Nice to see this is still going. With Britain and France being more pally with Italy will Mussolini feel emboldened to make more land grabs, maybe even attacking Albania.
"A Greater Britain"
- Thread starter EdT
- Start date
After his embarresment over his North African adventures, and his awareness that a hostile Hitler contributed to it, I'd think that Mussolini would see a greater need to prepare to defend against trouble from the North rather than make it in the East, unless he saw it as a glorified live fire exercise to whip the Italian army into something approaching shape. With no significant threat from Britain and France in the Med, we can proably also expect more resouces to go into the airforce and army and less into the navy.
Who says Mussolini can't do both? By the mid 1930's Albania was pretty much a de facto Italian protectorate anyway, and while it's unlikely that Mussolini will formally annex the place to avoid irritating the British and French it's still very much under Italian control. Actually I feel that Mussolini will be less likely to try and land grabs after Abyssinia- ITTL he gave up the war at the first sign of trouble (as he almost did OTL) and as Altaran points out there's the ever-present threat from the north to consider. After the remilitarisation of the Rhineland (which'll happen in the next installment) Mussolini will be even more aware of the fact that he can't afford to be messing around in colonial adventures when there's a major threat on the other side of the alps.
Oh, and while I'm here- have a quick map showing the border changes in Abyssinia after the war of 1935...
Oh, and while I'm here- have a quick map showing the border changes in Abyssinia after the war of 1935...
Thanks 
- One problem with this TL is that there isn't a huge amount of scope for map-making yet, as the divergences are generally political rather then military; it also doesn't help that I'm going for detail so we're only five years from the first major consequence of the PoD. All going well this will soon change however...
- One problem with this TL is that there isn't a huge amount of scope for map-making yet, as the divergences are generally political rather then military; it also doesn't help that I'm going for detail so we're only five years from the first major consequence of the PoD. All going well this will soon change however...Awesome map EdT. It didn't mention it but I would presume that Italy would be guaranteed transit rights through the portions of Abyssinia not directly under their control? (Yes the rest is under League Mandate but France and Britian may not always be friendly towards Italy, and a rail line from Eritrea to Somaliland would be good for logistics, etc.)
While the rest of Abyssinia would be League mandate, Italy in this TL is still a member of the League. France and Britain couldn't try anything on their own without Italy raising a fuss, and they are all partners in the same organisation, so transit rights I'd imagine to be a fait accompli.
Excellent timeline, by the by! A good understanding of Mosley's character, a very smart person often undone by his own impatience. It seems in this ATL that his impatience is a virtue. Mussolini was a socialist before he led Italian Fascism, so in Mosley he probably saw a young version of himself, which explains how chummy the both of them are. Chances are Mussolini himself will be taking lessons from Mosley later in this timeline.
Excellent timeline, by the by! A good understanding of Mosley's character, a very smart person often undone by his own impatience. It seems in this ATL that his impatience is a virtue. Mussolini was a socialist before he led Italian Fascism, so in Mosley he probably saw a young version of himself, which explains how chummy the both of them are. Chances are Mussolini himself will be taking lessons from Mosley later in this timeline.
Shadow Knight- Yes, Italy will have transit rights. As Rasputin points out Italy is still a member of the league and is on friendly terms with the British and French, so these sorts of issues will not be a problem in the slightest.
Wendell- Yeah, if I recall correctly one of the Franco-Italian agreements made OTL in January 1935 concerned a French project for a north-south railway. Italy bought quite a few shares in the company and will have done the same ITTL- I'll try and dig out the reference. I wouldn't be too surprised if the Italians try and build a railway of their own as well in this TL, especially as they've had their economic control of the south cemented.
Rasputin- Glad you approve! Mosley strikes me as a fascinating person, one of those incredibly talented and idiosyncratic mavericks that British politics occasionally throws up but rarely actually get into power. Powell is another who comes to mind... In this TL a few different decisions and a bit of luck on his part means that he's able to be the man of the moment. Mussolini and Mosley see a lot of the other in themselves and have cemented a friendship that never quite reached its potential OTL- Although having said that, an obstensibly left-wing Prime Minister having a strong personal friendship with the rightist leader of a foreign ally will bring a series of problems when the international situation becomes more dangerous...
Wendell- Yeah, if I recall correctly one of the Franco-Italian agreements made OTL in January 1935 concerned a French project for a north-south railway. Italy bought quite a few shares in the company and will have done the same ITTL- I'll try and dig out the reference. I wouldn't be too surprised if the Italians try and build a railway of their own as well in this TL, especially as they've had their economic control of the south cemented.
Rasputin- Glad you approve! Mosley strikes me as a fascinating person, one of those incredibly talented and idiosyncratic mavericks that British politics occasionally throws up but rarely actually get into power. Powell is another who comes to mind... In this TL a few different decisions and a bit of luck on his part means that he's able to be the man of the moment. Mussolini and Mosley see a lot of the other in themselves and have cemented a friendship that never quite reached its potential OTL- Although having said that, an obstensibly left-wing Prime Minister having a strong personal friendship with the rightist leader of a foreign ally will bring a series of problems when the international situation becomes more dangerous...
When I first started making the map, I was expecting to give Italy a lot more territory- but then I came across the exact text of the Hoare-Laval proposal (it's here) and actually a surprisingly small amount of territory was conceded by the Abyssinians. I've followed the territorial descriptions in the text as best I can and I'm pretty sure that it's accurate- but yeah, I'm slightly surprised as well at how relatively little the Italians get.
What would be important would not be the amount of land but rather the resources it contained. Italy would be after mineral resources and arable land, and chances are both would be concentrated in a few areas. As far as I know it was Hitler who had the obsession about capturing as much territory as possible. I believe Mussolini was (marginally) more realistic, since by 1935 he was pretty used to playing the internationalist game, and had presumably learnt to distinguish economic influence from direct control. It was only in Abyssinia that he would have spied an opportunity to have both.
Just throwing out reasons here.
Just throwing out reasons here.
Part 9- “Unless you are ambitious, you do not make progress”
(Taken from “The Mosley Era” by Tobias Griffin, Picador 1987)
“..Mosley entered the New Year on a surge of popularity, and after the domestic and foreign successes of the previous year there seemed little that could stand in the way of the Labour government winning a historic second term. The Conservatives under Eden had never quite managed to recover from their defeat of four years before, and Tory politicians still struggled to reconcile their vehement opposition to ‘Mosleyism’ with the programme’s evident popularity in the country at large. This led to constant infighting within Conservative ranks on a range of issues, the traditional Tories on one side being opposed by veteran rebels like Churchill and young modernisers such as Macmillan on the other. In any event the dimly hoped-for ‘spring miracle’ that would bring down the Mosley government never materialised, and in March the Prime Minister went to Buckingham palace and asked the King to dissolve parliament…
…The campaign was generally regarded as one of the most boring in living memory, as from the start there was little doubt as to the outcome. The flare-up of violence in Palestine halfway through the campaign[1] led to renewed foreign policy debate, but as consensus was soon reached on the issue it had little bearing on the overall result. With this sole exception, the entire campaign was successfully framed by Labour as a vote of confidence in the government’s policies in the previous four years, a stroke that made campaigning extremely easy, although at the expense of turnout…”
(Taken from “The Encyclopaedia of 20th Century British Politics”, Eds. June + Peterson. Longman, 1999)
“1936 ELECTION: As had long been expected, the 1936 Election was called for May 1st. In contrast to the previous contest in 1932 campaigning was desultory and muted, as there was little doubt of the overall outcome and the Conservative party were clearly still incapable of mounting a significant challenge to Labour. The result saw Oswald Mosley’s government returned with an increased majority, as well as a further fall in the working class Tory vote and the continued decline of the Liberals at the expense of the two main parties.
The results were as follows:
Labour: 342 (+24)
Conservative: 234 (-17)
Liberal: 28 (-8)
Independent: 2 (+1)
(Taken from “The Mosley Era” by Tobias Griffin, Picador 1987)
“With the election won and another term in office secured, the government felt able to continue with “business as usual”. Even the traditional post-election reshuffle was muted, with Attlee being sent to India as the new Viceroy and Graham taking his place at the foreign office. The new Home secretary was Herbert Morrison[2]. Mosley’s main victory however was not against the Conservatives, but rather an internal one- with his majority now enhanced, the perennially rebellious ILP were less of a threat then ever before and now had no control over the government’s ability to pass legislation[3]. The removal of the ILP’s theoretical veto meant that Mosley was no longer obliged to give great consideration to the views of the far left, a luxury that he would increasingly avail himself of in the years to come…
...Just before Parliament departed for the summer recess, the government found the legislative time to finally pass the mammoth Government of India Act. The Act was the result of years of intensive negotiations and had been the subject of endless debates in the Commons, where hard-line Conservative members deplored its provisions and claimed that it would lead to the break-up of the Empire. With the resignation of Anthony Eden as Tory leader in late May however, Labour had found the perfect time to get the bill though Parliament with the minimum of controversy, the Conservatives being distracted by choosing a new leader and unable to do much more then rage impotently from the opposition benches…”
(Taken from “The Encyclopaedia of 20th Century British Politics”, Eds. June + Peterson. Longman, 1999)
“1936 GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT: The 1936 Government of India Act was the result of a long and torturous process of consultation and compromise between the British government, the princely states of India and Indian politicians themselves. It promised the imminent elevation of India to Dominion Status, and conditionally established a Federal government, provided that half the provinces accepted the proposals. Clement Attlee was in charge of overseeing the implementation of the Act. It was the longest bill ever passed by Parliament.[4]”
(Taken from “Power, Politics and the Olympic Games” by Peter Scott, Tribune 1989)
“…Ignoring the activity of the worker’s internationals, the Berlin Olympics went ahead on schedule. Foreign critics continued to object however; the British Manchester Guardian called for a boycott and was appalled when it was revealed to great popular acclaim that the then-Prime Minister Oswald Mosley was intending to compete[5]; ‘Germany is seizing ideological control of the games’… As far as the Nazi government was concerned, the Games brought about a period of international good feeling. Visitors left with memories of grand parties; in the words of Oswald Mosley to his wife[6]; “It was a fantastic Olympics, spectacular! I had such fun!” The talks between Mosley and Hitler were also regarded to have been a success, although nothing substantive was agreed. Nonetheless, Hitler saw the opportunity to build relations with Britain as a fringe benefit of the Olympic phenomenon…”
(Taken from “My Life” by Oswald Mosley, Longman 1961)
“…Boxing was my first love and I only turned to fencing, in which my main successes were won, when competition boxing was forbidden to me. The headmaster of Winchester tolerated the sport within the school but would not allow any of us to go to the public schools competition, on which I had set my heart with some assurance of success from my instructor. Yet as so often in life, reverse and disappointment turn to success and happiness in the longer range of experience. International fencing, representing Britain in sport and entering into the camaraderies of the great salles d'armes throughout Europe was a joy of my manhood, and in my intellectual maturity gave me some sense of the fullness of life in the Hellenic gymnasium; ‘et ego in Arcadia vixi’…
…1913 was my last serious chance at the world championship for the foil, for after that I was never again first-rate. At the end of the war the full use of my legs was gone for good. It was ten years before I returned to the sport at all, and then at first only for exercise. Gradually though I discovered that by adapting my style to my new condition I could be quite effective with the epee, the heavy duelling sword, which required less mobility. I was twice to be runner-up to different champions with this weapon in the British championship, and in 1936 was fortunate enough to be a member of our international team…In Berlin I was fortunate enough to reach the round deciding the bronze medal after being bested in the semi-final by one Franco Riccardi, a master fencer and the deserving eventual gold medallist. There I came up against another Italian of a most unorthodox and disconcerting action who upset all my classic preconceptions[7]. I was down three hits to one, out of a total of five up. I then threw all text-book plans to the wind, and decided to mix it with him and rely on sheer speed and constant attack. I took the next four hits and won the round and the bronze. All these things are good lessons for life; never hold too long to methods which do not work, be firm and fixed in principles, but infinitely flexible and adaptable in method…
…An interview with Hitler was exactly the opposite to my first encounter with Mussolini. There was no element of posture. At Berlin in August 1936 we talked for an hour before lunch at this first meeting. He entered the small room in his apartments quite simply; we sat down and talked with the aid of an interpreter, for I could speak no German until I learnt it during my retirement. At first Hitler was almost inert in his chair, pale, seemingly exhausted. He came suddenly to life when I said that war between Britain and Germany would be a terrible disaster, and used the simile of two splendid young men fighting each other until they both fall exhausted and bleeding to the ground, when the jackals of the world would mount triumphant on their bodies. His face flushed and he launched with much vigour into some of his main themes, but in the normal manner of any politician moved by strong convictions. The hypnotic manner was entirely absent; perhaps I was an unsuitable subject; in any case, no effect of that kind whatsoever was produced. He was simple, and treated me throughout the occasion with a strange, almost feminine charm…”
(Taken from “The Spanish Intervention” by Ian Allerton, Picador 1998)
“… The final orders, sent out by General Mola in coded telegrams, provided for the Army of Africa to revolt at 5am on the 18th August, and the army in mainland Spain to rise 24 hours later. The difference in timing was to allow Spanish Morocco to be secured before the Army of Africa could be transported to the Andalusian coast by the Navy… The rebels could hardly have failed to take Spanish Morocco. There were only a handful of Republican officers, while the Foreign legionaries obeyed the order to rise without question. The Spanish workers, who had no arms and little contact with the indigenous population, were completely isolated…
Things were different on the mainland however. Here the success of the rebels varied immensely, and depended as much on luck and nerve as planning and military skill. In Oviedo General De Llano managed to convince the local garrison to join him and secure the city entirely through his own verve and ruthlessness, while in Tetuan the town fell to the plotters after the Guardia Civil arrested the local governor and shot prominent trade unionists. In a reversal of roles, in Carlist Pamplona the local garrison remained loyal but the population rose against them, a crowd of red-bereted farmers storming the barracks shouting ‘Viva Christo Rey!”. Observing the scene, a French observer said that he would not have been surprised to have seen an auto de fe of heretics occurring at the same time…
Unfortunately for the plotters however, these victories were not widespread or shocking enough to topple the Republic by coup de main. In Barcelona the conspirators completely underestimated the CNT-FAI and found themselves besieged, while in Valladolid the local garrison split down the middle and fought itself ferociously until the railwaymen of the UGT came to the aid of the loyalists and managed to crush the rebels. Crucially, in the strategically vital city of Seville the plotters failed to make any headway whatsoever, General Paxtot and his few co-conspirators being arrested by their own men when they ordered a march on the centre of the city…
…It was not until three days later that clear fronts became recognisable and the situation clarified. The rebels had managed to secure Morocco, the Balearics save Minorca, a strip of territory in the west consisting of Galicia, Leon and parts of western Castile, and a handful of other towns scattered across the country. The government still controlled the majority of the mainland however, and had the advantage that the rebel areas were isolated from each other on the periphery. The failure of the rebels to secure the Navy further added to the strategic difficulties of Generals Mola and Sanjuro…[8]”
(Taken from “The road to war” by John Coombs, Picador 1979)
“…Of the three most important neutral governments Britain played the most important role. France was alarmed by Hitler’s rearmament and, despite having signed a defensive pact with Italy relied principally on Great Britain for mutual defence. So when on 19th August the Spanish Republic turned to France for arms, the sympathetic left-of centre government of Leon Blum looked to Britain for guidance. For his part, south of the Alps Mussolini found himself naturally sympathetic to the rebels, but was wary both of Hitler’s vocal support for them and of endangering relations with Mosley’s Labour government…. With both powers looking to Britain to take a lead, the British will to act proved crucial. While Mosley and Attlee were presciently concerned about the threat posed to the Republic by the extreme Left, they nevertheless agreed that Sanjuro’s rebels should not be allowed to overthrow a democracy and concluded that it was the responsibility of the Locarno Powers[9] to ensure stability in Spain. Over the objections of the Foreign Office then, on the 25th Downing St agreed with France that arms should be sold to the Republic as soon as possible. Meanwhile in Geneva British delegates to the League proposed an embargo on the rebel-held areas of Spain, to be enforced by the Royal Navy[10]…
[1] This is the beginning of the great Arab uprising of 1936-1939, of which more later.
[2] ITTL Morrison never lost his seat in 1931 and remained in Parliament. From 1932-1936 he was at the War Ministry.
[3] Mosley didn't have too much to fear from the ILP from 1932-1936 as he managed to effectively split the group between loyalists and radicals anyway- he was a member himself, which helped matters, and the government programme of legislation in the period didn't leave much scope for more radical action. However now he has no need to control the ILP it will gradually become more of a coherent body, and this will cause problems in the future.
[4] So, how is this Act different from OTL's equivalent? Well, it's more wide-reaching and has a decent chance of success, as the Mosley government is more willing to compromise then the National government was OTL and this has paid dividends. Attlee as Viceroy will help matters as well, as he'll use his energy to far better effect then Lord Linlithgow did OTL. India isn't sorted out by any means, but will evolve rather differently ITTL. Dominion status by 1940 is all but assured, for example.
[5] Oswald Mosley fencing for the British Olympic team? It's not actually at all far-fetched- OTL Mosley was a skilled fencer and competed on the international level as late as 1937. Besides, Mosley being Mosley he'd never pass up the chance to be all swashbuckling in the name of his country...
[6] This is a slight inaccuracy- Mosley won't marry Diana Mitford for a while yet ITTL, at this stage they're merely engaged.
[7] This would be Giancarlo Cornaggia-Medici, who OTL got the bronze medal in the Epee for Italy.
[8] Why is the "Generals' rising" not as successful as OTL? Well, a series of reasons really. One factor is that the Royal Navy doesn't allow the conspirators to use phone exchanges in Gibraltar to coordinate their actions as OTL, so the coup attempt is a lot less well-organised. As well as this, butterflies from the slightly different political situation mean that different generals are stationed in different places- Mola for example is in Saragossa instead of Pamplona, which puts him further from the Carlist centres of support that he was able to help coordinate OTL. De Llano for his part finds himself in Asturias instead of Seville, far from anything important. This puts the conspirators in a less advantageous potion then OTL. There's also the whole luck factor as well- ITTL the conspirators don't get quite as many lucky breaks as their OTL equivalents got.
[9] The "Locarno Powers" is the term increasingly used to describe the Anglo-Franco-Italian Bloc of the period. It's not strictly accurate, but since when has that ever stopped anyone?
[10] OTL the Anglo-French response to the Spanish civil war was driven almost entirely by Britain and Eden as Foreign secretary- things are the same here, but of course Mosley has different ideas about what should be done.
(Taken from “The Mosley Era” by Tobias Griffin, Picador 1987)
“..Mosley entered the New Year on a surge of popularity, and after the domestic and foreign successes of the previous year there seemed little that could stand in the way of the Labour government winning a historic second term. The Conservatives under Eden had never quite managed to recover from their defeat of four years before, and Tory politicians still struggled to reconcile their vehement opposition to ‘Mosleyism’ with the programme’s evident popularity in the country at large. This led to constant infighting within Conservative ranks on a range of issues, the traditional Tories on one side being opposed by veteran rebels like Churchill and young modernisers such as Macmillan on the other. In any event the dimly hoped-for ‘spring miracle’ that would bring down the Mosley government never materialised, and in March the Prime Minister went to Buckingham palace and asked the King to dissolve parliament…
…The campaign was generally regarded as one of the most boring in living memory, as from the start there was little doubt as to the outcome. The flare-up of violence in Palestine halfway through the campaign[1] led to renewed foreign policy debate, but as consensus was soon reached on the issue it had little bearing on the overall result. With this sole exception, the entire campaign was successfully framed by Labour as a vote of confidence in the government’s policies in the previous four years, a stroke that made campaigning extremely easy, although at the expense of turnout…”
(Taken from “The Encyclopaedia of 20th Century British Politics”, Eds. June + Peterson. Longman, 1999)
“1936 ELECTION: As had long been expected, the 1936 Election was called for May 1st. In contrast to the previous contest in 1932 campaigning was desultory and muted, as there was little doubt of the overall outcome and the Conservative party were clearly still incapable of mounting a significant challenge to Labour. The result saw Oswald Mosley’s government returned with an increased majority, as well as a further fall in the working class Tory vote and the continued decline of the Liberals at the expense of the two main parties.
The results were as follows:
Labour: 342 (+24)
Conservative: 234 (-17)
Liberal: 28 (-8)
Independent: 2 (+1)
(Taken from “The Mosley Era” by Tobias Griffin, Picador 1987)
“With the election won and another term in office secured, the government felt able to continue with “business as usual”. Even the traditional post-election reshuffle was muted, with Attlee being sent to India as the new Viceroy and Graham taking his place at the foreign office. The new Home secretary was Herbert Morrison[2]. Mosley’s main victory however was not against the Conservatives, but rather an internal one- with his majority now enhanced, the perennially rebellious ILP were less of a threat then ever before and now had no control over the government’s ability to pass legislation[3]. The removal of the ILP’s theoretical veto meant that Mosley was no longer obliged to give great consideration to the views of the far left, a luxury that he would increasingly avail himself of in the years to come…
...Just before Parliament departed for the summer recess, the government found the legislative time to finally pass the mammoth Government of India Act. The Act was the result of years of intensive negotiations and had been the subject of endless debates in the Commons, where hard-line Conservative members deplored its provisions and claimed that it would lead to the break-up of the Empire. With the resignation of Anthony Eden as Tory leader in late May however, Labour had found the perfect time to get the bill though Parliament with the minimum of controversy, the Conservatives being distracted by choosing a new leader and unable to do much more then rage impotently from the opposition benches…”
(Taken from “The Encyclopaedia of 20th Century British Politics”, Eds. June + Peterson. Longman, 1999)
“1936 GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT: The 1936 Government of India Act was the result of a long and torturous process of consultation and compromise between the British government, the princely states of India and Indian politicians themselves. It promised the imminent elevation of India to Dominion Status, and conditionally established a Federal government, provided that half the provinces accepted the proposals. Clement Attlee was in charge of overseeing the implementation of the Act. It was the longest bill ever passed by Parliament.[4]”
(Taken from “Power, Politics and the Olympic Games” by Peter Scott, Tribune 1989)
“…Ignoring the activity of the worker’s internationals, the Berlin Olympics went ahead on schedule. Foreign critics continued to object however; the British Manchester Guardian called for a boycott and was appalled when it was revealed to great popular acclaim that the then-Prime Minister Oswald Mosley was intending to compete[5]; ‘Germany is seizing ideological control of the games’… As far as the Nazi government was concerned, the Games brought about a period of international good feeling. Visitors left with memories of grand parties; in the words of Oswald Mosley to his wife[6]; “It was a fantastic Olympics, spectacular! I had such fun!” The talks between Mosley and Hitler were also regarded to have been a success, although nothing substantive was agreed. Nonetheless, Hitler saw the opportunity to build relations with Britain as a fringe benefit of the Olympic phenomenon…”
(Taken from “My Life” by Oswald Mosley, Longman 1961)
“…Boxing was my first love and I only turned to fencing, in which my main successes were won, when competition boxing was forbidden to me. The headmaster of Winchester tolerated the sport within the school but would not allow any of us to go to the public schools competition, on which I had set my heart with some assurance of success from my instructor. Yet as so often in life, reverse and disappointment turn to success and happiness in the longer range of experience. International fencing, representing Britain in sport and entering into the camaraderies of the great salles d'armes throughout Europe was a joy of my manhood, and in my intellectual maturity gave me some sense of the fullness of life in the Hellenic gymnasium; ‘et ego in Arcadia vixi’…
…1913 was my last serious chance at the world championship for the foil, for after that I was never again first-rate. At the end of the war the full use of my legs was gone for good. It was ten years before I returned to the sport at all, and then at first only for exercise. Gradually though I discovered that by adapting my style to my new condition I could be quite effective with the epee, the heavy duelling sword, which required less mobility. I was twice to be runner-up to different champions with this weapon in the British championship, and in 1936 was fortunate enough to be a member of our international team…In Berlin I was fortunate enough to reach the round deciding the bronze medal after being bested in the semi-final by one Franco Riccardi, a master fencer and the deserving eventual gold medallist. There I came up against another Italian of a most unorthodox and disconcerting action who upset all my classic preconceptions[7]. I was down three hits to one, out of a total of five up. I then threw all text-book plans to the wind, and decided to mix it with him and rely on sheer speed and constant attack. I took the next four hits and won the round and the bronze. All these things are good lessons for life; never hold too long to methods which do not work, be firm and fixed in principles, but infinitely flexible and adaptable in method…
…An interview with Hitler was exactly the opposite to my first encounter with Mussolini. There was no element of posture. At Berlin in August 1936 we talked for an hour before lunch at this first meeting. He entered the small room in his apartments quite simply; we sat down and talked with the aid of an interpreter, for I could speak no German until I learnt it during my retirement. At first Hitler was almost inert in his chair, pale, seemingly exhausted. He came suddenly to life when I said that war between Britain and Germany would be a terrible disaster, and used the simile of two splendid young men fighting each other until they both fall exhausted and bleeding to the ground, when the jackals of the world would mount triumphant on their bodies. His face flushed and he launched with much vigour into some of his main themes, but in the normal manner of any politician moved by strong convictions. The hypnotic manner was entirely absent; perhaps I was an unsuitable subject; in any case, no effect of that kind whatsoever was produced. He was simple, and treated me throughout the occasion with a strange, almost feminine charm…”
(Taken from “The Spanish Intervention” by Ian Allerton, Picador 1998)
“… The final orders, sent out by General Mola in coded telegrams, provided for the Army of Africa to revolt at 5am on the 18th August, and the army in mainland Spain to rise 24 hours later. The difference in timing was to allow Spanish Morocco to be secured before the Army of Africa could be transported to the Andalusian coast by the Navy… The rebels could hardly have failed to take Spanish Morocco. There were only a handful of Republican officers, while the Foreign legionaries obeyed the order to rise without question. The Spanish workers, who had no arms and little contact with the indigenous population, were completely isolated…
Things were different on the mainland however. Here the success of the rebels varied immensely, and depended as much on luck and nerve as planning and military skill. In Oviedo General De Llano managed to convince the local garrison to join him and secure the city entirely through his own verve and ruthlessness, while in Tetuan the town fell to the plotters after the Guardia Civil arrested the local governor and shot prominent trade unionists. In a reversal of roles, in Carlist Pamplona the local garrison remained loyal but the population rose against them, a crowd of red-bereted farmers storming the barracks shouting ‘Viva Christo Rey!”. Observing the scene, a French observer said that he would not have been surprised to have seen an auto de fe of heretics occurring at the same time…
Unfortunately for the plotters however, these victories were not widespread or shocking enough to topple the Republic by coup de main. In Barcelona the conspirators completely underestimated the CNT-FAI and found themselves besieged, while in Valladolid the local garrison split down the middle and fought itself ferociously until the railwaymen of the UGT came to the aid of the loyalists and managed to crush the rebels. Crucially, in the strategically vital city of Seville the plotters failed to make any headway whatsoever, General Paxtot and his few co-conspirators being arrested by their own men when they ordered a march on the centre of the city…
…It was not until three days later that clear fronts became recognisable and the situation clarified. The rebels had managed to secure Morocco, the Balearics save Minorca, a strip of territory in the west consisting of Galicia, Leon and parts of western Castile, and a handful of other towns scattered across the country. The government still controlled the majority of the mainland however, and had the advantage that the rebel areas were isolated from each other on the periphery. The failure of the rebels to secure the Navy further added to the strategic difficulties of Generals Mola and Sanjuro…[8]”
(Taken from “The road to war” by John Coombs, Picador 1979)
“…Of the three most important neutral governments Britain played the most important role. France was alarmed by Hitler’s rearmament and, despite having signed a defensive pact with Italy relied principally on Great Britain for mutual defence. So when on 19th August the Spanish Republic turned to France for arms, the sympathetic left-of centre government of Leon Blum looked to Britain for guidance. For his part, south of the Alps Mussolini found himself naturally sympathetic to the rebels, but was wary both of Hitler’s vocal support for them and of endangering relations with Mosley’s Labour government…. With both powers looking to Britain to take a lead, the British will to act proved crucial. While Mosley and Attlee were presciently concerned about the threat posed to the Republic by the extreme Left, they nevertheless agreed that Sanjuro’s rebels should not be allowed to overthrow a democracy and concluded that it was the responsibility of the Locarno Powers[9] to ensure stability in Spain. Over the objections of the Foreign Office then, on the 25th Downing St agreed with France that arms should be sold to the Republic as soon as possible. Meanwhile in Geneva British delegates to the League proposed an embargo on the rebel-held areas of Spain, to be enforced by the Royal Navy[10]…
[1] This is the beginning of the great Arab uprising of 1936-1939, of which more later.
[2] ITTL Morrison never lost his seat in 1931 and remained in Parliament. From 1932-1936 he was at the War Ministry.
[3] Mosley didn't have too much to fear from the ILP from 1932-1936 as he managed to effectively split the group between loyalists and radicals anyway- he was a member himself, which helped matters, and the government programme of legislation in the period didn't leave much scope for more radical action. However now he has no need to control the ILP it will gradually become more of a coherent body, and this will cause problems in the future.
[4] So, how is this Act different from OTL's equivalent? Well, it's more wide-reaching and has a decent chance of success, as the Mosley government is more willing to compromise then the National government was OTL and this has paid dividends. Attlee as Viceroy will help matters as well, as he'll use his energy to far better effect then Lord Linlithgow did OTL. India isn't sorted out by any means, but will evolve rather differently ITTL. Dominion status by 1940 is all but assured, for example.
[5] Oswald Mosley fencing for the British Olympic team? It's not actually at all far-fetched- OTL Mosley was a skilled fencer and competed on the international level as late as 1937. Besides, Mosley being Mosley he'd never pass up the chance to be all swashbuckling in the name of his country...
[6] This is a slight inaccuracy- Mosley won't marry Diana Mitford for a while yet ITTL, at this stage they're merely engaged.
[7] This would be Giancarlo Cornaggia-Medici, who OTL got the bronze medal in the Epee for Italy.
[8] Why is the "Generals' rising" not as successful as OTL? Well, a series of reasons really. One factor is that the Royal Navy doesn't allow the conspirators to use phone exchanges in Gibraltar to coordinate their actions as OTL, so the coup attempt is a lot less well-organised. As well as this, butterflies from the slightly different political situation mean that different generals are stationed in different places- Mola for example is in Saragossa instead of Pamplona, which puts him further from the Carlist centres of support that he was able to help coordinate OTL. De Llano for his part finds himself in Asturias instead of Seville, far from anything important. This puts the conspirators in a less advantageous potion then OTL. There's also the whole luck factor as well- ITTL the conspirators don't get quite as many lucky breaks as their OTL equivalents got.
[9] The "Locarno Powers" is the term increasingly used to describe the Anglo-Franco-Italian Bloc of the period. It's not strictly accurate, but since when has that ever stopped anyone?
[10] OTL the Anglo-French response to the Spanish civil war was driven almost entirely by Britain and Eden as Foreign secretary- things are the same here, but of course Mosley has different ideas about what should be done.
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Pax Britannia said:
That's actually directly lifted from what Mosley had to say about meeting Hitler OTL, so I'll allow you to draw your own conclusions...
Wendell said:
That's an interesting idea actually, I hadn't thought of Mosley like that before but that fits in quite a few ways. Certainly Mosley has the same force of personality that Roosevelt had, and has a similar taste for the swashbuckling.
Anyway, onwards to the next part...
[Note: Because of its length, the next part is divided into two sections- I was tempted to make it two seperate parts but because they both deal with the Spanish conflict it seemed to make more sense to do things this way]
Part 10A- “We owe it to the refugees to ensure they can return to their homes in safety. And when they do, every other would-be dictator in the world will know that the international community will not stand by and let them kill at will, destabilise a region, destroy a people.”
(Taken from “The Spanish Intervention” by Ian Allerton, Picador 1998)
“…The first months of the war were unsuccessful for both sides. By the end of August it became clear that a protracted struggle might potentially be in the offing, especially after the government drive towards Cadiz was halted at the end of August. Of perhaps more consequence however was the rebels’ failure to seize the Spanish fleet- a mistake that left General Franco and his 30,000 veterans stranded across the straits of Gibraltar. As the attack on Cadiz stalled however General Mola began an advance north towards the Basque country, while elsewhere in the rebel-controlled zone the plotters attempted to establish themselves and root out local fifth columns… By early October however, the British blockade was beginning to have severe effects for the rebel war machine. The Italian refusal of aid left many rebels feeling betrayed and although the Nazis had been sending supplies, the efforts of the Royal Navy meant that the only reliable method of reinforcement was by air[1]. Relations between London and the rebel leadership in Saragossa plumbed new depths, much to the anger of many on the British right. The rebels increasingly felt that British naval power was doing the work of the Republic’s army for it, and after several prominent incidents where sympathetic gun-runners were halted and turned back by the Royal Navy within sight of port, some felt that Britain’s line between neutrality and belligerence had began to blur. Unfortunately for the rebels, their increasing intransigence on the blockade issue would prove disastrous….
On the morning of October 7th, the British cruiser HMS Orion stopped and boarded a tramp steamer in the Gulf of Cadiz, several miles south of the port of Huelva. The captain of the steamer was a devout Carlist, and knowing that Huelva’s governor was the prominent Carlist Manuel Fal Conde[2] he ordered his radio operator to request assistance from the mainland. Conde, an Anglophobe, had been calling for a confrontation with the British ever since the blockade had been imposed, feeling that if the rebels showed a willingness to escalate the issue Britain would back down. With this in mind then he promptly telephoned the local aerodrome, and soon a flight of Breguet bombers had been scrambled to ‘buzz’ the Orion and hopefully intimidate it into allowing the steamer through. When the bombers reached the Orion however, instead of over-flying the cruiser they launched an attack run that took the ship completely by surprise, killing many crew members and causing severe damage to the ship. When return fire from the Orion shot down the flight leader the surviving bombers broke off their attack and made for the mainland, closely followed by the steamer that had precipitated the incident in the first place. In all, 41 members of the Orion’s crew were killed in the attack and the cruiser itself suffered serious damage, although it managed to limp back to Gibraltar[3]… To this day it is still uncertain what exactly precipitated the attack, and the death of the flight’s commander made it impossible to know what his motivations were. It is generally accepted however that in the chaos surrounding the scrambling of the rebel bombers the flight’s orders somehow became confused, although Conde himself has also been blamed for personally ordering the attack...”
(Taken from “The Mosley Era” by Tobias Griffin, Picador 1987)
“…In the early autumn the issue of Spain had become a divisive issue in the newly-reconvened Commons, but the bombing of HMS Orion managed to change the political situation overnight. Whereas before the Spanish blockade had split MPs strictly along party lines, the loss of British life and prestige in the Gulf of Cadiz enraged Tory members just as much as Labour ones and the political consensus swiftly moved to retaliatory action. Only a few voices in the Commons dared express their dissent- when Winston Churchill[4] rose to argue that the incident was a natural consequence of unwarranted British interference in the region, he was booed and shouted down, and when George Lansbury stood from the government benches to caution against aggressive action he received the same treatment.
The government was utterly unprepared for the crisis, and the storm of parliamentary and public anger led to an unusual panic in Downing St, as the carefully constructed Spanish policy of the Labour government began to collapse. Within the cabinet, there was sharp disagreement over how to proceed, and the meeting called to discuss the subject dragged on into the early hours of the 8th. Dalton and Morrison were worried that any dramatic action would drive Italy and Germany together as well as undermining the French government, but Graham spoke out in favour of a punitive strike at the very least, floating the idea of using the incident as a way of getting the League to involve itself on the peninsula. Mosley, who had sat quietly through the entire discussion, then rose and agreed with the Foreign Secretary. He proposed an immediate punitive strike on the rebels followed by a demand for an apology and calls for League intervention in Geneva, a course of action that unexpectedly gained the full support of the new Tory leader, Samuel Hoare[5]…”
(Taken from “The Spanish Intervention” by Ian Allerton, Picador 1998)
“The Orion incident not only raised the spectre of foreign intervention but also exposed the growing rift between the rebel military and the political parties that supported them. The fact that it was the Carlist leadership in Huelva that triggered the crisis rather then the military was not lost on Generals Sanjuro and Mola in Saragossa, but despite their titular command of the rebellion they had little influence in the areas not immediately under the control of their own units. In the event, as soon as General Sanjuro heard of the incident he went to the British consulate in Saragossa to apologise in person, but his efforts were almost immediately undone by the Carlist leadership, who declared the attack a great victory and eulogised the sole rebel casualty of the raid[6]. As British planes based in Gibraltar bombarded Cadiz the following day Sanjuro continued his attempts to defuse the situation, even going as far as to gauge the practicality of arresting Conde, regardless of the damage this would do to relations with the Carlists. Relations between the military and the Carlists was still more strained by the behaviour of Generals Mola and De Llano, both of whom had made clear their distaste for a restoration of the monarchy. When it came to the attention of the Carlist Count of Rodezno that the latter had ended all his radio broadcasts with the refrain “Viva la Republica!” a major confrontation between the two factions developed[7]. It became increasingly clear by the middle of October that while the rebellion’s military leadership was theoretically centralised in Saragossa, in reality it only controlled the region around the city itself and the Balearics- the Carlists held sway in much of the rebel-controlled interior and in Andalusia, while General Franco was a power unto himself in Morocco. More worryingly for the rebels, in Galicia a power struggle appeared to be beginning between General De Llano on one side and the charismatic leader of the Falange Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera[8] on the other…”
(Taken from “The Encyclopaedia of 20th Century British Politics”, Eds. June + Peterson. Longman, 1999)
“LOGRONO MASSACRE, THE: Massacre of women and children in northern Castile that provided the official pretext for the League of Nations’ intervention in Spain. On October 25th 1936 a Carlist militia seized the town from its government garrison, and imprisoned many prominent leftists and trade unionists along with their families. When a militiaman was killed three days later the angry occupiers emptied the town’s prison and massacred 103 of the prisoners, many of whom were common criminals. The massacre came to international attention completely through chance- an American journalist named Herbert Matthews was passing through the Logrono on his way to the rebel headquarters at Saragossa when the killings took place, and his report was printed in most major newspapers across the world. After the massacre support for intervention gained wide publicity in Western Europe, and combined with the already existent military action by Britain in the south led to a League declaration of support for the Spanish Republic on November 2nd[9]. ”
(Taken from “The road to war” by John Coombs, Picador 1979)
“The commencement of British bombing raids on rebel targets in Spain precipitated yet another crisis for the League. Just as a year before in Abyssinia, a major Power had taken unilateral military action, coming before the League only to gain retrospective approval and request further support. The League’s critics increasingly painted the organisation as a mere vehicle for the interests of the Locarno powers, and it is ironic that despite his professed admiration and support for the League Oswald Mosley managed to so gravely wound it by his determination to transform the organisation into an interventionist one…
…the non-interventionist nations were further shaken a month later, when details of the infamous ‘Logrono massacre’ emerged. In Britain the details of the atrocity destroyed what little popular support remained for the rebels, and further increased the pressure on Blum’s Popular Front government in France to provide more support to the Spanish government then merely selling them weapons. Encouraged by signs of public support in France and Britain, on November 1st the Spanish government formally requested military assistance from the League to help it ‘secure peace and stability in the country’, and the following day the League assembly narrowly assented to the request[10]. The move presented Blum with a political crisis; fearing a repeat of the right-wing riots that had taken place earlier in the year the French government confined itself to providing a few squadrons of fighters and avoided any commitment of ground troops to crush the rebellion, although border patrols were stepped up on the border between the two Moroccos. Another Great Power was more forthright; on the 4th Mussolini surprised the world by pledging Italy’s support to the Spanish government, sending a consignment of 12 Savioa bombers to Barcelona and promising more direct military aid as well. At the time, Mussolini’s willingness to help the Spanish government against his supposed ideological allies amongst the rebels was interpreted as another sign of Il Duce’s political pragmatism; in reality, a Spanish representative had signed a secret agreement with Count Ciano the day before allowing Italy to construct naval bases in Majorca and the Canaries[11]…
…The Spanish government’s diplomatic efforts finally bore military fruit on the 16th November, when 8000 Italian troops supported by aircraft from the Royal Navy landed unopposed on Majorca and quickly quelled rebel resistance on the island, suffering enough casualties in the process that Mussolini was able to stage a state funeral for the ‘Balearic Martyrs’ on the arrival back in Italy a week later. The operation gave the Spanish government the confidence to attempt an offensive of its own and by the 20th the weak rebel garrisons in Cadiz and Jerez had been crushed, although Huelva still held out…”
(Taken from “The Spanish Intervention” by Ian Allerton, Picador 1998)
“The Anglo-Italian operation in the Balearics proved to be a turning point for the rebellion. In Morocco, it was the final straw that convinced General Franco that the rebellion was doomed. His veteran troops were rested and ready for combat but had no way of reaching the Spanish mainland because of the British blockade, and with the government capture of Cadiz there seemed to be nowhere obvious that he could reinforce even if he had the ability. While there seemed no immediate prospect of a French attack from the south Franco was uncomfortably aware that his army remained the largest rebel force in the field. Determined not to let the army of Africa suffer the same fate as that of the rebels on Majorca then, the ever-canny Franco opened informal channels with the government to negotiate his defection on November 22nd[12]…
…While in the south General Franco began to sell out his cause, in Galicia the political infighting between the military and the Falange steadily became more and more serious. Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera increasingly distrusted the suspiciously liberal General De Llano, and for his part the General resented the Falange’s interference in military matters. A debacle in late November when Falangist militias disobeyed direct orders and seized the town of Vilalba instead of rushing to the defence of nearby Lugo further convinced De Llano that the Falange were a threat to his authority and had to be dealt with. Accordingly, in the early hours of November 13th the General and a group of trusted officers attempted to replicate his success of three months before and launched a pre-emptive strike, raiding the party’s headquarters in Oviedo in an attempt to arrest Primo de Rivera and disable the Falange at a stroke. Unfortunately for De Llano, a sympathiser in the military camp had tipped off the Falangists, and the result was a pitched gun battle between the two factions that raged all night. By morning De Llano himself was dead having been taken prisoner and then shot, and the Falange swiftly moved throughout the region to remove ‘defeatist’ elements in the rebel command structure[13]…”
[1] This means that the German aid is even more air-based then OTL. This has serious effects on the rebels’ ability to equip troops, although they do have good planes.
[2] Fal Conde was the Chairman of the Carlist Junta in 1936. In the absence of anyone better he’s basically leading the rebels in Andalusia, which without the energetic efforts of General De Llano is mostly in government hands ITTL.
[3] Damage and casualties on the Orion were made far more severe by the fact that the cruiser was completely unprepared for an attack. Many of the crew were not at their posts, instead having come up on deck to watch the search of the tramp steamer, and hatches were open, guns were being cleaned etc. As the first indication of an attack came when the first bomb fell, this led to chaos on board.
[4] While Churchill was as jingoistic as the next man, I feel his contrary nature would lead him to speak out against Spanish intervention, it also being a distraction from Germany.
[5] Why Samuel Hoare? Mainly because he’s not too closely associated to Eden and is a figure all the various Tory factions can swallow their misgivings about and support. This does not represent a huge vote of confidence in his ability.
[6] This seems like a pretty stupid thing to do, and it is. But, from the Carlist point of view Spanish force of arms has driven the British blockade away from a major port and opened it to shipping, if only temporarily. There is also no news of the British response at this stage. Of course the Generals are rather more pragmatic then this and realise how idiotic a move the attack was.
[7] OTL relations between the military and the Carlists were often strained- indeed Manuel Fal Conde had to escape to exile in Portugal in 1936 after angering Franco.
[8] Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera was moved from Alicante to Burgos in late July, and in the first days of the uprising he managed to escape to rebel territory. His survival ITTL will not prove to be good news for the rebels.
[9] The massacre is similar to many that took place on both sides in the first days of OTL’s Spanish Civil War. In itself it’s nothing too unusual by the brutal standards of that conflict- however, the Carlists had the misfortune of having Matthews see what was going on, and have him publish at a time when the conflict had caught the public mood.
[10] Why the appetite for intervention? Well, in Britain there’s a general sense that the rebels need to be punished for their effrontery, and the British public has worked itself up into one of its periodic bouts of moral hand-wringing over foreign events. For its part the Labour government genuinely believes that the Spanish rebels are a threat to world peace and have to be eliminated, and are able to drag the French government along with them. It’s worth pointing out that this is an extremely controversial move by the League, and angers many representatives of the smaller nations, who feel that the organisation is increasingly a tool of the Great Powers. More on this later, but many historians date the demise of the league from November 2nd 1936.
[11]OTL the Italians wanted to do this, but were skilfully deterred by Franco- here, the Spanish government is happy to do such a deal in exchange for help in putting down the rebellion.
[12] Franco was a clever, clever operator, and once he realises that there’s no mileage in the rebellion he’s naturally inclined to try and jump ship, figuring that the army of Africa will prove a highly useful powerbase in the post-rebellion political climate.
[13] Unfortunately, many of these ‘defeatists’ are the more competent officers commanding the rebels in the region- the Falange has just significantly harmed its own ability to wage war.
Part 10A- “We owe it to the refugees to ensure they can return to their homes in safety. And when they do, every other would-be dictator in the world will know that the international community will not stand by and let them kill at will, destabilise a region, destroy a people.”
(Taken from “The Spanish Intervention” by Ian Allerton, Picador 1998)
“…The first months of the war were unsuccessful for both sides. By the end of August it became clear that a protracted struggle might potentially be in the offing, especially after the government drive towards Cadiz was halted at the end of August. Of perhaps more consequence however was the rebels’ failure to seize the Spanish fleet- a mistake that left General Franco and his 30,000 veterans stranded across the straits of Gibraltar. As the attack on Cadiz stalled however General Mola began an advance north towards the Basque country, while elsewhere in the rebel-controlled zone the plotters attempted to establish themselves and root out local fifth columns… By early October however, the British blockade was beginning to have severe effects for the rebel war machine. The Italian refusal of aid left many rebels feeling betrayed and although the Nazis had been sending supplies, the efforts of the Royal Navy meant that the only reliable method of reinforcement was by air[1]. Relations between London and the rebel leadership in Saragossa plumbed new depths, much to the anger of many on the British right. The rebels increasingly felt that British naval power was doing the work of the Republic’s army for it, and after several prominent incidents where sympathetic gun-runners were halted and turned back by the Royal Navy within sight of port, some felt that Britain’s line between neutrality and belligerence had began to blur. Unfortunately for the rebels, their increasing intransigence on the blockade issue would prove disastrous….
On the morning of October 7th, the British cruiser HMS Orion stopped and boarded a tramp steamer in the Gulf of Cadiz, several miles south of the port of Huelva. The captain of the steamer was a devout Carlist, and knowing that Huelva’s governor was the prominent Carlist Manuel Fal Conde[2] he ordered his radio operator to request assistance from the mainland. Conde, an Anglophobe, had been calling for a confrontation with the British ever since the blockade had been imposed, feeling that if the rebels showed a willingness to escalate the issue Britain would back down. With this in mind then he promptly telephoned the local aerodrome, and soon a flight of Breguet bombers had been scrambled to ‘buzz’ the Orion and hopefully intimidate it into allowing the steamer through. When the bombers reached the Orion however, instead of over-flying the cruiser they launched an attack run that took the ship completely by surprise, killing many crew members and causing severe damage to the ship. When return fire from the Orion shot down the flight leader the surviving bombers broke off their attack and made for the mainland, closely followed by the steamer that had precipitated the incident in the first place. In all, 41 members of the Orion’s crew were killed in the attack and the cruiser itself suffered serious damage, although it managed to limp back to Gibraltar[3]… To this day it is still uncertain what exactly precipitated the attack, and the death of the flight’s commander made it impossible to know what his motivations were. It is generally accepted however that in the chaos surrounding the scrambling of the rebel bombers the flight’s orders somehow became confused, although Conde himself has also been blamed for personally ordering the attack...”
(Taken from “The Mosley Era” by Tobias Griffin, Picador 1987)
“…In the early autumn the issue of Spain had become a divisive issue in the newly-reconvened Commons, but the bombing of HMS Orion managed to change the political situation overnight. Whereas before the Spanish blockade had split MPs strictly along party lines, the loss of British life and prestige in the Gulf of Cadiz enraged Tory members just as much as Labour ones and the political consensus swiftly moved to retaliatory action. Only a few voices in the Commons dared express their dissent- when Winston Churchill[4] rose to argue that the incident was a natural consequence of unwarranted British interference in the region, he was booed and shouted down, and when George Lansbury stood from the government benches to caution against aggressive action he received the same treatment.
The government was utterly unprepared for the crisis, and the storm of parliamentary and public anger led to an unusual panic in Downing St, as the carefully constructed Spanish policy of the Labour government began to collapse. Within the cabinet, there was sharp disagreement over how to proceed, and the meeting called to discuss the subject dragged on into the early hours of the 8th. Dalton and Morrison were worried that any dramatic action would drive Italy and Germany together as well as undermining the French government, but Graham spoke out in favour of a punitive strike at the very least, floating the idea of using the incident as a way of getting the League to involve itself on the peninsula. Mosley, who had sat quietly through the entire discussion, then rose and agreed with the Foreign Secretary. He proposed an immediate punitive strike on the rebels followed by a demand for an apology and calls for League intervention in Geneva, a course of action that unexpectedly gained the full support of the new Tory leader, Samuel Hoare[5]…”
(Taken from “The Spanish Intervention” by Ian Allerton, Picador 1998)
“The Orion incident not only raised the spectre of foreign intervention but also exposed the growing rift between the rebel military and the political parties that supported them. The fact that it was the Carlist leadership in Huelva that triggered the crisis rather then the military was not lost on Generals Sanjuro and Mola in Saragossa, but despite their titular command of the rebellion they had little influence in the areas not immediately under the control of their own units. In the event, as soon as General Sanjuro heard of the incident he went to the British consulate in Saragossa to apologise in person, but his efforts were almost immediately undone by the Carlist leadership, who declared the attack a great victory and eulogised the sole rebel casualty of the raid[6]. As British planes based in Gibraltar bombarded Cadiz the following day Sanjuro continued his attempts to defuse the situation, even going as far as to gauge the practicality of arresting Conde, regardless of the damage this would do to relations with the Carlists. Relations between the military and the Carlists was still more strained by the behaviour of Generals Mola and De Llano, both of whom had made clear their distaste for a restoration of the monarchy. When it came to the attention of the Carlist Count of Rodezno that the latter had ended all his radio broadcasts with the refrain “Viva la Republica!” a major confrontation between the two factions developed[7]. It became increasingly clear by the middle of October that while the rebellion’s military leadership was theoretically centralised in Saragossa, in reality it only controlled the region around the city itself and the Balearics- the Carlists held sway in much of the rebel-controlled interior and in Andalusia, while General Franco was a power unto himself in Morocco. More worryingly for the rebels, in Galicia a power struggle appeared to be beginning between General De Llano on one side and the charismatic leader of the Falange Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera[8] on the other…”
(Taken from “The Encyclopaedia of 20th Century British Politics”, Eds. June + Peterson. Longman, 1999)
“LOGRONO MASSACRE, THE: Massacre of women and children in northern Castile that provided the official pretext for the League of Nations’ intervention in Spain. On October 25th 1936 a Carlist militia seized the town from its government garrison, and imprisoned many prominent leftists and trade unionists along with their families. When a militiaman was killed three days later the angry occupiers emptied the town’s prison and massacred 103 of the prisoners, many of whom were common criminals. The massacre came to international attention completely through chance- an American journalist named Herbert Matthews was passing through the Logrono on his way to the rebel headquarters at Saragossa when the killings took place, and his report was printed in most major newspapers across the world. After the massacre support for intervention gained wide publicity in Western Europe, and combined with the already existent military action by Britain in the south led to a League declaration of support for the Spanish Republic on November 2nd[9]. ”
(Taken from “The road to war” by John Coombs, Picador 1979)
“The commencement of British bombing raids on rebel targets in Spain precipitated yet another crisis for the League. Just as a year before in Abyssinia, a major Power had taken unilateral military action, coming before the League only to gain retrospective approval and request further support. The League’s critics increasingly painted the organisation as a mere vehicle for the interests of the Locarno powers, and it is ironic that despite his professed admiration and support for the League Oswald Mosley managed to so gravely wound it by his determination to transform the organisation into an interventionist one…
…the non-interventionist nations were further shaken a month later, when details of the infamous ‘Logrono massacre’ emerged. In Britain the details of the atrocity destroyed what little popular support remained for the rebels, and further increased the pressure on Blum’s Popular Front government in France to provide more support to the Spanish government then merely selling them weapons. Encouraged by signs of public support in France and Britain, on November 1st the Spanish government formally requested military assistance from the League to help it ‘secure peace and stability in the country’, and the following day the League assembly narrowly assented to the request[10]. The move presented Blum with a political crisis; fearing a repeat of the right-wing riots that had taken place earlier in the year the French government confined itself to providing a few squadrons of fighters and avoided any commitment of ground troops to crush the rebellion, although border patrols were stepped up on the border between the two Moroccos. Another Great Power was more forthright; on the 4th Mussolini surprised the world by pledging Italy’s support to the Spanish government, sending a consignment of 12 Savioa bombers to Barcelona and promising more direct military aid as well. At the time, Mussolini’s willingness to help the Spanish government against his supposed ideological allies amongst the rebels was interpreted as another sign of Il Duce’s political pragmatism; in reality, a Spanish representative had signed a secret agreement with Count Ciano the day before allowing Italy to construct naval bases in Majorca and the Canaries[11]…
…The Spanish government’s diplomatic efforts finally bore military fruit on the 16th November, when 8000 Italian troops supported by aircraft from the Royal Navy landed unopposed on Majorca and quickly quelled rebel resistance on the island, suffering enough casualties in the process that Mussolini was able to stage a state funeral for the ‘Balearic Martyrs’ on the arrival back in Italy a week later. The operation gave the Spanish government the confidence to attempt an offensive of its own and by the 20th the weak rebel garrisons in Cadiz and Jerez had been crushed, although Huelva still held out…”
(Taken from “The Spanish Intervention” by Ian Allerton, Picador 1998)
“The Anglo-Italian operation in the Balearics proved to be a turning point for the rebellion. In Morocco, it was the final straw that convinced General Franco that the rebellion was doomed. His veteran troops were rested and ready for combat but had no way of reaching the Spanish mainland because of the British blockade, and with the government capture of Cadiz there seemed to be nowhere obvious that he could reinforce even if he had the ability. While there seemed no immediate prospect of a French attack from the south Franco was uncomfortably aware that his army remained the largest rebel force in the field. Determined not to let the army of Africa suffer the same fate as that of the rebels on Majorca then, the ever-canny Franco opened informal channels with the government to negotiate his defection on November 22nd[12]…
…While in the south General Franco began to sell out his cause, in Galicia the political infighting between the military and the Falange steadily became more and more serious. Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera increasingly distrusted the suspiciously liberal General De Llano, and for his part the General resented the Falange’s interference in military matters. A debacle in late November when Falangist militias disobeyed direct orders and seized the town of Vilalba instead of rushing to the defence of nearby Lugo further convinced De Llano that the Falange were a threat to his authority and had to be dealt with. Accordingly, in the early hours of November 13th the General and a group of trusted officers attempted to replicate his success of three months before and launched a pre-emptive strike, raiding the party’s headquarters in Oviedo in an attempt to arrest Primo de Rivera and disable the Falange at a stroke. Unfortunately for De Llano, a sympathiser in the military camp had tipped off the Falangists, and the result was a pitched gun battle between the two factions that raged all night. By morning De Llano himself was dead having been taken prisoner and then shot, and the Falange swiftly moved throughout the region to remove ‘defeatist’ elements in the rebel command structure[13]…”
[1] This means that the German aid is even more air-based then OTL. This has serious effects on the rebels’ ability to equip troops, although they do have good planes.
[2] Fal Conde was the Chairman of the Carlist Junta in 1936. In the absence of anyone better he’s basically leading the rebels in Andalusia, which without the energetic efforts of General De Llano is mostly in government hands ITTL.
[3] Damage and casualties on the Orion were made far more severe by the fact that the cruiser was completely unprepared for an attack. Many of the crew were not at their posts, instead having come up on deck to watch the search of the tramp steamer, and hatches were open, guns were being cleaned etc. As the first indication of an attack came when the first bomb fell, this led to chaos on board.
[4] While Churchill was as jingoistic as the next man, I feel his contrary nature would lead him to speak out against Spanish intervention, it also being a distraction from Germany.
[5] Why Samuel Hoare? Mainly because he’s not too closely associated to Eden and is a figure all the various Tory factions can swallow their misgivings about and support. This does not represent a huge vote of confidence in his ability.
[6] This seems like a pretty stupid thing to do, and it is. But, from the Carlist point of view Spanish force of arms has driven the British blockade away from a major port and opened it to shipping, if only temporarily. There is also no news of the British response at this stage. Of course the Generals are rather more pragmatic then this and realise how idiotic a move the attack was.
[7] OTL relations between the military and the Carlists were often strained- indeed Manuel Fal Conde had to escape to exile in Portugal in 1936 after angering Franco.
[8] Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera was moved from Alicante to Burgos in late July, and in the first days of the uprising he managed to escape to rebel territory. His survival ITTL will not prove to be good news for the rebels.
[9] The massacre is similar to many that took place on both sides in the first days of OTL’s Spanish Civil War. In itself it’s nothing too unusual by the brutal standards of that conflict- however, the Carlists had the misfortune of having Matthews see what was going on, and have him publish at a time when the conflict had caught the public mood.
[10] Why the appetite for intervention? Well, in Britain there’s a general sense that the rebels need to be punished for their effrontery, and the British public has worked itself up into one of its periodic bouts of moral hand-wringing over foreign events. For its part the Labour government genuinely believes that the Spanish rebels are a threat to world peace and have to be eliminated, and are able to drag the French government along with them. It’s worth pointing out that this is an extremely controversial move by the League, and angers many representatives of the smaller nations, who feel that the organisation is increasingly a tool of the Great Powers. More on this later, but many historians date the demise of the league from November 2nd 1936.
[11]OTL the Italians wanted to do this, but were skilfully deterred by Franco- here, the Spanish government is happy to do such a deal in exchange for help in putting down the rebellion.
[12] Franco was a clever, clever operator, and once he realises that there’s no mileage in the rebellion he’s naturally inclined to try and jump ship, figuring that the army of Africa will prove a highly useful powerbase in the post-rebellion political climate.
[13] Unfortunately, many of these ‘defeatists’ are the more competent officers commanding the rebels in the region- the Falange has just significantly harmed its own ability to wage war.
Another interesting and well thought out post EdT.
I seem to recall that Republican Spain (RS) in OTL sent Soviet Russia their gold reserves for 'safe' keeping which he promptly seized when the Nationalists (NS) took over. Now if my memory is indeed correct with RS being much stronger they might not have done such a thing leaving Spain wealthier and the USSR not getting some free hard currency.
I seem to recall that Republican Spain (RS) in OTL sent Soviet Russia their gold reserves for 'safe' keeping which he promptly seized when the Nationalists (NS) took over. Now if my memory is indeed correct with RS being much stronger they might not have done such a thing leaving Spain wealthier and the USSR not getting some free hard currency.