alternatehistory.com

In this article describing the German drive on Leningrad in 1941:

https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/daily/wwii/panzer-group-4-the-march-to-leningrad/

It appears there was perhaps an opportunity to force the Luga river line in late July. But there was much dithering and caution around about what to do in OTL and no such attack happened. Could the Germans with some focus, and risk taking, in late July, force the Luga and seize high ground and key points on the approach Leningrad????

(OTL: it would be harder later in August+September, the Soviets were stronger and the weather worse).

OR perhaps, typically commentary about the eastern front on this board, usually delves into the supply issues at hand, does lack of supply, prevent this sort of focused attack in late July and what happened OTL just has to happen anyway?

OR perhaps Hitler just didn't realize in July 1941 he was in a do or die situation, He might have thought that if he just keeps his elite motorized formations intact, keeps unnecessary risks low, he wins eventually anyway, even if 1942 is necessary. They was no way Hitler could know the future in July 41 and its unreasonable to expect him to take such risks with what he knew then.


Snippet from the article:

"On July 23, the Russians on the Luga received a new commander. For his previous week’s failure, Piadyshev was relieved and later executed. His former commander, Lt. Gen. Popov, assumed the position of commander of the Luga Operational Group while still holding his overall command of the Northern Front.

Merging Von Manstein and Reinhardt
While the new fighting had stalled the Germans for the moment, the toll of Russian dead and wounded grew. Sensing a chance for a breakthrough, both von Manstein and Reinhardt proposed that their corps be united for a concentrated action. Von Manstein wanted to move his corps to Reinhardt’s sector, where the better road network would allow both corps to advance side by side instead of having his corps move through the swampy wooded area surrounding Lake Ilmen. Reinhardt concurred, but Berlin did not.

Hitler worried about his precious panzer divisions’ supply lines, which had shown themselves to be open to attacks and raids by Soviet units. He therefore ordered the halt of offensive operations in von Manstein’s sector until the infantry of the 16th Army could be brought up to secure his right flank.

Von Leeb was tempted to order Reinhatdt’s corps to resume the attack on his own, but instead he told Hoepner to use the corps to finish clearing the south bank of the Luga. After a bitter struggle, Reinhardt succeeded in clearing the Soviet bridgehead at Kingisepp, although the town, located on the opposite bank of the river, was still in the hands of the Red Army.

During the next few days, the 16th Army arrived, taking up positions along the Shelon. To the east, the 18th Army was clearing out the rest of Estonia and was advancing toward Narva, securing Reinhardt’s left flank.

In the interim, Hitler decided that the terrain around Lake Ilmen was indeed not suitable for armored operations. On July 30, Halder noted in his diary: “It is becoming evident that OKH is revising its erstwhile notions and no longer insists on the impossible demand for Army Group North to cut off the eastward retreat route (Manstein’s mission) of the enemy around Leningrad.”

Consequently, it was decided that von Manstein should join forces with Reinhardt for a renewed thrust to Leningrad. While pleased, von Manstein ran up against a new set of orders that reshuffled his corps. The Totenkopf would be attached to the 18th Army, while the 8th Panzer would go into the Panzer Group Reserve. In their place von Manstein received Brig. Gen. Ernst von Leyser’s 269th Infantry Division and Maj. Gen. Arthur Mülverstedt’s 4th SS “Polizei” Infantry Division. That left von Manstein with only one motorized unit—Jahn’s 3rd.

Frustration With Berlin
The Soviets still held onto the town of Luga. While Reinhardt was clearing out Kingisepp, which would hold out for a while longer, and established a bridgehead on the northern bank of the river near the city, part of his corps rushed toward Narva to secure a connection with the 18th Army. At the Luga bridgehead itself, the Russians had rushed two divisions to the area by rail along with some brand new KV I and II tanks, fresh from the factories of Leningrad.

Reinhardt was still furious that the opportunity for a joint attack with von Manstein had been frustrated by Berlin for so many days. In his diary he noted: “Time and again our corps urged a speedy resumption of the attack and asked that some units, at least of von Manstein’s corps, should be switched over to us, especially as they were bogged down where they stood. But it was all in vain…. More delays. It’s terrible. The chance that we opened up has been missed for good, and things are getting more difficult all the time.”
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