A German Push On Leningrad Late July 41

In this article describing the German drive on Leningrad in 1941:

https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/daily/wwii/panzer-group-4-the-march-to-leningrad/

It appears there was perhaps an opportunity to force the Luga river line in late July. But there was much dithering and caution around about what to do in OTL and no such attack happened. Could the Germans with some focus, and risk taking, in late July, force the Luga and seize high ground and key points on the approach Leningrad????

(OTL: it would be harder later in August+September, the Soviets were stronger and the weather worse).

OR perhaps, typically commentary about the eastern front on this board, usually delves into the supply issues at hand, does lack of supply, prevent this sort of focused attack in late July and what happened OTL just has to happen anyway?

OR perhaps Hitler just didn't realize in July 1941 he was in a do or die situation, He might have thought that if he just keeps his elite motorized formations intact, keeps unnecessary risks low, he wins eventually anyway, even if 1942 is necessary. They was no way Hitler could know the future in July 41 and its unreasonable to expect him to take such risks with what he knew then.


Snippet from the article:

"On July 23, the Russians on the Luga received a new commander. For his previous week’s failure, Piadyshev was relieved and later executed. His former commander, Lt. Gen. Popov, assumed the position of commander of the Luga Operational Group while still holding his overall command of the Northern Front.

Merging Von Manstein and Reinhardt
While the new fighting had stalled the Germans for the moment, the toll of Russian dead and wounded grew. Sensing a chance for a breakthrough, both von Manstein and Reinhardt proposed that their corps be united for a concentrated action. Von Manstein wanted to move his corps to Reinhardt’s sector, where the better road network would allow both corps to advance side by side instead of having his corps move through the swampy wooded area surrounding Lake Ilmen. Reinhardt concurred, but Berlin did not.

Hitler worried about his precious panzer divisions’ supply lines, which had shown themselves to be open to attacks and raids by Soviet units. He therefore ordered the halt of offensive operations in von Manstein’s sector until the infantry of the 16th Army could be brought up to secure his right flank.

Von Leeb was tempted to order Reinhatdt’s corps to resume the attack on his own, but instead he told Hoepner to use the corps to finish clearing the south bank of the Luga. After a bitter struggle, Reinhardt succeeded in clearing the Soviet bridgehead at Kingisepp, although the town, located on the opposite bank of the river, was still in the hands of the Red Army.

During the next few days, the 16th Army arrived, taking up positions along the Shelon. To the east, the 18th Army was clearing out the rest of Estonia and was advancing toward Narva, securing Reinhardt’s left flank.

In the interim, Hitler decided that the terrain around Lake Ilmen was indeed not suitable for armored operations. On July 30, Halder noted in his diary: “It is becoming evident that OKH is revising its erstwhile notions and no longer insists on the impossible demand for Army Group North to cut off the eastward retreat route (Manstein’s mission) of the enemy around Leningrad.”

Consequently, it was decided that von Manstein should join forces with Reinhardt for a renewed thrust to Leningrad. While pleased, von Manstein ran up against a new set of orders that reshuffled his corps. The Totenkopf would be attached to the 18th Army, while the 8th Panzer would go into the Panzer Group Reserve. In their place von Manstein received Brig. Gen. Ernst von Leyser’s 269th Infantry Division and Maj. Gen. Arthur Mülverstedt’s 4th SS “Polizei” Infantry Division. That left von Manstein with only one motorized unit—Jahn’s 3rd.

Frustration With Berlin
The Soviets still held onto the town of Luga. While Reinhardt was clearing out Kingisepp, which would hold out for a while longer, and established a bridgehead on the northern bank of the river near the city, part of his corps rushed toward Narva to secure a connection with the 18th Army. At the Luga bridgehead itself, the Russians had rushed two divisions to the area by rail along with some brand new KV I and II tanks, fresh from the factories of Leningrad.

Reinhardt was still furious that the opportunity for a joint attack with von Manstein had been frustrated by Berlin for so many days. In his diary he noted: “Time and again our corps urged a speedy resumption of the attack and asked that some units, at least of von Manstein’s corps, should be switched over to us, especially as they were bogged down where they stood. But it was all in vain…. More delays. It’s terrible. The chance that we opened up has been missed for good, and things are getting more difficult all the time.”
 
not studied enough to know whether they should have risked this scenario, my speculation is always for a more robust naval effort from the onset, the KM should have blocked the evacuations from Tallinn and later Hanko https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_evacuation_of_Tallinn

that would have cost the Soviets some tens of thousands of defenders for Leningrad.

maybe if they were making progress on the maritime front they could/would make a more determined push? with the expectation they could be resupplied/reinforced by sea?
 

Deleted member 1487

There was the serious problem of supply. IIRC in July there was only enough available to supply one Panzer corps to reach Leningrad.

not studied enough to know whether they should have risked this scenario, my speculation is always for a more robust naval effort from the onset, the KM should have blocked the evacuations from Tallinn and later Hanko https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_evacuation_of_Tallinn

that would have cost the Soviets some tens of thousands of defenders for Leningrad.

maybe if they were making progress on the maritime front they could/would make a more determined push? with the expectation they could be resupplied/reinforced by sea?
One of the biggest issues happened even earlier in the campaign. No Panzer corps were set aside to rush Riga and cut off the retreat of the Soviet 8th army, which allowed them to pull back relatively intact into Estonia and drag out that part of the campaign, even allowing for the Tallinn evacuation to happen. Had Reinhardt's corps instead of rushing for Jekabpils had pushed on Riga and cut off the Soviet 8th army and then pushed on Estonia instead of pushing on Pskov and into Russia, they could have had a much easier time and secured Estonia (and the Narwa route to Leningrad) and their shale oil industry intact (at least more so than IOTL). Not only that, but they'd have advanced in friendly territory with decent roads (i.e. not have had the logistics issues due to guerrilla attacks on supply trucks nor deal with Russian roads in swamps east of Pskov), which would have facilitated that advance quite a bit.

The downside is that it leaves Manstein as effectively a flank guard, dealing with Soviet forces East of Pskov on their own, which means his corps may not be able to advance alone.

If you want to wargame it:
https://boardgamegeek.com/boardgame/10642/barbarossa-army-group-north-1941

As an aside (separate POD perhaps), I always wondered how things might have played out if the Luftwaffe hadn't taken the Hs123 out of production and 4th Panzer Group had a dedicated squadron of Hs123 CAS backing them. Raseiniai would have played out quite a bit differently.
 
Last edited by a moderator:
As an aside (separate POD perhaps), I always wondered how things might have played out if the Luftwaffe hadn't taken the Hs123 out of production and 4th Panzer Group had a dedicated squadron of Hs123 CAS backing them. Raseiniai would have played out quite a bit differently.

always consider that a significant error, even leaving aside the invasion of USSR, they had need for it in the Balkans and to equip their allies with?

AND when Soviet invasion planned a crash conversion of Gotha gliders to powered flight, with some of the captured French engines.
 

Deleted member 1487

always consider that a significant error, even leaving aside the invasion of USSR, they had need for it in the Balkans and to equip their allies with?
In hindsight sure, but at the time it was thought newer and more complex was better than old and slow, but simple. Also I don't think the Germans were thinking in terms of what to equip Balkans armies with.

AND when Soviet invasion planned a crash conversion of Gotha gliders to powered flight, with some of the captured French engines.
I'm not sure what you're trying to say here.
 
always consider that a significant error, even leaving aside the invasion of USSR, they had need for it in the Balkans and to equip their allies with?

AND when Soviet invasion planned a crash conversion of Gotha gliders to powered flight, with some of the captured French engines.

In hindsight sure, but at the time it was thought newer and more complex was better than old and slow, but simple. Also I don't think the Germans were thinking in terms of what to equip Balkans armies with.

I'm not sure what you're trying to say here.

they had sold HS-123s to China, so in a certain sense it was still viable for sale, and the plane Henschel introduced, HS-126 was not much of an advance and was soon replaced?

and meant for their OWN operations in the Balkans or other areas with crude or no airfields.

for the Gotha, meant they found themselves with 1,000s of gliders and 1,000s of captured French aircraft engines, they should have paired the two prior to invasion (at the very least a single engine for the return flight unloaded)

of course that is not going to solve their transportation problems solely.
 

Deleted member 1487

they had sold HS-123s to China, so in a certain sense it was still viable for sale, and the plane Henschel introduced, HS-126 was not much of an advance and was soon replaced?
And Spain, but they were trying to dump stuff they didn't want on militaries that couldn't necessarily handle that much more complex gear at the time...in the 1930s. By the 1940s the thought was their export potential was over.

and meant for their OWN operations in the Balkans or other areas with crude or no airfields.
They weren't planning on fighting in the Balkans and thought that the Ju87 would be just fine even in relatively rough conditions.

for the Gotha, meant they found themselves with 1,000s of gliders and 1,000s of captured French aircraft engines, they should have paired the two prior to invasion (at the very least a single engine for the return flight unloaded)
Only after 1941. The Go242 only entered service in August 1941 and the Go244 showed up in 1942, first in Greece. Over the course of the war they built about 1500 of the Go242 and only less than 200 of the Go244. Kind of hard to pair the two when the glider only started being used months into the invasion. If they waited to pair them with the engine then things get delayed even further, probably into 1942 as per OTL.

of course that is not going to solve their transportation problems solely.
Indeed.
 
for the Gotha, meant they found themselves with 1,000s of gliders and 1,000s of captured French aircraft engines, they should have paired the two prior to invasion (at the very least a single engine for the return flight unloaded)

Only after 1941. The Go242 only entered service in August 1941 and the Go244 showed up in 1942, first in Greece. Over the course of the war they built about 1500 of the Go242 and only less than 200 of the Go244. Kind of hard to pair the two when the glider only started being used months into the invasion. If they waited to pair them with the engine then things get delayed even further, probably into 1942 as per OTL.

excuse me for conflating their various gliders, perhaps the DFS one would have worked, perhaps not, for conversion.
 
There was the serious problem of supply. IIRC in July there was only enough available to supply one Panzer corps to reach Leningrad.


One of the biggest issues happened even earlier in the campaign. No Panzer corps were set aside to rush Riga and cut off the retreat of the Soviet 8th army, which allowed them to pull back relatively intact into Estonia and drag out that part of the campaign, even allowing for the Tallinn evacuation to happen. Had Reinhardt's corps instead of rushing for Jekabpils had pushed on Riga and cut off the Soviet 8th army and then pushed on Estonia instead of pushing on Pskov and into Russia, they could have had a much easier time and secured Estonia (and the Narwa route to Leningrad) and their shale oil industry intact (at least more so than IOTL). Not only that, but they'd have advanced in friendly territory with decent roads (i.e. not have had the logistics issues due to guerrilla attacks on supply trucks nor deal with Russian roads in swamps east of Pskov), which would have facilitated that advance quite a bit.

The downside is that it leaves Manstein as effectively a flank guard, dealing with Soviet forces East of Pskov on their own, which means his corps may not be able to advance alone.

This is interesting. So the 41st Panzer after Raseinai would head a bit more northerly.
Does that impact (slow) the 56th taking Dvinsk? (kind of odd the two panzer corps crossed paths). I am guessing not, since the northerly turn would probably be after the Raseiniai battle anyway?

I can see why the OTL Germans would shoot for Ostrov, Pskov, if their trying to reach the A-A line. Potentially collapses the whole northern front. Might even provide some support for a push for Moscow later. (But this requires a 1918 style Soviet collapse at some point).

I agree, certainly through Latvia and Estonia communications and supply is a whole lot easier though for 41st Panzer corps.

Would the Germans be able to rush Leningrad in mid July then with only 41st panzer corps? (assuming the 56th is dealing with counterattacks)

Would the Soviets just barricade the narrowish Narva gap with new reinforcements?

AGN-22-30June-1024x762.jpg
 

Deleted member 1487

This is interesting. So the 41st Panzer after Raseinai would head a bit more northerly.
Does that impact (slow) the 56th taking Dvinsk? (kind of odd the two panzer corps crossed paths). I am guessing not, since the northerly turn would probably be after the Raseiniai battle anyway?

Would the Germans be able to rush Leningrad in mid July then with only 41st panzer corps? (assuming the 56th is dealing with counterattacks)

Would the Soviets just barricade the narrowish Narva gap with new reinforcements?
Since the corps effectively operated separately for a while I doubt there would be much impact on the fall of Dvinsk.

If they were ballsy enough I'd imagine they could try and rush Leningrad via Estonia...but that depends on how quickly they could move and how quickly reinforcements follow behind. I'd think the Soviets could try and throw something together at Narva, but that depends on what is available and whether they opt to focus on Narva or Tallinn. IIRC there wasn't even a battle worth the name when 18th army moved through it to the Luga river in August.
 
Top