really key to understanding why the IJA of early 1942 was as successful as it was - for all the blustering about banzai charges etc, their M.O was to dive into the jungle on first contact, circle around a few miles of jungle - invariably unpatrolled by the road-tied CW forces - and put up a roadblock behind whatever force they're opposing - at which point that force either sits and waits to be rescued, while being compressed from all sides, or tries to fight its way out, invariably losing equipment and most of its motor transport in the process. Since the forces in Malaya weren't numerous enough to really work out any sort of defence in depth, you're left with fighting your way out of encirclement every time you make contact with a Japanese force - nasty!

It was a tremendously demoralising thing to fight against; and into that situation you're putting thinly-spread troops, with limited training, who don't even necessarily speak the same language as their officers - a recipe for disaster, and disaster was approximately what went on as a consequence. However, the moment you get into open country it ceases to be viable except in outlying situations; your infiltrating forces will get themselves spotted, and your roadblocks are just blocking a road - not an irreplaceable line of communication - at which point you've just got a detachment behind enemy lines, and the enemy know it just as much as you do. In that situation your firepower deficiency, which is not too crippling in forest, becomes a big problem - your force can just be shot out. Note that the one thing the Indian Army never lacked, even in Malaya etc, was 'basic' soldiery skills - the infantry could shoot straight, and the artillery could put rounds on target; the problem was that invariably they had no idea what was going on around them, which is something that will change once you get out of forest.

-Morale: The Japanese had just been victorious in Singapore / Malaysia, Burma and The Phillipines. Meanwhile the British were out of breath and reeling. After the defeats in both Europe and Asia, Indian confidence in the U.K. to be the winning power was shaken.

There is a grain of truth in this as regards the Indian 'elite'; urban India was certainly not happy in 1942. However, this doesn't directly translate into the Indian Army; its recruits are for the most part not members of that section of society that is politically unhappy - the IA skews heavily rural, and Muslim and Gurkha - and it's very notable that political issues only really came into play after the war ended.

- U.S. help along way off: The U.S. was not going to send partially trained units. After Baatan, even trained units would be sent only after the front stabilized (British trade space for time) for fear that a possible collapse would lead to U.S. units getting "swallowed".

Why on earth do you need the US Army involved? India has no shortage of manpower and a large pool of trained, experienced forces in the Middle East - they're needed there, but they can be back relatively quickly if they're needed more in India; it'd cause disruption, but it's not going to let the Germans into Cairo or anything.

What the US can provide is equipment - but by Nov 1942 that provision is already in full swing.

I'm not going to get into the 'what if a fairy came along and it actually happened' stuff - that's interesting in its own right, but that is ultimately what your other points are.

 

[Cryptic]

By 1942 the United States was the most powerful industrialised nation in the world whose armed forces were gearing up for an enormous expansion.

With the key word being "gearing up". The gearing up was going to take time and the cautious U.S. was not inclined to rush into offensives.
In the meantime, the U.S. needed full participation of the Commonwealth. If a Japanese invasion of India threatned that, or was even preceived to threaten that, then this invasion was going to be solved first.

or the troops will be second or third rate units, ie not as good as the ones that the US fought in OTL. I'm no expert, but I would think if better trained and well equipped US troops fought Japanese forces of inferior quality compared to OTL, casualties among US forces would not be as bad to begin with.

Sure it is always better to have first line troops in fixed positions. History, however, has shown again and again that determined second and even third string troops can still inflict massive casualties when fighting from dug in positions. At the end of the day, fixed positions negate alot of manuver skill of the attackers. For example:

Tarawa: Japanese units included Korean service troops as well as Imperial Marines
Okinawa: Most Japanese troops on the island were garrisson troops from China or Okinwan militia units
Initial defense of stalingrad: Soviet militia units stop Germany's best

I fail to see what the Eastern front or the Hurtgen Forest has to do with the Pacific, seeing as the US and Japanese where not involved in the former, and the Hurtgen Forest gave the Germans a superior tactical position with which the US had to tend with.

And mountaineous islands in the pacfic or lagoon atolls do not give the defenders a terrain advantage? Hutegren foprest was included because it demosntrated the core principle well: determined troops in fixed positions can compensate for alot of the attckers finer skills. Yes, replacing a certain number of the actual Japanese units in the Pacific with second string units would reduce U.S. casualties, but not by the amouint you suspect.

Why on earth do you need the US Army involved? India has no shortage of manpower and a large pool of trained, experienced forces in the Middle East -

Because a truly lethal allied counter attack was going to involve armour, combat engineers and massed artillery. The U.S had these units.

However, the moment you get into open country it ceases to be viable except in outlying situations; your infiltrating forces will get themselves spotted, and your roadblocks are just blocking a road - not an irreplaceable line of communication - at which point you've just got a detachment behind enemy lines, and the enemy know it just as much as you do. In that situation your firepower deficiency, which is not too crippling in forest, becomes a big problem - your force can just be shot out.

I think the terrain on the immediate side of the Burmese border would heavily favor IJA. Even the terrain in what is today bangaldesh (river deltas, swamps, etc) could favor IJA tactics supported by amphibious capabilities with rivers substituting for forest trails. Orissa state is mainly forest. The British could and probably would trade space for time and retreat to the plains. But... would the IJA take Calcutta?

 

[Hyperion]

And mountaineous islands in the pacfic or lagoon atolls do not give the defenders a terrain advantage? Hutegren foprest was included because it demosntrated the core principle well: determined troops in fixed positions can compensate for alot of the attckers finer skills. Yes, replacing a certain number of the actual Japanese units in the Pacific with second string units would reduce U.S. casualties, but not by the amouint you suspect.

Because a truly lethal allied counter attack was going to involve armour, combat engineers and massed artillery. The U.S had these units.

So what would you estimate casualties would be if the US faces second rate troops on say Tarawa.

Also, this might surprise you, but a number of Indian divisions, particularly ones that fought with 8th Army in North Africa and Italy, did have a good amount of armor and artillery and decent engineers.

 

[Ak-84]

No it would not, prior to Torch, none of those US divisions involved in the invasion where ready. Some divisions literally arrived off the beaches of North Africa directly from the US, without stopping in England or anywhere else first.

Torch included more British troops then it did US Troops. What I meant was that the UK troops who were sent to N Africa may well have been sent to India instead.

 

[Super_Cool]

Torch included more British troops then it did US Troops. What I meant was that the UK troops who were sent to N Africa may well have been sent to India instead.

I don't think so. Britain viewed the war with Japan as an afterthought. Japan didn't threaten the British Isles. Germany did. Therefore, Britain was going to use most of its resources to fight Germany.

Can you imagine Churchill telling his people "We have a whole bunch of troops but rather than use them to defend us, we will defend our empire on the other side of the planet!" I can't imagine many would be happy with that, and the British people would turn even more anti-empire after the war, defeating the purpose of trying to save it.

 

[Cryptic]

So what would you estimate casualties would be if the US faces second rate troops on say Tarawa.

Still very high. In actual history, 50% of the Japanese on Tarawa were category B Japanese and Korean construction / service troops.

In an alternative scenario, the big deciding factor would be the quality and placement of the bunkers, pill boxes etc. and how well sited the firing positions were (especially crew served weapons, which cause the greatest casualties).

If the defending and determined category B unit received category A level advise on these matters, then they were still going to cause near the same level of U.S. casualties. What would benefit the Japanese alot would be to establish cadre teams of experts who move from island to island giving key advise and supervision to category B units.

 

[Hyperion]

Torch included more British troops then it did US Troops. What I meant was that the UK troops who were sent to N Africa may well have been sent to India instead.

Not to be mean, but where in the world did you find that out.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Torch

http://www.navweaps.com/index_oob/OOB_WWII_Mediterranean/OOB_WWII_Casablanca.htm

http://www.combinedops.com/Torch.htm

http://niehorster.orbat.com/500_eto/42-11-08/_42-11-08.html

The British had a lot of ships and aircraft on hand, but the bulk of the ground troops where US, under the overall command of Eisenhower.

The wiki article is about as accurate as you can get, but as some people have low opinions, I found something better to cite from.

 

[Dathi THorfinnsson]

While the main Japanese fleet does what.... nothing?

Err... No, by this scenario, much of the Japanese fleet is in the Indian Ocean attacking India and/or shipping supplies there from ??? Japan.

 

[Hyperion]

Err... No, by this scenario, much of the Japanese fleet is in the Indian Ocean attacking India and/or shipping supplies there from ??? Japan.

Terrible idea.

The POD is in July 1942. Meaning after Midway. Meaning after the US has destroyed four of Japan's six big carriers available at the time, and right before the Guadalcanal campaign kicks off.

If the Japanese fleet and shipping are tied down in the Indian Ocean at the end of a long logistics chain, the US can take and secure Guadalcanal that much sooner, and start moving up the Solomons chain months sooner.

That and by late 1942 when this India operation would kick off, British naval forces, sans decent carriers, where slowly starting to trickle into the region enough that there would have been British submarines around to start harassing Japanese shipping. And unlike US torpedoes at the time, British submarines had torpedoes that where more reliable.

 

[Maur]

Well, i hope it's not much of a necro....

Well, actually, we are already fighting that nation, so taking the war to them instead of waiting while they grow stronger is not entirely illogical (1944-45). This nation is currently under the control of a foreign power and is increasily resistive about that. Our goal is not to dominate the entire nation, just destroy the British power base, expecially in the eastern most portion. In short, we are going to "kick in the door" and see how stable the structure is. It also has deep internal divisions and a significant percentage of the population does not even feel that they belong to the "nation" (muslims).

Judging from the British government of Burma performance, it would fold like house of cards. It was more concerned with preserving British rule over India than with utilizing Indians against potential invasion.

The Result: After a series of local defeats or forced retreats, the British high command decides to imitate the Soviets and the Tsars. Space is traded for time. British and Indian units considered reliable retreat out of range of the mostly footborne Japanese. Distance stabilizes the front.

IIRC, that was actually the defense "plan".