A limited Barbarossa 1941

Will the government of the USSR accept this German peace treaty?

  • Yes before October 1941

    Votes: 5 8.2%
  • Yes after the the Ukraine falls

    Votes: 11 18.0%
  • Yes once the attack on Moscow begins

    Votes: 4 6.6%
  • No

    Votes: 38 62.3%
  • Other

    Votes: 3 4.9%

  • Total voters
    61
I believe there is a misunderstanding about the Soviet Union's industry, its system of mobilization, and its form of warfare during a state of war. These elements can easily explain why the Soviet Union WOULD NOT sign any form of peace agreement with Germany.
A) The Soviet Union was a relatively industrialized nation that also happened to be socialist. Its Socialist nature allowed for its industry to be nationalized without too much difficulty early in the war and to be able to put a emphasis on military goods rather than consumer goods. However, due to the vast gains made by the Germans (to be explained in section C) they had to evacuate a vast majority of their economy to the east in order to keep it operational. This evacuation sucked the wind out of the USSR's lungs for all of 1941 and the beginning of 1942 but would start showing results by 1943 with a relatively unmolested industrial capacity. This action allowed for the Soviet Union to continue operating at a decent scale and with a emphasis on military goods rather than consumer goods.
B) The Soviet Union relied on a system of mobilization in order to raise an army to fight foreign powers. This is a factor drastically overlooked when comparing the actions of Germany to those of the Netherlands, Poland, and Norway which expected no real confrontation with Germany. Nations would see mobilization as further expenditure with no real benefit during peace. Therefore, it makes more sense for the Soviets to keep a professional active army and a massive reserve army in order to beat off foreign powers who would take time in order to invade the Soviet Union. The main expectation being that the enemy wouldn't quickly overrun the forward positions with overwhelming forces but would rather be allowed to push slowly while being heavily harassed by active Soviet forces while the Soviets gathered a force that was stronger in numbers and equipment to overwhelm the enemy.
C) The Soviet Union as a result of its previous two features would find protracted warfare heavily in its favor as they would be able to eventually overwhelm the enemy due to manpower, industry, and territory. However, the Soviet Union would require time in order to properly mobilize for the purpose of maintaining this style of warfare but only saw failure after failure in 1941. Moreover, it was unlikely that the German Military would've been stopped even with this strategy due to the disparity of troop quality, supply, organization, and tactics during 1941. The expectation of the Soviets was actually something similar to this though, and the Soviet Army simply retreated further into the Soviet Union as a result. This is one of the reasons Order 227 was issued and why towards the end of 1942 that we see a sudden seize in German advances across the entire front line. This quote from the Former OKH Chief of Staff, Kurt Zeitzler, in June 1942 when describing readiness of Axis units for Case Blue shows the strategy even proving effective to both Soviet and German High Commands; "Military objectives must always correspond to the forces and other means available for their attainment...we lack the materials, manpower, and quality(1) required..." It also partially explains the failures of Case Blue and why the Battle of Stalingrad was a massive German failure.
I could try to flush this explanation for why the Soviet Union would not surrender with more features, explanations, and other factors but its apparent that the Soviets expected a protracted war to which the Germans were kind enough to provide. The results of all these factors establish a solid argument that the Soviets simply wouldn't sign a peace agreement for doing badly in the first 2 years of a war they expected to suffer in anyways.
(1) - quality referring to the experience of fielded units
 
I believe there is a misunderstanding about the Soviet Union's industry, its system of mobilization, and its form of warfare during a state of war. These elements can easily explain why the Soviet Union WOULD NOT sign any form of peace agreement with Germany.


This sounds like a machine that has no people operating it.
 
This sounds like a machine that has no people operating it.
I'm not exactly sure what you mean by that, so I'm sorry ahead of time for any miscommunication. The Soviet Union's ideology of warfare was effectively attempting to allow the German Armed Forces to proceed into their country in order to engage in a war of attrition with them. However, the losses taken by the Soviets in 1941 and early 1942 beat some of the worst expectations by most Soviet Commanders and proved to be one of the causes for low morale. Moreover, these losses lost massive amounts of food production and manpower for the Soviet Union which was originally expected by German Commanders to weaken Soviet resolve. However, the result was actually a formation of unified national cause and the sudden influx of Soviet volunteers that wanted more food due to the sudden increase of rationing due to the loss of their main food production. There's also the matter of fanatical Soviet commanders that were unwilling to not accept surrender and the fact that Stalin was quite willing to face this war until the end.
The combination of these factors pretty much illustrate that the people had no real control for pushing for peace, with the government and military quite determined in continuing this war for as long as possible for the hope of victory due to Russian/Soviet Doctrine of the time.
 
How much worse are we talking about here?

Basically whatever was behind the Nazi front line at the time.

The Soviet Union's ideology of warfare was effectively attempting to allow the German Armed Forces to proceed into their country in order to engage in a war of attrition with them

Err. No, it wasn't. The Soviet doctrine was basically the deep battle doctrine (though while Tukachevsky was considered a traitor, it wasn't called that). It was a doctrine that emphasized attack, encircling the enemy formations in massive pincer movements, mechanization and superior weapons, and fighting the enemy on their land, not on Soviet land.

The Soviets ended up fighting a war of attrition because they were attacked at a time when they did not have the equipment, logistics, training or numbers of officers to enact their doctrine. The Germans jumped them while they had their pants around their ankles. The resulting rape of the Red Army wasn't how the Red Army was supposed to fight.

So far as I know, the Soviets only had one plan for how they'd defend themselves if the Germans attacked in 1941 - a desperate counter-attack that would thrust along the Baltic coast and along the foothills of the Carpathians that would penetrate something like 300km behind the 1941 border to bag all the German forces in Poland (this was completely beyond the capability of the Red Army in 1941 - though the Red Army of 1944 would and could do such stunning offensives) and murder the wehrmacht in the resulting cauldron.

And this seems to have been the only plan for if the Germans attacked before the Soviets finished their post-winter war reforms. And the generals and politicians seemed to be very aware that there was zero chance that it could work.

There was no plan to defend the frontier like a giant trench. No plan to fall back and defend on the Stalin line... Units were left to figure it out for themselves what to do when their counter-attacks didn't work.

They certainly weren't intending to sacrifice the better part of a generation of young men to the Nazis.

fasquardon
 
Err. No, it wasn't. The Soviet doctrine was basically the deep battle doctrine (though while Tukachevsky was considered a traitor, it wasn't called that). It was a doctrine that emphasized attack, encircling the enemy formations in massive pincer movements, mechanization and superior weapons, and fighting the enemy on their land, not on Soviet land.

The Soviets ended up fighting a war of attrition because they were attacked at a time when they did not have the equipment, logistics, training or numbers of officers to enact their doctrine. The Germans jumped them while they had their pants around their ankles. The resulting rape of the Red Army wasn't how the Red Army was supposed to fight.

So far as I know, the Soviets only had one plan for how they'd defend themselves if the Germans attacked in 1941 - a desperate counter-attack that would thrust along the Baltic coast and along the foothills of the Carpathians that would penetrate something like 300km behind the 1941 border to bag all the German forces in Poland (this was completely beyond the capability of the Red Army in 1941 - though the Red Army of 1944 would and could do such stunning offensives) and murder the wehrmacht in the resulting cauldron.

And this seems to have been the only plan for if the Germans attacked before the Soviets finished their post-winter war reforms. And the generals and politicians seemed to be very aware that there was zero chance that it could work.

There was no plan to defend the frontier like a giant trench. No plan to fall back and defend on the Stalin line... Units were left to figure it out for themselves what to do when their counter-attacks didn't work.

They certainly weren't intending to sacrifice the better part of a generation of young men to the Nazis.

fasquardon
No army likes to be on the receiving end of a slaughter for the beginning of a war but there was no real plan on how to repulse the Germans due to how far the Germans were advancing, and the Soviets were even able to put up a fight with active units in areas they weren't overwhelmed at. The real problem comes from the fact that there simply wasn't enough men, materials, and equipment to be used in the fight against the German forces during the early stages of the war in order to engage the Germans with their preferred fighting terms.
However, the Soviet High Command expected mobilization to be faster than it was but the problems mounted due to post-Purge leadership difficulties and the fact that resources were tied down in the evacuation of industrial necessities and specialized personnel.
The Soviets never wanted to yield an inch but their military structure, logistical situation, and lack of a real grand battle plan basically left them on the rope with the only actual course of action being suggested from unit commanders being: There's more land behind us, we can regroup with our reinforcements if we fall back. Its really the only rational thing to do when the enemy seeks to overwhelm you in a series of offensives in the center and attempts to envelop you in the South while you lack the necessary equipment to defend against their tanks.
However, I totally agree with the aspect that this form of attritional/withdrawal warfare was forced upon the Soviet Army but it was somewhat planned for by Soviet Commanders and was even a fallback option in Soviet Officer Academies. The only reason most commanders and politicans went with it was basically due to a lack of any real alternatives to stop the German advance due to the German advance overrunning several mobilization points. The plan was to not be beat back 300 kilometers but to rather mobilize vast amounts of reserves in order to establish a solid front line in which they would have held in order to mobilize massive amounts of their industrial capacity towards wartime production. The only problem is when reality meets a plan, that reality will always win.

PS: The best description I was ever given of Operation Barbarossa for the Soviets was from the diary of a Soviet Officer who described the situation as "Futile, relentless, unforgiving. There are no allies beside me, only land behind me, and enemies in front of me." or something very similar (I read the record about 4 months back from a series of various documents that I was sorting at a local Uni).
 
These elements can easily explain why the Soviet Union WOULD NOT sign any form of peace agreement with Germany.

Add to your list it would lose the UK as an ally and soon the US. The USSR would be very alone if it did make a treaty with Germany.
 
I doubt that Stalin considered the UK (and USA) "allies". whatever they called each other. Co-belligerents at best. Other than a desire to beat the Nazis, they had zero interests in common - yes the US/UK/France etc were not on the same page with everything but they had many mutual interests. If Stalin felt the only way for a communist USSR to survive (which includes him staying in power) was to come to an agreement with Germany, he would do so in a heart beat and f*ck all the UK/US etc. The Germans end up killing/enslaving most of the population in areas ceded to them, it is a sacrifice necessary to preserve communism.

Stalin will be happy to take what he can and rebuild as best possible while the Germans and the Western Allies batter each other. Don't forget the historical dialectic is on the side of communism, so making sure the USSR survives in some form is important. When the dust settles elsewhere, sure there will eventually be another round between the USSR and the capitalists/fascists, but you have to survive until then. Using the model of Brest-Litovsk, Lenin made that deal to save communism, and also when the Germans ended up losing the USSR got most of that back - so that can happen again.

Do note that all of the above is if things look/are so bleak it is cut a deal now, or be really curb stomped and have a complete diktat.
 
Add to your list it would lose the UK as an ally and soon the US. The USSR would be very alone if it did make a treaty with Germany.

But in 1941 and early 1942 it was a rather tenuous alliance. The British were convinced the Soviets would collapse like the French and were sending aid so they could kill more Germans before their inevitable collapse. The Soviet victories in December 1941 changed the assumption that the Soviets would collapse easily, but there was still alot of hatred, fear and mistrust on both sides. It's not until 1943 and 1944 that some degree of affection starts to build between Britain and the Soviets. And by that point, Stalin knew he could win.

So in the critical period, there wasn't really an alliance to lose. The Soviets would be trading an untrustworthy "friend" for actual peace.

fasquardon
 
But in 1941 and early 1942 it was a rather tenuous alliance. The British were convinced the Soviets would collapse like the French and were sending aid so they could kill more Germans before their inevitable collapse. The Soviet victories in December 1941 changed the assumption that the Soviets would collapse easily, but there was still alot of hatred, fear and mistrust on both sides. It's not until 1943 and 1944 that some degree of affection starts to build between Britain and the Soviets. And by that point, Stalin knew he could win.

So in the critical period, there wasn't really an alliance to lose. The Soviets would be trading an untrustworthy "friend" for actual peace.

fasquardon
I think that perfectly describes the relationship of the British and the Soviets. However, my only real objection is to the underlined phrase. The Soviets never wanted to give up hope of victory and believed victory was inevitable if given the time. But yeah, perfect brief description of UK-USSR relations during WW2.
 
I'm not exactly sure what you mean by that, so I'm sorry ahead of time for any miscommunication. The Soviet Union's ideology of warfare was effectively attempting to allow the German Armed Forces to proceed into their country in order to engage in a war of attrition with them. However, the losses taken by the Soviets in 1941 and early 1942 beat some of the worst expectations by most Soviet Commanders and proved to be one of the causes for low morale. Moreover, these losses lost massive amounts of food production and manpower for the Soviet Union which was originally expected by German Commanders to weaken Soviet resolve. However, the result was actually a formation of unified national cause and the sudden influx of Soviet volunteers that wanted more food due to the sudden increase of rationing due to the loss of their main food production. There's also the matter of fanatical Soviet commanders that were unwilling to not accept surrender and the fact that Stalin was quite willing to face this war until the end.
The combination of these factors pretty much illustrate that the people had no real control for pushing for peace, with the government and military quite determined in continuing this war for as long as possible for the hope of victory due to Russian/Soviet Doctrine of the time.

Your description of the Russia strategic doctrine/plan which points to only one conclusion. No plan ever 'survives first contact' and maybe without the role of the individual- it could become a self fulfilling prophecy. But human participation always can twist these things out of control - so you can end up being forced to do what you enemy wants instead.
 
That would be a great help, thanks, I tried to have a look through it there but it's restricted. I can see the references but I can't see what they, well, refer to. Its not just the Pavel Sudoplatov account again is it?

Bellamy references two sources when talking about Stalin's schedule during Khrushchev's "10 days". One is Stalin's appointment book, in the FSB archives. The other is Pavel Sudoplatov's memoirs.

fasquardon
 
I imagine after any Brest-Litovsk style peace , There a good chance for a second great purge as Stalin would be worried about being overthrown after losing so much land.
 
Bellamy references two sources when talking about Stalin's schedule during Khrushchev's "10 days". One is Stalin's appointment book, in the FSB archives. The other is Pavel Sudoplatov's memoirs.

fasquardon

That's what I feared when I saw Sudoplatov's memoirs were listed as a source, everything that relates to a Soviet peace offer always seems to come back to that very unreliable narrator.
 
I imagine after any Brest-Litovsk style peace , There a good chance for a second great purge as Stalin would be worried about being overthrown after losing so much land.

He would also be looking for any decent military or industrial expert he could get.
 
I believe there is a misunderstanding about the Soviet Union's industry, its system of mobilization, and its form of warfare during a state of war.

Oh there are so many misunderstandings.

The first one is that Barbarossa does not 'fail' what it said on the tin. It destroys the Red army in a series of concentric attacks within 600km of the frontier.


Incidentally that sentence is virtually the entire text of phase 1 of Barbarossa everything else, Moscow, Stop lines, genocide is based on that having happened.


Problem ofc is the other 75% of the Red Army but the Germans know nothing about this until about 1960. What they see is the opportunity to destroy a weak USSR and take it.


After phase 1 from the perspective of the key decision maker in the contemporary writing at OKH/OKW/OKL, every army group, Army and panzer group commander every luftflotte commander ( but not so much from Infantry corps and lower commanders and a mixed view of panzer division commanders) the situation is clear.

The Wehrmacht is in the process of pursuing a routed enemy and it is utter nonsense to stop, allow the racial enemy to rest, refit and come back at you.

This goes to the extent of both Bock and Reichenau, during Typhoon, proposing dismounting panzer formations to retain mobility during poor weather and capturing Moscow with a Regimental sized light infantry KG. These are serious proposals.

Stalin and Stavka have by then a very clear idea of the reinforcement rate they can expect and see no need to stop the war cos the nazis are winning.

As to specifics. Stalins state of mind in the first 10 days or so of Barbarossa are irrelevant. The whole point of the way the Germans were fighting was to render the enemy C3I inoperable normally be reason of the speed of the advance and make any attempt to counter it irrelevant. So local formations will respond according to pre planned moves without higher direction because the higher direction cannot get relevant information. Which is what happened with the complications that the forces that could do the most good are part trained with insufficient vehicles, ammo, fuel and leadership facing an enemy with complete command of the air and knowledge of the situation.


As to Soviet operational thought. Its complex but for these purposes the key guy is probably Isserson looking at the full depth of mobilisation and the inability of any army to achieve decisive results quickly – the Germans think that can be done, the Russians have a completely different world view.
 
I imagine after any Brest-Litovsk style peace , There a good chance for a second great purge as Stalin would be worried about being overthrown after losing so much land.

I'm not sure. The Soviets were carrying out maybe their greatest purge during WW2.

I've seen people argue that the great purge didn't in fact end until after Stalin died.

However, I've not read deeply into this subject, so I don't have an opinion on this myself. Just wanted to point out that maybe peace would cause a negligible change in this area.

That's what I feared when I saw Sudoplatov's memoirs were listed as a source, everything that relates to a Soviet peace offer always seems to come back to that very unreliable narrator.

I know, Sudoplatov comes across as such a reliable guy doesn't he?

However, Khrushchev has also been revealed to be very willing to play fast and loose with the truth. So if our only sources were Khrushchev and Sudoplatov, I'd say we were better off flipping a coin to determine what to believe. But given the Soviet meticulousness for bureaucracy, if Stalin's appointment book said he was meeting with people at a certain hour on June 22nd, I'm inclined to believe it. Another thing that makes me inclined to believe Stalin was working through the first 10 days of the invasion is we know for absolute certain that key decisions were made - like the decision made on June 24th to evacuate industries behind the Urals - something I just can't imagine Stalin not being involved in.

Of course, against that weight of evidence, we need to be wary about exactly how sources in former Soviet archives are accessed - after the initial wild-west days when Russian-speaking historians could just go into the archives and look at files for themselves the FSB has come up with a great trick where some former FSB man is given access to the archives, writes down some notes, then meets up with a historian and co-writes a book with him. And of course, we have no way to verify whether these reliable former FSB men (who are selected by serving FSB men) are being very selective in their sources or just making things up. Add to that, we've only seen the very tippy tip of the ice bergs of the Soviet archives, so there is the risk of drawing incorrect conclusions based on insufficient data points making misleading trend lines seem plausible.

So at the end of the day, we have a bunch of sources that we can raise serious questions about. But since big decisions were getting made, I am inclined to believe the sources that say that Stalin did not break down.

fasquardon
 
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