A Fitter Italian Military

[Borys]

Ahoj!
I did not question consciption , but never mind.

I respectfully disagree on the other points, but it is your stroy.

Let us imagine a a new 152,4mm howitzer:
1936 - exisitng guns shown not to work so well.
1937 - new gun designed, prototypes made and sent to front for testing.
1938 - field test results built into design
1939 - mass production begins

With circa 40 divisions, and a low allocation of 12 per division (one 36 peiece heavy howitzer regiment per each 3 division strong corps) Italy needs c.500 guns. No, Italy cannot make that many in 18 months time (I suppose it could, not building anything else). And the gunners - both officers and OR - need to train on this weapon.

New AT gun - 54 per divion - that's thousands for the whole army.
New field howitzer - agin 54 per division, if not 72 - thousands for the whole army.

Skip the move over to 8mm, keep the 6,5mm calibre, just introduce an improved round, with better loading and ballistics, which can be used with exisitng weapons. However, get rid of the oil-pump MGs. And give the troops a good LMG.

Nice idea for the double track promotion, but it still does not address the low pay of junior officers who abandoned the army for other pursuits.

Social issues - just like in Germany with the SA and SS, the Blackshirts were democratic. In the field the Royal Army ran separate kitchens for officers and OR - not so good for morale.
This is a whle new world you can address.
But I'm no expert on the Italian army. I go by the various snippets I read and some contatns which apply to armies anywhere.
Maybe I focus too much on gritty details?
Borys

 

[Croesus]

Borys: I recognised your point about conscription, was just confirming it ITTL.

Not sure about what other points you disagree with; am more than happy to debate merits point by point.

The double track promotion was real OTL but did not survive; ITTL it did.

The artillery reforms ITTL commenced in 1929: in OTL this was when the issue was first seriously raised but priority was not given to the reform, ITTL it was. It's my preference at this stage not to get too hung up on details as things very quickly bog down. For me it's sufficient to broadly establish that the artillery is 'better' and slowly develop detail as required.

This does mean that some detail eventually contradicts the established parts of the TL (I'm not convinced about the rechambering to 8mm either), but what I'm not trying to do is create a wank scenario, just making enough changes that were suggested OTL.

Croesus

 

[Borys]

Ahoj!
Appologies. I missed the finer points of your TL. I had the erroneous impression that the army started training/rearming after "the first lessons of the Spanish Civil War".

Two users of the 6,5mm calibre abandoned it - Italy and Japan (which produced THREE different 7,62 rounds .. ). Sweden was happy with their 6,5mm until the 60s or 70s.

Borys

 

[Croesus]

Next installment is up, how the Hungarians are viewing all this. Aiieee, but that was a long one. So much reading, but makes a refreshing change from all the soldierwank on the TL of late.

Croesus

 

[whatisinaname]

Another great part posted

 

[schrammy]

mhhh interesting quite diffrent from what i always tought about hungary verry intersting indeed ;D

 

[Grimm Reaper]

I hate wanks of any kind.

Reasonable developments:

1) Mussolini does not try to bolster the trade deficit by selling off some of his best armaments. Italian army better equipped, fiscal condition weakened.

2) Mussolini is persuaded not to attempt to monopolize Italian industry and arms manufacturers into the three ministries mentioned. Superior and more innovative production results.

3) Mussolini does not feel the need for sixty crippled divisions. The forty or so Italian divisions remain at full manpower and are closer in combat strength to their likely opponents.

4) Mussolini does not declare war on the WA in 1940, instead realizing that his tanks and aircraft are badly dated, instead determining to improve the situation while dealing with Yugoslavia until 1941.

Italy was indeed equipped with inferior equipment, and for the same reason as France. Italy and France purchased substantial quantities of weaponry in the late 1920s and early 1930s, Germany and England did not. By purchasing equipment with recent developments, Berlin and London gained an edge.

5) Mussolini could instead produce a larger number of destroyers, subs and cruisers, leaving a more modest battle fleet(4 or 5). Note that the carriers planned would have been badly outclassed by the Americans(or Japanese) and that the Italian fleet air arm would have no more than two ships and a tradition of active duty going back only to the late 1930s at best.

6) Discover the oil by a fluke. Not only would this require serious investment, it would be likely to divert Mussolini's interest until done AND encourage German investment in a neutral Italy which could provide oil, as opposed to an ally whose oil fields were a British prize/target.

7) Find an ally. Spain is a good choice although a more pragmatic Mussolini might mean the Spanish Civil War lingers up to another year. Either Greece or Turkey would be a good selection, but not both. Alas.

Turkey is obviously the more potentially formidable although the military was far less respectable than is widely realized(more in a bit). As an associate of Italy and Spain concessions might well be extracted at the expense of Syria, Iraq or Bulgaria.

However, in September 1939 Turkey had all of 48 T-26B tanks, plus 800 machine guns and 600 artillery of varying age groups. Also sufficient rifles for 65% of the conscripts. An air force of @300 aircraft, all of them dated to some degree, often seriously.

Greece might seem a strange selection but Italy and Greece could both have gained from a breakup of Yugoslavia or from British concessions and/or losses in war(Macedonia, Cyprus, etc.)

8) Gain aid/gifts from Germany and England/France. This not only enables Italy to improve the weapons and armor and such at a much lower cost of R&D but might prove substantial.

In comparison Turkey, by 1943, had used Anglo-German competition to add 100 Renault R-35 tanks(in January 1940), 24 Shermans, 220 Stuarts, 180 Valentines, 34 PzKwIII and 37 PzKwIV. Also 72 Baltimores, 60 Hurricanes, and 72 FW 190s. Almost 600 fairly modern tanks and 200+ fighters and bombers. Italy's bargaining position would have been much stronger.

 

[katanbuilder3]

Very enjoyable!

 

[Croesus]

mhhh interesting quite diffrent from what i always tought about hungary verry intersting indeed ;D

My sources re. Hungary come from a series of articles from JSTOR.org, which is a source I'm fairly confident of. Hungarian revisionism isn't a contested historigraphical issue, and neither is the tendency to predominance of the counter-revolutionary moderate-conservatives in the Hungarian government in the face of repeated militarist/radical-right agitation (AFAIK). In the absence of an effective popular front, this makes Hungarian politics a two-horse race.

ITTL a fascist (radical-right) conquest of Yugoslavia cannot IMHO avoid placing significant pressure on the politics of the moderate-conservatives. My available reading is near complete on Hungary and I'm not seeing much to throw serious doubt on the proposal that a fascist/nazi invasion of *yet another* neighbouring non-radicalised country would in any way prevent the growth of power of Hungary's politicised military.

Croesus.

 

[Croesus]

I hate wanks of any kind.

Reasonable developments:

1) Mussolini does not try to bolster the trade deficit by selling off some of his best armaments. Italian army better equipped, fiscal condition weakened.

2) Mussolini is persuaded not to attempt to monopolize Italian industry and arms manufacturers into the three ministries mentioned. Superior and more innovative production results.

3) Mussolini does not feel the need for sixty crippled divisions. The forty or so Italian divisions remain at full manpower and are closer in combat strength to their likely opponents.

4) Mussolini does not declare war on the WA in 1940, instead realizing that his tanks and aircraft are badly dated, instead determining to improve the situation while dealing with Yugoslavia until 1941.

Italy was indeed equipped with inferior equipment, and for the same reason as France. Italy and France purchased substantial quantities of weaponry in the late 1920s and early 1930s, Germany and England did not. By purchasing equipment with recent developments, Berlin and London gained an edge.

5) Mussolini could instead produce a larger number of destroyers, subs and cruisers, leaving a more modest battle fleet(4 or 5). Note that the carriers planned would have been badly outclassed by the Americans(or Japanese) and that the Italian fleet air arm would have no more than two ships and a tradition of active duty going back only to the late 1930s at best.

6) Discover the oil by a fluke. Not only would this require serious investment, it would be likely to divert Mussolini's interest until done AND encourage German investment in a neutral Italy which could provide oil, as opposed to an ally whose oil fields were a British prize/target.

7) Find an ally. Spain is a good choice although a more pragmatic Mussolini might mean the Spanish Civil War lingers up to another year. Either Greece or Turkey would be a good selection, but not both. Alas.

Turkey is obviously the more potentially formidable although the military was far less respectable than is widely realized(more in a bit). As an associate of Italy and Spain concessions might well be extracted at the expense of Syria, Iraq or Bulgaria.

However, in September 1939 Turkey had all of 48 T-26B tanks, plus 800 machine guns and 600 artillery of varying age groups. Also sufficient rifles for 65% of the conscripts. An air force of @300 aircraft, all of them dated to some degree, often seriously.

Greece might seem a strange selection but Italy and Greece could both have gained from a breakup of Yugoslavia or from British concessions and/or losses in war(Macedonia, Cyprus, etc.)

8) Gain aid/gifts from Germany and England/France. This not only enables Italy to improve the weapons and armor and such at a much lower cost of R&D but might prove substantial.

In comparison Turkey, by 1943, had used Anglo-German competition to add 100 Renault R-35 tanks(in January 1940), 24 Shermans, 220 Stuarts, 180 Valentines, 34 PzKwIII and 37 PzKwIV. Also 72 Baltimores, 60 Hurricanes, and 72 FW 190s. Almost 600 fairly modern tanks and 200+ fighters and bombers. Italy's bargaining position would have been much stronger.

OMG where do I start. It's late and I've just finished an eight hour road trip, so can't immediately reply. You raise some very good points and I look forward to debating them fully. At this stage I would observe that you seem to allow yourself more ATL latitude than do I.

Croesus

 

[Croesus]

1) Mussolini does not try to bolster the trade deficit by selling off some of his best armaments. Italian army better equipped, fiscal condition weakened.

The Italian economic situation under the Fascist regime is a very complex beast. I'm an economist and identifying the best case course of action is not easy at all. There is a sense that the Italian fiscal reaction to the effects of the depression on the lira was too strong, but there are a lot of other influences at play; not simply the political ones. Given the currency crisis, arms sales brings in foreign currency and helps prevent a fundamental collapse of the financial system.

2) Mussolini is persuaded not to attempt to monopolize Italian industry and arms manufacturers into the three ministries mentioned. Superior and more innovative production results.

Breaking the monopolies is important but I've read some papers that indicates that fascist centralising tendencies also produced positive results. I think its important to give the FIAT-Ansaldo conglomerate competition; but the flip side to this is where is the competing capital base to come from in the midst of a depression?

3) Mussolini does not feel the need for sixty crippled divisions. The forty or so Italian divisions remain at full manpower and are closer in combat strength to their likely opponents.

OTL the traditional establishment of the RE was 30 divisions, more or less. From early in the inter-war period there was an awareness that that number needed to be halved if the small industrial base was to be able to fully equip the army in the field. Pariani introduced the binary division and changed the focus of Italian maneuver from a divisional focus to a corps focus, with absolutely terrible results. If there is no Pariani reform there will still be an insufficient materiel base to the RE; hence ITTL I've played the Balbo card to get their number reduced, but fully equipped.

4) Mussolini does not declare war on the WA in 1940, instead realizing that his tanks and aircraft are badly dated, instead determining to improve the situation while dealing with Yugoslavia until 1941.

TTL is certainly heading in that direction. I'm behind on my writing because I'm ahead on my research, but I see a solid basis for Italy maintaining its non-belligerence status while simultaneously using the Danubian political situation to its advantage vis a vis the relationship with Germany.

5) Mussolini could instead produce a larger number of destroyers, subs and cruisers, leaving a more modest battle fleet(4 or 5). Note that the carriers planned would have been badly outclassed by the Americans(or Japanese) and that the Italian fleet air arm would have no more than two ships and a tradition of active duty going back only to the late 1930s at best.

Naval rationalisation is something that needs to be looked at. I've got notes whereby Italy moves away from investing into a white-elephant battlefleet in response to funding pressures. I'll be rolling them out when the time comes; I am however mindful that I'm not looking to make changes to suit my needs. Your point about the fleet air arm is well taken, though I can't see ITTL the rivalry between RA and RM decreasing. Whatever the case, I need to research more in this field.

6) Discover the oil by a fluke. Not only would this require serious investment, it would be likely to divert Mussolini's interest until done AND encourage German investment in a neutral Italy which could provide oil, as opposed to an ally whose oil fields were a British prize/target.

LordKalvan has demonstrated several times in several threads that there is insuffient time to develop the Sirte oilfield to a substantial level before war breaks out. I've played the AGIP card in the Mosul oilfield such that increased revenue comes into the Italian energy industry, leading to an earlier anticipation of the OTL post-war focus on exploitation of Italy's natural gas reserves. Again I've not developed it, but I recall mentioning somewhere that Italian heavy industry is beginning to move from a coal base to a gas base. Overall I think the oil POD is a mirage; promises a lot but when examined closely really lacks fundamental substance... without becoming oilwank.

7) Find an ally. Spain is a good choice although a more pragmatic Mussolini might mean the Spanish Civil War lingers up to another year. Either Greece or Turkey would be a good selection, but not both. Alas.

At face value, Spain and Turkey seem ideal, yet both OTL were wary of Italian Mediterranean ambitions. I've read enough to date to pretty much scratch those two. Greece seems to me to be the better of the three mentioned, but in light of my last post, there will be increased Danubian interest in an Italian alliance.

8) Gain aid/gifts from Germany and England/France. This not only enables Italy to improve the weapons and armor and such at a much lower cost of R&D but might prove substantial

In the inter-war period? Italy foreign policy shifted too much to give foreign governments/business much faith that investment into Italy would prove profitable; furthermore each country was grappling with its own economic woes. German economic imperialism into the Danube basin was used as a political tool and would not be permitted on the same scale by Italy; and when the initial German terms would be refused, there was rarely any OTL negotiation to improve them. Italy has little option but to look to itself.

Croesus

 

[Shadow Knight]

In the inter-war period? Italy foreign policy shifted too much to give foreign governments/business much faith that investment into Italy would prove profitable; furthermore each country was grappling with its own economic woes. German economic imperialism into the Danube basin was used as a political tool and would not be permitted on the same scale by Italy; and when the initial German terms would be refused, there was rarely any OTL negotiation to improve them. Italy has little option but to look to itself.

Croesus

IIRC Italy had a substantial amount of the trade with the US at this time how does this affect things?

 

[Croesus]

IIRC Italy had a substantial amount of the trade with the US at this time how does this affect things?

There are two parts to this: pre- and post- 1939.

In terms of pre-1939 Italian terms of trade was improving following the Depression. Italy was self-sufficient in foodstuffs and some manufacturing; otherwise everything else was trade dependent. Post-Abyssinia Italy's energy requirements were satisfied by German coal shipped from Rotterdam. ITTL I can see increased levels of US investment into the Mosul financed energy infrastructure as well as flow on effects into the broader industrial base. However there remain political sensitivities around trading with a fascist expansionist nation and this will serve to constraint growth of private sector investment.

Post-1939 things change dramatically. Rome's status of non-belligerency is too fine a political point for Italy escape being caught up in the British blockade. Considering that that great majority of Italian imports (and remember that Italy is a net importer) comes through Suez or Gibralter, and that the German coal export from Rotterdam is halted, Italy is abruptly faced with a significant economic problem. If the US is wanting to invest, or export, directly into Italy it now has to talk to Britain. And in the scheme of things the Washington-London relationship greatly outweighs that of Washington-Rome.

What's interesting, in economic terms, about the Italian conquest of Yugoslavia is that, not only does Italy now stand to gain significantly in terms of raw mineral and agricultural output, but it's gain is Berlins loss as, up till that point, 46% of Yugoslavia's exports went to Germany [just out of interest, the percentage of imports/exports from/to Germany for the Danubian states in 1939 are: Bulgaria(71%/70%), Yugoslavia (46%/53%), Romania (43%/56%) & Hungary (52%/53%). So the situation emerges that, following the British blockade Italy compensates itself indirectly from Germany. How ironic.

Croesus

 

[Shadow Knight]

Okay but is Britain willing to isolate the US by dictating US trade policy with Italy? Also might not the UK try to use the US to restrain Italy since they can't seem to do it themselves? As of the TL Italy is not at war with the UK but might be if not handled right. I would think the opportunity to forge greater ties with the US (and consequently let them be a restraining hand on Italy) would be well worth the effort.

 

[Croesus]

Okay but is Britain willing to isolate the US by dictating US trade policy with Italy? Also might not the UK try to use the US to restrain Italy since they can't seem to do it themselves? As of the TL Italy is not at war with the UK but might be if not handled right. I would think the opportunity to forge greater ties with the US (and consequently let them be a restraining hand on Italy) would be well worth the effort.

Well, Britain had no qualms about doing so in OTL and given that non-belligerent Italy has attacked neutral Yugoslavia it could easily be argued that the US would have fewer issues TTL as it did OTL.

At this point of TTL, with only six weeks of war elapsed, there is no sense within London that its Italian policy is failing. Italy has not fulfilled its requirement to its PoS partner and has concluded a non-aggression agreement with Greece which indirectly strengthens the Anglo-French position vis-a-vis the 'western' Danubian countries of Greece, Romania and Turkey.

The diplomacy occurring behind the scenes is both substantial and complex; frinst as in OTL, TTL France offers Italy substantial concessions on the question of Tunisia, hitherto a major point of contention between the two powers... while on the other side of the ledger there is this very murky matter of the implications of a common Italo-Hungarian border effectively preventing direct German influence into the Danube region.

I think both London and Rome will be quite aware that they will each lose if they come to blows in the current circumstances (irrespective of the fact that Italy might want to come to blows). As for the matter of Italo-US relations, that's something thats going to have to evolve as my reading continues. At the moment though the US seems to be in-step with the Chamberlain approach: that Italy gives leverage against Germany and offers a means of preventing escalation of the war (though they've complicated things with the Yugoslav invasion).

Croesus

 

[Croesus]

Next installment is up: Yugoslav collapse, immediate conclusions drawn of Italian military achievements.

Croesus

 

[TotrueTufaar]

Do you plan to allow Macedonia to be joined Bulgaria, or to be an Italian sattelite, or to be partially annexed by Greece? Bulgaria would seem to be an excellent area to partition, to keep the Aegean countries happy.

 

[Hierophant]

Am I crazy or does it seem like Italy and (most) of the Balkans is going to skip out on WW2?

If the Germans still loses, Europe could be split between the West and East AND with a Mediterrean fascist bloc.

 

[Croesus]

Do you plan to allow Macedonia to be joined Bulgaria, or to be an Italian sattelite, or to be partially annexed by Greece? Bulgaria would seem to be an excellent area to partition, to keep the Aegean countries happy.

Well, to be fair, I don't plan on anything.

However... Greece has secured a non-aggression treaty with Italy and, while it may or may not hold, it does permit Greece an opportunity to attempt some sort of profit from the evolving situation. It has four basic choices: (i) to attempt to reclaim the Dodecanese, (ii) to look for territorial gain against Serbia, (iii) to re-open accounts with Turkey over Constantinople or (iv) to press its claim on Macedonia.

The Dodecanese means war with Italy and, given the Italian hold on Croatia and Albania, not to mention the uncertain attitude Britain might take, this is a risky option. Constantinople means overturning some substantial interwar diplomacy plus reneging on treaties with Britain and France and could completely backfire. Serbia offers some gain but the situation is very confused and there are many claimants. Macedonia therefore offers itself as the most likely area of gain *if* Greece decides to make a further move.

As for Bulgaria, its long standing policy of revision at the expense of its neighbours is looking more positive than it has been. First the Little Entente fell over, and now the Balkan Pact has stood aside while one of its members has been dismembered. ITTL it has already beginning to occupy Vardar Macedonia, which suggests that a renewal of its claims over the remainder of Macedonia may yet be pressed. The question of the Dobrudja probably can't be settled at the moment, and claims on Thrace would mean conflict with Turkey, which would serve to drive Athens and Istanbul closer together rather than further apart. Sofia is however aware that there is a deal in place between Rome and Athens, something it does not share. So its next steps would need to be careful.

Italy is walking a fine line by interfering so directly into the German economic hinterland; while it certainly has a strong political claim to the Danubian region on account of its orientation, there remains the fact that Italy is a small power and Germany a large one. Hitler's whim delivered Yugoslavia up to Italy in a way he didn't expect and he'll not want to repeat that mistake; worse, he has opened up the possibility for a common Italo-Hungarian fronteir which will cut Germany off from Romania, Bulgaria and Greece - all of whom are both strongly bound to Germany in economic termas and are also seeking economic alternatives. But Hitler too must take care not to act such that he alienates Rome and so drive the Danubian states fully out of its camp.

Its a beautiful piece of diplomatic confusion.

Croesus

 

[Croesus]

Am I crazy or does it seem like Italy and (most) of the Balkans is going to skip out on WW2? If the Germans still loses, Europe could be split between the West and East AND with a Mediterrean fascist bloc.

Not crazy. My next posts cover the implications for the Danubian states of the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement. Traditionally these powers balanced Russia and Germany between each other and OTL Italy was too weak to provide an alternative. Negotiations around the establishment of a 'Third Europe' or an Italian led bloc of neutrals foundered largely to Italian indifference and weakness. ITTL Italy is plagued by neither of those two problems.

Italy, as a second tier power, doesn't gain from a general european war as it doesn't have the strength to defy the great powers. OTL Mussolini thought he backed the winning horse when he declared against France largely because he feared the consequences of a German imposed general peace on Italy, who had faltered and dithered. ITTL Mussolini has a different set of options. Bear in mind that Hitler O/TTL informs Mussolini of the attack on Poland only in August; and in OTL did not inform him of either the Romanian occupation or the Russian invasion. These are not the acts of a power that cares for its ally.

The role of Italy in Sep 1939 was to act as a distraction for the western powers and to absorb their initial attack; Italy was never meant to obtain success. But, oh dear, Yugoslavia has split, Hungary has followed up its Polish sympathy with Italian cooperation and the Anglo-French have not declared war let alone attacked. Add to this mix the fact that Stalin is clearly exploiting his pact with Germany in the Baltics and the Black Sea states and it becomes clear that Hitler has not just miscalculated, but given Italy a convenient out-clause.

Croesus