A House United? A Douglas Wins TL

Post #8


The first formal response to Abraham Lincoln's election was given by that of the outgoing President, the now rather battered Stephen A. Douglas. Despite his political reversals however, his aggressive stance was not diminished. Speaking at a public event in Washington DC just days after the election Douglas spoke on the topic saying “if the Southern States (not a part but all) shall secede from the Union, upon the inauguration of Abraham Lincoln, it will be the duty of the President of the United States, who, in the case supposed, will be Lincoln, by arms to punish or subdue them.” He continued, even more bluntly to add, “ Yes my friends, I would hang every man higher then Haman who would attempt by force to resist the execution of any provision which our fathers made and bequeathed to us.”


These strong words were not merely empty bluster. Throughout the election Douglas had been preparing for any Southern moves toward secession with an eye to military force if required. He was greatly helped in this by his Secretary of War, Andrew Johnson. While Johnson found the Republicans 'strident and counterproductive' he was a unionist to the core and found the entire concept of southern insurrection abominable. To this end he had, all through 1860, been slowly preparing to protect Federal properties throughout the South. While defending every post office or custom house was impossible, Johnson made a determined effort to at least attempt to defend the forts, armories and other major military installations. In order to manage this, Johnson gave John E. Wool, the commander of the Department of the East, carte blanche in both repairing and preparing the various fortifications and outposts. Wool, although over seventy years old, was a determined and capable organizer who gave his all to the imposing task. Setting his command center not in DC but in Fort Monroe Virginia, Wool quickly began a crash course of re-vitalization of the various coastal defense systems throughout the South, with an eye to defending them from local rebels.


The aged but formidable Commander of the East, John E. Wool

Some were written off immediately either due to disrepair (such as Fort Gaines in Alabama) or due to being indefensible from land attacks (Fort Moultrie in South Carolina). In these cases and a few of the more exposed Federal armories, Wool stripped them of armaments and supplies, pulling everything back to defensible locations such as Fort Macon in North Carolina or the as yet unfinished Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor. Wool hoped that by depriving the secessionists with easy targets, he could dissuade them from action as well as preventing them from plundering Federal military stores. In other places he dramatically increased the number of soldiers, often pulling men out of Northern bases to send south. For example Fort Pulsaki at the mouth of the Savannah river was of critical importance but was manned by a mere two caretakers in the summer of 1860. Wool quickly rectified this, and other cases of lapsed protections throughout the South.

Southern politicians railed against these actions but could do little about it, at least legally. It was well within the rights of the Army to move troops and disposition them as the President and various commanders saw fit. The fire-eaters could rail about a tightening Northern noose all they liked, it was clear that every newly manned fort, every new cannon was a blow to any Southern hope of separation. This muscular response pushed many extremists into direct action.

Already faced with the doomsday scenario of a Republican president and now increasingly encircled by troops intent on forcing through whatever evil designs were cooked up by the Federal government, the time for action seemed to have arrived. In a number of Southern states extremists pressed the state governments to unilaterally declare secession, promising other states would follow. However with Federal troops prepared and Douglas showing no signs of backing down, no state wanted to be the first to stick their neck out. In South Carolina in particular the memory of the Nullification Crisis, where the Palmetto State had stood alone, was still fresh. Even in pro-secession Mississippi, governor John Petrus feared to “move alone”. Finally, stymied by inaction the fire eaters pushed for a new tactic. A general Southern Convention to discuss, debate and (hopefully) vote on secession.

It was not a new tactic. In 1850, at the behest of secessionist John C. Calhoun, had gathered in Nashville to discuss a proper response to the Wilmot Proviso, a proposed ban on slavery in the new Western territories. It had been a heated but ramshackle affair that had ended with no action being taken. The 1860 Convention appeared to be on quite another scale altogether. Hosted in Birmingham in late December, secessionists wrote to allies in every Southern state urging them to bring delegations, so the entire South “may be represented and heard”. The response, at least in terms of attendance, surpassed their wildest dreams. Well over four hundred delegates arrived from all over the South. Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Florida, and Tennessee all sent official delegations while the border states of Maryland, Delaware, Arkansas, Kentucky and Missouri sent unofficial representatives. Uniquely, from Texas, came the sitting Governor, the Unionist Sam Houston.

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Birmingham Alabama 1860, one of the few cities in the Deep South and host to the Southern Convention


The gathering crowd of southerners was divided into several competing factions, all with different aims, tactics and overriding goals. The loudest were, of course, the secessionists, those fire-eaters who pushed relentless for a full division from the Union. Having waited in the fringes of Southern politics for years, and in some cases decades, they saw in the election of a Republican President both their worst nightmare and greatest opportunity. To men like William Yancey or Edmund Ruffin, the South was surrounded by foes who were looking to attack their very way of life and the only acceptable response was immediate, unilateral withdrawal from the Union to protect both slavery and themselves from unwanted abolitionist sentiment and activities. Anything less then this extreme action was completely unsuitable.


A much larger group were the co-called Cooperationists. These men made up a wide swath of opinions about the impending crisis and the best reaction to it. Some of them held that while secession was inevitable the entire South should do it as a bloc, to best intimidate even President Douglas into backing down into acceptance. Their influence is what had brought about the Birmingham Convention and had so far stopped the ‘Stampeders’, their derisive name for the radical secessionists, who balked at any delay. Esteemed Southerners like Stephen Toombs or even former presidential candidate Breckenridge claimed that a united south leaving on ‘good terms’ might avoid a bloody civil war that the South could very well lose. Prudence and consideration for national opinion, as well as unamity among the slave owning states was the best path forward. Another bloc held that secession would only be valid if the actual people of the South were consulted, through referendums. While such democratic ideals were virtually nonexistent among the planter elite of the coastal slave states, they were widely held by upper South representatives. In addition, many of them felt that a true plebiscite on the issue would silence Northern cries that a ‘Slave Power’ was recklessly pressing a mass of southern whites into a war no one wanted. What better way to cement their cause then a direct appeal to the people?


Lastly there were the Unionists, who felt that compromise with the North was still possible, and that slavery, among other things, could still be protected and defend against a Republican Federal government. Secession was an unacceptable breach of the Constitution and the South best hope was to obtain Constitutional protection of slavery and other such institutions. While the smallest group, many of them were quite steadfast with the irascible Sam Houston, a slave owner and yet passionate Unionist, being their natural leader.


This welter of opinions made the Convention a very divided and fractious affair. At first the fire-eaters controlled the platforms, using their momentum from assembling the Convention, and pushed hard for secession. Every moment, they claimed, merely gave time for the Black Republicans time to further their agenda. The scare tactics were quite successful and the radical fringe seized many of the various committees to promote immediate secession. However, as the New Year came and went, sheer inenteria began to tell, with the Cooperationists arguing for all types of actions ranging from a South wide referendum on secession to a separate Constitutional Convention to formulate southern aims. Meanwhile the Unionists dismissed everything and constantly harragued the pro-secession speakers. Eventually the tension spilled over into actual violence as several Unionist representatives from Kentucky were attacked by a mob outside the doors of the hall. The fight spread into a general riot which eventually had to be quelled by the Birmingham police, who were forced to temporarily barricade the conventioneers inside.

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A northern and exaggerated depiction of the Birmingham Secession Riot

After the disturbance settled down, the fire-eaters pressed and gained a major victory, a motion to dismiss all Unionists and those who would not back secession. The motion passed and the Convention, in a dramatic fashion, named each evicted member as they were forced to leave the chamber. Most left at once, but Houston remained to the end and gave a fiery speech ending with the now famous- "Our people may be going to war to perpetuate slavery, but the war will be its death knell." The stage seemed set for a secessionist victory. They had dominated the Convention, they had removed their opponents and sidelined most of their rivals. However, just as Yancey and his allies reached to seizes final victory a political explosion rocked the Convention, and indeed, the entire nation. For Douglas had not been idle.





As the nation watched in horrid fascination at the Southern Convention, Douglas threw himself into the many last ditch compromises being considered in Congress. Despite later revisionism it is important to not portray the President, at this stage, as a ideological enemy to the concerned Southerners. Indeed, Douglas would be the first to admit the South had legitimate grievances and generally blamed northern abolitionists for the current state of turmoil in the nation. That said, however, he was diametrically opposed to secession in any form, considering it not only a mark of failure against him but a blow to the entire American experiment. It was these twin concepts, of southern legitimacy and hatred of secession, that allowed Douglas to pursue any compromise in pursuit of peace, no matter the makeup.


The concerned president certainly had his choice. In the Congressional session that began in December 1860, more than 200 resolutions with respect to slavery and secession, including 57 resolutions proposing constitutional amendments were proposed. Some of these were elaborate affairs, such as the Crittenden Compromise which contained no less than six proposed amendments to the Constitution and four other congressional resolutions. Others were much simpler and it was one of these that Douglas latched onto in the first weeks of the New Year.

The Corwin Amendment had been written up by Thomas Corwin a Democratic Representative from Ohio. The amendment was quite straightforward and said thus, ‘No amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will authorize or give to Congress the power to abolish or interfere, within any State, with the domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons held to labor or service by the laws of said State.’

This idea, that the Federal government could not ban slavery was hardly a new one. Known as the Federal Consensus, it was subscribed to by everyone from proslavery radicals like John C. Calhoun and abolitionist radicals like William Lloyd Garrison. Still, Corwin’s firm restatement protected slavery in very clear and uncertain terms, and he hoped it would ease Southern minds about Republican domination at the Federal level. Douglas took up the idea and promoted it heavily among Congress. However, his most important move was to arrange a personal meeting with incoming president Lincoln to get the Republicans’ backing. After a long private meeting, much to the radical wing of his party’s outrage, Lincoln agreed to back the Corwin Amendment and made it clear he would sign any such document that made it to his desk.

The announcement landed like a bombshell in Birmingham and fractured the already fragile Southern consensus. In an instant the Cooperationists had their own victory and could point to this extraordinary concession by a Republican president. While an amendment protecting slavery was not all the South needed, it was a substantial start. It was enough to sway the more moderate center away from immediate secession and toward further negotiations with Washington or, to some of them, yet more reasons to hold state-wide votes. Perhaps with this law in place, more citizens would wish to stay? By the end of January, after more then a month of circular arguing and no signs of further progress, several of the more radical state delegations withdraw in disgust causing the entire Convention to collapse. This should not be taken as a sign of pessimism on the part of the radicals however.

Most simply saw it as a failure of method. The south-wide convention had, again, merely been a tool used by the moderates to block secession, a delaying method to curb passions. So they spurned it, and other democratic policies as betrayal of their cause. So they went home, not to lick their wounds, but to act.
 
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So between the Kentucky delegates being attacked and the backing of the corwin amendment is that going to reduce the secessionist supporters there and other border states. If so then that has all sort of interesting repercussions.
 
I can't guess what the border states and Texas will do this time round, but it looks like the deep south is about to throw down the gauntlet and dare Douglas and Lincoln to make them remain in the Union. This is going to get ugly quick. Also....
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Florida, and Tennessee all sent official delegations while the border states of Maryland, Delaware, Arkansas, Kentucky and Missouri sent unofficial representatives.
Louisiana is noticeably absent, either one of the dual Arkansas was supposed to be it or something is afoot down on the bayou. Anywho, an enjoyable update.
 
I can't guess what the border states and Texas will do this time round, but it looks like the deep south is about to throw down the gauntlet and dare Douglas and Lincoln to make them remain in the Union. This is going to get ugly quick. Also....

Louisiana is noticeably absent, either one of the dual Arkansas was supposed to be it or something is afoot down on the bayou. Anywho, an enjoyable update.

I don't have the slightest idea what you are talking about...
 
Just discovered this TL, and enjoying it so far! Very intrigued to see how this brewing crisis and Lincoln’s presidency plays out. #subscribed
 
Re the Corwin Amendment: the President does not sign a proposed constitutional amendment submitted by Congress to the states for ratification.

In any case - the proposed amendment was pointless. A constitutional amendment must be ratified by 3/4 of the states. No anti-slavery amendment would be ratified by the 15 slave states, so no such amendment could be passed until there were at least 60 states. Thus the Corwin Amendment would make impossible de jure something that was impossible de facto.

So it actually conceded nothing.
 
In any case - the proposed amendment was pointless. A constitutional amendment must be ratified by 3/4 of the states. No anti-slavery amendment would be ratified by the 15 slave states, so no such amendment could be passed until there were at least 60 states. Thus the Corwin Amendment would make impossible de jure something that was impossible de facto.


And that's on the assumption that every free state would ratify an antislavery amendment.

This is in fact by no means certain. Many in the North and West would be concerned that, if free to leave their masters, a lot of Blacks might migrate northwards or westwards - which many white folks there would consider undesirable, not wishing to live alongside free Blacks any more than enslaved ones.
 
Re the Corwin Amendment: the President does not sign a proposed constitutional amendment submitted by Congress to the states for ratification.

In any case - the proposed amendment was pointless. A constitutional amendment must be ratified by 3/4 of the states. No anti-slavery amendment would be ratified by the 15 slave states, so no such amendment could be passed until there were at least 60 states. Thus the Corwin Amendment would make impossible de jure something that was impossible de facto.

So it actually conceded nothing.

So? Politics is often about theater and symbolism, even at the very highest levels.
 
Re the Corwin Amendment: the President does not sign a proposed constitutional amendment submitted by Congress to the states for ratification.

In any case - the proposed amendment was pointless. A constitutional amendment must be ratified by 3/4 of the states. No anti-slavery amendment would be ratified by the 15 slave states, so no such amendment could be passed until there were at least 60 states. Thus the Corwin Amendment would make impossible de jure something that was impossible de facto.

So it actually conceded nothing.

Yes, the President is not required but in OTL Buchanan took the step to show he advocated it that strongly and Lincoln said the same. Imagine it as a theoretical flourish, a use of the bully pulpit.

Kentucky passed said Amendment in OTL. It is not so unimaginable that the Border states or and some of the Upper South may be pressured (in various ways) to accept the Amendment.

@Mikestone8 said:
And that's on the assumption that every free state would ratify an antislavery amendment.

This is in fact by no means certain. Many in the North and West would be concerned that, if free to leave their masters, a lot of Blacks might migrate northwards or westwards - which many white folks there would consider undesirable, not wishing to live alongside free Blacks any more than enslaved ones.

The Crowin Amendment keeps blacks firmly planted in the South.
 
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The Crowin Amendment keeps blacks firmly planted in the South.
How does it do that? I understand that they could just easily say in the Amendment "no blacks beyond this point", or something, but blacks could still find a way. Their is such as the Underground Railroad.

Edit: Also, really good TL so far!
 
How does it do that? I understand that they could just easily say in the Amendment "no blacks beyond this point", or something, but blacks could still find a way. Their is such as the Underground Railroad.

Edit: Also, really good TL so far!

The debate about the Fugitive Slave Act will not be pretty.....
 
It began, of course, in South Carolina. The Palmetto State, with the strongest planter elite and the highest ratio of slaves to whites had always been the hotbed of secession. It was the home state of fire eaters from John C. Calhoun who had clashed with Andrew Jackson in the 1830's to William Yancey who had worked so hard to spike Douglas's nomination in 1860. So it was only fitting at the movement to leave the Union officially started in Charleston South Carolina, February 23rd 1861. It was on that day that the returning delegates from Birmingham gathered in a Charleston meeting hall and plotted out the future. The Convention had been a failure, as they had predicted, and had cost the irreplaceable asset of time. The momentum had to be regained that would only happen with action and where better to start then right here? A band marched into Governor Gist's office and demanded a motion for unilateral secession be placed in front of the South Carolina Legislature. Gist, always a dedicated secessionist agreed willingly, happy to bypass any delay. A rump extraordinary Legislature was called together the next week and, under intense pressure from the extremists, voted to secede from the Union. The First Southern Insurrection had begun. Only days later Abraham Lincoln was inaugurated as the sixteenth President of the United States. Instantly the new President declared South Carolina and ‘all those that follow them’ in a state of rebellion and began taking steps to combat secession.

Lincoln's ascension and words seemed to do nothing but spur on the tide of secession in the South. Events played out nearly identically in Florida and Mississippi over the upcoming weeks as extremists delegates forced the pliant governors to agree to extra-legal legislative sessions where secession was nearly unanimously approved. There was little opposition in these radical states where fire-eaters were the actual majority even among the entrenched political elite. The first stumbling blocks were met in Alabama, where the radicals were not nearly so numerous in the capital. The Alabama legislature had already passed a motion the previous year that in the event Lincoln won the election, a special session on secession should be called. While the Birmingham Convention had delayed this, after the breakup of that august body, a special session had indeed convened and was still deliberating as the news from South Carolina, Florida and Mississippi arrived. The Governor Andrew Moore, while very sympathetic to secessionist views, was afraid that a failed rebellion might end with his head in the noose. His worries were confirmed when a hastily raised militia (secretly backed by Moore) had attempted to seize Fort Morgan on the Gulf Coast. Unfortunately for them, Commander Wool had heavily re-enforced the strongpoint, marking it one of the defensible and modern forts he wished to attempt to hold. The fort was too strongly held and the militia fell back in disarray without firing a shot. This show of Federal strength strengthened the Cooperationists hand in the special session, even as it debated secession. When the fire-eaters pushed forward a bill of secession, the bill actually failed as (mostly from moderate northern Alabama) politicians arrived at the last minute and voted it down. Incensed the radicals turned to violence. They assembled a disorderly mob to protest outside the next vote. So it was with screams and threats of violence in the air that on March 16th Alabama voted to leave the United States, although many in northern Alabama considered the vote a non-binding sham and refused to abide by it.


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Fort Morgan, where Alabama militia failed to even attempt to dislodge Federal troops

Two more states came into play quickly, and it was in Georgia and Louisiana the weaknesses of the secessionist position started to become apparent. The first real check on the snowball of secession came in Georgia in April, as the state debated secession. While the Governor Joseph E. Brown was, of course, a strident defender of slavery, he also felt secession was unwise on many levels, not least of which a personal distaste for the radicals themselves. Had not the South gathered together in Convention and found secession wanting? It was the radicals, who had stormed out of the convention, that were jeopardizing Southern unity, not the Cooperationists. Furthermore, whatever the claims of extremists like Yancey or Ruffin might be, clearly Lincoln was willing to compromise somewhat, offering the Corwin Amendment at the very least. Could more perhaps be wrung from the ‘Black Republicans’ to both stave off a bloody war and maintain Southern power inside the system? His views were reinforced by a strong Cooperationist presence in his state by such staunch figures as Alexander Stephens, Herschel Johnson and the towering Robert Toombs who, despite constant wavering, was eventually convinced military victory was impossible for the South over a determined North. Instead of voting for secession Brown and his allies sent an ultimatum to the North, calling for the Federal government to explicitly state support for the Fugitive Slave Act, an allowance of slavery in the western territories and the signing of a Corwin Amendment. Secession was shelved pending further Federal replies and attempts to rally the crowds as in Alabama were quashed by the assembled Georgia militia.


Things went ever worse for the radical’s cause in Louisiana. The state had a radical pro-secessionist governor in Thomas Overton Moore, who quickly called together a secession convention in Baton Rouge in early April. Despite his own personal enthusiasm however, such sentiment was not universal. New Orleans was the largest city, by far, in the South and a major hub of commercial interests, particularly cotton and slave trading. These monied interests were generally opposed to secession, especially as it became clear Abraham Lincoln would be vigorous in his response to Southern extremism. Any war would surely disrupt the trade the city thrived on and the Mississippi was bound to be a corridor of conflict. If they could be convinced the South could leave without a fight, they would be first in line knowing they would economically dominant any southern nation, but as things stood the elites remained opposed. In addition the more rural areas, those with few slaves and distinct cultural backgrounds (namely the Cajuns) opposed the war. So it was when Moore gathered together his convention, secession was narrowly voted down with most delegates proposing a Georgia-like ultimatum to the North to ask for concessions. Moore refused and dissolved the convention, using militia troops to disperse Cooperationist and Unionist delegates. The governor quickly reformed the now pliant body which duly voted for secession by a wide margin. The blatantly illegal move outraged the more moderates who quickly assembled their own rival militias, based around New Orleans or deep in the swamps. While Moore had greater support and numbers, both sides were loath to begin true violence although numerous small skirmishes were fought. Another side effect of the stalemate was that most Federal positions remained unchallenged leaving large areas still under effective Federal control. Both sides called for outside help as Moore asked seceded Mississippi for troops while the New Orleans elites intrigued with Washington DC. On an even greater scale then Alabama, secession had brought violence to the South, not liberty and freedom.

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Thomas Overton Moore, the radical secessionist governor of Louisiana

While the secession ripple effect headed north into the Upper South, things were already moving fast , out of the realm of ballots and conventions and into those of the bullet and blood. The states that had declared themselves independent gathered militia (or commanded already assembled troops) to seize Federal stores of weapons and fortifications. As noted above, militia in various states had already been attempting to take over abandoned forts with outnumbered Federal troops giving way. Indeed, in South Carolina, troops had taken over Fort Moultrie and Castle Pickney (both abandoned as indefensible by Commander Wool) during the Birmingham Convention, assuming secession was coming. Federal troops had withdrawn to the island fortress of Fort Sumter, nearly unassailable and well supplied. In days it was the only Federal held territory in South Carolina. After the official votes in other states, such seizures were stepped up throughout the South. It was only a matter of time to the first real, deadly violence broke out between radical militia and Federal troops.

This happened first not in Charleston, where Federal troops were cordoned off by water but in nearly equally radical Florida at Fort Barrancas and Fort Pickens, near Pensacola. After the state declared secession, local militia rushed to the forts, knowing how vital such strongpoints were to defending the extensive and vulnerable coastline. Fort Barrancas was an old Spanish era fort which had been extensively remodeled in the previous decades by slave labor. While it had been re-enforced and selected by Wool as 'defensible' it was in reality far too vulnerable to landward attack. Neighboring Fort Pickens, situated on a long spit of swampy land was far more inaccessible and modern. Still the Northern commander, Adam Slemmer was determined to at least make the southern militia work for his position. The first attack on April 2nd was thrown back after Federal troops killed three militia men, the first official casualties of the uprising caused by Federal troops. Despite his temporary victory Slemmer knew he couldn't hold the aged, landlocked fort, so under the cover of night, he withdrew to Fort Pickens where he was nearly impossible for the poorly armed militia to dislodge.


This rather anticlimactic start was quickly overshadowed by events in Charleston as the South Carolina militia began a determined effort to take Fort Sumter. The modern island fort dominated the harbor and was far too dangerous for the secessionists to ignore. The assembled what cannon they had, mostly stolen from the Military College of South Carolina and began shelling it. The South Carolinan forces, under former governor turned general Milledge Luke Bonham, caused great damage at first. However the Federal troops, well protected and supplied, began to reply in kind. Indeed the better trained Federal troops drove off the secessionist batteries a number of times, being far more accurate. Still, the situation was perilous for the fort and it was extremely exposed to enemy fire. The United States Navy, at Lincoln’s urging sent a relief force which arrived several days into the siege. The ships returned fire at the land batteries, forcing the militia to temporarily draw back. Re-enforced, Federal troops did their best to repair the damage and prepare for further bombardment. After a final salvo the naval detachment broke off, concerned renewed secessionist shelling might be impossible to deter. Little did they know that Bonham’s forces suffered not only from poor training and inexperienced with heavy cannons but also lacked supplies. Knowing secession was looming Federal troops had left very little powder or ammunition behind and this lack crimped Bonham’s options. While the barrage of Fort Sumter was renewed it was lackluster and faced constant stoppages due to lack of war material. In the first formal battle the Federal troops had, barely, won a defensive victory.

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Fort Sumter under the first intense barrage which Federal gunboats ended.

So all eyes turned north, both to the debates in the Upper South and to the new man in the White House.
 
For the time being at least the secessionists are doing far worse than OTL. Which, in its way, is a good thing as if this war can be contained to the deep south it'll be shorter and less deadly than OTL. The flip side of the record is of course that a short victorious war means the slavery question is left hanging over the head of the United States like the proverbial Sword of Damocles. With Fort Sumter being fired on though (the more things change....) I guess all eyes are now on the upper south and the ultimatum states. Also....
The First Southern Insurrection had begun.
That is pretty darn ominous.

Anywho, an enjoyable update.
 
With some states only voting yes at gunpoint that is not a good image to the rest of the south and with Lincoln indicating compromise I can see Virginia seeing if that will work, which keeps North Carolina in as well. More so since some of the supposedly secessionist states are already divided. I think that Kentucky is much more firm in the union camp along with Maryland at the very least.

That violence to change votes is not going to play well with the border states so this should be an interesting change.
 
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