A German Eastern Strategy exposed

What kind of victory ?

  • entente victory 1914-1915

    Votes: 1 2.9%
  • CP victory 1914-1915

    Votes: 4 11.4%
  • entente victory 1916

    Votes: 3 8.6%
  • CP victory 1916

    Votes: 13 37.1%
  • entente victory 1917

    Votes: 3 8.6%
  • CP victory 1917

    Votes: 10 28.6%
  • entente victory 1918-????

    Votes: 5 14.3%
  • CP victory 1918-????

    Votes: 2 5.7%
  • stalemate

    Votes: 5 14.3%

  • Total voters
    35
  • Poll closed .

BooNZ

Banned
In that case...

Germany can't conquer Russia. If the Russians know an East First campaign is coming, they're going to put extra effort into developing the railways needed to deploy men from the interior as quickly as possible and try to further improve/rationalize the mobalization system.
The Russians had prioritized railway construction for at least 25 years prior to 1914 and I am skeptical the POD would generate any perceived need to further accelerate railway construction.

What else they do depends in many other ways on the stance Russia adopts for the Austrian front. Do they decide to push the offensive there, perhaps with the goal of swinging around and cutting the German tail in Silesia? Then you likely see a build-up towards Galicia with the goal of taking the western Carpathians and Krakow with a lighter push in the east.

The Russians were OTL working on the assumption a 20% superiority of numbers over the Germans would bring them victory, which can be achieved if the Russian 4h Army joins the Russian 1st and 2nd Armies...
Does Russia adopt a "Mongolian" strategy of slowly retreating, wearing the Germans out and pulling them into the depths of Poland before finding a thin point in the strechec lines and going for a rupture?
I am curious how the German planners glance east, instantly cures the systemic disfunction within the Russian military.
Than they probably take a more passive stance against Austria, counting on the poor logistical capacity for them to conduct an offensive into Ukraine to let them skimp on concentration. Whatever the case, the mobility, speed, and positioning advantages don't exist to pull a Barbarossa in 1914, meaning no giant bags of Russian prisoners being taken out of the fight.
The Polish salient has several Russian armies and the Polish fortresses with vast quantities of munitions therein. If Russians fight then many of those formations are likely destroyed, if they run some of those formations will be caught and vast quantities of munitions lost.
The Frenchies... depends on how powerful the fortresses the Germans build in E-L. The Cult of the Offensive is still strong, and there's a real chance the French decide to push on if they perceive the German "thin grey line" as something they can punch through. There's likely a bigger focus on heavy artillery build up in any case though, and infastructural build-up in the east to support a large localized offensive.

The French were obsessed with the offensive and their fabled light artillery. Heavy artillery was not a priority and French doctrine actually eschewed the need for artillery in offensives. I understand the Germans would not have wanted to deter any French offensives. In accordance with Joffre, their doctrine and treaty with Russia, the French will continue to attack until their forces lose cohesion. Then attack again...
End result: advantage tilts far more to the Entente, particularly the French. Britain likely sees little more than naval activity and seizure of German colonies, as there's no good front on which to operate (Butterflies, I'll detail of asked, almost gurantee the OE is at least neutral if the Frenchies and Russians know France will be providing the treasure and the Ruskies the blood in a more lopsided manner than otl). War is ultimately likely shortened with less damage to AH and France demographically and economically, and the peace treaty probably ends up less draconian

In the west the Germans are entrenched on defensible terrain on a narrow front against hapless but predictable French offensives (lacking appropriate doctrines and equipment). Until Joffre is removed, the French will bleed themselves white on the offensive. In the east, the Russian forces either attempt to defend Polish salient and get destroyed en masse, or get mauled while abandoning Poland, losing vast quantities of munitions and stores in the process. In either case, A-H prewar armies are substantially intact and Italy will be sitting firmly on the sidelines. Any early losses incurred by the Russians are going to be especially difficult to replace with the dire state of Russian industry at the start of the war.

I commend your courage, because with a strong A-H, a neutral Italy and a crumbling Russia, there are not many who would guarantee Ottoman neutrality.
 
The Russians had prioritized railway construction for at least 25 years prior to 1914 and I am skeptical the POD would generate any perceived need to further accelerate railway construction.

Yeah and they made immense progress here, the german (in 1905) planned that Russia would need 30 to mobilizate their troop, the french planned that they would made only 13-15 day in 1913, still Russia here know that the mobilization would be the key here so they could have still some minor improvement, but the main divergencve could be the rationalization problem.

"Even though the total length of railway tracks stood at 71,000 kilometres on the eve of the First World War, the Russian railway system had limited capacity to serve the belligerent interests of the state. While Germany and Austria-Hungary had thirty-two railway connections at their disposal, including fourteen two-lane tracks to the Russian borders, Russia relied on merely thirteen tracks to the enemy borderlands, amongst which only eight could be used simultaneously in two directions. It took Russia at least twice as much time - a month or more - as the Central Powers to concentrate the troops at the theatres of war and mobilise, due to unsatisfactory rail infrastructure." https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/railways_russian_empire

The main problem of Russia was the organizatiopn, supplies line, or if Russia follow a defensive strategy, they ciould have adopted some governemùental programm to
correct these problems OTL Russia was divided between the offensive faction and the defensive with attrition faction if the latter win the debate they would try to correct these problem allowing the Russia to have a better sustained army.

The French were obsessed with the offensive and their fabled light artillery. Heavy artillery was not a priority and French doctrine actually eschewed the need for artillery in offensives. I understand the Germans would not have wanted to deter any French offensives. In accordance with Joffre, their doctrine and treaty with Russia, the French will continue to attack until their forces lose cohesion. Then attack again...

In this case, Germany would surely transform Alsace-Lorraine in the heavy fortress, the french would surely still used the offensive doctrine and try to pierce this especially in the begining of the war (before the German could securize the area), but they would know that they would need heavy artillery to penetrate his fortresses so it seems likely that they will focus more in the heavy artillery in this case.

In the west the Germans are entrenched on defensible terrain on a narrow front against hapless but predictable French offensives (lacking appropriate doctrines and equipment). Until Joffre is removed, the French will bleed themselves white on the offensive. In the east, the Russian forces either attempt to defend Polish salient and get destroyed en masse, or get mauled while abandoning Poland, losing vast quantities of munitions and stores in the process. In either case, A-H prewar armies are substantially intact and Italy will be sitting firmly on the sidelines. Any early losses incurred by the Russians are going to be especially difficult to replace with the dire state of Russian industry at the start of the war.

Yeah German and Austria will surely win the first part of the war but Germany would surely try to derstroy Russia quickly to avoid a long war and would advance quickly in the Russian front or here, German army will suffer many flaw, lack of infrastcture, supplies line, problem of communication, they could suffer some sharp lose, and lose like the Russia in Tannenberg.
 
Yeah and they made immense progress here, the german (in 1905) planned that Russia would need 30 to mobilizate their troop, the french planned that they would made only 13-15 day in 1913, still Russia here know that the mobilization would be the key here so they could have still some minor improvement, but the main divergencve could be the rationalization problem.

"Even though the total length of railway tracks stood at 71,000 kilometres on the eve of the First World War, the Russian railway system had limited capacity to serve the belligerent interests of the state. While Germany and Austria-Hungary had thirty-two railway connections at their disposal, including fourteen two-lane tracks to the Russian borders, Russia relied on merely thirteen tracks to the enemy borderlands, amongst which only eight could be used simultaneously in two directions. It took Russia at least twice as much time - a month or more - as the Central Powers to concentrate the troops at the theatres of war and mobilise, due to unsatisfactory rail infrastructure." https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/railways_russian_empire

The main problem of Russia was the organizatiopn, supplies line, or if Russia follow a defensive strategy, they ciould have adopted some governemùental programm to
correct these problems OTL Russia was divided between the offensive faction and the defensive with attrition faction if the latter win the debate they would try to correct these problem allowing the Russia to have a better sustained army.



In this case, Germany would surely transform Alsace-Lorraine in the heavy fortress, the french would surely still used the offensive doctrine and try to pierce this especially in the begining of the war (before the German could securize the area), but they would know that they would need heavy artillery to penetrate his fortresses so it seems likely that they will focus more in the heavy artillery in this case.



Yeah German and Austria will surely win the first part of the war but Germany would surely try to derstroy Russia quickly to avoid a long war and would advance quickly in the Russian front or here, German army will suffer many flaw, lack of infrastcture, supplies line, problem of communication, they could suffer some sharp lose, and lose like the Russia in Tannenberg.

The Russians aren't skilled enough to pull of a victory as lopsided as Tanneberg.
 

BooNZ

Banned
Yeah and they made immense progress here, the german (in 1905) planned that Russia would need 30 to mobilizate their troop, the french planned that they would made only 13-15 day in 1913, still Russia here know that the mobilization would be the key here so they could have still some minor improvement, but the main divergencve could be the rationalization problem.

The Franco-Russian "defensive" treaties called for coordinated offensives against Germany as soon as practical - no later than Day 15. A series of large French loans were advanced to Russia with the explicit purpose of facilitating Russia's swift mobilization. If Russia has abandoned the offensive, it has effectively abandoned the Franco-Russian treaties and the chunks of funding that came with it.

I also don't understand your assumption a defensive Russia would place an even greater emphasis on rail infrastructure when the organization and logistical challenges of launching offensives would be far greater. What is this rationalization problem?

"Even though the total length of railway tracks stood at 71,000 kilometres on the eve of the First World War, the Russian railway system had limited capacity to serve the belligerent interests of the state. While Germany and Austria-Hungary had thirty-two railway connections at their disposal, including fourteen two-lane tracks to the Russian borders, Russia relied on merely thirteen tracks to the enemy borderlands, amongst which only eight could be used simultaneously in two directions. It took Russia at least twice as much time - a month or more - as the Central Powers to concentrate the troops at the theatres of war and mobilise, due to unsatisfactory rail infrastructure." https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/railways_russian_empire

The main problem of Russia was the organizatiopn, supplies line, or if Russia follow a defensive strategy, they ciould have adopted some governemùental programm to correct these problems OTL Russia was divided between the offensive faction and the defensive with attrition faction if the latter win the debate they would try to correct these problem allowing the Russia to have a better sustained army.

As outlined above, offensives pose greater organizational and logistical challenges than hunkering down on the defensive. There is no obvious nexus between the POD and your suggestion the Russians would suddenly identify and fix their organizational and military deficiencies. As previously stated, the Russian military believed it only needed a 20% numerical advantage to defeat the Germans, which suggests the Russians may have been somewhat ignorant of their extensive deficiencies. I'm not aware of any defensive with attrition faction within the Russian hierarchy.

As an aside, OTL the Russian rail network significantly outperformed the A-H rail network in 1914.

In this case, Germany would surely transform Alsace-Lorraine in the heavy fortress, the french would surely still used the offensive doctrine and try to pierce this especially in the begining of the war (before the German could securize the area), but they would know that they would need heavy artillery to penetrate his fortresses so it seems likely that they will focus more in the heavy artillery in this case.

Based on pre-war intelligence reports the Germans were enthusiastic at the prospect of French offensives across the Franco-German border and one of the benefits cited for a hypothetical eastern strategy was it would encourage the French to attack in disadvantageous circumstances. Key fortresses like the Metz may be reinforced, but overall they would not want to discourage French from putting themselves where they could be counter-attacked.

As previously stated, the French obsessed with the offensive and did not dwell on the need for artillery to support attacks on defensive positions. Further, the French artillery doctrine was obsessed with light artillery for more-or-less all purposes, including offensives. There is no obvious nexus between the POD and your suggestion the French would suddenly identify and fix their organizational and military deficiencies including heavy artillery.

Yeah German and Austria will surely win the first part of the war but Germany would surely try to derstroy Russia quickly to avoid a long war and would advance quickly in the Russian front or here, German army will suffer many flaw, lack of infrastcture, supplies line, problem of communication, they could suffer some sharp lose, and lose like the Russia in Tannenberg.
After the Russian forces in Poland are destroyed or routed, the CP advance will be shackled to rail, i.e. the speed rail can be converted, repaired and built. Without mechanized forces, there is very little scope for the CP powers to overstretch logistics in the east, since they are unlikely to be able to advance much more than 100 miles from the nearest functional railhead. As an aside, Imperial Germany would have far more rail resources and expertise than say Nazi Germany had in 1942-43.

The weakest aspect of a German Eastern strategy is the lack of an obvious end game if none of the Entente throw in the towel - especially if Britain joins. After a series of CP victory parades in 1914 and 1915, you have a slow march to Moscow ending in 1917 if no-one has not already fallen over.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
If this
...
here the kaiser would ask to Schieffen to design another plan the purpose is to destroy the Russian army
...
would happen still under the tenure of Schlieffen ...
...then this
...
After a series of CP victory parades in 1914 and 1915, you have a slow march to Moscow ending in 1917 if no-one has not already fallen over.
might actually become the operational goal !

Because Schlieffen might ITTL less indifferent/leaning towards the Kaisers obviuos wishes and recommend as his successor the IOTL also 'discussed' Colmar von der Goltz instead of Moltke the Minor.

Who - IMHO - would have strongly worked contrary the 'short-war' hypothesis as the base for military and political military planning (fortresses, logistics in East Prussia, economical preparations, etc.), as he would see 'preparing the whole nation for war' as one of his most noble tasks - in his social-darwinistic views.


However, this would even less 'weaken' the german military machines performance @Rheinbund seems to look for.
 
The Franco-Russian "defensive" treaties called for coordinated offensives against Germany as soon as practical - no later than Day 15. A series of large French loans were advanced to Russia with the explicit purpose of facilitating Russia's swift mobilization. If Russia has abandoned the offensive, it has effectively abandoned the Franco-Russian treaties and the chunks of funding that came with it.

I also don't understand your assumption a defensive Russia would place an even greater emphasis on rail infrastructure when the organization and logistical challenges of launching offensives would be far greater. What is this rationalization problem?

The main focus would be than Russian planned a court and small offensive nobody planned about a long war, here they know that they couldn't win in the short term and will focus more on the long term so i belive that they will not cure all their problem but that they will try to overcome these problem earlier meaning a more efficient organization. In the begining of the war Russian suffered a lot of problem of supplies, communication, because they put a lot of theior effort under an offensive doctrine trying to reach the most quickly possible in Prussia. Yeah the rail infrastructure was great for the mobilization but suffered many flaw especially to transport supplies in the front.

As outlined above, offensives pose greater organizational and logistical challenges than hunkering down on the defensive. There is no obvious nexus between the POD and your suggestion the Russians would suddenly identify and fix their organizational and military deficiencies. As previously stated, the Russian military believed it only needed a 20% numerical advantage to defeat the Germans, which suggests the Russians may have been somewhat ignorant of their extensive deficiencies. I'm not aware of any defensive with attrition faction within the Russian hierarchy.

Here is just my opinion but if the french ask for the Russian to go in the defensive and that Russian will saw thatGerùman planiffiate a huge offensive, they know that they will have difficulties OTL they believed that Germany will split thier forces between the western front and the Eastern front here they know that they will use all their force in the eastern front, so it seems likely that in this context that Russia will chose a more defensive approach.

Based on pre-war intelligence reports the Germans were enthusiastic at the prospect of French offensives across the Franco-German border and one of the benefits cited for a hypothetical eastern strategy was it would encourage the French to attack in disadvantageous circumstances. Key fortresses like the Metz may be reinforced, but overall they would not want to discourage French from putting themselves where they could be counter-attacked.

As previously stated, the French obsessed with the offensive and did not dwell on the need for artillery to support attacks on defensive positions. Further, the French artillery doctrine was obsessed with light artillery for more-or-less all purposes, including offensives. There is no obvious nexus between the POD and your suggestion the French would suddenly identify and fix their organizational and military deficiencies including heavy artillery.

OTL France know that Germany will goes in the offensive so it was a battle of the more efficient army on the offensive it explain their great emphasis on light artillery that allow a better mobility and spped against a static and defensives germans armies this emphasis would be useless, they would need for more heavy artillery.

Because Schlieffen might ITTL less indifferent/leaning towards the Kaisers obviuos wishes and recommend as his successor the IOTL also 'discussed' Colmar von der Goltz instead of Moltke the Minor.


Because Schlieffen might ITTL less indifferent/leaning towards the Kaisers obviuos wishes and recommend as his successor the IOTL also 'discussed' Colmar von der Goltz instead of Moltke the Minor.

Who - IMHO - would have strongly worked contrary the 'short-war' hypothesis as the base for military and political military planning (fortresses, logistics in East Prussia, economical preparations, etc.), as he would see 'preparing the whole nation for war' as one of his most noble tasks - in his social-darwinistic views.


However, this would even less 'weaken' the german military machines performance @Rheinbund seems to look for.

Let's be clear in this scenario Germany would have plannified their offensive during year so yeah they will have a lot of modification Alsace will be surely transformed in a heavy fortress, a lot of rail will be built in the eastern front, German would work on the logistics in East Prussia like i say earlier i dind't talk about this because i don't know enough about German and AH, but it's one of the reason i opened this thread, because i also want to know how the Germany will prepare differently in this scenario.
 

BooNZ

Banned
The main focus would be than Russian planned a court and small offensive nobody planned about a long war, here they know that they couldn't win in the short term and will focus more on the long term so i belive that they will not cure all their problem but that they will try to overcome these problem earlier meaning a more efficient organization. In the begining of the war Russian suffered a lot of problem of supplies, communication, because they put a lot of theior effort under an offensive doctrine trying to reach the most quickly possible in Prussia. Yeah the rail infrastructure was great for the mobilization but suffered many flaw especially to transport supplies in the front.

As outlined at least a couple of times on this thread, the Germans had an eastern plan on the books until at least 1912/13, and even factions within the German administration were surprised to discover that option had been formally discontinued. Accordingly, the POD is very small beer until the Germans actually decide to go east in July/August 1914. I am curious about where you derived your understanng of Russian planning?

You are either ignoring or not cognascent of the serious systemic issues facing imperial Russia in the early 20th Century. Much is made of the mass of Russian humanity (i.e. the fabled steamroller), but indemic curruption and mediocre education standards mean the Russians are going facing ongoing and competing shortages of competent military officers, military NCOs, factory foremen and beuraucrats. Russia already had the highest miltary budget among the great powers and railways continued to dominate non-military government spending. In simple terms, the quality of Russian manpower (or lack thereof), meant Russia had to spend a lot more to achieve outcomes substanitally inferior to the Germans.

In respect of spending priorities, the French requently bemoaned the fact loans intended to improve Russian railways to facilitate swift mobilisation were instead being spent by Imperial Russia on rail with more economic/holistic objectives. The simple fact was Imperial Russia was already attempting to improve its resilience,

Here is just my opinion but if the french ask for the Russian to go in the defensive and that Russian will saw thatGerùman planiffiate a huge offensive, they know that they will have difficulties OTL they believed that Germany will split thier forces between the western front and the Eastern front here they know that they will use all their force in the eastern front, so it seems likely that in this context that Russia will chose a more defensive approach.

There is no rationale for the French to ask the Russia to go onto the defensive. The Germans enjoy interior lines of supply, so can defeat Russia and France in detail if those powers remain inert. The rationale for the Franco-Russian offensive doctrines and treaties was to simultaniously attack Germany to prevent Germany from focusing on only one enemy. Even when it was expected France was the focus of German intentions, France remained obsessed with the offensive from 1912 and OTL proceeded to launch major offensives accross the Franco-German border as the Germans lurched though Belgium. Russia has a far longer border and is facing two great powers. Your suggestion the Russians would instantly adopt a substantially defensive posture is not supported by French/Russian military doctrines and treaties, the French/Russian strategic circumstances or the OTL rationale and decisions of their military leadership.

The Russians cannot effectively defend the Polish salient, which contains resources the Russians would be loathed to lose.

OTL France know that Germany will goes in the offensive so it was a battle of the more efficient army on the offensive it explain their great emphasis on light artillery that allow a better mobility and spped against a static and defensives germans armies this emphasis would be useless, they would need for more heavy artillery.

No, the French obsession with light artillery goes back to 1895-96 (at least), when the fabled French 75mm was the first example of modern fast firing artillery (i.e. artillery with a recoil system that dramatically improved accuracy and rate of fire). This ongoing obsession extended to designing munitions to replicate plunging fire. As outlined above, the French always intended to launch significant offensives accross the Franco-German border, which they did OTL. You are claiming the French would be seeking an entirely different set of tools, despite no real change of plan.
 
You are either ignoring or not cognascent of the serious systemic issues facing imperial Russia in the early 20th Century. Much is made of the mass of Russian humanity (i.e. the fabled steamroller), but indemic curruption and mediocre education standards mean the Russians are going facing ongoing and competing shortages of competent military officers, military NCOs, factory foremen and beuraucrats. Russia already had the highest miltary budget among the great powers and railways continued to dominate non-military government spending. In simple terms, the quality of Russian manpower (or lack thereof), meant Russia had to spend a lot more to achieve outcomes substanitally inferior to the Germans

Something I read that spun me out as I thought of the impacts was that the majority of Russian junior officers and NCOs were not used to living by mechanically measured time. Very few of these ranks and virtually bone of the rank and file owned personal watches and scheduled their activities around set times.

Just this simple thing could create a major deficiency in the quality of their army by not being able to coordinate action in time with other units. But you could never measure it.
 
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