A-H invading Serbia immediately after the assassination

Dear All,

I am busy reading Clive Ponting's book "Thirteen days", the period from the AH ultimatum to the start of it all.

It is focused on the diplomatic end of it, the telegrams going forth and the actions of the different governments around the globe. A lot of facts and a good read.

Facts: France and Germany had been at peace for 43 years. AH for nearly 50. Britain and Russia had not been at war for 60 years.

All "crisis" were addressed and solved by the Great Powers.

Despite French feelings about the lost provinces, it was not enough in itself to cause a war.

Germany and Britain were working well together.

So, it is back to the Balkans. The rise of Russian infuence, Pan-slav movements, Ottoman empie falling apart, etc.

AH could foresee that their status as world power was going and were determined to risk a European war just to prove a point.

Germany had issue the "blank cheque" and had left it to AH to take action.

Now, if it is correct that Germany and AH had decided that a reckoning with Russia had to come at some point, then this occasion would be as good as any.


But was it really that simple?

AH had an alliance with Italy (3-kaizer-bund), but were trying to "square the circle" creating an alliance with both Roumania and Bulgaria at the same time (really!)

Russia did not have a pact or alliance with Serbia.

Germany (and the rest of the world ) had expected an immediate action from AH. It could be "wipe-out", occupation of Serbia, partioning it out to all neighbors, etc. As long as it would be fast, before Russia could react.

Instead AH decided to mobilise some forces, which was hampered as it happened during the "harvest leave" for the army (sic!).

Serbia's army was occupied in Macedonia, its latest conquest. And was not particular big anyway

OK, the question is:

1) Could AH have invaded Serbia with its forces at that time without mobilising any additional forces and have settled the matter.

2) Was it more of a police action than a military action?

3) What were the forces involved from both sides (I can't find anything)

4) If it had been over in 2-3 days, would Russia even have had a chance to get involved?

5) Would WWI have awaited another opportuntiy?

Ivan
 
Austria-Hungary could not have invaded immediately as its mobilization process was tremendously cumbersome and there would have been a long delay from declaration of mobilization to the start of sustained combat.
 
But without the blank cheque from Kaiser Wilhelm would they have attacked Serbia for fear of Russian retaliation?

No. Oh, there'd likely still be an ultimatum and you'd see Serbia bend the knee on most conditions (as it did OTL). Possibly a conference where Austria tries to ram down a couple of more conditions down Serbia's throat in the process.

And that would be it ... for the time being.
 
Apparantly Serbia's army was busy "pacifying" Macedonia, so their (small) army was not deployed in the North.

Would it even have been necessary for AH to mobilise? couyldn't they have done it with their forces available?

Does anyone have any tables on relative military strenghts?

Ivan
 
"After the war Serbia had a population of 4.5 million. All males aged between 21 and 46 were liable for compulsory military service and by 1914 the Serbian Army contained about 260,000 men."

"Austria and Hungary both had their own standing armies. In 1914 Austria had 40,000 soldiers and Hungary had 30,000. There was also the Imperial and Royal Army that was drawn from all parts of the Empire. The 350,000 men in this army gave their allegiance direct to Emperor Franz Josef."

Link: http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/FWWaustriaA.htm

In conclusion, I think it's unlikely for Serbia to fall in three days...
 

Flubber

Banned
1) Could AH have invaded Serbia with its forces at that time without mobilising any additional forces and have settled the matter.


From what I understand and I could very well be wrong, the Hungarian half of the empire has to sign-off on any military actions, whether mobilization is involved or not.

The empire's PM for Hungary, Istvan Tisza, was initially against going to war with Serbia. He wanted proof of Serbia's complicity, felt that German support was an absolute prerequisite, and was also fearful that the "Little Entente" of Romania and Bulgaria would try to grab Transylvania while the empire was focused on Serbia.

Wilhelm II's famous blank check took care of two of Tisza's requirements; the empire would have German support and the Little Entente was warned off. The third, proof of Serbian involvement, took a few weeks longer but Princip and his co-conspirators hid nothing from the empire's investigators.

With his three requirements filled, Tisza signed off on the ultimatum with the proviso that Serbia wouldn't be destroyed. After the ultimatum lapsed, Tisza then supported the declaration of war without any further reservations.

A more bellicose PM for Hungary might have signed off faster on the various stages of the ultimatum-declaration of war process and shortened the OTL's nearly five week period, but I doubt the empire could have reacted within days.
 
As I remember it, Franz-Ferdinand was in Bosnia because he attended the annual army exercizes in Bosnia. That would mean that there would at least be some kind of force ready for immediate action.
 
But without the blank cheque from Kaiser Wilhelm would they have attacked Serbia for fear of Russian retaliation?
Yes. The Austrian council of ministers had already resolved on the ultimatum, which was designed to provoke a war, before Hoyos delivered the news that Germany would back them.

The Habsburg government had been burned by Germany twice in the past two years over Balkan affairs: after both Balkan Wars, the Austrians were champing at the bit to intervene, as Serbia was territorially aggrandizing itself and creating an immense threat to Austrian security. Both times, the Germans restrained their ally from doing anything in the name of Franco-German detente. Both times, Austro-German negotiation failed to materially change the outcome - Serbia just got larger and more powerful. Therefore, by 1914, the Habsburgs had decided that the German alliance was effectively useless. If the Germans supported them over Serbia, great. If not, well, screw them anyway: Austria would take the actions its government thought it needed to ensure its survival.

While recognizing that the worst-case scenario, a war against the Entente powers and Serbia and Italy without the support of Germany, would be utterly disastrous to the Danubian monarchy, Berchtold and Franz Josef did not particularly care. They were not even all that sanguine about it; the Kaiser's remarks at the time tended towards the après moi le déluge variety.
 
Would the 260,000 Serbian army force not be after total mobilisation? Even so, the majority of Serbian forces were im Macedonia on "pacifying" missions.

If AH had some 30-40,00o troops ready in peace time, it should be possible to do something serious.

Belgrad had a total population of 100,000 in 1914. Not much of a capital.

Apparantly, the Serbian military were convinced they would be no match for AH.

Tisza did delay it a bit, but it was more form than substance.

Was the AH mobilisation done out of the perception that Russia would be involved, wherefore it was not as much mobilisation for war with Serbia, but more getting ready for war with Russia?

After all, Russia was the first to mobilise, making sure it would end up in a European war.

Ivan
 

Flubber

Banned
Tisza did delay it a bit, but it was more form than substance.


Really? Did you notice that all three of Tisza's requirements were fulfilled before the empire went to war? Hungary needed to sign off and Tisza was the only "cabinet" member who didn't automatically call for war.

It took the empire nearly five weeks after Sarajevo to declare war, their mobilization didn't require all that time, the blank check was issued early on, and, once it was finally issued, the ultimatum had a 48 hour waiting period. Why did it take the empire so long if not internal political wrangling?

Hopefully wiking will see this thread and answer the question.
 

rohala

Banned
I admit I do not have knowledge of the subject but I have to point some obvious misconceptions here.

Conscript armies of the time were designed to not be combat ready. The active force in peace time represented only a fraction of an army's full war time establishment. Units were echeloned deep inside national territory, usually with mobilisation as the basic criterion.
Mobilisation does not refer singly to the calling of reservist soldiers, but also to animals -to an extent greater than personell- and the collection of food supplies.
It was always assumed that there would be time to mobilise. Armies made their plans accordingly.
As such, I doubt the Austrians had any significant force capable of deploying immediately or with short notice. Even more importantly, Serbia was more efficient in its mobilisation. Historically, Serbia put forces on the filed faster and in greater numbers than Austria.

Second, armies of the time moved slowly. Even if Serbia was utterly defenseless, it would take the Austrians way more than "3 days" to overrun it. Rather more like 3 weeks.

Third, I highly doubt the claim that Serbia's army was fighting any serious resistance in "Macedonia". Perhaps the bulk of Serbia's formation was indeed deployed to the south, against -the very recently fought enemy- Bulgaria.
 
It apparantly took AH that long as the army was on "harvest leave" as the first thing.

That said, they would still not be ready after the issuing of the ultimatum. The plan was to issue the ultimatum, then wait for it to expire (48 hours) and only then start mobilisation.

The sluggishnes guaranteed that it could not be contained and that Great Power mediation was called for, exactly what Germany did not want.

It also gave Russia the chance to get deeply involved and not just facing a "fait accompli".

Serbia had not mobilised anything at the time of the ultimatum.

Let's look at a time line like this:

28 June: Assassination
29 June: Conrad and Berchtold meeting: decision to make war on Serbia
2-3 July: Policy document drawn up (less Tisza's comments)
6 July: Conrad discovers that the army is on "harvest leave" nearly 50% of the army not available.
9 July: Berchtold to see Franz Josef. Ultimatum decided (it was discussed)
10 July: Ultimatum issued
12 July: invasion by whatever forces available.
13 July: Belgrade occupied (Serbia had decided not to defend Belgrade)
15 July: Serbian government kicked out, puppet government formed
16 July: war over. AH occupying the Belgrade strip plus border regions only.

AH stated they had no territorial claims on Serbia.

Remember as well, Serbia had not called up any forces.

It does not leave Russia any room for intervention.

With 2-3 AH divisions against the 2-3 Serbian regiments available, it might be possible.

Comments?
 
Why did it take the empire so long if not internal political wrangling?
An international-relations miscalculation. The Central Powers hoped for a limited war, and also wanted to use the crisis to break the Franco-Russian Dual Alliance if at all possible. This meant waiting until after the late-July French state visit to Petersburg, so that the French could not coordinate policy so easily with the Russians. Of course, there was never any doubt in either Russia or France that the two would fight together, and indeed the machinery had been in place for years; if anything, the decision solidified the alliance even more. Even worse, the French already knew about the Austro-German plan due to SIGINT in Italy long before the state visit.
 
According to Ponting, the other aspect is that the diplomatic world worked via telegram.

It would take a few couple of hours to get a telegram from Berlin to London. Then add coding and decoding on top of, and the process gets pretty lengthy.

The other aspect is that a lot of interaction was through the ambassadors. So, the "real" leaders were not in direct contact and their instructions were in for interpretations.

It is also proven that some of the ambassadors lied or at least were not 100% truthful, telling their governments what they wanted to hear or had their own interpretations based on their own bias.

These things will surely cause a lot of confusion and miscalculations.

PS: My comment above: It should have been the triple-alliance.

One of Tisza's fears was that AH would incorporate parts of Serbia into AH. That would have pushed the balance between Hungarians and slavs in the double-monarchy to Hungaria's disadvantage. With more slavs, Hungarians might be forced to cede influence.

Tisza also tried to avoid more Bulgaria-Romania war, but that became pretty impossible.

Ivan
 
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