Chapter 16: Building a New, Small World (Cont’d)
Excerpt from The King is Dead: The Walt Disney Company After Walt Disney, an Unauthorized History by Sue Donym and Arman N. Said
On May 1st, 1991, Port Disney, Phase I opened in Long Beach, California. It was a milestone of an achievement at the time, given all that Disney had done to bring it to fruition, battling state and local politics, NIMBY-ism, global recession, shareholder dissatisfaction, and mounting debt[1].
The ultimate origins of this tale, however, date all the way back to 1955 and the opening of Disneyland. Jack Wrather, a friend of Walt Disney’s, opened the Disneyland Hotel in Anaheim in partnership with Walt, but kept ownership for himself despite Walt’s repeated attempts to buy him out. Eventually Walt died in 1966 and Wrather died in 1984, shortly after brief but failed merger talks with Disney, and thus the hotel and the rest of Wrather Corporation, an eclectic mix of properties that ranged from petroleum refiners to production studios to the RMS Queen Mary, the Spruce Goose, Lassie, and the Lone Ranger, was passed to his family, who ultimately sold it all to Disney in 1988. Disneyland expanded to absorb the Disneyland Hotel and surrounding property. Lassie and the Lone Ranger went into the Disney Library, resulting in 1990’s
Benji and Lassie, directed by Joe Camp, and 1992’s
The Lone Ranger, directed by Chris Columbus. Disney sold off all of the TV stations, production companies, petroleum refineries, and other random subsidiaries (many of the TV stations ironically going to former nemesis ACC) and invested the proceeds into restoring and developing the other Wrather acquisitions. Disney also kept the Queen Mary, the Spruce Goose, and the waterfront property at Long Beach, California, that went with the latter acquisitions. They had other plans for that.
Port Disney as of Phase I opening, 1991 (Image modified by
@Denliner from original on Wikipedia)
Construction of Port Disney and DisneySea highlights the complexities of theme park design and implementation, particularly within an already developed urban area. The complexity of the DisneySea and Port Disney development was such that an agreement had to be reached between Disney, the City of Long Beach, the Port of Long Beach, the California Coastal Commission, and the Army Corps of Engineers, along with EPA and OSHA environmental and safety regulations, union rules, and other red tape and roadblocks. Disney, however, demonstrated why they are the masters of the game. Not only did Disney President Frank Wells and Recreation head Dick Nunis manage to successfully navigate the red tape, but Wells and his “right hand” Stan Kinsey, using Creative Chief Jim Henson’s amicable personality and childlike enthusiasm for the project to drum up support, managed to convince the state and federal governments to issue tax incentives and even historical renovation, educational, and environmental protection grants in order to help fund the efforts!
It wasn’t easy, even for the politically connected executives at Disney. Far from it. The biggest obstacles were the California Coastal Commission (CCC) and the Port of Long Beach, both of whom initially opposed the Port Disney project. Their chief complaints centered around environmental and traffic concerns. The CCC’s objections were met by a focused legal challenge that highlighted Disney’s growing reputation for environmental protection and restoration. In addition to the aforementioned attractions and guest services, Port Disney and DisneySea would feature renewable energy, energy efficient power systems (with a cogeneration plant cleverly built into the volcano), recycling, wastewater and runoff cleaning and salvage facilities hidden away underground, and other environmentally friendly design features implemented at other Disney parks.
Following the dredging of the silt buildup of the channel to build DisneySea, which Disney argued would have a positive economic impact on the Port of LA by widening and deepening the channel, Disney promised to spend resources on restoring the tidal zone in and around the Los Angeles area coastline. Some proceeds from the parks and hotels would in part fund wildlife rescue and environmental protection and conservation efforts. Jim Henson himself, through Kermit, promised a share of the funds (hundreds of thousands of dollars per annum) to protect and restore critical (and vanishing) California Coastal Wetlands, not just in the LA metro area, but all up and down the coast. Jim Henson loved the plan because it helped preserve the Earth. Roy Disney loved the opportunity for more nature documentaries to produce. Jack Lindquist loved the great public relations the effort brought. Mike Bagnal, the CFO, liked the tax write-offs. And Chairman Frank Wells loved the moment of cohesion and sense of One Disney that it brought. And now with the tacit support of the Reagan/Bush EPA behind the plan, the CCC ultimately relented in 1990.
The Port of Long Beach, however, required stronger leverage. Shipping company Maersk was threatening to pull out of the port due to potential traffic congestion that could interfere with their operations since only a single two-lane road served both sides of the port. Also, many residents were likewise complaining about the likely increase in traffic, particularly once Disney shuttle busses began to run between Long Beach and Anaheim and visitor’s cars began to appear. Disney ultimately agreed to shrink the park by a 20-foot strip in order to widen the road leading to the port, allowing for dedicated parallel lanes for Disney guests and commercial trucks operating out of the Maersk terminal, and thus reduce congestion for both. Disney ultimately built part of the hotels and parking garage over their dedicated lanes.
And finally, a charm offensive was launched targeting the local landowners, shop owners, and potential employees, which helped get a plurality of the people of Long Beach and (most critically) the Chamber of Commerce on board, reducing the risk of protests or lawsuits. It was, to quote new COO Stan Kinsey, “a strategy to be as ‘low impact’ to the surrounding land, water, and communities as we could make it in every sense of the word.” Disney advertised its mission and history of historical, environmental, and economic “preservation, restoration, and stimulation”. They also resorted to bald-faced political pressure tactics. Roy E. Disney and E. Cardon Walker lobbied the California Republican Party on the economic benefits while Frank Wells and Jim Henson lobbied the California Democratic Party on the environmental and educational benefits. Historians appreciated the painstaking work to be put into restoring the historical vessels to their original condition, which would be done in cooperation with the Smithsonian Museum of American History and Air & Space Museum. The US and California State Departments of Education supported the educational mission of many of the attractions with grants and research. The US and local Chambers of Commerce appreciated the economic benefits.
Even the Department of Defense, a major stimulus for industry to the south in San Diego and Oceanside and to the north at Port Hueneme, was courted, with special Veterans’ Appreciation Days where active duty and veteran military and their families got special discounts through Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) partnerships. Navy vessels would be encouraged to dock directly at the port and dislodge sailors into the facility (with Disney management fully aware that the navy ships themselves would attract attention), and busses from nearby land bases were welcomed. The Military Police teamed with Park Security and Long Beach police on these days to keep the order after the bars got overrun.
In the end, the Port of Long Beach relented to the multi-pronged effort and permitted construction to begin in late 1989 with a planned completion date in the fall of 1992. Disney had managed to not just secure permissions, but secured partnerships, including EPA grants for the environmental protection aspects, Department of Education grants and Smithsonian Institute partnerships for the historical restoration and educational outreach efforts, and some State and Local grants for infrastructure development, including the road widening and utilities integration efforts. Marriott Hotels, a major Disney shareholder, even partnered with them to develop the four planned hotels and the ultimate restoration of the Queen Mary as a “floating hotel”.
However, things, as they are wont to do, did not go as smoothly as planned. First, the recession of the late ‘80s and early ‘90s began to drag on Disney’ profits and the spike in gas prices associated with the Gulf War began to increase construction costs. And with Disneyland Valencia’s costs skyrocketing, debt was starting to grow. The careful, minimal-impact dredging methods agreed to by Disney drastically increased the time scale on establishing the landfill for the port facilities and land for the DisneySea resort. The dredging efforts also led to a temporary stop-work order from a California State judge on behalf of Maersk, who accused the dredging company of interfering with their port operations. Though ultimately thrown out, the delays added up…and added cost. This, combined with the rising costs in both Long Beach and Valencia, led Frank Wells and Ron Miller to conclude by the summer of 1990 that the 1992 full opening was ambitious at best. A phased approach would be called for.
The relative success of the Disneytowns offered a good middle-road plan. Disney had been coy with the press about their full plans for the park, so on July 4th, 1990, they formally announced the Port Disney Project to the world, a phased developmental plan that would see the eventual opening of the full “Phase III” park, likely in the mid-1990s. Phase I would be to open Disney’s Pier Revue, a Disneytown-type concept in all but name. The planned Midway would be put into place along with old-fashioned rides (a vintage-looking Ferris wheel and a small wooden roller coaster), arcades, and games in the style of The Pike back in the Jazz Age. Additionally, shows, shops (including a second Disney Store), restaurants, night clubs, and other entertainment awaited. At the far end of the pier was DisneySea Plaza, a Disney Plaza of the type seen in Disneytowns. Even the as-yet unrestored Queen Mary would be open for limited tours and a “haunted cruise” walk-through attraction. The whole place would, like the 1920s-themed Main Street USA in Valencia, be “Los Angeles in the time of Walt”, a mix of California Victorian and Jazz Age art deco that came to be known as the “Hyperion Style”.
Phase I, or Disney’s Pier Revue, opened on May 1st, 1991, as previously stated, and while not a smashing success right out of the gate, it nonetheless began to bring in some critical income from the otherwise idle property. The prime drivers became, as per the Disneytown model, “families in the daytime, teens and adults after dark”. A theater played both Disney and MGM classics along with new releases and the Wrather acquisitions. One hotel, the Disney Shoreline, would open, accepting guests, and a pilot shuttle service to-and-from Disneyland in nearby Burbank would be initiated to test routes and schedules.
Meanwhile, out past DisneySea Plaza, dredging and road construction continued farther out on the pier, where signs advertised “Coming Soon: Port Disney Phase II!” Leaks of some drawings of the proposed new park only further whet appetites.
And yet by this point Port Disney, whose original projected cost was already a staggering $2.8 billion dollars, was now projected to be well over $3.5 billion. With Valencia’s costs ultimately reaching $3.5 billion, over half of that absorbed as debt by Disney itself, suddenly the future of Phases II and III were in serious doubt.
[1] Mouse-eared Hat Tip to
@Denliner and
@El Pip for help in developing Port Disney.