A House Divided Against Itself: An 1860 Election Timeline

The Union is starting this civil war off on a strong foot. But with an extra 4 years of slaver radicalization, I expect things to get intense once the deep south gets penetrated.
 
I agree that the irony of Abraham Lincoln and Alexander Stephens being on the same ticket together is rather delicious. And is Virginia split into two states ITTL or no? If not then the future of Virginia will definitely be different than OTL?
 
I agree that the irony of Abraham Lincoln and Alexander Stephens being on the same ticket together is rather delicious. And is Virginia split into two states ITTL or no? If not then the future of Virginia will definitely be different than OTL?
As of right now, Virginia is still intact. This, like you said, will certainly have an impact.
 
A Merry Christmas to all the readers of this TL and a restful New Year! I look forward to continuing to work on this TL in the coming year, and hope that you can all enjoy reading it as well.
 
XLXII: Their Souls Are Rolling On!
XLXII: Their Souls Are Rolling On!
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The decision of George H. Thomas to stay loyal to the Union surprised many of those who were keeping tallying of which senior army commanders were resigning their commissions and joining the forces of the Confederacy. After all, he was a Virginian. Among those closest to him, however, his decision came as little surprise. Both Winfield Scott and John E. Wool, the two senior-most army officers in Morton's early war "brain-trust" and who were so crucial in bringing Thomas into his position of early war prominence, had never doubted the redoubtable brevet colonel. Morton too soon saw the value of the Virginian and saw to his promotion as a brigadier general in both the regular and volunteer army. This confidence was then rewarded with the first major Union triumph of the war, the capture of Alexandria, which landed Thomas further promotions to major general in both armies and eventually even Commanding General of the United States Army following Scott's retirement. Even as his service was currying the favor of the most powerful man in the nation, however, other factors served as a hindrance.

Unavoidably, the lingering memories of his Virginian heritage hung over any discussion of Thomas among political circles. There had been a quiet movement among some radical Republican circles in the Senate to attempt to prepare opposition to his appointment as Commanding General. Only the support of Charles Sumner, who had personally interviewed the general, prevented the movement from going forward. Even with that potential debacle avoided, however, some continued to question the wisdom of allowing a Virginian to head the Union army forces in their invasion of Virginia. Furthermore, Thomas himself was less than eager to take over primary field command in a theater where he knew he would be under continual and intense political scrutiny and second-guessing. Ultimately, these factors, combined with his desire to send a capable officer to organize affairs in the Western Theater, lead to Morton dispatching Thomas to take command on that front.

Accompanying the Virginian was his subordinate from the capture of Alexandria, newly promoted Major General William S. Rosecrans. Wielding together a unique personal charm in public circles, appeal to moderate demographics, and a capable military sense, Rosecrans had found himself the other belle of the Washington military scene along with Joseph Hooker in the early days of the war. Hoping for his own independent military command and chance at glory, he had agreed to come West with Thomas to take over one of the two army prongs that were going to advance into the southern heartland. The Army of the Tennessee, under Thomas, would be tasked with Tennessee, primarily Nashville, Knoxville, and Chattanooga, as well as the rivers within the state. Given great leeway in his strategy from Washington, Thomas intended to enter the state from the western rivers of the Cumberland and the Tennessee, using them as a path to Nashville. Following the capture of the state's capital, he intended to divide his forces into two columns: one direct towards Knoxville and the other towards Chattanooga.

Rosecrans, meanwhile, was given command of the Army of the Mississippi. As the name suggested, their primary objective was securing Union control of the all-important Mississippi River. Not only did the river control the access of the northwestern states to the Gulf of Mexico, but it also provided the opportunity to divide the Confederacy into two. It also enacted Scott's plan for the "execution of the Confederacy", whereby Union army and naval forces took control of the waterways of the Confederacy, serving as a noose to strangle them of outside goods (hence its common nickname as the "Hangman's Program"). Consequently, Rosecrans' strategy for conquest was fairly simple, at least on paper. His Army of the Mississippi, accompanied by naval squadrons under the command of Charles H. Davis, would advance along the Mississippi River and secure it for the Union. In practice, however, Rosecrans realized that not only would he need to eliminate Confederate bastions and defenses on or near the river, which were numerous, but also establish Union ones at crucial points to prevent the river from slipping back into Confederate hands as soon as his troops departed. Furthermore, Confederate defenses would only grow stronger the further he advanced. Likely the greatest challenge of all, New Orleans, would lie at the end of their endeavor (if they made it that far). Rosecrans was well aware that a great challenge of a campaign lay ahead of him, but with his characteristic zeal and self-confidence he was prepared to throw himself into the endeavor.
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William S. Rosecrans
If the Union forces were going to have one major advantage in their complicated advance into the depths of enemy territory, it was the nature of the opposition. Nominally, all the Confederate forces in the West were tied together under the command of General Albert Sidney Johnston. Johnston was a respectable choice for such a complicated and difficult task, and was in fact the expected choice for command of the Western Theater throughout the South. Rendering distinguished service throughout his time in the United States Army, where he was a seemingly ubiquitous presence among their most noteworthy performances in the antebellum days, he had managed to work his way up to brigadier general in the regular United States Army. When secession had come, however, he had no hesitations about casting his lot with the Confederacy, making him the second-most senior officer to do so after the other Johnston, Joseph E. In spite of his impressive record and vast public confidence, he still hardly held an enviable command in the opening days of the war in 1865. He was tasked with commanding all Confederate forces west of the Appalachian Mountains, a command so vast he opted to focus almost solely on Tennessee while delegating most of his responsibilities concerning the Mississippi River to subordinate Richard Taylor.

Even narrowing his focus to a single state, the Confederate forces concentrated in it were a disorganized force. Governor Robert H. Hatton, who fancied himself as a military man from his civilian post, had spread the available forces thin. He had promised his constituents that, "Not a regiment of abolitionist madmen shall make camp upon our soil!" Consequently he had posted detachments of soldiers ranging from divisions to singular regiments at every conceivable avenue of Union entrance. This approach, while generating the support of the public, was quickly panned by Johnston. Knowing that only one Union army was coming, but that it was coming in force, he squabbled with Hatton over permission to unify Confederate forces in the state. De jure, Johnston could do as he pleased with army units and organize and place them according to his will. De facto, however, Hatton wielded the ability to hamper or even halt any troop movements by withholding crucial support and supplies. As a result, Johnston had to carefully balance his appeals to his governor and own self-initiative to accomplish anything.

Ultimately, two factors would prove crucial in breaking through Johnston's log-jam. First was the movement of new troops into Tennessee from other states of the Confederacy. As they arrived, Johnston took them under his purview to prevent them from falling under the sway of Hatton. It was from these men that the basis of the Army of Tennessee was formed. The second factor was the advance of Thomas and the opening of the Tennessee Campaign. On August 13, the six corps of the Army of the Tennessee, along with naval squadrons under the command of David D. Porter entered the state from Kentucky along the Tennessee River. Their target was Fort Avery (named after CSA Tennessee senator William T. Avery), a small fort defended by Colonel Felix Zollicoffer and his brigade of infantry. Determined to uphold his oath to Hatton and the state of Tennessee to defend his positions to the last, Zollicoffer and his 2,500 men were soon enveloped by the 60,000 strong command under Thomas and bombarded by Porter's eight ships. After an initial bombardment of cannon balls destroyed the unfinished works on the fort's walls, artillery shells began to decimate the garrison. In spite of the onslaught, Zollicoffer refused to concede. Only when he himself was eviscerated by several pieces of a shell would the fort finally raise the white flag at the direction of his subordinates on August 15. The Battle of Fort Avery proved to be a resounding victory for Union forces. Conducted solely with long-range artillery pieces, which the Confederates lacked, it had been an entirely one-sided affair. The casualty reports bore this out, with not a single reported injury on the Union side as opposed to 123 killed, 477 wounded, and the rest of the garrison captured for the Confederates.

Following the defeat, Hatton finally began to understand the magnitude of the situation and authorized Johnston to move and organize Confederate forces in Tennessee as he desired. Nevertheless, the blunder of the governor was to cost the Confederacy one more battle. Neither Thomas nor Porter were content to rest on their laurels. Instead, they hoped to move quickly to secure the Cumberland River as well while the Confederates remained divided. As a result, on August 20, the outer pickets of the Confederate Fort Harris (named after vocal former governor Isham G. Harris) began reporting sightings of the advance of Union army forces. Fort Harris' defenses hosted two infantry brigades under the command of Brigadier General Bushrod R. Johnson totaling around 4,000 men. Unlike Zollicoffer, Johnson had no intention of allowing his men to be subsumed by the Union forces. Although his initial inclination was to withdraw as rapidly as possible and avoid contact with the enemy, his senior subordinate, Colonel Lloyd Tilghman, convinced him of the importance of a fighting withdraw for the morale of both the soldiers and the state. As a result, Johnson had his soldiers ready and manning the fort's barricades even as he quietly making preparations for their withdrawal at the first sign of trouble. When the Union forces appeared in force on August 21 and began their seemingly inexorable advance, Johnson's nerve nearly broke and he prepared to order an immediate withdrawal. Only the calming words of Tilghman, who was commanding from the front, prevented the retreat.

Thus, the Battle of Fort Harris was entered. As Porter shelled the defenses and defenders, the infantry of the VIII Corps under Major General William T. Sherman charged the works. It was a bloody but brief battle. With the encouragement of Tilghman and Johnson, the Confederates managed to fire a few volleys that stung the Union frontline. As the VIII Corps returned fire, it was clear that their numerical advantage was allowing them to give much worse than they got. When Sherman gave the order to fix bayonets and charge, Johnson took his cue to order the retreat of his men. As panic spread throughout the rebel ranks caused by the gleam of enemy steel and the order of their commander, the Union forces charged and quickly mounted over the barricades. While Johnson was successful in withdrawing a portion of his command from the field, many lay dead or wounded in Fort Harris' works, or were left lingering in the Union prisoner columns. By final count, the Confederates suffered 95 killed, 383 wounded, and 479 captured compared to 39 killed and 167 wounded among the Union ranks. Although not as ruinous as Fort Avery, the defeat at Fort Harris still rung out sharply not only throughout the state but the nation. The soil of both Tennessee and Virginia had been trod upon the vast Union hordes, and the Confederates seemed to be put on the back foot. As the casualty lists began to fill the newspapers, some began to openly wonder if there was only hope left for the cause.
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Bushrod R. Johnson

Marching through Tennessee to unite with the unifying Confederate command, some of the more restive elements of Johnston’s Army of Tennessee, particularly those that had been "encouraged" into the ranks against their will, developed a marching tune harkening back to the antebellum politicians of compromise. Sung to the tune of “John Brown's Body”, it went:

John Bell’s body lies a rolling in the grave,
Next to beloved brother dear old Henry Clay,
Then there’s old John Crittenden and John M. of the Clay,
Their souls are rolling on!
 
It returns! :) It seems that the morale among the confederates is shaky after these losses
I'm hoping to release chapters more frequently this coming year. Drafting the conflict was somewhat challenging, but I have a more coherent idea in my head of the ultimate path, so I'm hoping that will increase frequency.
Glad to see Old Pap Thomas given a prominent command.
I couldn't resist. Whenever possible, I try to incorporate him into my TLs.
 
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