A Fitter Italian Military

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I suppose if the Norwegian disaster still occurs then Chamberlain would be out, but are you sure Churchill is going to be PM in TTL? Is it certain Halifax is out of the running?
 
Next installment is up.

ShadowKnight: as I understand Halifax takes himself out of the running - he's a non-starter. OTL it came down to Chamberlain or Churchill and I'll follow that. The main question is if Chamberlain faces the loss of public faith in British policy that OTL led to his resignation following Norway. It's early days yet as to whether Yugoslavia carries equal weight as Norway in the British public's mind.

Schrammy: I'm thinking of the Soviets mainly because of their OTL manifest destiny in the region. Entirely unresearched at this point.

Croesus
 
ShadowKnight: as I understand Halifax takes himself out of the running - he's a non-starter. OTL it came down to Chamberlain or Churchill and I'll follow that. The main question is if Chamberlain faces the loss of public faith in British policy that OTL led to his resignation following Norway. It's early days yet as to whether Yugoslavia carries equal weight as Norway in the British public's mind.

Croesus

That's what I understood too, but I've never got a really good explanation on the 'why' he took himself out of the running.

I'm going to say no as Norway allowed German naval and air assets to directly threaten GB. The loss of Yugoslavia is more of a "well there goes another one". All IMHO of course. :D
 
That's what I understood too, but I've never got a really good explanation on the 'why' he took himself out of the running. I'm going to say no as Norway allowed German naval and air assets to directly threaten GB. The loss of Yugoslavia is more of a "well there goes another one". All IMHO of course. :D

As I understand it so far Halifax took himself out due to the fact that he was a peer, a member of the House of Lords rather than the Commons. Curses be, but I've returned the book that covered it off.

And your Norway point is pretty persusasive.

Croesus
 
... but wait, there's more!... I'm on fire today.

The Anglo-French position revealed... completely in accordance with the feelings of the board too, how nice.

Croesus
 
... but wait, there's more!... I'm on fire today.

The Anglo-French position revealed... completely in accordance with the feelings of the board too, how nice.

Croesus

Hi Croesus,

You will need to buy yourself a fire extinguisher :D:D

Another great part.

Thanks

Whatisinaname
 
I'm really, really enjoying this TL.

It seems to me that I read a Demetrios Rammos TL years ago which implied that Greece missed out on an ethnic-Greek town or two in Southern Macedonia in the Balkan Wars. Does this still exist by 1939, and would Greece consider intervening or otherwise making itself useful to Italy to obtain this region>
 
It's a lot of fun to read up on though as things develop I have to be more careful. I know what I want to happen, but have to guard against such sentiment.

One thing I'm learning during my Balkans reading is to use multiple sources and then take a conservative line when making TL adjustments. So that's my disclaimer out of the way: Greece is getting a lot out of this scenario.

There is at this point an existing political current within Greek governance that had Greece pursuing a detente policy with both Italy and Turkey. This policy was derailed somewhat by the Italian invasion of Abyssinia and the German pressure on Austria; however there remained in existence parties in both governments sympathetic to an Italo-Greek accord.

In December 1934 the German ambassador Eisenlohr gave King George a lesson in realpolitik and conversation turned to the form of Greek absolutism that would suit Germany and keep George in power. The virulently anti-republican and Italiante fascist General Metaxas represented a choice that would satisfy both parties requirements. Furthermore Eisenlohr noted that the Romanian foreign minister Titulescu was looking to coordinate the Balkan Pact with the Little Entente and thus move the Balkans closer into the French diplomatic system. He advised that this would not be good for Greco-German relations and until OTL 1940 Greece acted in accordance with this advice.

The elections of January 1935 returned a Liberal government and threatened both King Georges control of the armed forces and his grip on his own royalist supporters. He managed to pull back a military coup but recognised that he must control the army or it would control him: he had as a model the situation of King Victor Emmanuelle in Italy. George forced the resignations of the existing War Minister and his deputy and installed Metaxas, which brought both the army and the conservatives under his control. A fortunate combination of events had now given Metaxas firm control of army and, coincedental to the German reoccupation of the Rhineland he insisted that Greece disentangle itself from the Balkan Pact.

The elections of January 1936 returned a split government, complicated by an increased profile of the Communists, and it became clear during the course of negotiation and counter-negotiation that a parliamentary solution for effective government could not be found with outh the consent of the crown and the military. Metaxas at this point sought to establish the crown as a seperate institutional power and King George moved to set aside the constitution and appointed Metaxas as head of government in the role of minister-president.

In external politics Metaxas at this point refused to commit Greece against any non-Balkan power in clear contradiction to several articles of the Balkan Pact. As part of it's appeasement policy Britain now began to send signals that the dual Italianate fascist and Germanophile Metaxas government was acceptable to its interests, and this was further confirmed by the Anglo-French position against Litvinovs League of Nations speech where it seemed clear that neither Paris nor London would entertain political agreements with leftist governments.

In the context of TTL then we have an absolutist-fascist Greek government with two concurrent and complementary relationships with Rome and Berlin that is also being given post-Polish assurances by Paris and London against Italy. This government has managed to cut a deal with an Italian government bent on attacking Yugoslavia that results in the achievement of it's irredentist goals in Northern Epiros and is clearly moving away from any responsibility to the Balkan Pact. It has established fairly good relations with Istanbul as both governments recognise they share several points of common interest in the current political environment, not to mention both governments have concluded arrangements with the Anglo-French.

This leaves Greece essentially free to pursue its remaining irredentist goal: Grecophone Macedonia.

Croesus
 
Thanks all for the encouragement; prevents me from slackening off.

Next installment is up. After two weeks the Italian invasion has made reasonable progress; the weaker Yugoslav Air Force and Navy have been rendered hors d'combat and the main force in the center is up against the first river obstacle with exploitation possiblities on both flanks. However the Slovenian advance has been disappointing and the Albanian force never got off its start line, and is even threatened with suffering a reverse.

Croesus.
 
Correction

The last installment was written without my main map in front of me. I wrote that detachments of the Pasubio had crossed the Sava; this is incorrect, they have crossed the Kupa. I also wrote that the Taurinense has moved around the right flank of Ljubljana; this is incorrect, they have advanced along the high ground on the left bank of the Sava between Ljubljana and Kranj.

Croesus
 
Beware of What You Read

I began this project knowing little about Mussolinis Italy. Unknowingly my posts have spanned a cross-section of orthodox and revisionist history. The more I read, the more I realise the less I know. Just in case others are interested in examining more closely the part Italy played in the Fascist period I offer the following list, taking the line of S.C.Azzi.

On the one hand are the orthodox writers, who tend to hold that Mussolini's conduct of foreign policy was scattered and archly-cynical and that there was no coherence;as Azzi writes 'In their view, Italy's foreign relations under Mussolini consisted only of stealing headlines to satisfy the domestic audience'. On the other are the revisionists who hold that Mussolini had a defined policy in foreign affairs'.

Orthodox: Gaetano Salvemini, Elizabeth Wiskemann, Stuart Hughes, AJP Taylor, Denis Mack Smith and Ennio di Nolfo.

Revisionist: Giorgio Rumi, Giampiero Carocci, Alan Cassels, Esmonde Robertson, MacGregor Knox and Renzo de Felice.

As a reminder to all alt-historians, a closing word from James Sadkovich:
'And it is indeed time that we look more objectively at the Italian war effort and undertook a comprehensive reappraisal of it, if we are as interested in studying history as we have been in manufacturing myth.

Croesus.
 
Next installment is up; Italians find hole in Yugoslav defensive dispositions.

Have been focusing mainly on the military side; however there are some political/diplomatic developments that may prove interesting.

Croesus
 
This just keeps getting better and better :)

BTW, is Germany still going invade Yugoslavia, if not this will mean that the German military will have a larger number of extra divisions and also the invasion of the SU could take place in early May rather than the 22 June?
 

Borys

Banned
Ahoj!
  • the Italian soldiers usually performed well enough, even with the obvious drawbacks of any conscript army. Where Italy failed was in developing a n officer class with a good average standard. My position is that conscription is there and will not change. However, if there is a change of outlook by the top brass, and a percepton of the technical progress under way, also the Modena accademy would be more receptive and ultimately would produce better officers. Obviously a shift of perception from numbers to quality would have helped a lot, but this was against the grain of fascist philosophy (7 millions of bayonets,!!!!)
  • In another way, the unpreparedness of the army was a result of political mistrust: the army - not just the officer class but also the largest majority of the soldiers - was monarchist. As such Mussolini was always wary of having them become too powerful (which is not the best approach to win a war, but first things come first for every dictator). Maybe stressing more the fascistization of the officer class would have been a solution (btw, don't make the comparison with Hitler and the Wehrmacht: the German officer corp was backing the revanchist policy of the Nazi; the Italians had been on the winning side of WW1 under the house of Savoy, which makes quite a difference - and also explains why Vittorio Emanuele protected some incompetent generals and why it was not thinkable to depose him in the early stage of the war. Note that Graziani was supported by the PNF, though. The royalist man was Badoglio).
IMO the above outlines the problem nicely. A "fitter Italian military" requires a throwback to 1923, to Mussolini coming to power.
And purgiing the army of the old generals and colonels - "We will never forgive those guilty of Caporetto!", promoting the luentnants and captains of WWI. And paying them better, too.

So the struggle against a monarchical army can be used as the POD for having a better army. However, I do not think it possible getting rid of the monarchy. Yet. IMO Italy is too fresh a state to survive a transition into a republic.

I do not consider "lessons of the Spanish Civil War" to be indispensable. Many doctrinal changes can be based on WWI experience - especially if one looks beyond the Western front.

And buying new artillery from 1927 onwards, not 1937, will work miracles for the Italian army.

Borys
 
whatsinaname: the German angle is problematic. A feature of Hitler's foreign policy was to simultaneouly entertain several options. OTL Yugoslavia is one of these: in Aug he invites Italy to attack, in Oct he warns against it. ITTL Italy exposes this weakness in German planning: Italy was invited into Yugoslavia to take up the immediate Anglo-French response in case those two powers declared war over Poland *assuming* that Italy would also be declared against.

However Italy extended it's OTL policy of equidistance by taking up the offer of Yugoslavia, but declaring non-belligerency. I haven't detailed how Germany responds to the situation apart from a brief note on Ribbentrop, but the German Danubian policy just took a big hit. Hitler can't very well forbid the operation while Italy is mobilising for fear of alienating Mussolini and weakening the Pact of Steel, which is so very much in his favour.

He can only intervene directly by moving divisions away from the French border and would have to move very fast to get in on the spoils. What's more his message to Belgrade relates purely to the Croatian issue, and any major intervention would probably have to be directed more at Belgrade than Zagreb.

What I increasingly suspect is that Hitler is going to lose control of events in the Danube: his first error was the Soviet-German pact which OTL and TTL sees an increase in Soviet diplomacy in southern Europe and his second error is the Italian invasion which gives the Danubian states an option to Germany as well as to the Soviets.

Borys: on your first point, conscription remains, Baistrocchi implemented a parallel system of promotion by merit which helps clear out dead-wood, the Modena academy has benefited from the entire reform process, the Balbo reforms did establish the quality army over Pariani's quantity army.

On your second, the army is monarchist and will emerge from this campaign as a more substantial political force. Till now it has been the Blackshirt divisions that have been at the forefront of Italian overseas campaigning, with the army in the background. This will change and Mussolini will have to deal with a stronger army. Recall that the model of the royal dictatorship, or at least the fascist-monarchist dictatorship, includes all of southern Europe. Mussolini will just have to deal with it as best he can. Fortunately for him he is a skilled politician and he is presently giving his country a military victory. This political angle will be dealt with in more depth in future posts.

The early posts in the timeline section details the slow growth of the army reform process. IMHO it is too big a change to have Mussolini throw out the villains of Caporetto and the old boy system too entrenched in the upper reaches of the army for it to be filled with new, vigorous blood. The Spanish question is two-sided: the Blackshirt bungled while the Army tested. This contributed to the dismissal of the Italian effort by all powers following the invasion: indeed the Germans will be among the most surprised. The first arm to benefit from TTL reforms was the artillery and so far that arm has done very well in the campaign.

Croesus
 
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