A Failed German Unification

So what if the German Unification under either Austria or Prussia failed for whatever reason? What would a 1900s or even modern Germany look like?
A more "natural" border would be that of the River Maine, deviding as it does, the Southern Catholic States of Bavaria proper, Wurtemburg and Baden, from the Prussian dominated states of Hesse, the Rhine Lands and Frankfurt etc. By this time, Prussia had from the Congress of Vienna in 1815 been in the ascendancy in these lands (not necessarily with the population of these lands) as possession is nine tenths of the Law
 
Very unlikely if not ASB.

The regency act of 1856 sets Empress Mother to be regent, and Prince Napoléon would come in position in the event of her demise. Even there, he does have to go along a Regency Council that is filled with people most of whom are hostile to him. In fact, Prince Napoléon was despised by almost everyone (he didn't improve this with his very independent behaviour) and first by Napoléon III (who viewed the House of Jérôme as who the Orléans were to the Bourbons); his father, King Jérôme resigned his seat as President of the Senate in 1852 because the Emperor and his fellows had formulated succession and regency laws very hostile to Prince Napoléon (one proviso was to allow the Emperor to adopt a heir in a collateral branch of the Bonaparte dynasty to bypass his cousin).
So, by the terms of the regency act of 1856, the regent doesn't have free hands with the government, especially if the other members of the council are opposed to him.

Then Morny. He was no doubt a great schemer but the Mexican adventure was essentially his work as he had financial interests in the matter (he had many "interests" in business ventures and he often used his position to advance his own interests like in the case of Mexico).

The only fault of Napoléon III's foreign policy was the weak character of the Emperor himself; he may have been somewhat clumsy at moments, especially after his health deteriorated from 1865 onwards, he was relatively smart to put the accent on diplomacy by contrast to his uncle's failures; he managed to build some understanding with the British and successfully brought France back in a position of influence it lost after 1815.

In any event, it's more likely that Republicans are to win the most from a confrontation between Conservative bonapartists and Prince Napoléon, and at this point, the Corps Législatif (lower house) was a rubber-stamp institution of which the only usefulness was to take a measure of the public opinion.

Morny's influence in the Mexico expedition has been way over-rated. Rouher was a more important driving force.

The Regency Council is Rouher, Vaillant, Morny, Troplong, Persigny, Baroche, Walewski, Fould and Morlot, plus Plon-Plon, of course. Even if the latter is not very well liked, he is the only alternative to Eugènie. If you think there are not enough grudges against her to allow for her replacement by Napoléon-Jérôme, we could always device a TL where she died alongside her husband. Then Plon-Plon is the uncontested Regent.

As to your appreciation of Napoléon III's foreign policy, I respect you opinion, but building the understanding (not an alliance, though) with the British is the only bright spot. He even managed to antagonize the Italians who were his creditors. In front of Bismark, the "pourboires" policy was a grave mistake.
 
As I said, almost everyone despised him and his only friends were marginals: Napoléon III didn't trust him (for his republican sympathies, previous collusion of the Jerome with the Orleans and the physical resemblance to Napoléon I which would have lent some weight to a rival claim), the Republicans hated him because who he was (and because he didn't refuse the dignities of the restored empire), clericals because he was virulently anti clerical, conservatives because he was a liberal ... that's all the establishment. Don't forget the regency act of 1856 and the previous succession acts, (incidentally all were retained by the constitution of 1870) were tailored to prevent him from reaching the top positions.

And to Napoléon III's credit, he ruled without alienating all Europe, undertook important colonial ventures and initiated an economic boom, and the fact that people like Cavour or Bismarck went to him, that the matter of who shall reign in Spain was up to French word were significant of a position France never had since Napoléon's days.
 
Because you can't just surrender Bohemia to the Prussians without a fight.

Looking at where Koniggratz is on the map, it would seem that most of it was abandoned by then.

And how long would Benedek need to avoid battle before Moltke was forced to send forces west o hold off a French Army (which might well have been reinforced by those of the South German states? He could soon be too busy defending Prussia to worry about Bohemia, never mind Vienna.

If for some reason France can't conquer the Rhenish Provinces, how about a compromise peace - Austria gives up Venetia, receives in exchange the southern (and Catholic) half of Silesia, and Prussia gets Schleswig-Holstein? Sounds the sort of complicated deal that would appeal to Nappy III.
 
I can not for the life of me, see why Prussia would give up any of Silesia to the Austrians.
It formed one of the core states of Prussia, and was considerably more valuable in minerals than any of Jutland.
Silesia was also eminently defensible against Austria, its mountainous terrain and massive fortresses were too valuable to just give to Austria; especially as Schleswig Holstein was easily annexed by Prussia so why buy it at a terrible cost to Prussias defence?
In August, soon after the war, France demanded Prussia relinquish Mainz - that or go to war with France. Bismarck replied "so it's war then" and the French backed down. Bismarck was no fool, and chanced his arm with Austria in the sure knowledge that France was not ready to go to war in Germany. He always sought the knowledgeable General Staff's opinions, and they considered the risk worthwhile.
If France could have intervened, it would not change the course of Sadowa, and as already been stated, when they tried to, Prussia was ready willing and able to prosecute a war with France.
Indeed it was said that the French Emperor feigned sickness so that the threat to Prussia could be blamed on "the enthusiasm of his ministers" and was thus able to avoid a war he wasn't ready to prosecute.
One must also bear in mind where the Prussian army was at this point - it was sat in South Germany (Mainz) and Bohemia, therefore its route to France would see it stomping on Bavaria before the French could mobilise support, then march into France holding to both banks on the river Maine, avoiding the more traditional route through the cockpit of Europe and the French fortresses of that region.
 
I can not for the life of me, see why Prussia would give up any of Silesia to the Austrians.

Because a slice of Prussian territory is under French occupation, and that's the price of buying it back?

If France could have intervened, it would not change the course of Sadowa, .

Why not? If Benedek knows that the French are in Germany, why does he gamble on fighting a battle before they arrive? All he has to do is preserve his army, and the Prussians (who certainly can't take on the French and Austrians simultaneously) have no choice but to pull back to defend their own territory.

Iirc the Prussian fprces in Western Germany had trouble enough just rounding up the miniscule Hanoverian Army, never mind taking on the French.
 
A mean to have Prussia losing may be to have Bismarck killed by Cohen-Blind. Bismarck as a moderating element and skilled diplomat was able to delver a safe victory; without him to moderate the zealous ambitions of the King and other in the army command, as he did IOTL to avoid scaring other European powers with a march on Vienna, we can think that Prussia could grow overambitious in its war goals and that Napoléon III could feel relieved of his previous engagements, these having been made with Bismarck.
 
Because a slice of Prussian territory is under French occupation, and that's the price of buying it back?

Iirc the Prussian fprces in Western Germany had trouble enough just rounding up the miniscule Hanoverian Army, never mind taking on the French.
The occupied part has to be quite big for that to happen, at least all of Rhineland or even more. That´s a lot to take.

That was one single battle, the Hannoverians surrended immediately afterwards. At the same they fared quite well against Austria given their better rails and rifles(as I recall)
 
The occupied part has to be quite big for that to happen, at least all of Rhineland or even more. That´s a lot to take.


OTOH Prussia in 1866 has only half the manpower that Germany will have in 1870 - and the bulk of that is in Bohemia. So the French have a massive edge in numbers. They could likely do it, even with second-rare generals.
 
OTOH Prussia in 1866 has only half the manpower that Germany will have in 1870 - and the bulk of that is in Bohemia. So the French have a massive edge in numbers. They could likely do it, even with second-rare generals.
I doubt it, if the French intervene the South Germans have less of a reason to oppose Prussia. How much does it take the French to mobilize anyway, the Prussia reached an armistice with the Austrians in 40 days.
 
My point exactly. It's all over for Austria before the French can mobilise, to defeat Prussia you have to defeat its army and that's two hundred kilometres away from the French main army groups. Langensalsa was a side show fought by Landwher and reservists - the main Prussian force is in Bohemia, and East Prussia.
 
I doubt it, if the French intervene the South Germans have less of a reason to oppose Prussia. How much does it take the French to mobilize anyway, the Prussia reached an armistice with the Austrians in 40 days.

OTL they did, but if France has entered the war then Austria has no reason to sign one - even supposing Koniggratz has still been fought, which it may well not have been.

My point exactly. It's all over for Austria before the French can mobilise, to defeat Prussia you have to defeat its army and that's two hundred kilometres away from the French main army groups. Langensalsa was a side show fought by Landwher and reservists - the main Prussian force is in Bohemia, and East Prussia.

Precisely - so it's hundreds of miles from Prussia's Rhenish possessions, which are pretty much at the mercy of France until such time as Moltke turns west. And if Benedek has the brains that God gave bastard geese in Ireland, he will avoid battle and keep the Prussians marching and counter-marching until the situation on the Rhine forces Moltke to do so.
 
A well explored POD is if the Duke of Kent had a son instead of a daughter. Hannover would then still share a King with Britain and this can impact upon Prussia's abilities to gather in the north german states. Often referred to as King Victor but, given Victoria's given name, King Alexander would also fit.
 
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