A House Divided Against Itself: An 1860 Election Timeline

The Seward-Chase negotiations before the election are so unremittingly dumb. They concede 50 electoral votes to the opponent, and split voters in several states, yet somehow both groups are still fantasizing that they might simply win the election outright. Where do they imagine the electoral votes coming from? Tennessee? Virginia? It's embarrassing.

Every adult in the room already knows with a deep certainty that 1860 isn't the Republican's year.
 
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The Seward-Chase negotiations before the election are so unremittingly dumb. They concede 50 electoral votes to the opponent, and split voters in several states, yet somehow both groups are still fantasizing that they might simply win the election outright. Where do they imagine the electoral votes coming from? Tennessee? Virginia? It's embarrassing.

Every adult in the room already knows with a deep certainty that 1860 isn't the Republican's year.
Once again, thank you for your critiques. I'll shall once again strive to defend my piece. First, I would like to point out that, on occasions, politicians can be unremittingly dumb, but on this occasion I believe a more accurate terminology would be unremittingly prideful, to even a blinding degree. The meetings were, in essence, an acknowledgment of the folly of running separate Republican campaigns without having to have either Seward or Chase admit the fault. I'm not quite certain where you are getting your comment about "fantasizing" from. Throughout the work, the specter of a continent election is the shadow looming over all the campaigns, and it is fully acknowledged as the most likely result by the campaigns in these chapters. In fact, the Republicans even plan and prepare for one in the chapter in question. They know the Democrats aren't going to win either outright because they are even more divided. Because neither Seward nor Chase will drop out, and a contingent election is all but certain, the best choice is to attempt to box out the Democrats with unity tickets and subsequently decide what to do after the election. If you would want to specify a particular passage, I would try to respond more directly.

There is also the fact that the Northern Democrats, Southern Democrats, and Constitutional Unionists did almost the exact same thing in New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island IOTL, so there is that too.
How.did Douglas come to live on?
IOTL, Douglas all but killed himself in the time period before Election Day by stumping across the South in favor of Union, as he knew he was going to lose and was dead-set on saving the Union. He followed this up with highly tense congressional negotiations. This, combined with the stress of a presidential campaign, an unfortunate bout of typhoid fever, and likely the shock of seeing the Union dissolved likely sent him to an early grave. With none of those factors occurring ITTL, Douglas is given a longer lease on life.
 
Once again, thank you for your critiques. I'll shall once again strive to defend my piece. First, I would like to point out that, on occasions, politicians can be unremittingly dumb, but on this occasion I believe a more accurate terminology would be unremittingly prideful, to even a blinding degree. The meetings were, in essence, an acknowledgment of the folly of running separate Republican campaigns without having to have either Seward or Chase admit the fault. I'm not quite certain where you are getting your comment about "fantasizing" from. Throughout the work, the specter of a continent election is the shadow looming over all the campaigns, and it is fully acknowledged as the most likely result by the campaigns in these chapters. In fact, the Republicans even plan and prepare for one in the chapter in question. They know the Democrats aren't going to win either outright because they are even more divided. Because neither Seward nor Chase will drop out, and a contingent election is all but certain, the best choice is to attempt to box out the Democrats with unity tickets and subsequently decide what to do after the election. If you would want to specify a particular passage, I would try to respond more directly.

There is also the fact that the Northern Democrats, Southern Democrats, and Constitutional Unionists did almost the exact same thing in New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island IOTL, so there is that too.

IOTL, Douglas all but killed himself in the time period before Election Day by stumping across the South in favor of Union, as he knew he was going to lose and was dead-set on saving the Union. He followed this up with highly tense congressional negotiations. This, combined with the stress of a presidential campaign, an unfortunate bout of typhoid fever, and likely the shock of seeing the Union dissolved likely sent him to an early grave. With none of those factors occurring ITTL, Douglas is given a longer lease on life.

I didn't actually offer critiques of your work in that post. I don't call posters dumb; you don't last indulging in that. Apologies for the apparent hostility?

The slightly fictionalized historical figures are being called stupid.
 
I'm not quite certain where you are getting your comment about "fantasizing" from. Throughout the work, the specter of a continent election is the shadow looming over all the campaigns, and it is fully acknowledged as the most likely result by the campaigns in these chapters. In fact, the Republicans even plan and prepare for one in the chapter in question. They know the Democrats aren't going to win either outright because they are even more divided. Because neither Seward nor Chase will drop out, and a contingent election is all but certain, the best choice is to attempt to box out the Democrats with unity tickets and subsequently decide what to do after the election. If you would want to specify a particular passage, I would try to respond more directly.

From here:

Plans for the post-election meeting to review the results and decide how to instruct the electors to vote would be unofficially outlined, but both sides, tried of conflict and seeing that future meeting as a likely flashpoint, decided to leave the details for a later time. For the last official motion of the meeting, Raymond and Tremain were selected to travel around and inform the state Republican parties of the plan. Both sides were thoroughly exhausted, and were certainly not looking forward to the drama of a post-election meeting to decide how to allocate the electoral votes, hoping instead that their candidate would just win outright. In the meantime, the opposition parties would caught wind of what was discussed in the closed-door meeting, and were preparing to make political hay out of it.
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Henry J. Raymond and Lyman Tremain, envoys of the meeting to the state Republican Parties

The bolded.
 
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I didn't actually offer critiques of your work in that post. I don't call posters dumb; you don't last indulging in that. Apologies for the apparent hostility?

The slightly fictionalized historical figures are being called stupid.
I'm sorry if I came across as hostile in my post, that was not my intent. I appreciate any and all comments, as well as the time people spend crafting them and reading this TL. The thank you was sincere, as it gave me an opportunity to clarify a part of the chapter that had the potential to be misunderstood. I appreciate that you are willing to spend time commenting here to help make this piece better and clearer, which I believe makes it more enjoyable for everyone.
 
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I'm sorry if I came across as hostile in my post, that was not my intent. I appreciate any and all comments, as well as the time people spend crafting them and reading this TL. The thank you was sincere, as it gave me an opportunity to clarify a part of the chapter that had the potential to be misunderstood. I appreciate that you are willing to spend time commenting here to help make this piece better and clearer, which I believe makes it more enjoyable for everyone.

No you didn't come off as hostile at all.
 
XIX: The Will of the State
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Despite expecting his state to have rallied around him during the official secession convention, Yancey's plan were not halted by his failure there, nor did his dreams of an independent Southern republic abate. Instead of sulking in the immediate aftermath of his humiliation, as he had done on the campaign trail in1860, he decided to take further action. He was going to see to the bringing about of his goal, even if it meant dragging Alabama and every other Southern state out of the Union kicking and screaming. It was for their own good, after all, he figured. Thus, he began dispatching letters to the Fire-Eaters throughout the region he had been conversing with, claiming that it was of the utmost importance to Southern stability and society that they gather in his home for a meeting. In the mean time, he hit the speaking circuits, denouncing the convention as a fraud and sham. He would claim that the Unionists had threatened several secessionists into turning down the opportunity to be delegates, and that the convention's chairman, George Goldthwaite (a native of Massachusetts but long-time Alabamian), had been bribed by Yankees and Republicans into some sort of unspecified scheme to prevent the rightful separation of Alabama from her tyrannical and oppressive sister states.

Of course, the Unionists would deny these accusations, and for the most part they seemed to have been unfounded, but Yancey's fiery and sometimes stirring rhetoric proved to have its traditional effect on the people of his state. On Inauguration Day, March 4, 1861, he delivered a particularly venomous address, laced with vitriol for the Unionists and acrimony for incoming President Crittenden. He certainly succeeded in getting the crowds riled up, even if he gave no real solutions or suggestions about what to do, ever skirting around the issue of secession for the moment. He was focused on getting the crowds angry and ready to act, prepared to unrelease their rage at the moment and in the direction Yancey intended. Yancey was preparing for that moment, and with the arrival of Fire-Eaters from across the nation to his house on March 10, 1861, the time had almost come.
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A depiction of one of Yancey's addresses, with him standing at left with a row of fellow secessionists delegates from the convention behind him
All told, 7 fellow Fire-Eaters representing 5 Southern states would gather at his house, in addition to the dozen Alabamians Yancey had coaxed into coming. The surprisingly small turn out was due in large part to Yancey himself. Many were at unease at the tone and implications of his letters, and only the most strident of Fire-Eaters and his closest state allies would come. In fact, even Robert B. Rhett Sr., who would served with Yancey in the House for a period and thus knew him personally, warned his son Robert Jr. against going, calling Yancey "the South's John Brown" and fearing the unpredictable course of action he might wrangle the men into. Rhett Jr. would still go nevertheless, joining William P. Miles from South Carolina, William W. Adams of Mississippi, Thomas R.R. Cobb of Georgia, J. D. B. De Bow of Louisiana, and Edmund Ruffin and Roger A. Pryor of Virginia as the out of state guests.

Even from the outset, Yancey's manner and words soon made clear what he had made veiled references to in his letters: that this gathering of men were to be the bringers of secession, the starters of revolution, and the founders of a new government for the South. Despite all the men present being radical and rabid secessionists, these idea seemed to be very close to the fringe of what they would accept. It was one thing to toss off the yoke of Union with the backing of one's state, specifically its duly elected government. But toss off not only federal but state government merely only the words and promises of a fanatic reached a whole new level.

Some, such as Adams, Cobb, and LeRoy P. Walker, took pause at Yancey's proposition. They believed that to strike now would be to early, and that secession must be allowed to simmer several more years for the loyalty of the people to reach its maximum amount and the state governments to view it solely as a necessity rather a burden. Walker spoke first-hand, having directed the failed effort at the convention. Nevertheless, there were other who were willing to take the plunge and believed the time was right, with the oldest and youngest men present, namely Ruffin and Rhett, leading the charge.


Seeing his climax come, Yancey moved to finally bring action. He called for first for an oath to be made amongst the men present to support each other regardless of the decision reached, and then for a voice vote on what to do. After some cajoling, questioning of manhood and honor, and reputedly a fellow glasses of whiskey and bourbon, Yancey managed to maneuver all the men present into swearing the oath. Then came the decisive moment: the vote. Seeing the inevitable, and deciding that it was better to commit to the ultimate result wholeheartedly rather than halfheartedly, the more recalcitrant men fell in line, and a unanimous vote on 20 to 0 decided that not only a new government, but a new nation was to be formed in Alabama, with no ties to the Union or the previous government. The matter had finally reached its peak for Yancey, and his path into the future was set.
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William L. Yancey's house, where his movement ultimately began
With their independence declared, Yancey and his fellow delegates soon set to work forming their provisional government (which currently consisted to govern a nation of 20 men). For a moment, they agreed to abide by the U.S. Constitution until a larger convention could be called, only adding an amendment to protect slavery in perpetuity and leaving the rest of the edits to be handled at that convention. Unsurprisingly, Yancey was made the president, with Miles to serve as his vice-president. Walker would be Secretary of State, John G. Shorter (another Alabamian) would be Secretary of the Treasury, William W. Adams would be Secretary of War, and Thomas R.R. Cobb would be Attorney General. Ruffin and DeBow were designated "Advisers to the President", while Rhett took the position of presidential secretary. Believing that as soon as word got out of his new nation the other Southern states would be scrambling to join him, Yancey saw fit to appoint John Forsyth Jr. (yet another Alabama secessionists) to the role of "Ambassador to the South". Yancey decided to see to appointing ministers to other nations when their nation was more established.

Finally, Yancey appointed three men, Pryor, Edward A. O'Neal, and Birkett D. Fry, as generals in the Alabama Army. This caused a stir amongst the gathered men (surprisingly the first). Adams questioned the necessity of generals without an army to command. It was at this that Yancey finally tipped his hand. Later that day, he was scheduled to deliver a speech to his largest audience yet, and he intended to have converted all of them to the cause by the end of the night. Confused, concerned, but still willing to play along, Yancey's new government agreed to accompany him to the speech. Finally, all the weeks of built up tension and malice Yancey had been cultivating could be released. Yancey delivering a stunning address, to the roars and adulation of the crowd. When he cried out who would volunteer to defend "the will of the state and our society", hundreds of hands sprung forward, and Yancey finally had his army. All told, roughly 1,500 men would join up.

With this force behind him, Yancey began the final stage in his plan: the seizure of Montgomery and the installation of his government. Pryor, O'Neal, and Fry would be left to organize the men into an army. Between them, their military education amounted Fry's dropping out of West Point following his failure in mathematics. Nevertheless, bold words and promises seemed enough to keep the contented for now. With the rabble somewhat organized into a cohesive force and his fellow officials now confident in his plans, Yancey began the march that he believed would set the dominos in motion that would finally create the independent Southern republic he had so long dreamed of.

Panic, meanwhile, began to ferment in Montgomery as rumors began to trickle in concerning Yancey's revolt. Governor Andrew B. Moore hastily called for the assembly of the the state guard and the militias. William H. Smith, who had been promised a noose from the Yancey's government should they succeed for his "treasonous and abolitionist" activities at the convention, coolly noted as the world seemed to whirl around him, "Truly it will be the will of this state if Yancey succeeds. I believe the rest of the Union will be the executor of the estate and will see to our certain death and burial in that case. Let it be known, however, the final will and testament of the true sons of our great state will be that of opposition to traitors and loyalty to all those things held dear by a democracy loving people."
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A pair of Yancey's rebel volunteers

Okay, this is tremendous work. A jarringly plausible effort at an extreme longshot goal: making a fundamental disruption of the secession movement after reaching the post-John Brown fever pitch of 1860.

Remarkable.
 
Is it? One can see a lot of battle flags driving smaller roads from northern California to eastern Maine.
Now that you mention it, I do seem to remember one house in my neighborhood that used to fly the Army of Northern Virginia's battleflag, but I guess the owner either left or took it down, because it hasn't been there for a while. Thinking about it some more, I think you're right. While regionalism still plays an important role (I've certainly seen more CSA flags in the South than the North), considering it again on the whole mistaken moral equivalencies of the two sides and the image of a heroic battle of guts and glory could certainly delude those who merely stratch the surface looking for a symbol to rally around. I guess that just makes me glad that the peolpe here are willing to dive more in-depth on the topic.
 
Finally took the time to get caught up with this one. Very nice work so far, and watched!
Thank you, and I'm glad you enjoyed the read and now that you're watching I hope you enjoy the ride!
Whatever your view of the rights and wrongs of the war, fighting soldiers are entitled to our respect
No lmao what
I'll just put it this way. The soldiers fighting on both sides were equally human (and thus equally able to engage in both acts of heroism and evil), but both sides were certainly not equally humane. One side clearly had the moral high ground in the struggle, even if they did engage in their own evils along the way. Being willing to go out and fight for someone else is certainly an admirable trait, but we must be constantly vigilant to ensure this admiration of one particular trait does not bleed into respect for their cause as a whole.
 
I'll just put it this way. The soldiers fighting on both sides were equally human (and thus equally able to engage in both acts of heroism and evil), but both sides were certainly not equally humane. One side clearly had the moral high ground in the struggle, even if they did engage in their own evils along the way. Being willing to go out and fight for someone else is certainly an admirable trait, but we must be constantly vigilant to ensure this admiration of one particular trait does not bleed into respect for their cause as a whole.
As a southerner raised to believe in the Lost Cause, this is a sentiment I strongly agree with.
 
Slavery was of course wrong but the South had the right to secede.
The southern states opened fire on a federal fort in Charleston Harbor. They fired the first shots of the war.

Additionally, while some may argue that secession is a noble goal, how ever, one can also argue that preserving the Union is an even greater goal.
 
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