The Reign of Caliph al-Qadir
In order to distract from the growing factionalism in the caliphate, khalifah al-Qadir resumed the annual summer raids against the Roman Empire, beginning in 786 CE, with himself taking personal command. The army for the first raid was comprised mostly of Khurasanis and Arabs from al-Sham, and commanding the army alongside the caliph was Harthama ibn A’yan. The expedition departed west from Tarsus and besieged Seleukeia; the city was captured, sacked, and looted. The Romans responded by dispatching a fleet which raided al-Iskandarun while the Abbasid army was returning to Tarsus. The next year’s raid was less successful; smaller Roman units continually harassed the Abbasid ghuzat, preventing them from effectively sieging the fort of Podandos and thus reducing the amount of loot they were able to seize from the surrounding area. Inspired by Abd al-Wahhab ibn Ibrahim al-Abbasi’s naval campaigns against Sind, the raid of 788 CE was carried out by a fleet. The town of Kibyrrha, for which the Roman Thema Kibyrrhaioton was named, was raided and many of its docked ships destroyed. This annual alternation between naval and land raids became the norm for the Abbasid Caliphate outside of periods of truce with the Romans.
Meanwhile in Ruma al-Gharbiya the new wali, second heir Abd al-Malik ibn Salih al-Abbasi, was attempting to cultivate relations with the Banu Fihr of al-Andalus as he had been instructed to by his brother. Caliph al-Qadir was not naïve enough to expect the full subordination of al-Andalus, for they had been autonomous for too long, but he at least sought their support in case of any complications for his rule in the central Dar al-Islam. An opportunity presented itself in 787 CE when wali al-Qasim ibn Yusuf ibn Abd al-Rahman al-Fihri died during a hunting trip with Muhammad Qarulamun ibn Baban al-Qarula and other courtiers from Qurtuba. Abd al-Malik ibn Salih supported al-Qasim’s brother Muhammad as the new wali, and made it clear that he acted with the authority of Caliph al-Qadir. Almost all of the Banu Fihr accepted Muhammad ibn Yusuf, as he had been his brother’s deputy throughout his tenure, but the deceased governor’s eldest son Habib ibn al-Qasim disagreed and came out in revolt. His following was small however because it only attracted support from some muwalladun. Consequently the revolt was easily crushed personally by Muhammad ibn Yusuf, with aid from soldiers from Ruma al-Gharbiya.
The death of al-Qasim ibn Yusuf al-Fihri also reignited a situation that had been dormant since the Islamic conquest of southern al-Faranj, then known as Aquitaine: the status of the province of al-Faranj and Muhammad Qarulamun ibn Baban al-Qarula. Upon the Frankish prince’s defection he had demanded control of Aquitaine. Following the war’s end Qarulamun was instated as the wali of al-Faranj but the province was subordinated to the authority of al-Andalus and its governor. This was unproblematic during the tenure of al-Qasim ibn Yusuf due to the close relationship between the two amirs, but afterwards Qarulamun ibn Baban travelled to Rabina to petition Abd al-Malik ibn Salih to separate al-Faranj from al-Andalus. In ordinary circumstances the Abbasid prince would have relished the opportunity to bring more territory under closer supervision from the central caliphal government. However his directive from the caliph regarding the Fihrids was clear. So instead Abd al-Malik gambled by revealing his orders to Qarulamun and promising to raise his status in future if he rendered service to the Abbasids when called upon. Apparently Qarulamun’s loyalty was to al-Qasim ibn Yusuf alone rather than the whole of the Banu Fihr, as he accepted the Abbasid governor-prince’s terms. With the matter settled, Qarulamun ibn Baban returned to Rabat al-Faranj to resume governing his province.
The Abbasid Caliphate was struck with a crisis in 789 CE. Abd al-Wahhab ibn Ibrahim al-Abbasi, first heir to the khilafah and wali of Sind, died in a naval battle against the Shia rebels who controlled most of the province. The governor’s death thus elevated the caliph’s brother Abd al-Malik to the position of first heir; the prospect of the caliphate returning to a hereditary succession was therefore a distinct probability. The khalifah was obliged to convene another shura to elect a new second heir, but weeks passed without the summons. Finally al-Qadir called for a shura and the realm’s elite breathed a collective sigh of relief. The goodwill the caliph had accrued for his personal victory over the Shia revolt had rapidly dissipated due to his centralisation of power into the hands of the Banu Salih and the tardiness with which he convened the shura. Consequently he could only rely on the support of his close relatives and direct allies, and so his opponents were able to seize the initiative in the meeting. They immediately demanded that Musa ibn Isa al-Rashid ibn Musa, son of the previous caliph, be appointed as the second heir. Al-Qadir however was still vexed over the lack of gratitude Musa ibn Isa al-Rashid had shown for his appointment to the lucrative and relatively stable governorship of Fars. The Salihids countered with the candidacy of Abu Abdallah Abdallah ibn al-Mansur; the anti-Salihid faction opposed him because even though he was not of Salih ibn Ali’s lineage he was very much seen as a lackey of their family, in addition to being incompetent. To break the deadlock al-Qadir proposed Abu Ya’qub Ishaq ibn Sulayman ibn Ali as a compromise candidate; Ishaq had been governor of a few minor provinces and so far avoided had most of the factional strife. As with many compromises no one was enthused with the outcome, but both parties reluctantly agreed and went their separate ways.
Caliph al-Qadir’s immediate concern was the appointment of a new wali of Sind. Though Imam Abdallah al-Ashtar had died shortly before Abd al-Wahhab ibn Ibrahim, the khalifah was under no illusions as to the ease of re-conquering Sind. The Imam had been succeeded by his young and vigorous son Abu al-Hasan Muhammad, who had expended a lot of effort into integrating the vassal rajas into the state bureaucracy and military. Even though the Shia state was an enemy of the Abbasid Caliphate, they had emulated the caliphate’s system of a standing army of professional soldiers who were paid a regular wage. After all, the caliphate (though divided into three periods) was the only Islamic state to have existed to this point (not including the Berber tribes of the Maghreb). Therefore any breakaway or secessionist states were going to imitate the caliphate in terms of its political structure. Due to Sind’s strategic place in the profitable Indian Ocean trading network, the Shia army and navy had grown considerable indeed. Furthermore the eastern provinces of the caliphate were still under the control of the Khurasanis and their allies, meaning that a pro-Salihid governor, or at least one who appeared to be so, was unlikely to gain support from his neighbouring governors in any campaigns against the Shia. With all of this in mind, al-Qadir appointed Abu Ya’qub Ishaq ibn Sulayman ibn Ali as the new wali of Sind and ordered him to refrain from grandiose or ambitious plans of re-conquest. He was instead to maintain the territorial integrity of the province, which in reality was limited to Makran, and to limit his military activity to raids. Ishaq ibn Sulayman found this plan to be agreeable.
Caliph al-Qadir’s relationship with the bureaucracy of Baghdad started off poorly when he abandoned them during the Shia revolt at the beginning of his reign. The relationship deteriorated even further when the prominent Khurasani Yahya ibn Khalid al-Baramika was appointed as the wazir. While mawali (plural of mawla) and dhimmis had served in the caliphal bureaucracy of the Rashidun and Umayyad periods, the Abbasid period saw a marked increase in the representation of these two groups; many of the mawali bureaucrats were Khurasani in origin. The bureaucracy as a whole had expanded and diversified during the Abbasid period and as such could be considered to be a political faction of its own. Even though the caliph had nominal control of the administration, the size of it gave it an autonomy which was exploited fully by Yahya ibn Khalid. During his term as wazir there was an influx of employees from Khurasan and Iran in general. Alongside more members of the Barmakid family, some of the notable bureaucrats include: Vandad Hurmuzd, son of the ispahbadh Khurshid of Tabaristan;[1] Sahl ibn Zadanfarrukh and his sons Fadl and Hasan; and Tahir ibn al-Husayn.[2] Yahya ibn Khalid and his allies subtly undermined the power of Caliph al-Qadir: army deployments were delayed, provincial revenues misplaced, and so on, all with the goal of making al-Qadir look ineffective. The khalifah was not entirely powerless against the bureaucracy however. The mazalim court was a forum for the subjects of the caliphate to interface directly with the caliph and appeal the decisions of lesser courts or accuse members of the administration of negligence and misconduct. The latter function was weaponised by al-Qadir in his long-running dispute with Yahya ibn Khalid and the bureaucracy, leading to a number of the latter’s allies being convicted and punished; some were even executed. In 795 CE al-Qadir was poisoned by one of his concubines. Though she was executed before she could be interrogated, it is likely that Yahya ibn Khalid had plotted the assassination.
[1] Without the murder of Abu Muslim and the subsequent revolt of Sunpadh, the Dabuyid dynasty don’t get the opportunity to claim their ill-fated attempt at independence from the caliphate. Therefore they remain a tributary state.
[2] Founder of the OTL Tahirid dynasty of governors.