A larger audacious class carrier

Sure but any time the building of CV01 & 02 were discussed a number of cruisers were also planned...by the 1970s this shifted to DDG , but the battle group has to be taken in account. In Pugh THE COST OF SEA POWER he notes the 1970 fleet as being two large carriers and two small-helicopter carriers plus 2 LPD, that left enough to operate 27 U-Boat + 6 DDG & 59 DD/FF.

After a DDG & 6 escorts per Carrier/Amphib , that leaves only 23 frigates for convoy escorts.

IIUC while there was talk about escort cruisers and the like the concrete plans were for 2 CVAs and 4 T82 DLGs, I don't think big helicopter-cruisers were factored into the inflated costs in the political wrangling that lead to the cancellation of the CVAs.

I think its important to keep in mind that the RAF operated the aircraft that the CVA01 and 02 would have used, so its not like the money has to be totally plucked from mid-air.

Also, I don't think that by 1970 convoy escort would be like the WW2 Atlantic convoys; constant shipping keeping Britain supplied with food and raw materials so she can fight a long war. It would be more like the Malta convoys; big naval operations to reinforce Europe from US and Canada, so there would be a smaller requirement for huge numbers of ASW escorts and a larger requirement for powerful covering forces.
 
For my own clarification, the Audacious class is largely the RN's analogue of the Essex class right, but taking RN practice and experience into account, whilst the Malta wasn't quite in the Midway's territory, it would have been close in terms of airgroup etc.
 
For my own clarification, the Audacious class is largely the RN's analogue of the Essex class right, but taking RN practice and experience into account, whilst the Malta wasn't quite in the Midway's territory, it would have been close in terms of airgroup etc.

They don't really fit into a direct comparison with US carrier classes. I'd say the Implacable class is the Essex analogue given they were to take advantage of the 'escalator clause' in the 2nd London Naval Treaty. In terms of time the Audacious are analogues of the Midways, and with their bigger air groups are closer to the Midways than earlier carriers but are still the armoured hangar design. The Malta design was a break from this practice, embracing an open hangar and the ability to 'pulse' almost all of its CAG in a single strike, unlike the armoured carriers.
 
Malta was to be about 2 metres narrower and 25 metres shorter then the midway class (as designed). They would have been roughly around the same displacement and had similar installed power.
 
1933

The RN gets back control of the RNAS from the RAF . The admiralty immediately put plans into play. They contact the fairey aviation company about building a new fighter and a new torpedo-bomber-recon planes.

At the same time the plans for a dedicated carrier build is put to tender. Cammel laird in Liverpool gets the contact to build three 25 000 tonne aircraft carriers capable of carrying up to 65 aircraft in one large hanger .

Sounds quite possible :)
 
IIUC while there was talk about escort cruisers and the like the concrete plans were for 2 CVAs and 4 T82 DLGs, I don't think big helicopter-cruisers were factored into the inflated costs in the political wrangling that lead to the cancellation of the CVAs.

I think its important to keep in mind that the RAF operated the aircraft that the CVA01 and 02 would have used, so its not like the money has to be totally plucked from mid-air.

Also, I don't think that by 1970 convoy escort would be like the WW2 Atlantic convoys; constant shipping keeping Britain supplied with food and raw materials so she can fight a long war. It would be more like the Malta convoys; big naval operations to reinforce Europe from US and Canada, so there would be a smaller requirement for huge numbers of ASW escorts and a larger requirement for powerful covering forces.


This sounds OK but what about the Commando Carriers and there escorts? If they are going up against Norway/Denmark , with SU anti shipping squadrons not far away. With out DDG/CG they will be vulnerable. While the convoy's may well work out like Malta, but then again - it might not.
 
This sounds OK but what about the Commando Carriers and there escorts? If they are going up against Norway/Denmark , with SU anti shipping squadrons not far away. With out DDG/CG they will be vulnerable. While the convoy's may well work out like Malta, but then again - it might not.

In a WW3 scenario the Commando Task Force reinforcing Norway would be covered by the RN carriers of NATO strike fleet Strike Group 2 (or maybe the USN carriers of SG1) and closely escorted by the 2 or 3 DLGs not assigned to SG2 and whatever frigate squadron is assigned to the operation.

For reference here is the composition of the RN in 1972, the first year of the post withdrawal East of Suez re-org.

THE FLEET 1972
FOCAS

Ark Royal Albion 11.72 p/o Bulwark Fearless Intrepid 1.72-DTS

First Flotilla
Blake-11.72 Antrim Kent Norfolk
Second Flotilla
Tiger 5.72- Devonshire Fife Glamorgan

1st Frigate Squadron
Charybdis [L]
Bacchante
Berwick
Euryalus
Puma
Whitby Hermione [L]
Ashanti
Falmouth
Jaguar
Leopard
Minerva

2nd Frigate Squadron
Undaunted [L]
Dundas
Exmouth
Hardy
Palliser
Russell
Penelope [trials]
Grenville [trials]
Ulster [tg]
4.72-Torquay [tg] Andromeda [L]
Jupiter
Plymouth
Rhyl
Mohawk
Lynx
2.72-Apollo

3rd Frigate Squadron
Diomede [L]
Londonderry-9.72
Lowestoft
Rothesay
Scylla [L]
Argonaut
Gurkha
Nubian
Zulu
Yarmouth
Salisbury
Keppel -10.72

4th Frigate Squadron
Juno [L]
Aurora
Dido-9.72
Phoebe
Brighton
Lincoln
Cavalier -7.72
10.72-Sirius Arethusa [L]
Achilles
Cleopatra
Danae-8.72
Leander
Sirius-10.72

5th Frigate Squadron
Hermione [L]
Ashanti
Falmouth
Jaguar
Leopard
Minerva

6th Frigate Squadron
Andromeda [L]
Jupiter
Plymouth
Rhyl
Mohawk
Lynx
2.72-Apollo

7th Frigate Squadron 2.72-
Scylla [L]
Argonaut
Gurkha
Nubian
Zulu
Yarmouth
Salisbury
Keppel -10.72 8.72-Danae


8th Frigate Squadron .72-
Arethusa [L]
Achilles
Cleopatra
Danae-8.72
Leander
Sirius-10.72

DEPLOYMENTS 1972

Far East
Jaguar-5.72
Falmouth-7.72
1.72-Rothesay-9.72
2.72-Diomede-10.72
2.72-Londonderry-9.72
4.72-Lowestoft -11.72
4.72-Yarmourh-11.72
6.72-Devonshire -1.73
6.72-Euryalus-11.72
6.72-Lincoln
7.72-Whitby
9.72-Andromeda
9.72-Lynx
11.72-Brigthon
11.72-Mohawk
Hong Kong
7.72-Chichester

West Indies
Phoebe-8.72
Lowestoft -6.72
8.72-Gurkha -12.72
8.72-Minerva
8.72-Plymouth
12.72-Sirius
Nato
1.72-Aurora
7.72-Norfolk -1.73

SHIPS IN REFIT

Devonport
Hermes (part of FOCAS)
Tiger-5.72
Galatea
Naiad 7.72-
Portsmouth
Blake 11.72-
Kent-12.72
London 12.72-
Hampshire
Chatham
Eskimo
Aurora 10.72-
Rosyth
Tartar 1.72-
Zulu 8.72-
 
1933

The RN gets back control of the RNAS from the RAF . The admiralty immediately put plans into play. They contact the fairey aviation company about building a new fighter and a new torpedo-bomber-recon planes.

At the same time the plans for a dedicated carrier build is put to tender. Cammel laird in Liverpool gets the contact to build three 25 000 tonne aircraft carriers capable of carrying up to 65 aircraft in one large hanger .
How is the Admiralty going to pay for 3 x 25,000 ton aircraft carriers? OTL HM Treasury provided the money for 1 x 22,000 ton ship, which became the Ark Royal.

Plus the 135,000 ton quota is still in force (if that has not already been mentioned) and 3 x 25,000 = 75,000 tons, which leaves 60,000 tons, but the Three Follies consume about 67,000 tons.

OTL the plan in circa 1924 was to scrap Argus, Eagle, Hermes and Vindictive (which was permitted by the WNT) which would allow the construction of four 17,000 ton aircraft carriers to be completed 1928-38 IIRC with The Three Follies would make a force of 7 aircraft carriers.

IIRC from Friedman the Admiralty's actual plan in the early 1930s the Admiralty wanted to have the aircraft carrier quota reduced to 110,000 tons, which would allow a fleet of five 22,000 ton aircraft carriers of the Ark Royal type.
 
Sounds quite possible :)
The unfortunate reality is that it's rather implausible.

IMHO the RAF and to a lesser extent HM Treasury are scapegoats for the poor state of British naval aviation in 1939.

The real villain of the peace if there was one was the First World War. This created the huge National Debt that required the spending of huge sums to pay the interest on it. It also created a backlash against military spending by the British electorate. The OTL politicians were only implementing the policies that would get them elected. The economic slump of the 1920s and then the Great Depression of the 1930s didn't help either.

Admiralty control of British naval aviation between 1918 and 1937 isn't what was really needed. What was really needed was a British electorate that was in favour of more military spending and less social spending. A stronger British economy between the wars would also have been helpful.
 
The unfortunate reality is that it's rather implausible.

IMHO the RAF and to a lesser extent HM Treasury are scapegoats for the poor state of British naval aviation in 1939.

The real villain of the peace if there was one was the First World War. This created the huge National Debt that required the spending of huge sums to pay the interest on it. It also created a backlash against military spending by the British electorate. The OTL politicians were only implementing the policies that would get them elected. The economic slump of the 1920s and then the Great Depression of the 1930s didn't help either.

Admiralty control of British naval aviation between 1918 and 1937 isn't what was really needed. What was really needed was a British electorate that was in favour of more military spending and less social spending. A stronger British economy between the wars would also have been helpful.

Sure, but that doesn't explain away the bad thinking of the period, where the Albacore was introduced in 1940 when the USN and IJN had monoplanes in service years earlier or the 2 seat Fulmar in the era of the Wildcat and Zero. Better institutions and systems will lead to better results within the existing financial and political limitations.
 
Sure, but that doesn't explain away the bad thinking of the period, where the Albacore was introduced in 1940 when the USN and IJN had monoplanes in service years earlier or the 2 seat Fulmar in the era of the Wildcat and Zero. Better institutions and systems will lead to better results within the existing financial and political limitations.
There was method in the madness.

The Swordfish and Albacore were not biplanes because naval aviation was part of the RAF between 1918 and 1939. They were biplanes because they needed good STOL characteristics because Argus, Eagle and Hermes were slow and because of their short flight decks. If the Admiralty had been able to scrap them and build four new ships as planned the Swordfish and Albacore would have been monoplanes.

Furthermore the 6 aircraft carriers that existed in the early 1930s could accommodate fewer aircraft than the Admiralty wanted for the fleet. Therefore it planned to make up the numbers with aeroplanes operating from flying off platforms fitted to capital ships and cruisers. This reinforced the need for aircraft with good STOL characteristics. Again if the Admiralty had been able to scrap Argus, Eagle and Hermes and build 4 new ships this measure would not have been necessary.

The poor performance of the Barracuda was partially due to the high lift devices that weighed it down (because good STOL characteristics were still necessary), partially due to being a torpedo bomber and a dive bomber (to make the most of the limited hangar space available) and partially due to the version with Merlin engines being under powered.

The problems with the Fulmar weren't due to the observer/navigator they were due to the range requirement and being underpowered. When the Fulmar's replacement the Firefly was developed the single seat Blackburn Firebrand was developed to the same specification to prove that the second crewman was not the cause of the disappointing performance.
 
Sure, but that doesn't explain away the bad thinking of the period, where the Albacore was introduced in 1940 when the USN and IJN had monoplanes in service years earlier or the 2 seat Fulmar in the era of the Wildcat and Zero. Better institutions and systems will lead to better results within the existing financial and political limitations.
What explains that was that the American and Japanese aircraft carriers were newer, larger, faster and had longer flight decks.

The American monoplane torpedo bomber that had been in service for several years was the Douglas TBD Devastator. Though some of that can be put down to its 850hp engine. If it had remained in production into 1942 the aircraft at Midway would have had engines in the 1,100 to 1,200hp class.

Also the American monoplane fighter that had been in service for several years was the Brewster Buffalo.
 
144 million pounds for carriers ,LPD , DDG & CS. The 54 FRIGATES should be 178 million pounds ,leaving just barely enough for SSN/SSBN/SS, on patrol. However the escorts included count 80+ so not sure were they get the extra ships /funding?

Fleet numbers only cover if EVERY ESCORT SAILS. http://navypedia.org/retro_view/1970/uk_1970.htm had 76 frigates and escorts. If you include minesweeping fleet this can swell to 177. But that means the entire fleet deployed...No reserves..

http://navypedia.org/retro_view/1975/uk_1975.htm had 86 frigates and escorts, and that's 152 if you include the minesweeping fleet.
 
The unfortunate reality is that it's rather implausible.

IMHO the RAF and to a lesser extent HM Treasury are scapegoats for the poor state of British naval aviation in 1939.

The real villain of the peace if there was one was the First World War. This created the huge National Debt that required the spending of huge sums to pay the interest on it. It also created a backlash against military spending by the British electorate. The OTL politicians were only implementing the policies that would get them elected. The economic slump of the 1920s and then the Great Depression of the 1930s didn't help either.

Admiralty control of British naval aviation between 1918 and 1937 isn't what was really needed. What was really needed was a British electorate that was in favour of more military spending and less social spending. A stronger British economy between the wars would also have been helpful.

No, actually it really isnt.

The FAA could have had far more effective planes for LESS cost than OTL, if the AM could have been bombed early..
As to carriers, they weer building quite a few. They could have built additional light carriers, or designed the carriers to take more planes, but as the AM refused to deliver even the pitiful number promised, there wasnt much point.

Cost wasnt the issue, really.
 
No, actually it really isnt.

The FAA could have had far more effective planes for LESS cost than OTL, if the AM could have been bombed early..
As to carriers, they weer building quite a few. They could have built additional light carriers, or designed the carriers to take more planes, but as the AM refused to deliver even the pitiful number promised, there wasnt much point.

Cost wasnt the issue, really.
Please provide some documented examples of the RAF refusing to provide aircraft that they had promised.
 
Cost wasnt the issue, really.
IMHO cost really was an issue in the completion date of the RAF's 52-Squadrons scheme of 1923 being put back several times from the original date of March 1928 to March 1938. Only 39 squadron (75%) actually existed in March 1934 with a total of 448 aircraft instead of the planned 594. The most glaring gap was night bombers (which were the most expensive) with only 80 in 8 squadrons instead of 150 in 15 squadrons.

Meanwhile the capacity of the aircraft carriers and catapult equipped capital ships and cruisers was 213 aircraft IIRC. However, the establishment of the 12 squadrons and 6 flights in the FAA at the end of March 1934 was 159 or 162 depending upon the source or 75-76% of what the FAA's strength should have been.

It looks very much like equal misery to me.

RAF Squadrons at 31st March 1934.png


Notes
  1. I have counted the bomber-transport flight in India as half a squadron.
  2. I have counted the 6 FAA catapult flights as 3 squadrons.
  3. I haven't included No. 24 (Communications) Squadron.
  4. I haven't included the 2 day bomber squadrons attached to the A&AEE because they only existed on a skeleton basis.
 
If the FFA belonged to the RN from 1923 would they have asked for the same planes in the same numbers in the mid 30s? Was the RN asking for few aircraft because they were used to being at the bottom of the RAF priority list for 20 years, and the FAA was a career dead end so there were few senior officers willing to push the issue?

If the FAA was back within the RN from 1923, it wouldn't be asking the RAF to provide it with planes, it would be taking a slice from the escorts, destroyers, minesweepers, cruisers and battleships budget. By 1937 this budget allocation will be fought for by Commodore and Rear Admirals who were CAG Commanders and Air Station Captains back in 1923.
 
Can we get back on topic? Would skipping the implacable class carriers and go to the audacious class carriers be possible in 1939 launched in 42 commissioned in late 42 early 43?
 
Can we get back on topic? Would skipping the implacable class carriers and go to the audacious class carriers be possible in 1939 launched in 42 commissioned in late 42 early 43?

I'd say no, both a) because of wartime experience needed to drive the bigger designs and b) at that timeframe I can't see how they get into service that quickly. Even assuming such a design is laid down in mid '39, it would still be paused for construction that could be finished quickly once war started, then there's impact of any "invasion scare" and the other demands (escorts/convoys hulls). I mean Victorious and Indomitable were laid in '37 and weren't in commission till '41. You won't get the Admiralty jumping to a design like Audacious in '39 and getting it built that quickly.
 
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