A heartbeat away from greatness: a timeline of missed opportunities

[yboxman]

#17b: The gates of Vienna


From: Nicholas Milyutin
To: Dmitry Milyutin
Dated: August 29th

Dear Dima,
I know not whether you have yet been appraised by official channels but a development has taken place which has the utmost significance to your campaign. Prussian troops, using underhanded and unscrupulous methods have more or less annexed all German states north of the main to their military control. This was apparently accomplished by rapid rail transport of armies directly into the capitals of each state under the cover of the ongoing Prussian mobilization. In some cases it appears the sovereign rulers themselves are more or less being held hostage to the good behavior of their soldiers.

Bavaria, while denying any foreknowledge of the Prussian action is itself engaged in the project of subordinating the rulers of the Southern German states to her own rule.

This news fills me with the greatest trepidation. No doubt, for a time, Prussia's strength will be consumed in digesting her new conquests and safeguarding htem from rebellion. But once this is done, and I suspect it is a matter of weeks, rather than months or years before the deed is accomplished then we will face to the West not a Prussia distracted by German competitors but a mighty state stretching unbroken from the Tislit to the Moselle, commanding a population more than half again as great as Prussia previously contained.

Gorchakov, in his wisdom, to which the Tsar is most attentive, submits that this is all to the good as such a state cannot but balance the ambitions of France. He believes that France shall be driven to ongoing conflict on the Rhine with both Prussia and Bavaria, leaving the spoils of Europe to the Rodina. Already, contacts between Gorchakov and Bismark have been initiated with the view of achieving an understanding between Russia and Prussia. While Gorchakov vision is driven purely by devotion to Tsar and motherland (1) it cannot be doubted that uncle's Pavel's success in negotiating an alliance with France has aroused great controversy and jealousy in court (2).

Whether Gorchakov's vision shall be proved true shall prove true or not I do not know. But for your own purposes you face a brief period of Prussian distraction followed by a hideous strength. News from Paris is likely to be further delayed by these events as Bismark has taken the drastic step of curtailing all Telegraph communication across Prussia.

I am attaching however, the latest report from uncle Pavel. I feel that it does not bode well.


From: Pavel Kislyov
To: Dmitry Milyutin
Dated: August 25th

My dearest nephew,

I trust that this message finds you well and honorably carrying out your duty to the motherland and the Tsar. I fear however, that that duty is about to become far more difficult. I have it on reliable information that the Austrian forces in Italy have effectively broken out of the mousetrap into which our allies had forced them. While official forces have reassured me that they have merely ensured their destruction unofficial forces from Italy have informed me that the Austrian forces are very nearly at Riva del Garda and show every intention of continuing their withdrawal from Lombardia and Venetia into the Austrian alps. All that stands in their way is an irregular brigade of Italian Franc-Tireurs and I view it as highly unlikely that they should hold up the Austrian retreat to any great length. I fear that within a week the Austrian forces commanded by Franz Josef will be in Trento. You shall have some more time before they recover their strength from the forced march but within 20 days you may expect to face 90,000 additional first class Austrian troops.

Unfortunately, I have been less than fully successful in negotiating any sort of concrete guarantees on the part of France to continue their advance into Austria proper should the Austrians turn their full strength to retake Hungary. The primary concern of France at this time is to ward off the gathering armies of Prussia and the German confederation on the Rhine and the thoughts of Louis Napoleon are increasingly turning to recalling their armies from Italy to the Rhine rather than pressing into the Alps. Should the reports of Prussian troops movements however be accurate you may at least be secure that it is not Russia which will bear the brunt of the German Assault(3). So many soldiers are being moved to the Rhine frontier that it seems that only Landwher must remain on our own borders(4), so should the worst happen and the war expand it will be a matter of months before Poland will be threatened with invasion (5).

I remain confident that with God's aid you shall find yourself capable of slicing through the Gordian knot you face.

From: Nikolai Sukhozanet, Minister of war (6)
To: Dmitry Milutin, Fieldmarshal of Austrian front (7).

I wish to convey the heartfelt congratulations of the Tsar and of myself to carrying out the advance approved by the ministry (8) within adequate parameters. However, at this fateful juncture in the fortunes of the Rodina, it is absolutely imperative that you press forward to utterance, and drive the enemy all the way to Vienna with no further delay (9). It is to our sorrow that no news of further advances have come in the past weeks. Needless to say you have my full confidence that you will appreciate the diplomatic constraints under which Russia must operate and apply your discretion as need be (10).


Milyutin took a deep sip from the lukewarm tea and then stepped outside his tent to his staff meeting. A familiar, sour feeling churned it's way in the pit of his stomach. Instead of the ranks of tents and trenches facing the Austrian defenses he saw endless highland forests, crawling with the shadows of Chechen skirmishers. He saw an endless parade of faces through a hazy red mist. Men dead under his command in the endless Caucasus campaigns. Campaigns which had lasted for two generations instead of a year or two. And beyond them classmates who had died in the pointless and ill thought Crimean war, lost because of indecisiveness at its inception (11).

Slowly the haze cleared and he examined his assembled staff.

Not here. Not now.

"Eduard" (12) he said, turning to the foremost of his generals. "How would you like to be the Russian General who takes Vienna?"

Eduard chuckled at his commander's joke. "Vienna? And where will you be marshal?"

Milyutin released a steely grin. "I? I will be riding to Krakow as soon as this meeting is concluded".

(1) code for: he's a rotten manipulative bastard trying to ruin you and the family.
(2) Watch your back!
(3) This is actually contrary to Moltke's default plan at the time. He planned, in case of a two front war, to hold France at the Rhine, and deliver a knockout blow to Russia, whom he viewed as the weaker opponent. However, only Prussia borders Russia and France is the traditional enemy. Getting Bavaria and German public opion onboard requires concentrating in the West. Furthermore, With French Armies south of the Alps France is viewed as more vulnerable.
(4) An exaggeration but not by much.
(5) Again, Kislyov does not fully comprehend the efficiency of the Prussian railway system. But his basic premise is sound.
(6) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nikolay_Sukhozanet
(7) Technicaly, Dmitry Milyutin has overall command of the entirety of the forces facing Austria and is responsible only to the minister of war and the Tsar. In practice court politics and the fractured nature of the Russian armies (no territorial command system. Or differentiation between staff, logistics and field command) means that it's a bit more murky than that.
(8) Taking credit….
(9) I'll be sure to blame you if you don't.
(10) This is so ambiguous that if anything goes wrong I'll be able to say that I instructed you to do the exact opposite of whatever it is you did wrong.
(11) Milyutin wrote a scathing analysis of the Crimean war which analysed the causes of failure. His conclusion was that the mistake was to occupy the Danubian principalities without threatening wider war at the outset.
(12) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eduard_Ivanovich_Totleben

 

[DrakonFin]

So let's go for a 4-8 day delay in messages from Paris. until October. then things get really messed up.

That would of course depend on when it gets cold enough that the sea starts to freeze over. On some years I believe steam ships might have made it from Stockholm to Turku well until December.

Not 1859, though, because I think that year as well as both the 50s and the 60s on average were pretty cold. The 1860s saw several years of famine in Finland because the cold weather destroyed much of the harvest.

If connections across the Archipelago Sea are not possible by ship or over the ice and the semaphores can't be used, it might take from two to three weeks to take a message overland from Stockholm to Turku, around the northern part of the Gulf of Bothnia.

In that case, it might be faster taking the message across the Baltic somewhere further south, from Sweden to a Baltic port like Riga and then overland to St. Petersburg - assuming the southern part of the Baltic is still free of ice.

And I guess it would be fair to assume that the Russians have a semaphore system operating in the Baltic provinces, too. There had been a semaphore line operating between St. Petersburg and Warsaw since 1839 - it would be likely that an extension line to Riga or other major Baltic towns would have been built during the Crimean War.

 

[yboxman]

That would of course depend on when it gets cold enough that the sea starts to freeze over. On some years I believe steam ships might have made it from Stockholm to Turku well until December.

Not 1859, though, because I think that year as well as both the 50s and the 60s on average were pretty cold. The 1860s saw several years of famine in Finland because the cold weather destroyed much of the harvest.

If connections across the Archipelago Sea are not possible by ship or over the ice and the semaphores can't be used, it might take from two to three weeks to take a message overland from Stockholm to Turku, around the northern part of the Gulf of Bothnia.

In that case, it might be faster taking the message across the Baltic somewhere further south, from Sweden to a Baltic port like Riga and then overland to St. Petersburg - assuming the southern part of the Baltic is still free of ice.

And I guess it would be fair to assume that the Russians have a semaphore system operating in the Baltic provinces, too. There had been a semaphore line operating between St. Petersburg and Warsaw since 1839 - it would be likely that an extension line to Riga or other major Baltic towns would have been built during the Crimean War.

As an aside you seem to be a Finland history specialist- Did the grand Duchy have any constitution or seperate army similiar to that congress Poland had before 1830? do you have any idea whether the Finnish army served outside Finland? Isort of have the impression that a large part of the protests against the russification policy in Finland in the 1890s were essentialy about Finns being conscripted to the Russian army and being taxed to pay for it.

 

[DrakonFin]

As an aside you seem to be a Finland history specialist- Did the grand Duchy have any constitution or seperate army similiar to that congress Poland had before 1830? do you have any idea whether the Finnish army served outside Finland? Isort of have the impression that a large part of the protests against the russification policy in Finland in the 1890s were essentialy about Finns being conscripted to the Russian army and being taxed to pay for it.

The question of a separate constitution is one depending on a particular reading of the situation - according to a Finnish view, popular since the 1850s or so, Finland indeed had its separate constitution and attached rights in the Swedish constitution of 1772 that the Finns said the Tsar had pledged to uphold in Finland among other "traditional laws and liberties of the Finns" at the Diet of Porvoo in 1809. Herein lies the Finnish idea of the basis of the Autonomy and the view that Finland was joined to Russia in "personal union" as a "separate state". One might say the Autonomy was at first something of a legal fiction and that many Finnish politicians struggled mightily to make it a reality - in many ways really succeeding in this by, say, the 1860s-80s.

From the viewpoint of the Tsar and the Russian government in St. Petersburg, though, the position of Finland was theoretically and perhaps in actual reality closer to any other part of the Empire, even if the Finns had some extraordinary rights within the borders of the Grand Duchy. I think any Finnish rights were increasingly seen as temporary and subservient to the larger interests of the Empire as the 19th century progressed.

In the late 19th century the situation came to a head during the attempted Russification policies because the Tsar and the Russian government thought that the laws of Finland were something they had the authority to change - with some justification - but the nationalist Finns saw these changes as the Tsar (and by extension, the Russian state) betraying its "holy promise" to uphold Finnish liberties.

That St. Petersburg had allowed Finland a lot of leeway in creating its own policies and systems had by then kept Finland a pretty loyal Russian domain, and an increasingly prosperous one at that, but at the same time the situation had created something like "hothouse conditions" for the Finnish state and nation to grow as a separate entity from Russia, making the Russification policies too little, too late and actually a thing that pushed Finland away from Russia rather than integrating the Grand Duchy closer to the Empire as had been the intention.

As to the Finnish armed forces, in the 1850s there were nine battalions of infantry and and a naval training unit in existence. Additionally, a cadet school for training officers operated in Hamina. The battalions were considered more or less ordinary units of the Russian Army, serving mostly as defensive units in Finland. The organisation had been beefed up during the Crimean War by bolstering the troop numbers in each battalion (to 600 men) and creating another naval training unit; in 1859 they were in the process of being brought back to a lower peace time strength of 320 men per battalion. Most of these units were disbanded in 1867.

In the 1850s the Finnish troops were still organised according to the traditional Swedish allotment system. Despite being considered similar as other "Russian" units in theory, the Finnish battalions were pretty much fully made of ethnically Finnish (or Finland-Swedish) men serving under Finnish (or Finland-Swedish) officers.

Sometimes Finnish units would also be used outside Finland, especially the "Life Guard's 3rd Finnish Sharpshooter Battalion", or the "Guard of Finland", the Helsinki-based unit that was considered an elite formation. It had been used in putting down the Polish uprising in 1830, for example, and would be later used during the Russo-Turkish War in 1877-78.

A general conscription would come into force in 1878, and after that a separate "Finnish Army" was created that existed until 1905 when it was disbanded during the Russification efforts. That was the background to the Finnish protests against conscription at the turn of the century: now the Finnish soldiers would be expected serve not in Finnish units but in any imperial unit in any part of Russia, something that had never happened before during the Autonomy.

 

[yboxman]

An error and a correction

Revision: Gates of Vienna

First of all, an explanation and an apology. Last weekend my girlfriend made a mistake and took me to a used bookstore (it was amistkae because I spent the next week glued to my new purchases. She swore never to set foot into that store again) I left with a score or so of old hardcovers, of which about half deal with the critical years of reform in Russia following the coronation of Alexander II. Among them is a fascinating title called "Dmitri Milyutin and the reform era in Russia" which, unlike other books I;ve read goes into great detail about the internal political factions which led Milyutin to become minister of war and which impeded his subsequent work. Specifically, it deals with the period before his appointment (OTL 1861).

After going over it I came to the conclusion that it would be unlikely for Milyutin to be appointed field marshal over the Austrian front. The reason is that the primary patron which impelled him into the war ministry was not his uncle but his commander, Field marshal Prince Alexander Bariatinskii. OTL Milyutin was his chief of staff during the Caucasus war and arguably the primary architect of Russian victory. OTL he intrigued to have Milyutin appointed minister of war while he became chief of staff of the army.

The reason the two were able to achieve such a meteoric rise is partly due to their political conncetions, partly to not having their military reputations destroyed in the Crimean war, and partly thanks to handing the Tsar a victory with the capture of Shamil and the effective victory over the Circassians.

Bariatinskii's plan was to apprantly make the Russian chief of staff similar to the Prussian chief of staff in political influence and independence (direct communication and responsibility to the Tsar, etc) while reducing the war minister to a glorified logistics officer for the army.

OTL Milyutin and Bariatinskii, after a very good relationship up to the end of the Caucasus war, had a falling out which impeded army reform and would dog Milyutin until Bariatinskiis death. The falling out was superficially over opposition to Milyutin's plan of reforms which would move Russia to a reserve based army similar to the Prussian model and separate field command from logistical command. In practice it was over the supremacy of the ministry over the chief of staff. A conflict which is, alas, all too familiar to my own country.

Milyutin won the immediate conflict and Bariatinskii resigned as chief as staff "at his own request" in 1862 due to "failing health". He then became a member of the state council however and aligned himself with the anti-reform faction. His loyalists continued to staff senior army positions and gave Milyutin no end of trouble. Milyutin eventually won but the split in the army was a constant source of embarrassment and tension.

If a political decision had been made to push for an early settlement of the Caucasus war (allowing Shamil to retain autonomy as a vassal ruler in southern Dagestan-Chechneya and the various Circassian chiefdoms to keep most of their land and some remmenant of their autonomy) then it's most likely that Bariatinskii would be appointed field marshal of the campaign, keeping Milyutin as chief as staff. I think it's likely he would have assumed personal command of the Hungarian invasion force (which would have been spearheaded by the army of the Caucaus) while leaving Milyutin to maintain the logistics and coordination with the Galician occupation forces in Karakow (who would have been composed of armies from Central and Northern Russia not personally loyal to him) and St-Petersburg lobbying- at least after the battle of Mohac.

Second, after considering the nature of communication between France and Russia during the war and the effect the cutoff of direct telegraph communication during the "night of long Bayonets" after the Austrian breakout from Pischiera and abandonment of Venetia but before the French victory in the Battle of lake Garda would have on decision making in St Petersburg I think a pro-push on Vienna faction in St Petersburg would be much stronger. And it is quite possible the French would encourage this faction out of a desire to reverse the buildup of Prussian forces in the Rhineland and be prepared to make certain commitments in order to secure a push on Vienna.

Third, my characterization of Nikolai Sukhozanet appears unfair. He was a competent officer and had had a fairly cordinal relationship with Milyutin before and in the period immediately after Milyutin's replacement of Sukhozanet as minister as war (partly because Sukhozanet realized he was too old and tired for the job). Tensions appeared only after Milyutin's press for reform (which adversely affected aristocratic privilege and thus his cronies and protégés in the army).

Fourth, after reading a bit more about Gorchakov I think my prior interpretation of his position on a Prussian Vs French orientation and the Gorchakov-Milyutin rivalry is not quite correct.

Gorchakov had a personal relationship and trust with Bismark dating back to his post as ambassador to the Frankfort diet. However, he was also an advocate of Russian-French reaproachment prior to the 1863 polish rebellion (which won a great deal of verbal if not practical support from Napoleon and was suppressed in cooperation with Prussia). While he did not favor a Russian participation in war against Austria in 1859, if a war did take place due to a different leadership in Prussia, I don't think he would have tried to sabotage the alliance if Russia was already commited to it. He would try to hedge his bets by reaching an understanding with Bismark but he would not veto an advance on Vienna automatically unless he was sure Russia would be dragged into a long war on unfavorable circumstances.

Finally, Alexander II was not as committed to friendship with Prussia as he would later become. This pro-Prussian bent seems to have been part of a general reactionary backlash occurring after 1860 and accelerated by the Polish insurrection and assassination attempts on the Tsar (including one by a Polish patriot while visiting Paris. The French press

To summarize, I think that once news of the Austrian breakout reaches Milyutin- Bariatinskii (and thanks to his uncle the news will reach Milytin within 2-3 days. Another 3-4 days for communication with Bariatinskii ) they will almost immediately begin to apply pressure for a invasion of Moravia. I think that Sukhozanet will gradually back their position. Gorchakov will be ambivilant and will try to reach some kind of understanding with Bismark (who, it might be recalled, is NOT the foreign minister in 1859 and has no official capacity to reach an agreement with him) beforehand but unless he gets an iron clad agreement very quickly he's going to be a minority in the state council. And Alexander II will have to do something he hates. Make a decisive decision. In the meantime his field commanders may end up making the decision for him.

So after reconsidering probabilities I re-flipped some coins and re-wrote the chapter: enjoy.

 

[yboxman]

Integrated gates of Vienna

#17a: The gates of Vienna
September 2nd, Bratislava, Austrian empire, Province of Upper Hungary (recognized), republic of Hungary (proclaimed), Autonomous kingdom of Slovakia (Proclaimed)

The Austrians had put up a fight for Bratislava. While outside the boundaries of the German confederation the population of the city was primarily German and had rallied to the Habsburg cause. For whatever reason (1) the Austrians had avoided retreating to Vienna and had remained to defend their loyal subjects from the revenge of the Magyars (2).

It was a defensible enough position, flanked by both the Danube to the South, whose course by Austrians had dominated until recently(3), and a spur of the Carpathians to the north, which was one reason Bariatinskii had been content to build up his own strength over the past week rather than attempt to storm the defenses of the city.

There were other reasons, of course.

Foremost was the effect of the Austrians scorched earth tactics on the condition of his forces. Bariatinskii had counted on, indeed he had depended, on Hungarian supplies from the moment he crossed the Carpathians. The strategic military logic of carrying out what amounted to a two-pronged invasion of Austrian territory, rather than concentrating forces on either the Bukovinan-Hungarian front or the West Galician- Moravian front, was that while Russia had a great many of soldiers it had rather fewer good roads and almost no railways. Funneling supplies to masses of men was easier the farther apart they were and easier still if they could pillage enemy territory (4). Against a competent enemy with parity of forces this strategy would lead to disaster and defeat and detail- against the overstretched Austrians it had led to fantastic advances, albeit with no major victories on the field (5)

Unfortunately, the Austrians had seemed to grasp the essence of his strategy and had set the route of their retreat aflame. That was one reason Bariatinskii had taken care to advance through Slovak inhabited territory. The steps taken by the retreating Habsburgs had ensured that the Slovak "national guard" militia which dominated the Carpathian passes separating Galicia from upper Hungary (6) increasingly viewed the Habsburgs as enemies as bad as the Magyars and did not pester his North-South communication routes as much as they used originally did. Although…

Bariatinskii sighed. The Habsburg commander facing him was too clever by half. Before evacuating, and burning, Budapest, He had offered a bounty for every piece of telegraph wire presented to Habsburg officials in Transylvania and Upper Hungary, raising the Bounty as Habsburg presence on the ground grew scarcer. Slovak Militia men and nationalists might be apathetic to the Habsburg cause but a peasent, regardless of his nominal nationality would not be apathetic to their gold. Once the Austrians realized how effective this strategy was they had offered similar bounties in Galicia though too late to have as much impact as in the Cis-Carpathian war zone.

The result was that his communication with both his Northern forces and the political echelon was spotty, to say the least. That was what allowed the Austrians to surprise him at Mohac (7). Only Milyutin's independent decision to push south with the Galician troops once he realized the Moravian front was being denuded of men rescued his position. That same advantage in communication meant the Austrians were almost instantly aware of Milyutin's push to the south, enabling them to escape encirclement. That, and the Austrian railways, which while incomparable with the dense networks employed by the French and the Prussians, at least connected the major population and administrative centers which was more than could be said for Russia (8).

Without a means of swiftly coordinating offensives amongst his own forces, let alone those of the Hungarian rebel forces south of the Danube he was forced to depend on his Rapport with Milyutin (9), improvisation by notoriously low initiative local Russian commanders (10) and laboriously laid out pre given orders- while his enemy had excellent lateral communications and transportation on the Krakow-Vienna- Ljublajana line.

Indeed, for much of his supplies and communications he depended upon the Austrian infrastructure. The Danube river barges and Bratislava-Budapest railway line, with what few rolling stock the Hungarian provisional government was able to restore, were making all the difference in keeping his men semi adequately fed and even supplied with ammunition. More critically, the Bratislava- Budapest- Bucharest-Odessa Telegraph line offered him a very roundabout means of communication with St Petersburg and Krakow.

In Galicia, Milyutin was ably using the Warsaw-Krakow line was being to achieve a concentration and supply of Russian forces from the east far greater and swifter than Russia was used to. Of course, with the threat of Prussian intervention hanging over Russia should any troops enter German soil, that force was proving to be of very little use to Bariatinskii (11). The glacial but steady Russian mobilization had piled up nearly 400,000 troops on a front stretching from Cracow to Batislava and southwards and another 150,000 screening the Prussian frontier (12). Yet he could only bring 150,000 of them to bear against the 90,000 Austrians still fighting on non-German soil (13). And if he called on Milyutin to shift his forces further south he would be unable to supply them.

Now, at least, the troops in position were sufficiently well supplied to launch a serious attack on Bratislava and have some hope of success. But of what use would that success be? The Austrians would simply retreat for the better defended Vienna positions and rely on those fortifications and the threat of Prussian intervention to maintain the untenable military situation. Already, the troops maintaining the Carpathian communication lines with Galicia were coming under hit and run raids from Saxon forces from Moravia and were unable to respond due to the political constraints on their activity.

He was mulling his options when Murat (14) approached with his steaming samovar and a recently dispatch from Krakow.

(1) Partly morale, partly a decision by the political echelon to maintain a foothold outside the German confederation and so demonstrate that Austria was not simply hiding behind Prussian skirts but was prepared to defend the entire empire.
(2) Who are outraged at the burning of Budapest and the scorched earth tactics the Habsburgs adopted during their retreat.
(3) Chains, mines and emplaced artillery at hamuliakovo
(4) Of course the Magyars are technically allies- but Russia did not expect to keep the territory after the war and thus has little invested in it's economic or humanitarian well being.
(5) The Campaign to date is one where the Austrians succesfully hold a position- only to find that the Russians are outflanking them elsewhere.
(6) Slovakia. The Slovaks were one of the tardiest groups in the Austro Hungarian empire to develop national consciousness which is why both the Magyars and Habsburgs tend to overlook them. Milyutin does not.
(7) Minor Tactical Austrian victory, strategic Austrian setback.
(8) By 1859, Budapest, Vienna, Prague, Krakow, Bratislava, Ljublajana, Venice and Milan are all linked. Lvov and Zagreb, as well as the Banat and Transylvania remain unconnected until the early 1860's. In contrast Russia has two railway lines connected Moscow with St Petersburg and Warsaw with Krakow.
(9) Who is reassigned to oversee the northern Russian wing in Krakow. Bariatinskii has the Caucasus army reassigned to the central, Slovak inhabited, Carpathian front facing Moravia after Mohac since they are best trained to mountain warfare as well as putting down insurgencies.
(10) And hot headed Hungarian national army commanders. Too much is as bad as too little.
(11) Earlier in the campaign that force had fixed Austrian troops in Moravia and had forced the Austrians to retreat from Mohac. But that was before the Prussian threat of intervention.
(12) Russia has an army larger than a million men. But the war has been going on for nearly five months and The Russians started shifting troops three months earlier. Of course, most of them are glorified peacekeeping troops and getting them from one place to another takes ages. And they are armed with muzzle loading muskets when the Western armies, and the better armed Austrian troops have rifles outranging them by a hundred meters.
(13) The Austrians are really at their breaking point. They have another 30,000 men as central reserve in Vienna, 20,000 (mostly second rate) men and a Saxon detachment guarding the Moravian approach to Vienna and putting down scattered Czech insurrections, 30,000 men holding the Alpine passes, and 60,000 men effectively gone AWOL in the Silent mutiny in Croatia. After the battle of Lake Garda that's what is left. There are also a host of Slovak, Serb and Romanian militias backed by the Habsburgs but they're looking out for their own interests.
(14) That's Murat son of Shamil, Imam of Daghestan. He, and other Chehnian and Circassian nobles have been taken to Russia as sort as a mix between hostages to insure good behavior by their parents and cadets to ensure Russiified rulers of their countrymen in the future.

#17b: The gates of Vienna

From: Nicholas Milyutin
To: Dmitry Milyutin
Dated: August 28th

Dear Dima,
I know not whether you have yet been appraised by official channels but a development has taken place which has the utmost significance to your campaign. Prussian troops, using underhanded and unscrupulous methods have more or less annexed all German states north of the main to their military control. This was apparently accomplished by rapid rail transport of armies directly into the capitals of each state under the cover of the ongoing Prussian mobilization. In some cases it appears the sovereign rulers themselves are more or less being held hostage to the good behavior of their soldiers.

Bavaria, while denying any foreknowledge of the Prussian action is itself engaged in the project of subordinating the rulers of the Southern German states to her own rule.

This news fills me with the greatest trepidation. No doubt, for a time, Prussia's strength will be consumed in digesting her new conquests and safeguarding htem from rebellion. But once this is done, and I suspect it is a matter of weeks, rather than months or years before the deed is accomplished then we will face to the West not a Prussia distracted by German competitors but a mighty state stretching unbroken from the Tislit to the Moselle, commanding a population more than half again as great as Prussia previously contained.

Gorchakov hopes that this is all to the good as such a state cannot but balance the ambitions of France. He believes that France shall be driven to ongoing conflict on the Rhine with both Prussia and Bavaria, abandoning the Sublime Porte to the Rodina. Already, contacts between Gorchakov and Bismark have been initiated with the view of achieving an understanding between Russia and Prussia.

These contacts, however, have not yet borne fruit. The chaotic situation in the Prussian court and the cutting off of Telegraph communications to our Embassies in Berlin and Frankfurt have made definitive understanding difficult to reach.

For your own purposes you face a brief period of Prussian distraction followed by a hideous strength. I am attaching, the latest report from uncle Pavel. I feel that it does not bode well. With telegraph contact with Paris cut off it may be the last word we shall receive from him for some weeks.




From: Pavel Kislyov
To: Dmitry Milyutin
Dated: August 25th

My dearest nephew,

I trust that this message finds you well and honorably carrying out your duty to the motherland and the Tsar. I fear however, that that duty is about to become far more difficult. I have it on reliable information that the Austrian forces in Italy have effectively broken out of the mousetrap into which our allies had forced them. While official forces have reassured me that they have merely ensured their destruction unofficial forces from Italy have informed me that the Austrian forces are very nearly at Riva del Garda and show every intention of continuing their withdrawal from Lombardia and Venetia into the Austrian alps. All that stands in their way is an irregular brigade of Italian Franc-Tireurs and I view it as highly unlikely that they should hold up the Austrian retreat to any great length. I fear that within a week the Austrian forces commanded by Franz Josef will be in Trento. You shall have some more time before they recover their strength from the forced march but within 20 days you may expect to face 90,000 additional first class Austrian troops.

The primary concern of France at this time is to ward off the gathering armies of Prussia and the German confederation on the Rhine and the thoughts of Louis Napoleon are increasingly turning to recalling their armies from Italy to the Rhine rather than pressing into the Alps. Should the reports of Prussian troops movements however be accurate you may at least be secure that it is not Russia which will bear the brunt of the German assault (1). So many soldiers are being moved to the Rhine frontier that it seems that only Landwher must remain on our own borders(2), so should the worst happen and the war expand it will be a matter of months before Poland will be threatened with invasion (3). Thus, while I have not been able to secure a French commitment to assault the alpine passes should the necessities of war require the motherland to press forward to Vienna, France

I remain confident that with God's aid you shall find yourself capable of slicing through the Gordian knot we now face.


From: Dmitry Milutin, Chief of staff of Austrian front, acting commander of the army of Galicia.
To: Nikolai Sukhozanet, Minister of war (4)
Dated: August 28th

I wish to reassure your highness that the previous month has been used to good effect. All forces located to the Krakow-Moravia front are now ready for action. I wish to stress that any additional time waiting for action will only detract from the effectiveness of these forces. Furthermore, our scouts confirm the near abandonment of Moravia by the Austrians. All we face on the way to Vienna is a Saxon army more concerned with news of Prussian depredations in Dresden than suppressing the Czech insurgency in Prague.

As for the Prussians, the Jewish and Polish smugglers in our employ report that only a skeleton force of Lanwher threatens our flank. This force, however, is projected to grow as the Prussian mobilization proceeds. The window of opportunity for a drive on Vienna is closing rapidly.

I remain, of course, your most obedient servant.

From: Nikolai Sukhozanet, Minister of war
To: Dmitry Milutin, Chief of staff of Austrian front, acting commander of the army of Galicia.
Dated: August 29th

You are to be recommended for your readiness to do battle with the enemy. However, while I will continue to forward your reports, and my heartfelt recommendations of the same to the Tsar, any urge you feel to advance must be contained. We live, after all, in the day of the telegraph, and thus field commanders may not act independently of political control- after all, negation of any orders to advance is but an electrical impulse away while the telegram lines are intact.


Minutes of Russian state council, dated September 1st 21:00-21:30

Prince Alexander Gorchakov: We have begun relaying messages to Paris through a complicated system of semaphore, telegram, and dispatch boats. Assuming Kisleyov is doing the same I expect to hear of him within the next three to four days. However, whatever word we receive will be, of course, outdated and will offer no direct response to our queries or suggestions.

I have attempted to reach an accomodation with Prussia to resume telegram communications as a sign of good faith. However, the situation at the Prussian court remains unsettled. At the moment all Mantufell (5) will commit himself to is a reopening of communications contingent on an immediate armistice in place and a Congress involving all the Great powers (6) to be held in Berlin. I believe, however that he and the rest of the cabinet on their way out. There is no point in attemptiong to reach an understanding with the current Prussian cabinet as they lack the authority to commit to anything and anything to which they do commit is not likely to be ratified by the regent (7)

Nikolai Sukhozanet: And in the meantime the Prussians will continue mobilizing their army. It is the last few weeks of mobilization which are truly critical, your highness. Even now the Prussians lack sufficient formed divisions to fight a two front war. But once mobilization is complete they can overwhelm France on the Rhine and still delay us until they can turn their army to the East.

Not to mention that Franz Joseph will by then be safely ensconced in the Alps and prepared to defeat our taskforce in Hungary in Detail. If he is not in Vienna already (8)

Tsar Alexander III: What of Austria? Are they open to the Idea of Armistice and negotiations along more reasonable lines (9)?

Prince Alexander Gorchakov: Von Rechberg lacks the authority to make the concessions we require on his own authority or commit to a course of action which would make such concessions ineveitable. Until Franz Josef is either in Vienna or captured by Marshal Regnaud I fear any diplomatic resolution with Austria is unlikely. Unless, of course we are prepared to content ourselves with Galicia alone and leave Hungary and Italy to the Habsburgs (10). This would of course be in violation to our commitments to France. Not to mention our promises to the Hungarian provisional government.

Nikolai Sukhozanet: And it would push Austria into the arms of an alliance with Prussia against us. My liege, if you would have my own advice we have waited too long. Order Milyutin to march on Vienna and let us dictate terms from a position of strength!

We have been prepared for a march on Vienna for a month. Every moment we continue to delay weakens our diplomatic position. Worse, it weakens our military position. Half a year ago (11) you said our people need a victory. We have the making of such a victory- do not allow it to slip out of your fingers! Act now!

Prince Alexander Gorchakov: I believe that we can wait a few more days for the situation in Prussia and Austria to clarify. Bismark is unofficially offering us far more than we dreamed to achieve (12) when we set out on this enterprise.

Tsar Alexander II: But Bismark is not in power. And even he is demanding we accept the coup he participated in as legitimate (13). How soon will he be sending trains packed with soldiers to Warsaw and Reval (14)?

Prince Alexander Gorchakov: Russia is not Hannover. And he will need his Prussian soldiers to guard the Rhine. Whatever the martial virtues of Prussia it is a smaller, poorer and less peopled land than France (15). No French ruler will give up his craving for the Natural frontiers of France and no German ruler shall yield to French demands. While they are occupied with each other we may undergo the internal reforms we require and in due time recover your father's legacy, and more.

Major Pavel muraviev (enters room): an urgent telegram from Krakow for War minister Sukhozanet. I regret the interruption but after deciphering the contents it was thought best to bring it to your attention immediately.

From: Dmitry Milutin, Chief of staff of Austrian front, acting commander of the army of Galicia.
To: Nikolai Sukhozanet, Minister of war
Dated: September 2nd 19:45

I must inform your excellency that word has just arrived from Field marshal Bariatinskii in Bratislava indicating Austrian reinforcements pouring in, apprantly in preparation of a counter-attack. I fear that we must assume that these are the Austrian troops previously engaged in Italy which means our southern wing will soon be outnumbered (18) and, as you are aware, outgunned (17).

Accordingly my duty to my commander and my comrades in arms, demands immediate actions to relieve our left wing of the danger threatening it. At dawn the Krakow wing will invade Moravia and push for Vienna. Orders had been sent to the central wing on the Carpathian front to advance as well into the flank of the Saxon-Austrian force holding the Moravian front.

Due to Austrian agents sabotaging our telegraph lines the relevant orders had been sent by couriers and cannot be reinscided except by courier. Accordingly, I must urge you to send me a reply no later than 0200 as past that time it will be too late to stop their advance into Moravia. Finally, I must regretfully request that should my request to relieve field marshal Bariatinskii be denied my resignation from this command, and any position in the army be accepted.


From: Dmitry Milutin, Chief of staff of Austrian front, acting commander of the army of Galicia.
To: Field marshal Bariatinskii, acting commander of the army of the Danube.
Dated: August 27th

I have received a letter from Shamil inquiring as to the welfare of his son. He desires to inform him that no fewer than five mothers have attempted to interest his own mother in the virtues of their daughters. Please let me know how he reacts when you inform him of this.

Smarter than the average bear- a new film from Darien studios!

A stagecoach, massively mishappen is approaching the smoking ruins

From: Dmitry Milutin, Chief of staff of Austrian front, acting commander of the army of Moravia.
To: Tsar Alexander III.
Dated: September 5th

I regret, your majesty, that by the time your command to halt for consultations reached me our armies had already advanced considerably more than halfway to Vienna, and received a plea for an armistice from the Austrian empire. Pending your approval, I have provisionally accepted a two hour armistice under the attached conditions.

Armistice of Borno, Encyclopedia Britannica , 1923 edition.

Armistice reached between Austrian Empire and Russian empire, French empire, Piedmont, papal stats, Tuscany and kingdom of Naples in September 6th 1859. The background to the Armistice was rapid advance of Dmitry Milyutin through Moravia to the northern outskirts of Vienna, accompanied by the encirclement of Bratislava by the mountaineer troops of Field marshal Bariatinskii. As, much to the surprise of the invading Russians, Austria had no more than 40,000 second rate troops to spare for the defences of Vienna the newly crowned emperor Maximilian, having come to the conclusion that no aid would be forthcoming to Austria from Prussia asked for terms.

Though the diplomatic contacts prior to the armistice declaration remain disputed the terms of the armistice are clearly recorded:

Item 1: All acts of hostility between Russia and the Austrian empire to cease within 48 hours of the Armistice coming into effect.
Item 2: The Austrian empire will, for the duration of the armistice, hand over to Russian control the portions of the Bratislava-Krakow railway line remaining under it's control as well as use of it's telegraph system.
Item 3: A similar offer of armistice will be extended to France and Piedmont and should both agree France shall be permitted to occupy the provinces of Tyrol and Salzburg.
Item 4: France, Prussia and Bavaria will be invited, in partnership with Austria and Russia to participate in a congress to determine the best way to restore peace to Europe.
Item 5: The armistice shall last ten days and may be extended at the end of that period with the agreement of all contracting powers

Austria apparently agreed to these harsh, indeed humiliating terms, once Milyutin, acting under still disputed authority, provided a guarantee that Russia would not seek to sever Croatia, Bohemia or Moravia from Austrian rule and would not support any Piedmontese demands for Tyrol or Trieste. It is believed that his threat that he would seek exactly those aims should his terms be rejected, and the threat of Field marshal Bariatinskii to allow Hungarian nationalist troops to occupy Vienna (18) that led emperor Maximilian to accept the terms.



(1) This is actually contrary to Moltke's default plan at the time. He planned, in case of a two front war, to hold France at the Rhine, and deliver a knockout blow to Russia, whom he viewed as the weaker opponent. However, only Prussia borders Russia and France is the traditional enemy. Getting Bavaria and German public opion onboard requires concentrating in the West. Furthermore, With French Armies south of the Alps France is viewed as more vulnerable.
(2) An exaggeration but not by much.
(3) Again, Kislyov does not fully comprehend the efficiency of the Prussian railway system. But his basic premise is sound.
(4) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nikolay_Sukhozanet
(5) Who is still, officially, the chancellor
(6) Russia, Prussia, Austria, France and Britain
(7) OTL William waited a year before sacking the reactionary cabinet. TTL he moves quicker both because he can (the night of Long Bayonets won him the loyalty of the army and both liberal and Junker support) and because he must (because they are sabotaging his efforts and look bad to the liberals in the newly formed North German confederation)
(8) He's just arriving in Vienna actually. But in a ceremonial casket.
(9) Giving up Galicia, Italy and Hungary.
(10) Rechberg lacks the authority to give Galicia up either. But at this point he's prepared to go rogue up to a point in order to save the empire.
(11) I'm retro-correcting post #2 to be a conversation between Alexander II and Sukhozanet, rather than with Milyutin (Who's still in the Caucasus).
(12) Galicia, a Romanov on the Hungarian throne, and a free hand in Romania and Serbia.
(13) Legitimism is a major concern of Russian emperors since 1815. That's their ideological justification for resisting Napoleon and the principle is all that is keeping them on the throne.
(14) Not very soon at the current rate of Russian railway construction. But the point still stands- Bismark bloodied his hands by the way he united northern germany, more than OTL. His credibility suffers.
(15) Not for long. But Russia, and the rest of Europe, do not use statistical analysis of industrial and demographic trends very consistently.
(16) In fact these troops a the trickle of Croat military frontier troops who were not upswept in the Silent mutiny. They are badly armed and number no more than 15,000.
(17) The Austrian forces in Italy are to a large extent armed with rifles. The Russians are still using muskets. The rifles outrange the muskets by 100 meters.
(18) They have a score to settle after the burning of Budapest

 

[stevep]

yboxman

Interesting. It seems that Prussia has looked so concerned with securing its own domination in the north that Austria feels it necessary to make peace at any terms. They must be desperate to agree to French occupation of places like the Tyrol and Salzburg. Russia may have promised not to support any France bid for the former to be transferred to Italy but getting the French or Italians out of there could be a problem. I do notice however that Russia seems to have agreed that Croatia won't be part of Hungary.

Should there be some footnotes for part b? A number in the text but nothing at the bottom of the page.

Steve

 

[yboxman]

Maximillian's dilemma and Croatian concerns

yboxman

Interesting. It seems that Prussia has looked so concerned with securing its own domination in the north that Austria feels it necessary to make peace at any terms.
Steve

It's more of a case of Prussia not being able to offer any help immediately to protect Vienna or distract the Russians. Since they have concentrated their buildup on the French border that means that all they can promise the Austrians is that if they take Paris and then win a broader war (and that's a big if) Austrian territory will be restored in the peace conference that follows.

The best case scenario for Austria in such a war is that such a restoration would only occur after the Russians occupy Vienna, central administration collapses and nationalist outbreaks in Bohemia and Croatia make imperial reintegration more problematic.

The more likely scenario is that Prussia uses the war to either vassalize them or gobble them up.

Either way a victory in alliance with Prussia looks like a worse option than defeat to Russia.

Surrender now effectively means that Austria remains a medium power and a buffer state between Prussia and Russia. Victory probably means vassalization to Prussia. Defeat means obliteration.

They must be desperate to agree to French occupation of places like the Tyrol and Salzburg. Russia may have promised not to support any France bid for the former to be transferred to Italy but getting the French or Italians out of there could be a problem.

They are desperate. But the Italians are specificaly precluded from joining the occupation and French occupation is accompanied by obligations not to transfer occupation to Piedmont (not that Piedmont would want Salzburg or most of Tyrol).

The strategic significance of the occupation, and the reason Milyutin demands it (again, without prior communication with the French) is that Regnaud, while not being able to support Louis Napoleon on the Rhine, can at least threaten Bavaria's and by extension Prussia's southern flank. This would either keep Bavaria neutral in case Prussia decides to rush to Paris or force Bavaria to keep it's forces to defend Munich.

That's Milyutin's consideration anyway and Maximillian can understand and mostly accept it. Louis Napoleon may have other, non-military, ideas for the occupation later on.

And Prussia/Bavaria may intervene before the occupation comes into effect, putting Austria in an extremely unpleasent position.

I do notice however that Russia seems to have agreed that Croatia won't be part of Hungary.

Quite.

First of all the facts on the Ground are that Croatia is now de-facto independent and has a significant and well motivated military to defend that independence. The commitment required by Russia to assist Hungary in reasserting control of Croatia is simply too high and too far away.

Second, If croatia is part of Hungary then it is far less likely that either France or Britain would accept Russia making a puppet out of Hungary. Neither want a Russian presence on the Mediterranean and both have more power projection there than Russia does.

Third, France already has a significant military presence in Dalmatia and is cozying up to Croat nationalists. Colliding with France over dominance in Croatia is not something Russia wants.

Fourth, Russia wants either a puppet Hungary or a weak Hungary south of the Carpathians. If Croatia is part of Hungary then Hungary is stronger and harder to dominate.

Fifth, long term thinkers who want the Habsburg empire to survive are thinking that a larger Slav population within Austria is actually a good thing.

The bottom line is that Russia prefers that a weak Habsburg monarchy keeps titular control of Croatia in order to increase Slav influence in Vienna and keep the Western powers out of the Balkans. Of course for Vienna to regain control of Croatia it will either have to make significant concessions (which the Czechs, especially the Moravians currently under Russian occupation, will demand as well) or engage in a very long and bloody civil war with a depleted and demoralized military. Think the conditions that led to the Austrian-Hungarian compromise in 1867 but Austria is even worse off.

Should there be some footnotes for part b? A number in the text but nothing at the bottom of the page.

Corrected- note that there are seperate footnotes for each section

 

[stevep]

yboxman

Thanks for that. Two points come to mind from those the footnotes:

a) If the offer Bismarck made matches with Russian intent/desire then I see changes for potential further clashes as the free hand in Romania and Serbia is likely to lead to a clash with the Ottomans, probably backed by Britain. Also a Romanov on the throne of St Stephen could have some interesting effects. Would he have to convert to Catholicism for instance? Or would a constitution established by the rebels be accepted by their new ruler?

b) I notice the invite to assorted powers to attend a conference doesn't include the UK. Was that a mistake or are the Russians seeking to try and deny Britain any say at the conference?

Steve

 

[yboxman]

yboxman

Thanks for that. Two points come to mind from those the footnotes:

a) If the offer Bismarck made matches with Russian intent/desire then I see changes for potential further clashes as the free hand in Romania and Serbia is likely to lead to a clash with the Ottomans, probably backed by Britain. Also a Romanov on the throne of St Stephen could have some interesting effects. Would he have to convert to Catholicism for instance? Or would a constitution established by the rebels be accepted by their new ruler?

Quite right. Of course, Russia would want to avoid any fight with Britain+Ottoman empire before it reforms. However, at the same time, it will want to cash in on commitments made to it by Prussia before they become outdated (as they did OTL by 1878). And on the gripping hand The Ottoman empire may be using the war to eliminate the autonomy of Serbia and Montenegro and possibly unseat Curza. Also, Bismark may not be able to push through his offer after the stunt Milyutin pulled. After all, the Russian invasion of Moravia is a slap in the face to Prussian prestige and it may weaken the pro-Russian faction (though it also demonstrates that Russia is a military factor that cannot be ignored)

b) I notice the invite to assorted powers to attend a conference doesn't include the UK. Was that a mistake or are the Russians seeking to try and deny Britain any say at the conference?

It's deliberate. and it's not just out of pique at the Crimean war. The Russian interest is to get a peace treaty hammered out quickly (before Prussia completes mobilization) and to be in a position to sell their support/non interference to both Prussia and France. having another major power at the conference messes up those aims.

Finally, bear in mind that Prussia, backed by Britain may refuse to attend the conference and simply make a run for Paris while the Russian amies are still displaced in Austria. It may even choose to strike before the Brno armistice.

Or they could use the conference to complete their mobilization, secure British and Bavarian support, and possibly wait for the Alpine passes to become more impassable (the trans alp tunnel was only completed in 1871. that means that after a certain date it will be much harder for Regnaud to make it back to France in time to stop the Prussians) and then strike at Paris.

The French, of course will try to use the conference to play for time while Regnaud starts ferrying troops by rail back to France and the Rhine frontier.

And Piedmont, Austria and Bavaria will all try to manuver amongst the big sharks to maximize their advantage.

As for Britain? it could decide to threaten a blockade against which (it thinks) France and Russia have no effective counter unless it is invited to the conference and/or Russia and France agree to unconditionaly withdraw from German confederation territory. If they do, the pressure to reach an agreement quickly or go to all out war before the blockade begins to bite is even higher.

In short total war may not have been averted.

 

[yboxman]

A romanov on the throne of King Stephan

yboxman

Also a Romanov on the throne of St Stephen could have some interesting effects. Would he have to convert to Catholicism for instance?Steve

Well, probably but not necessarily. I mean catholic and protestant german princes imported to rule Greece, Rumania and Bulgaria all had to either convert to Eastern Orthodoxy or commit themselves to raising their heirs according to that religion.

However, those states were at the time monoethnic and monoreligous (yes, I know about the Muslim Turk minorities in Greece and Bulgaria. But in terms of internal political representation and European mores they were irrelevent)

"greater Hungary", even excluding Croatia isn't like that. A large proportion of the Magyar elite is protestant (more among the townsmen and nobility) and the same is true to some extent among the Slovaks (who will tend to view a ROmanov king as a gurantee against Magyarization). Many of the Germans are protestant as well and The Romanians and Serbs are of course Orthodox. Furthermore, the anti-clerical element in Magyar nationalism was, at the time (not later) fairly strong. Partly because the counter reformation was engineered by the rather fanatical Habsburgs. I wouldn't go so far as saying that a Orthodox King would be viewed as a positive "compromise" candidate by the Protestants but Hungary isn't Poland. Catholocism was not part of it's defining national identity.

In the 1848 constitution freedom of religon is declared and it's likely the same would be true in 1859, at least in order to try to win over the Romanians. If a Romanov is "suggested" to the provisional government, it may also be "suggested" that the religion of their king be kept his own business. That would make Hungary unique among European monarchies- but that's not impossible.

Or would a constitution established by the rebels be accepted by their new ruler?

As for the constitution- well, it depends on the constitution and the Romanov in question. For example Alexander II might decide the Hungarian throne looks perfect for Alexander III, his second son.

(Nicholas is still alive and may not die in 1864 as in OTL. If he does die before producing a heir and ALexander III is king in Hungary... well, that opens all sorts of other questions. Actualy if he dies after producing a heir but before Alexander II is assasinated ,if he is assasinated, Alexander III may still be heir to the throne of Russia- need to brush up on Romanov inheritance law.)

Since Alexander III is only 15 at the time accepting or declining the constitution won't be up to the "King". A regency council will be appointed as was the case in Greece and they will be getting their orders from St Petersburg, which will rule whatever it views is in Russia's best long term interest.

Depending on how strong the Russian position is they may "suggest" altering the constitution in some particulars, using the threat of support for the minorities, or demanding a plebescite to accept the constitution as a lever for making the changes they want.

All this is still up in the air though. Right now much of Hungary is still a stalemated battleground between Ethnic militias and the Russians aren't going to step into that mess until the situation with both AUstria and Prussia is settled.

So the question is- What does the regent William do? and what are Mantuffel, Bismark, Roon and Moltke each urging him to do? What, for that metter is the British ambassador urging him to do and what is his own government prepared to do?

And if they ever make up their minds what is Maximillian of Bavaria going to do with the collapsing Austrians to his east, the Franco-Italian armies poised to advance into the Tyrol in the south, A "Blood and Iron" Prussia to it's north, an ambitious Napoleon to it's west, and a population torn between pan-German nationalism, consertvative regionalism and idealistic liberalism in the center?

 

[yboxman]

#18: The Second congress of Vienna


News of the Austrian capitulation, following in rapid succession news of the Prussian night of long Bayonets sent shockwaves through the courts of Europe, and presented each government with hard choices.

Prussia, having sought to consolidate power in the north of Germany under cover of the war, found itself caught in a moment of weakness, it's mobilization disrupted, the Northern German states and armies as yet unintegrated, and the court still resistant to the will of the regent and divided by feud between Mantuffel and the increasingly influential Bismark. The plan for a swift domination of Austria and the southern German states by their "protection" under the Prussian army lay in tatters due to the unexpectadely swift Austrian capitulation. Worse, the violation of German territory by Russian troops and the slaying of a German monarch at the hands of the ancient enemy had unleashed a torrent of barely controllable nationalist outrage which would be hard to satisfy except by a declaration of war against both Russia and France- a war which Moltke, Roon and Bismark were unaminous in opposing. Yet opposing the will of the nation might turn it's outrage against the the Prussian government. After all, what justification could the night of the long bayonets have if Prussia, having unified northern Germany under it's harsh rule, failed to protect the borders and honor of the German nation?

France found itself in a position of discomfort nearly as acute. While victorious in war it suddenly found to its east a swiftly consolidating state of 26 million souls. Any thoughts of intervention in the Prussian takeover were stymied by the fact that nearly half of it's armed forces were ill positioned in Northern Italy and would have to engage in a piecemeal conveyance by rail to the alps followed by a week long march over the alps before again being entrained to Paris and the Rhine frontier. Ten days would be required for the first soldiers to reach Paris and more than a month would pass before such a maneuver might be completed. The only alternative would be to occupy the Austrian alpine passes and then march en masse to Munich, forcing Bavaria into alliance with Prussia and risking defeat. The highest ranking French diplomats were swiftly dispatched to Munich, there to contend with their Prussian (and Russian and British) counterparts in an elaborate dance of cloak and dagger.

For Russia the glory gained by their decisive victories on the field was tempered by the harshly realistic assessments provided to Sukhozanet by Dmitry Milyutin of the indifferent tactical performance of the Russian field forces and the abyssal performance of Russian logistics. Tsar Alexander II was also grimly aware of the state of Russian finances, even with the French subsidies. The war, as wars tend to, had proved more costly than expected.

As for the minor powers, Piedmont, though fully victorious in war, had taken the brunt of the casualties in blocking the last desperate attempt of Franz Ferdinand to withdraw to the Alps. It's battered army was stretched to the limits in occupying Lombardia and suppressing any separatist sympathies in . Furthermore, though Both Cavour and Victor Immanuel were quietly relieved at Garibaldi's incapacity and were even more quietly disappointed at his survival of the Battle of lake Garda, his revolutionary adherents, rather than either dispersing or becoming more pliant had, in the absence of his guidance and willingness to coordinate action with the Piedmont government, launched a series of uncoordinated and ill thought insurrections. Some were aimed at toppling the regimes of ruling the South Itlaian states but others were aimed at establishing a republican government in Piedmont itself. Still others were centered at Savoy, where news of Garibaldi's heroics was interspersed with rumors of an underhanded deal handing Savoy to the rule of France.

The uncoordinated nature of those uprisings, and the prestige afforded to the South Italian rulers by their participation in the anti-Austrian war, enabled the southern Italian states to brutally crush the uprisings (in Rome itself with French help) while promising reforms which concillated the more moderate of the liberal rebels. Nontheless the king of Naples, the Duke of Tuscany, and the Pope himself remained in a most uncomfortable position and were increasingly concerened with Piedmont's intentions towards them. Quietly, they began to discuss a defensive alliance both with each other and with outside powers.

In the most precacious position of all the minor powaer however, was Bavaria. Suddenly faced with French troops at it's previously inviolable southern borders, Maximilian seriously considered a rush to block the Alpine passes of Tyrol before they were handed over to the French. In the event, the Western disposition of his troops, the fears of Prussia, the suspicions of Baden and Wurtenburg, and a breakdown of communications with Austria delayed his orders sufficiently for Regnaud to occupy most of Tyrol before Bavarian troops could beat them to the passes. Salzburg and a small swath of Northern Tyrol however were occupied by Bavarian soldiers, often with the cooperation or even defection of local Austrian troops.

And beyond the Lamansh Canal, torn between liberal public opinion and realistic national interest, outraged at the Snub directed against it by the pointed exclusion of Britain from the Vienna conference lay the greatest industrial and naval power, and the weakest military power in Europe. Possessing the greatest war making potential of all the powers, yet with a potential almost unrealized, and averse to both the risks and costs of warfare Britain wildly sought a continental ally it might throw it's weight behind in order to rebalance the balace of power in Europe. It found such an ally in Prussia, whose insistence resulted in a belated invitation to Britain to join the other great powers at the conference.

Neither Britain or any of the continental powers wished for a general European war. All feared it. And yet all feared that it was ineveitable and that each must seize the intiative and take advantage of localized advantages before they might pass away. In the end each of the powers sent a delegation to the Congress of Vienna primarily out of fear that the attending members might reach an agreement at their own cost.

In the very center of Europe, on the border between the "civilized" West and the barbaric East, between the German North and polygot Balkans, Vienna lay glimmering as a splendid jewl. As yet unravaged by war but with Hostile armies but a day's march away passing through daily in sealed railway cars, it's citizens trembled.

The second Vienna conference was the last, best hope for peace in Europe. Would it fail?

 

[stevep]

yboxman

Good update but that last line sounds distinctly ominous.

So much fear and mistrust could result in war simply because no one dare risk trusting or making concessions to a perceived rival.

Austria has to a degree significantly improved its position over the immediate per-armistice status. Neither France or Russia wants a new war with them so are possibly going to offer more favourable terms to keep them out of any Anglo-Prussia alliance. At the same time they have escaped, for the moment anyway, Prussian domination and it could even be that Austria sits out any new conflict, or at least the early stages of it. On the other hand, without a major change in the balance of power its reduced to at best a 2nd rank power.

Steve

 

[yboxman]

#19 the agonies of Austria, September-October 1859


It was the end of the year of 5619 (1) and the beginning of a new year (2). It was the end of the old balance of power and the dawn of a new age of chaos. The armistice underlying the second Vienna conference would waver, and crack, but in the end, the patchy peace accord constructed at the conference would hold, if only for a time. Because what is built on a foundation of fear, mistrust and conspiracy may endure, but only for so long as it takes for the fear to grow, for the mistrust to fester and the conspiracies to mature.

The conference averted a general European scale war thanks to two main factors. The first was that the breakup of the Austrian empire and the consolidation of Prussian dominion in Northern Germany were so final in their nature that any thoughts of either putting the Asutrian empire back together or breaking up Northern Germany were viewed as unrealistic by nearly all attendants of the conference.

With the independence of Hungary and Northern Italy, and the decline of Austria to the statues of a minor power, recognized as a fiat accompli what remained were the individual ambitions of each of the great powers. It is there that the second factor came into play. In the evenings, after the formal and pedantic diplomacy concluded, a curious game of musical chairs would ensue, as each diplomat of the major powers would invite one or more of his counterparts, and upon occasion an observer from the minor powers to his quarters. On the background of the final stages of Prussian mobilization, Belated British efforts to increase the size of their home armies, the Shutteling of Regnaud's army of Italy back to France, and the awkward shift of the Russian hordes to the North of the Carpathians, backroom deals, some very nearly contradicting each other, were struck. It could have been no other way, for had those arrangements seen the light of day, the conference would have erupted in flame and acrimony.

France, having made the greater contribution in the war sought compensation and support for it's drive for it's "natural frontiers". As this demand placed it in direct conflict with both Prussia and Bavaria it sought, and very nearly demanded Russian support.

Prussia, emerging with the greatest gains from the war in spite of remaining neutral throughout, wished to receive recognition for its rule over Germany and secure its Eastern Frontier from a Russian attack in the war it saw as ineveitable with France. More ambitiously, it sought recognition as the dominant power in Germany and eventual control of the southern German states.

Russia, in addition to securing Galicia, denouncing the outcome of the peace of Paris, and ensuring that Austria would never again threaten it's southern flank, wished to translate it's current advantage in Hungary into permanent influence, preferably by placing a Romanov on the throne of St Stephan. Furthermore, it sought to clear it's inexorable advance into the Danubian principalities, Serbia, Turkey in Europe, and ultimately the straits from the interference of either France or Prussia.

In a masterful gambit, Gorchakov was able to secure, in two consecutive nights, French and Prussian public support for the revocation of the treaty of Paris, promises of non interference in the promotion of a Romanov candidate to the throne of Hungary and neutrality in any future conflict with the Ottoman empire over the Danubian principalities or Serbia… by promising Prussia neutrality in any future war launched upon it by France while simultaneously ensuring France of Neutrality in any future war launched by it in pursuit of it's natural and linguistic frontiers (Germany west of the Rhine, Belgium, southern Netherlands, Western Switzerland). Well realizing the limits of Russian Power Gorchakov did not seek any guarantees regarding Russia's ultimate aims in the Balkans.

Britain had no territorial aims on the continent. What it primarily sought was to establish a new balance of power by safeguarding Prussian gains and ensuring that neither Italy nor Hungary would become Franco-Russian puppets. While it gained this formally, by the second and fourth and fifth clauses of the peace treaty (2), reality on the ground would prove somewhat different. The gradual realization that a true balance of power would require Britain to enter into a formal alliance with Prussia was slow in blossoming but the initial seeds were definitely planted.

Undertanding between Prussia and France was, obviously, hardest to reach. France however, grudgingly agreed to publicly recognize Prussian control of the North German confederation in return for vague Prussian promises of support in case of French possession of Belgium. As it were, later events would show both powers had every intention of violating their understanding.

But perhaps the most surprising, and certainly the least understood of the backroom exchanges involved the minor power of Bavaria. It had easily won recognition as holding a statues in southern Germany equivalent to that of Prussia in the North, with a monopoly on foreign relations and military force. But it's gains did not end there. To the surprise of both Prussia and Britain, and the outrage of Austria, Bavaria announced the annexation of Salzburg, and during the course of negotiations, was permitted to occupy Tyrol by Regnaud's retreating troops. To the population of Tyrol, and to the German newspapers, Maximilian explained the step as necessary to safeguard the German provinces from Piedmontese encroachment, as Austria was too overwhelmed with other problems to safeguard them herself. While this explanation was factually true it severely damaged relations between the two Maximilian's and would hinder any future attempts at cooperation against Prussian dominance. Russia's payment for their support (4) soon became clear as Russia insisted with the Support of France and the clearly expressed non-opposition from Bavaria, on Vienna and the Moravian approaches to it remaining demilitarized for a period of 15 years and on the Austrian empire paying a severe indemminity to Hungary for the Burning of Budapest as well as to Russia, France and Piedmont as war costs. Prussia's consent to these arrangement was eventually secured by the "compenstation" of Austrian Silesia (5).

What France had to gain by this curious transaction remained unclear. Bavaria quietly let Prussia understand that the price of French support for Bavarian aggrandizement was Bavarian non participation should Prussia withdraw from the conference and advance on Paris. Only Bismark suspected that France had demanded anything beyond this and his warnings and attempts to advise refusal of Silesia went unheeded.

With the Bavarian crisis settled, and the armies of the major powers gradually withdrawing, the conference ended. It would not be long before the first in a series of crisises would rock the fragile understandings achieved at the conference.

(1) Jewish calendar, of course
(2) Rosh hashana, the Jewish new year just happens to fall on this conference. Not that any of the participants know or care.
(3) The people of Hungary shall freely choose their ruler in a diet of their own making. Russian forces shall make no further advance into Hungary, will remove all troops south of the line formed by the Danube in Bratislava within 1 month and all troops whatsoever from Hungary within three months. French troops will evacuate Piedmont within no more than two months.
(4) Actually, Russia is quite pleased with this outcome. It means Austria is both weaker and has a relatively smaller German element within it, which means it is even less of a threat to Russian Poland and Russian dominated Hungary.
(5) Yes, Austria is undergoing the death of a thousand cuts. But it's still getting out of this better than it did OTL.

 

[Tongera]

May we see a basic map please?

Also, love the two updates in quick succession.

 

[yboxman]

May we see a basic map please?

Also, love the two updates in quick succession.

Thought about keeping the first cliffhanger for a few days- but decided we had too much naval gazing of each powers motives in the discussions for that to be satisfying to the readers in another post.

About the map- as soon as I figure out how to make one! any suggestions?

 

[Tongera]

Thought about keeping the first cliffhanger for a few days- but decided we had too much naval gazing of each powers motives in the discussions for that to be satisfying to the readers in another post.

About the map- as soon as I figure out how to make one! any suggestions?

1. You kept the last update on a cliffhanger. A great one I might add.

2. Heard of the GIMP?

 

[yboxman]

Ok, here's the first map- bear with me. It describes the division of the German confederation following the conference

 

[yboxman]

German tripartiate division




So here is how the division of the German confederation looks like

 

[Tongera]

So Austria keeps the port of Trieste, Bohemia and a part of Moravia as well. Bavaria keeps Tyrol and Prussia gets a bit more of Silesia.

A good day to be Prussian and Bavarian it seems.

A general map of Europe as well please?