Chapter One Hundred and Fifteen
Faugh a Ballagh
Flag of the 28th Massachusetts
From “The North Carolina Campaign” by Thomas R. Yetters
Buffalo 2006
“From the eastern bank of the Catawba, the three main works ran in a line: Fort Latta, Fort Wedgewood and Fort Lee. The North Road ran between Forts Latta and Wedgewood and in order to protect it another major work was raised athwart it about 700 yards behind and between Forts Latta and Wedgewood, called Fort Pickett but known by the men as the Hornet’s Nest. The forts of wood and earth were not the only defenses raised by the Confederates. Between each of the works further field works had been raised and manned albeit with no artillery in these lines. No works were raised between Forts Latta and Wedgewood but anyone pressing down the road between them would be in a deadly crossfire from the three forts and the field works between Forts Latta and Pickett, and between Forts Pickett and Wedgewood. The deadly crossfire that would ensue from any attack meant the position, a well fortified “V”, well earned its nickname of the Hornet’s Nest…
Pickett’s Division occupied the left of the line: Kemper’s Brigade in Fort Latta, Pegram’s in the intervening works, and Garnett’s in Fort Pickett. Mahone’s Division came next: G.B. Anderson’s brigade in the works between Forts Pickett and Wedgewood, Wright’s in Fort Wedgewood and Benning’s between Forts Wedgewood and Lee. Barksdale’s Mississippi brigade of Hood’s Division occupied Fort Lee on the extreme right of the portion of the line that would be subjected to the Union attack. General Richard H. Anderson would oversee the defense that day…”
From "Always The General - The Life of John Fulton Reynolds" by Jed Bradshaw
Penn State 1999
“The ever professional General Reynolds seemed particularly serious that morning. He had met with Generals Hancock and Smith before dawn before passing over the Catawba to General Humphreys. General Hunt had prepared four “grand” batteries to support the attack. The fire of two of those batteries would converge on Fort Latta making it the focus of Smith’s attack. Smith would attack Fort Latta with Caldwell’s divisions, Gorman’s would advance down the North Road, and William Hays’ would attack Fort Wedgewood from the north west. Of Hancock’s Corps, Stannard’s division was ordered to the assault of Fort Wedgewood from the north east, while the smaller divisions of Gibbon and Doubleday would attack Fort Lee. General Stevens and his two remaining divisions (Orlando Poe’s and Edward Harland’s) would be held in reserve astride the road…
It was suggested that, because General Reynolds had serious misgivings about the attack and as General Kearny had not shared his purpose in making it, General Reynolds left the direction of this attack to Kearny, while positioning himself on the west bank with Humphreys. Whatever the truth of it, General Reynolds would spend most the morning away from the main assault…”
From “A Thunderbolt on the Battlefield – the Battles of Philip Kearny: Volume III” by Professor Kearny Bowes
MacArthur University Press 1962
“General Kearny had placed his headquarters behind Caldwell’s division, just to the east of Battery No.1. He was at the edge of the range of the best Confederate artillery in this position. As a result his staff, at the orchestration of Colonel McKeever, tended to gather around him to try to shield him from harm. General Stevens suggested Kearny’s staff appeared as “
a host unto themselves”. General Kearny’s staff had attracted the brave and the talented. Not only had the staff gathered around. General Kearny was the “lightening rod” (Wolseley) as far as the European observers were concerned. With little sensibility for what was proper or diplomatic, General Kearny encouraged the observers to ride with him (in their own uniforms) and see the battle from the front line. Kearny’s entourage included Colonels Garnet Wolseley and Lord Abinger of England, Chef de Bataillon Jerome Napoleon Bonaparte II of France, Captain Fitzgerald Ross of Austria (who had ridden against Kearny at Solferino)…"
From “The North Carolina Campaign” by Thomas R. Yetters
Buffalo 2006
“As dawn broke General Hunt had his grand batteries open up a storm of shot and shell on the Confederate positions. Somehow Hunt had managed, by rail and cross country dragging, to bring up several larger siege guns and these contributed dramatically to the weight of shell being hurled at the rebel works.
In order to conserve ammunition General Porter ordered the Confederate guns not to respond unless an infantry attack commenced…
Under intense fire the Confederate artillery conserves ammunition and waits
From “Kearny the Magnificent” by Roger Galton
NorthWestern
“The attack began at around 7:15 a.m. Lead parties of sharpshooters and engineers led the way in a screen designed to overwhelm rebel pickets and to remove obstructions that would delay the infantry advance. Kearny may have expected to loose this battle but he had not planned it half-heartedly. They were followed by nine groups of 100 men assigned to storm the rebel forts (Latta, Wedgewood and Lee) and stream back into the Confederate rear area. These men relied on surprise and speed—they set off before the artillery bombardment commenced with the intention of getting close enough to storm the works when it stopped before the rebels could emerge from their dugouts. Unlike those approaching Forts Wedgewood and Lee, the storming party at Fort Latta achieved complete surprise and fighting was fierce…”
Colonel Hall's attack from the riverside breaks into Fort Latta
From “The North Carolina Campaign” by Thomas R. Yetters
Buffalo 2006
“General Anderson, the officer responsible for the attacked section of the line, heard the sounds of the cannonade, and rode to Fort Pickett, just to the south of Forts Latta and Wedgewood, which he found to be ready to defend itself. He sent a short note to General Longstreet “
it looks like Phil Kearny has finally lost patience with us”. As he moved north, Anderson ordered the artillery at Fort Pickett to open fire on Union troops advancing on Fort Latta and ordered a reserve infantry regiment to reinforce Kemper’s hard pressed brigade there, which they did with fixed bayonets, briefly re-repelling the Union advance screen. Assuming that there would be no breach in the line, Anderson rode back to Fort Pickett. He recalled, "
I crossed the parapet and beyond it saw some troops passing between Forts Latta and Wedgewood and advancing towards Fort Pickett down the North Road. I supposed the Union Generals would right them back to the attack on one or other fort but they seemed hell bent on advancing into the Hornet’s Nest." He suddenly realized that the men he was observing were the troops of the Irish Brigade and they intended to pass through the crossfire between the two advance forts, the field works on both flanks and capture Fort Pickett. He was taken aback by this foolishness. The Irish Brigade was marching into a no-man’s land through which none could live…
Baldly Smith soon arrived at the foot of Fort Latta and found General Caldwell. The attack had stalled but Caldwell believed that an advance via the riverbank flank, covered by Battery No.12 on the west bank could exceed their "
most sanguine expectations." With Caldwell at their head, he led the troops of Colonel Norman J. Hall’s brigade. Within minutes they had swept up through a defilade and seized the western end of Fort Latta, opening a gap no more that 200 feet long in the Confederate line. Union artillerists following them tried to use the handful of captured guns to open up enfilading fire on the entrenchments to the east and south…
The attack began having difficulty on I Corps front to the east, where the Confederate defensive formed a seamless battle line and the Union troops were too confused by the maze of trenches and too few to attack it effectively. Kearny turned his attention to the centre of his attack and Fort Wedgewood, against which he launched the division of Willis A. Gorman. He was to support Hays and Stannard’s attacks there. The defenders successfully employed canister rounds from nine cannons, halting the assault by the three divisions, but two of Gorman’s brigades had gone awry. As Gorman led off the brigade of Samuel K. Zook to support Stannard, the following Irish Brigade under General Thomas Meagher, set off down the North Road, Meagher having misunderstood his orders. Colonel H. Boyd McKean’s brigade followed the Irish. Men from New York, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts and New Hampshire were marching into the worst place on the battlefield…
General James Kemper tenaciously held on to the eastern portion of Fort Latta, and while his troops fought to recapture the western portion, his artillery concentrated on the troops attacking Fort Wedgewood. In the smoke and confusion the advance of the Irish brigade and its fellows went unnoticed initially in Fort Latta…
The Union artillery from Battery 2 continued bombarding Fort Wedgewood and the rebel field artillery returned fire. When the Confederate flag was knocked down, the Confederate gunners outside the fort assumed that it had fallen to the Yankees and opened fire on their own men. Volunteers were found to raise the flag again and four of them were killed before the Confederate artillery ceased fire…
Smith sent a message back to Kearny that the attack was going well, but he was either exaggerating or unaware of the trouble developing. Only about half of Caldwell’s troops had managed to breach any of the rebel works and had still not yet taken Fort Latta completely. Two brigades had effectively disappeared into the Hornet’s Nest and no one had noticed as Gorman was too engrossed in the Fort Wedgewood assault. Finally the main Confederate reserve defense force was beginning to mobilize. Longstreet had acted decisively, ordering both Anderson’s reserve (Wilcox’s Division) to close the gap at Fort Latta while ordering Jackson’s (Dorsey Pender’s Division) reserve to take up positions south of Fort Pickett so it could reinforce either flank of the attacked section…
Meagher, in the words of historian James Douglas Kelly "
was a man possessed. From the instant he received word to advance, Meagher pressed on furiously to come to grips with the Confederates. However and for whatever reason he had misunderstood his orders and targeted Fort Pickett rather than Fort Wedgewood". Colonel Patrick Kelly, when asked to explain the attack privately replied that “
we were led by a drunk and a fool that day”. With the artillery at both Forts Latta and Wedgewood heavily engaged the Irish Brigade passed through their first trial between these pillars of wood and earth relatively unscathed. Beyond the forts they came under flanking fire from field works on both flanks manned by the brigades of John Pegram and G.B. Anderson. General Dick Garnett also observed the advancing Irish from Fort Pickett “
They emerged from the smoke like shades of men; bent forward as those marching into wind and rain; never did I see an advance like it”…
As McKean’s men emerged behind the Irish into the crossfire between field works he, unlike Meagher, realized the gravity of his position. Wheeling his brigade to the right he attack Pegram’s field works in the rear of Fort Latta. McKean’s men would advance no further but they did briefly distract Pegram’s men from the Irish…
Kearny's "Bravest of the Brave"
“
I thought they would break long before they reached us” General Anderson was incredulous when the battered and reduced Irish Brigade reached the foot of the Fort Pickett works. General Longstreet now arrived and both he and Anderson watched in awe as the Irish commanders, men like Colonels Patrick Kelly and St. Clair Mulholland, formed their men to assault the fort under a hail of fire from above and both flanks. General Meagher lay stunned further back as his horse had been smashed by shot. Captain James McGee of the 69th New York later observed “
we had been sent out from camp that morning and passed by General Kearny, who in earshot of many had turned to the foreign officers and said “the bravest of the brave”. Then turning to us he roared our own battle cry “Faugh a Ballagh” three times to us. After that Christ himself could not have stopped us while we still had breath”…
It was with no little indignity that a number of Confederate staff officers who had watched the advance of the Irish brigade with a certain amount of respect and awe scrambled back from the parapet as it became clear the Irish would press home their attack…
It was a tragic act of futile heroism. With no support, and with fast dwindling numbers the Irish attack evaporated on the walls of Fort Pickett but not before the colors of the 69th New York and 88th New York had been placed on the parapet. The worst was not over for the broken Irish could only retreat back into the hell though which they advanced. A dispirited Major Michael O’Rourke won the Kearny Cross by the simple fact of his walking back to Union lines for “
he’d run from no man least of all damn rebs”…
From “A Thunderbolt on the Battlefield – the Battles of Philip Kearny: Volume III” by Professor Kearny Bowes
MacArthur University Press 1962
“General Kearny, who sat exposed just north east of Fort Latta, realized the attack had failed when his lead men started returning and reported remarkable Confederate resistance. Quickly deciding that he had achieved his objective and resolving not to give Longstreet any more of a victory than was necessary, Kearny scrambled to get his forces back to safety. Caldwell's men had particular difficultly extracting themselves from Fort Latta and further heavy casualties were incurred...
By 11:00am the Union troops had returned to their starting positions in semicircle north of the Confederate works…”
From “The North Carolina Campaign” by Thomas R. Yetters
Buffalo 2006
“Many of the Confederate commanders were jubilant. This was the victory they so desperately needed. Even General Longstreet seemed pleased. General Anderson observed that “
a few more such victories and there will be no Army of the Potomac”. General Longstreet was under no illusion that the relative strengths of the two armies had changed much during the day’s fighting but if Kearny could be provoked into further such assaults matters might change. A messenger was dispatched to Atlanta to report the victory and Longstreet confirmed to General Johnson that he would not yet withdraw from Charlotte. The Federals had been badly defeated; a siege was not imminent; and further such opportunities of defeating the Federals might arise if he stayed in the works at Charlotte. Resolving to stay, for the moment at Charlotte, but intending to withdraw if the risk of siege manifested itself General James Longstreet managed to turn victory into defeat as General Kearny had anticipated…”