I have dyslexia which doesn't help but I actually did spell Baghdad correctly (its not different to what you want me to replace it with)
A distraction removed, A Saddam falls in 1991 ATL
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I have dyslexia which doesn't help but I actually did spell Baghdad correctly (its not different to what you want me to replace it with)
This is a good TL but please correct your statement about the United States giving chemical weapons to Iraq in the 1980s. The United States certainly helped Iraq a great deal in the Iran-Iraq War and definitely turned a blind eye to the use of chemical weapons but Iraq's chemical weapons materials came from a variety of sources to include the US but plenty of other countries as well. If you are going to point fingers, then be thorough. This is just basic Wikipedia research:
The know-how and material for developing chemical weapons were obtained by Saddam's regime from foreign sources.[23] Most precursors for chemical weapons production came from Singapore (4,515 tons), the Netherlands (4,261 tons), Egypt (2,400 tons), India (2,343 tons), and West Germany (1,027 tons). One Indian company, Exomet Plastics, sent 2,292 tons of precursor chemicals to Iraq. Singapore-based firm Kim Al-Khaleej, affiliated to the United Arab Emirates, supplied more than 4,500 tons of VX, sarin and mustard gas precursors and production equipment to Iraq.[24] Dieter Backfisch, managing director of West German company Karl Kolb GmbH, was quoted by saying in 1989 that "for people in Germany poison gas is something quite terrible, but this does not worry customers abroad."[23]
The 2002 International Crisis Group (ICG) no. 136 "Arming Saddam: The Yugoslav Connection" concludes it was "tacit approval" by many world governments that led to the Iraqi regime being armed with weapons of mass destruction, despite sanctions, because of the ongoing Iranian conflict. Among the chemical precursors provided to Iraq from American companies such as Alcolac International and Phillips was thiodiglycol, a substance needed to manufacture mustard gas, according to leaked portions of Iraq's "full, final and complete" disclosure of the sources for its weapons programs. The provision of chemical precursors from United States companies to Iraq was enabled by a Ronald Reagan Administration policy that removed Iraq from the State Department's list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. Alcolac was named as a defendant in the Aziz v. Iraq case presently pending in the United States District Court (Case No. 1:09-cv-00869-MJG). Both companies have since undergone reorganization. Phillips, once a subsidiary of Phillips Petroleum is now part of ConocoPhillips, an American oil and discount fossil fuel company. Alcolac International has since dissolved and reformed as Alcolac Inc.[25]
On December 23, 2005, a Dutch court sentenced Frans van Anraat, a businessman who bought chemicals on the world market and sold them to Saddam's regime, to 15 years in prison. The court ruled that Saddam committed genocide against the people of Halabja;[26] this was the first time the Halabja attack was described as an act of genocide in a court ruling. In March 2008, the government of Iraq announced plans to take legal action against the suppliers of chemicals used in the attack.[27]
In 2013 20 Iraqi Kurds took legal action to expose two French companies – not named – whom their lawyers say were among 20 or more companies that helped Saddam Hussein construct a chemical weapons arsenal.[28]
The know-how and material for developing chemical weapons were obtained by Saddam's regime from foreign sources.[23] Most precursors for chemical weapons production came from Singapore (4,515 tons), the Netherlands (4,261 tons), Egypt (2,400 tons), India (2,343 tons), and West Germany (1,027 tons). One Indian company, Exomet Plastics, sent 2,292 tons of precursor chemicals to Iraq. Singapore-based firm Kim Al-Khaleej, affiliated to the United Arab Emirates, supplied more than 4,500 tons of VX, sarin and mustard gas precursors and production equipment to Iraq.[24] Dieter Backfisch, managing director of West German company Karl Kolb GmbH, was quoted by saying in 1989 that "for people in Germany poison gas is something quite terrible, but this does not worry customers abroad."[23]
The 2002 International Crisis Group (ICG) no. 136 "Arming Saddam: The Yugoslav Connection" concludes it was "tacit approval" by many world governments that led to the Iraqi regime being armed with weapons of mass destruction, despite sanctions, because of the ongoing Iranian conflict. Among the chemical precursors provided to Iraq from American companies such as Alcolac International and Phillips was thiodiglycol, a substance needed to manufacture mustard gas, according to leaked portions of Iraq's "full, final and complete" disclosure of the sources for its weapons programs. The provision of chemical precursors from United States companies to Iraq was enabled by a Ronald Reagan Administration policy that removed Iraq from the State Department's list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. Alcolac was named as a defendant in the Aziz v. Iraq case presently pending in the United States District Court (Case No. 1:09-cv-00869-MJG). Both companies have since undergone reorganization. Phillips, once a subsidiary of Phillips Petroleum is now part of ConocoPhillips, an American oil and discount fossil fuel company. Alcolac International has since dissolved and reformed as Alcolac Inc.[25]
On December 23, 2005, a Dutch court sentenced Frans van Anraat, a businessman who bought chemicals on the world market and sold them to Saddam's regime, to 15 years in prison. The court ruled that Saddam committed genocide against the people of Halabja;[26] this was the first time the Halabja attack was described as an act of genocide in a court ruling. In March 2008, the government of Iraq announced plans to take legal action against the suppliers of chemicals used in the attack.[27]
In 2013 20 Iraqi Kurds took legal action to expose two French companies – not named – whom their lawyers say were among 20 or more companies that helped Saddam Hussein construct a chemical weapons arsenal.[28]
Thank you very much I appreciate that, Zheng He the changes have been implemented.
Edit Also my apologies to everyone following for the delay on the next update.
The End of the rebellion part 1
Rebel troops on the way to Baghdad.
Shortly after the end of the Regime's counter offensive operations plans, preparation got under way for an assault on Baghdad. However, due to the number of rebel groups with separate commands (leading to some friendly fire later on) and the differences in ideologies made planning and organisation a challenge. This delayed the beginning offensive operations till April the 7th. Whilst things were progressing slowly in the South. in the North it was a different situation.
![kurds1991[1].jpg](https://libcom.org/files/images/library/kurds1991[1].jpg)
Even when it begun the offensive still ran into logistical and organisational problems with one issue being transport (sharing transport between the different groups) forcing many to walk to Baghdad
After that taking of Kirkuk the Kurdish forces made preparations to attack Mosul. Here the difference in co-operation (between all Kurdish groups) allowed for better and faster preparation allowing for the offensive to (whilst starting later on April the 10th ) reach Mosul and begin to siege the city on the 13th before the Southern Rebels where able to reach Baghdad. However, some historians note Saddam's wasteful placement of unites outside of Baghdad in order to try to ambush the advancing rebels and turn the tide of the rebellion might have impacted the advance.
These ambush attempts had no hope of turning the War around, despite what Saddam had told himself, but they did delay the already slow advance. The over all impact on the rebels s is still debated but for the the Regime it is agreed upon that they served to drain manpower from the defence of Baghdad thus making the city's defence weaker and shortening the length of the battle considerable.
Saddam's appearance in the led up the climax of the rebellion started to reflect his mental state at an alarming rate
The battle of Mosul was planned by the Kurdish commanders to first cut off the city then they would advancing into the city from several sides in order to spread the regimes manpower thin to achieve a breakthrough. The first part was achieved surprisingly quickly however the advancement into the city was not for the Kurds as Saddam wanted the city turned into a death trap. The regime's forces set up many traps and 'fortifications' throughout the city in attempts to make the kurds bleed as much as possible. These effort were hampered due to the lack of time the defenders had in preparation and as a consequence there were several 'holes' in the defence which allowed some advancing unites to break through and surround and capture many enemy positions.
An intact neighbourhood in Mosul thou not completely unscaved
By the time the city was captured the earlier debate on advancing to Baghdad had been ended as the Kurds were too late as the battle for Baghdad had begun.
To Be Continued.
Rebel troops on the way to Baghdad.
Shortly after the end of the Regime's counter offensive operations plans, preparation got under way for an assault on Baghdad. However, due to the number of rebel groups with separate commands (leading to some friendly fire later on) and the differences in ideologies made planning and organisation a challenge. This delayed the beginning offensive operations till April the 7th. Whilst things were progressing slowly in the South. in the North it was a different situation.
Even when it begun the offensive still ran into logistical and organisational problems with one issue being transport (sharing transport between the different groups) forcing many to walk to Baghdad
After that taking of Kirkuk the Kurdish forces made preparations to attack Mosul. Here the difference in co-operation (between all Kurdish groups) allowed for better and faster preparation allowing for the offensive to (whilst starting later on April the 10th ) reach Mosul and begin to siege the city on the 13th before the Southern Rebels where able to reach Baghdad. However, some historians note Saddam's wasteful placement of unites outside of Baghdad in order to try to ambush the advancing rebels and turn the tide of the rebellion might have impacted the advance.
These ambush attempts had no hope of turning the War around, despite what Saddam had told himself, but they did delay the already slow advance. The over all impact on the rebels s is still debated but for the the Regime it is agreed upon that they served to drain manpower from the defence of Baghdad thus making the city's defence weaker and shortening the length of the battle considerable.
Saddam's appearance in the led up the climax of the rebellion started to reflect his mental state at an alarming rate
The battle of Mosul was planned by the Kurdish commanders to first cut off the city then they would advancing into the city from several sides in order to spread the regimes manpower thin to achieve a breakthrough. The first part was achieved surprisingly quickly however the advancement into the city was not for the Kurds as Saddam wanted the city turned into a death trap. The regime's forces set up many traps and 'fortifications' throughout the city in attempts to make the kurds bleed as much as possible. These effort were hampered due to the lack of time the defenders had in preparation and as a consequence there were several 'holes' in the defence which allowed some advancing unites to break through and surround and capture many enemy positions.
An intact neighbourhood in Mosul thou not completely unscaved
By the time the city was captured the earlier debate on advancing to Baghdad had been ended as the Kurds were too late as the battle for Baghdad had begun.
To Be Continued.
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End of the Rebellion Part 2
Taken shortly after the capture of Baghdad ending the uprising
On April the 14th the remaining rebel groups reached Baghdad and proceed to cut off any escape route for Saddam Hussain. The battle for Baghdad whilst the last battle was arguably one of the bloodiest. The reasons for this had to do mainly with the lack of co-ordination between the rebel groups in the planning phase of the operation* led to many of them going after the same objective (not a bad thing in itself). One example in partial was the aim to capture Saddam, this unfortunately meant large sections of the city were ignored creating pockets of loyalists within the city who at various points attempted to break out hindering progress.
Some of the damage done in the fighting
The break out attempts would fail and resulted in many more desertions among loyalists forces. The die hards in response to this started a fear campaign of sorts by hanging would be - deserters in public places to prevent others from doing so. These breakouts also had the effect of finally resulting in a greater 'division of labor' between the rebels in the capturing of the city with attention being paid to destroying resistance pockets.^
As the battle wore on the regimes hold was fast slipping as Saddam would order his remaining units to fight for every inch of ground resulting in thousands of lives waste on his side. The effect was on that on the 19th a significant rebel brake though occurred capturing most of the city save a few highly important structures.
Another issue was the many civilians still trapped in the cit. These civilians, whilst attempting to get out often found themselves caught up in the cross fire (similar to the rebel one rebel action that took place earlier) . For those that didn't leave there was still the issue of gathering sufficient supplies, which forced them to leave the sanctuary of their homes ,and there was always the added risk that they would be ejected form their homes by those who decided their house was a good vantage point or command centre.
One particularly large group of civilians that was trying to flee who nearly ended up caught in the cross fire.
During all this the noose around Saddam was tightening until the 21st when a mixture of rebel units captured Saddam, apparently having abandoned his Command post (and his family) and attempting to flee disguised as a civilian. News of this quickly spread leading to the end of hostilities within the city in the 23rd (the high command surrendered as soon as Saddam disappeared from the command post, however, other unites continued most notable ones connected to his sons who were forced to surrender on the 23rd when it became clear no one else was prepared to fight for them.)
One of many scenes of celebration that was played out across Iraq
Whilst the fighting was over the difficult task of rebuilding Iraq had begun and the ability of the rebels to co-ordinate would determine their success and failure or failure.
*Arguably the results of the battle of Baghdad led to more co-operation between the groups in the Governing Council of Iraq which was tasked with keeping the workings of Government in order until democratic elections could take place.
^However most eyes were still on the various prizes: symbols of power for Saddam's regime and seeking the prestige of capturing Saddam himself.
Taken shortly after the capture of Baghdad ending the uprising
On April the 14th the remaining rebel groups reached Baghdad and proceed to cut off any escape route for Saddam Hussain. The battle for Baghdad whilst the last battle was arguably one of the bloodiest. The reasons for this had to do mainly with the lack of co-ordination between the rebel groups in the planning phase of the operation* led to many of them going after the same objective (not a bad thing in itself). One example in partial was the aim to capture Saddam, this unfortunately meant large sections of the city were ignored creating pockets of loyalists within the city who at various points attempted to break out hindering progress.
Some of the damage done in the fighting
The break out attempts would fail and resulted in many more desertions among loyalists forces. The die hards in response to this started a fear campaign of sorts by hanging would be - deserters in public places to prevent others from doing so. These breakouts also had the effect of finally resulting in a greater 'division of labor' between the rebels in the capturing of the city with attention being paid to destroying resistance pockets.^
As the battle wore on the regimes hold was fast slipping as Saddam would order his remaining units to fight for every inch of ground resulting in thousands of lives waste on his side. The effect was on that on the 19th a significant rebel brake though occurred capturing most of the city save a few highly important structures.
Another issue was the many civilians still trapped in the cit. These civilians, whilst attempting to get out often found themselves caught up in the cross fire (similar to the rebel one rebel action that took place earlier) . For those that didn't leave there was still the issue of gathering sufficient supplies, which forced them to leave the sanctuary of their homes ,and there was always the added risk that they would be ejected form their homes by those who decided their house was a good vantage point or command centre.
One particularly large group of civilians that was trying to flee who nearly ended up caught in the cross fire.
During all this the noose around Saddam was tightening until the 21st when a mixture of rebel units captured Saddam, apparently having abandoned his Command post (and his family) and attempting to flee disguised as a civilian. News of this quickly spread leading to the end of hostilities within the city in the 23rd (the high command surrendered as soon as Saddam disappeared from the command post, however, other unites continued most notable ones connected to his sons who were forced to surrender on the 23rd when it became clear no one else was prepared to fight for them.)
One of many scenes of celebration that was played out across Iraq
Whilst the fighting was over the difficult task of rebuilding Iraq had begun and the ability of the rebels to co-ordinate would determine their success and failure or failure.
*Arguably the results of the battle of Baghdad led to more co-operation between the groups in the Governing Council of Iraq which was tasked with keeping the workings of Government in order until democratic elections could take place.
^However most eyes were still on the various prizes: symbols of power for Saddam's regime and seeking the prestige of capturing Saddam himself.
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Winning the peace, putting Iraq together
The New Iraqi flag, agreed upon during the early part of the Governing Council of Iraq.
In the immediate aftermath of the overthrow of Saddam left a power vacuum in Iraq which in the interests of stability needed to be filled. Many of the army defectors and former Ba'athists started working together in order to enforce law and order, other rebels not wanting to be cut out of power quickly joined in resulting in the forming of the Governing Council of Iraq.
However that isn't the fully story as some in the original grouping had to be pushed by the US into accepting co-operation with groups who they were politically opposed to. The US did this in order to limit any influence Iran would try to get through the fall of Saddam (specifically though their proxy SCIRI). The reason it was listened to was that is was perceived that good relations would be needed to help Iraq rebuild (and restructure the Iraqi army after 2 practical defeats by Iran and the US)
The Council's structure whilst meant to be represented based ( one members representing one fraction) creating a certain amount of chaos when trying to control things on a national level as there wasn't ministers to speak of. The council had one representative from each group* with the aim of solely existing to to fill a void until elections occurred. In order to pass anything the representative of the various groups needed to hold a vote and a majority vote in favour. because there wasn't proper ministers which made the council reliant on former members of the civil service and other bureaucrats who switched sides. This created an advantaged for the former Ba'athist members (on top of having good relations with most of the army that defected as they came from the same boat so to speak ).
Ayad Allawi, the leader of disaffected Ba'athist fraction which would latter build the Iraqi National Movement.
The situation one the council was made more complicated by the acceptance of a new fraction: the exiles. They were made up of many influential Iraqis living abroad who returned upon the fall of Saddam. This fraction was Pro-Western (and specifically pro American) and generally considered to be Neo-Liberals economically and having their own business giving them significant weighting in any decision. They never the less were viewed with contempt by many as they hadn't physically fought to liberate Iraq from Saddam's iron grip, the main reason they were included was because they were seen by a significant few as being key to re-establishing good relation with Washington. The representative for this fraction, Ahmed Chalabi sought to the maximum extent possibly for elections which after much debate were agreed for June the 12th.
The Council also decided to appoint a temporary president in order to try to make sorting out diplomatic relations and control of Iraq easier, this was eventually filled by Mohammad Bahr al-Ulloum. Whilst this appointment was significant was the first non-Sunni leader of Iraq it was seemed hollow due to the fact he was a seat filler for who the Iraqi parliament after the election would decide to make President.
The council became a battle ground of sorts for the various groups that wanted to band together for coalitions during the election and many of the long term political alliances were made here. The former Ba'athist and the exiles having a similar secular views (and agreed on the need to reform the economy by mainly attracting Western investment). The islamic Shia groups also gripped together due to similar views on the role religion should play in the new Iraq. The kurds rather noticeably did not as they were largely decided along ideological lines and would not ally with any of the Arab groups as they weren't 100% on what they would do for them.
Aside from politics there were many issues the council had to do with the most pressing being the internal displacement of thousands of Iraqi's.
Many of them had no homes left to return to and the state of the Iraqi economy also made easing the situation difficult. As a results the council and interim President decided to appeal to international aid to help mitigate the situation as much as possible.
The sanctions and damage done by the wars with Iran and the US led coalition and rebellion left the economy in a a bad state to say the least but the council was stalemated on economic views (namely on should they apply for an IMF loan and the extent liberalisation measures) so it was left till after the election but one measure decided was to begin downsize the Iraqi army. Most of the older equipment was sold in exchange for money which would be used to either upgrade the army or help repair the Iraqi state.
* Former Ba'athist members, Dowa, Communists, Leftist Ba'athist members (backed by Assad), Communists, PUK, KDP, IMK (official name for Kurdish islamists), SCIR ,the often forgotten Zowaa (Assyrians) and the army defectors (who normally voted with the first group mentioned)
^Which after much debate were agreed for June the 12th to give the groups enough time to campaign.
Also the next update is looking at the larger regional effects.
The New Iraqi flag, agreed upon during the early part of the Governing Council of Iraq.
In the immediate aftermath of the overthrow of Saddam left a power vacuum in Iraq which in the interests of stability needed to be filled. Many of the army defectors and former Ba'athists started working together in order to enforce law and order, other rebels not wanting to be cut out of power quickly joined in resulting in the forming of the Governing Council of Iraq.
However that isn't the fully story as some in the original grouping had to be pushed by the US into accepting co-operation with groups who they were politically opposed to. The US did this in order to limit any influence Iran would try to get through the fall of Saddam (specifically though their proxy SCIRI). The reason it was listened to was that is was perceived that good relations would be needed to help Iraq rebuild (and restructure the Iraqi army after 2 practical defeats by Iran and the US)
The Council's structure whilst meant to be represented based ( one members representing one fraction) creating a certain amount of chaos when trying to control things on a national level as there wasn't ministers to speak of. The council had one representative from each group* with the aim of solely existing to to fill a void until elections occurred. In order to pass anything the representative of the various groups needed to hold a vote and a majority vote in favour. because there wasn't proper ministers which made the council reliant on former members of the civil service and other bureaucrats who switched sides. This created an advantaged for the former Ba'athist members (on top of having good relations with most of the army that defected as they came from the same boat so to speak ).
Ayad Allawi, the leader of disaffected Ba'athist fraction which would latter build the Iraqi National Movement.
The situation one the council was made more complicated by the acceptance of a new fraction: the exiles. They were made up of many influential Iraqis living abroad who returned upon the fall of Saddam. This fraction was Pro-Western (and specifically pro American) and generally considered to be Neo-Liberals economically and having their own business giving them significant weighting in any decision. They never the less were viewed with contempt by many as they hadn't physically fought to liberate Iraq from Saddam's iron grip, the main reason they were included was because they were seen by a significant few as being key to re-establishing good relation with Washington. The representative for this fraction, Ahmed Chalabi sought to the maximum extent possibly for elections which after much debate were agreed for June the 12th.
The Council also decided to appoint a temporary president in order to try to make sorting out diplomatic relations and control of Iraq easier, this was eventually filled by Mohammad Bahr al-Ulloum. Whilst this appointment was significant was the first non-Sunni leader of Iraq it was seemed hollow due to the fact he was a seat filler for who the Iraqi parliament after the election would decide to make President.
The council became a battle ground of sorts for the various groups that wanted to band together for coalitions during the election and many of the long term political alliances were made here. The former Ba'athist and the exiles having a similar secular views (and agreed on the need to reform the economy by mainly attracting Western investment). The islamic Shia groups also gripped together due to similar views on the role religion should play in the new Iraq. The kurds rather noticeably did not as they were largely decided along ideological lines and would not ally with any of the Arab groups as they weren't 100% on what they would do for them.
Aside from politics there were many issues the council had to do with the most pressing being the internal displacement of thousands of Iraqi's.
Many of them had no homes left to return to and the state of the Iraqi economy also made easing the situation difficult. As a results the council and interim President decided to appeal to international aid to help mitigate the situation as much as possible.
The sanctions and damage done by the wars with Iran and the US led coalition and rebellion left the economy in a a bad state to say the least but the council was stalemated on economic views (namely on should they apply for an IMF loan and the extent liberalisation measures) so it was left till after the election but one measure decided was to begin downsize the Iraqi army. Most of the older equipment was sold in exchange for money which would be used to either upgrade the army or help repair the Iraqi state.
* Former Ba'athist members, Dowa, Communists, Leftist Ba'athist members (backed by Assad), Communists, PUK, KDP, IMK (official name for Kurdish islamists), SCIR ,the often forgotten Zowaa (Assyrians) and the army defectors (who normally voted with the first group mentioned)
^Which after much debate were agreed for June the 12th to give the groups enough time to campaign.
Also the next update is looking at the larger regional effects.
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Lost Freeway
Banned
I'm real interested in the butterfly effects on American politics. Without Saddam, the neocons will have to find some other tinpot dictator to knock down.
To give a slight hint there was someone before Saddam in the Middle East not connected to the USSR for ideological reasons who I think the neocons will try to go after.
I have a friend with dyslexia. I tried to help him through high school.
Suggested corrections in same format as previous post. Brackets with question marks at the end are suggestions I am not sure about - due to either ambiguity about your intent and uncertainty about my interpretation of your intents.
Sorry if I sound condescending or uncivil. Criticism regarding my criticism (bwong!) welcome.
Grammar notes and other questions
1. Perhaps the uncoordination of the rebel groups led to any of: blue on blue fire, other objectives being neglected, logistical problems and many others.
2. I may have sinned here by deviating from your intent.
3. I have never heard of people deliberately getting caught in crossfires.
4. Though the original version of this is grammatically incorrect, my admittedly mostly cursory study of modern Middle Eastern history shows the original statement to be depressingly/ darkly hilariously true.
5. Cooperation. Between the many, many rebel groups associated with Middle Eastern political uphevals?
6. I have no idea why a national government would want to create chaos in order to run a country.
7. Remember, punctuation comes immediately after a word and a space before the next word.
8. Either of these is grammatically ok: "also decided to elect" and "also elected"
9. "Mainly" describes the primary source of something. Scott Manley is a youtuber known for playing space games, being Scottish and for being an astrophysicist.
10. To the best of my knowledge Iraq never had client states.
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I have a friend with dyslexia. I tried to help him through high school.
Suggested corrections in same format as previous post. Brackets with question marks at the end are suggestions I am not sure about - due to either ambiguity about your intent and uncertainty about my interpretation of your intents.
Sorry if I sound condescending or uncivil. Criticism regarding my criticism (bwong!) welcome.
Grammar notes and other questions
1. Perhaps the uncoordination of the rebel groups led to any of: blue on blue fire, other objectives being neglected, logistical problems and many others.
2. I may have sinned here by deviating from your intent.
3. I have never heard of people deliberately getting caught in crossfires.
4. Though the original version of this is grammatically incorrect, my admittedly mostly cursory study of modern Middle Eastern history shows the original statement to be depressingly/ darkly hilariously true.
5. Cooperation. Between the many, many rebel groups associated with Middle Eastern political uphevals?
6. I have no idea why a national government would want to create chaos in order to run a country.
7. Remember, punctuation comes immediately after a word and a space before the next word.
8. Either of these is grammatically ok: "also decided to elect" and "also elected"
9. "Mainly" describes the primary source of something. Scott Manley is a youtuber known for playing space games, being Scottish and for being an astrophysicist.
10. To the best of my knowledge Iraq never had client states.
Thanks for the input
Regional effects part 1
The fall of Saddam triggered a few shockwaves throughout the Middle East, which will be covered here by looking at the effects on each nation/organisation.
The PLO had effectively allied itself with Saddam and begun suffering from internal dissent as many of the lower members felt that Yasser Arafat was out of touch (mainly due to Saddam being overthrown by his own people). His failure to secure more nation state backers (which wasn’t helped by him siding with Saddam alienating the PLO throughout most of the region) was also seen as part of the reason for their failure to succeed. The result was the beginning of the emergence of other groups separate from the PLO.
Within Israel itself whilst many were happy to see Saddam go and the PLO look weakened there was still some worried over the new Iraq as it was presumed (correctly) that a democratic Iraq wouldn’t be friendlier to Israel despite the PLO siding with Saddam. This same double-edged sword could arguably apply to weakening over the PLO and Yasser Arafat as they weren’t too sure if any other emerging groups would be more or less hostile and willing to negotiate.
Ali Khamenei, Supreme leader of Iran since Khomeini's death in 1989
In Iran there was what could be described as a smug feeling or a quiet satisfaction as many still remembered the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war and felt that Saddam had it coming (like the rest of the world at this point). The leadership were focused on trying to get Iraq into the Iranian camp using its puppet the SCIRI (which it instructed to align with other Shia parties guessing that they would be more willing to pursue closer relations with Iran). However the Islamic Republics capacity to do so was questionable as Iran hadn’t fully recovered from the War with Saddam’s Iraq and the US had started making inroads with the exiles (and those that were becoming allied with the exiles on key issues)
Hafez al-Assad, today remembered by some as Assad senior
Syria an ally of Iran that participated in the Gulf War (suplying100 000 Syrians) and the President (gained it in a coup) Hafez al-Assad had a deep personal hatred of Saddam and was thus overjoyed with Saddam having fallen it like its ally Iran wanted Iraq to be on their team. Their own version of Ba’athism in Iraq however its popularity was low and like Iran was seemingly outmanoeuvred.
For Saudi Arabia and the remaining Gulf States there was relief that Saddam was gone and some saw a potential ally in Iraq. However many in the various leadership circles were concerned about Iran’s attempts at gaining influence and subsequently supported the American backed parties. However in Jordan there was concern over the presence of Ahmed Chalabi sense he was wanted for Petra banking scandal and many hoped that the new Iraqi government would extradite him to serve his 22 year sentence*
Finally the other secular dictatorships, whilst many didn’t like Saddam many were also worried about how this could effect there on personal grip on power in their respective nations. Yemen was actually a client of Saddam’s and whist open to buying small arms from Iraq is looking to get the US to supply it after seeing Saddam fail in the Gulf War.
Saleh, president of Yemen sense reunification in 1990
* In 1977 he founded the Petra bank with Crown Prince Hassan, the Kings brother. In 1989 the central bank decreed that all banks had to deposit 35% of their profits into the central bank and Petra was the only one that failed to do so. An investigation found evidence of embezzlement and false accounting causing Chalab to flee. He was tried in absentia and found guilty and sentenced a 22 year prison sentence. He claimed the Saddam was responsible for the charges.
The next regional one will look at the effects of the election results
The fall of Saddam triggered a few shockwaves throughout the Middle East, which will be covered here by looking at the effects on each nation/organisation.
The PLO had effectively allied itself with Saddam and begun suffering from internal dissent as many of the lower members felt that Yasser Arafat was out of touch (mainly due to Saddam being overthrown by his own people). His failure to secure more nation state backers (which wasn’t helped by him siding with Saddam alienating the PLO throughout most of the region) was also seen as part of the reason for their failure to succeed. The result was the beginning of the emergence of other groups separate from the PLO.
Within Israel itself whilst many were happy to see Saddam go and the PLO look weakened there was still some worried over the new Iraq as it was presumed (correctly) that a democratic Iraq wouldn’t be friendlier to Israel despite the PLO siding with Saddam. This same double-edged sword could arguably apply to weakening over the PLO and Yasser Arafat as they weren’t too sure if any other emerging groups would be more or less hostile and willing to negotiate.
Ali Khamenei, Supreme leader of Iran since Khomeini's death in 1989
In Iran there was what could be described as a smug feeling or a quiet satisfaction as many still remembered the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war and felt that Saddam had it coming (like the rest of the world at this point). The leadership were focused on trying to get Iraq into the Iranian camp using its puppet the SCIRI (which it instructed to align with other Shia parties guessing that they would be more willing to pursue closer relations with Iran). However the Islamic Republics capacity to do so was questionable as Iran hadn’t fully recovered from the War with Saddam’s Iraq and the US had started making inroads with the exiles (and those that were becoming allied with the exiles on key issues)
Hafez al-Assad, today remembered by some as Assad senior
Syria an ally of Iran that participated in the Gulf War (suplying100 000 Syrians) and the President (gained it in a coup) Hafez al-Assad had a deep personal hatred of Saddam and was thus overjoyed with Saddam having fallen it like its ally Iran wanted Iraq to be on their team. Their own version of Ba’athism in Iraq however its popularity was low and like Iran was seemingly outmanoeuvred.
For Saudi Arabia and the remaining Gulf States there was relief that Saddam was gone and some saw a potential ally in Iraq. However many in the various leadership circles were concerned about Iran’s attempts at gaining influence and subsequently supported the American backed parties. However in Jordan there was concern over the presence of Ahmed Chalabi sense he was wanted for Petra banking scandal and many hoped that the new Iraqi government would extradite him to serve his 22 year sentence*
Finally the other secular dictatorships, whilst many didn’t like Saddam many were also worried about how this could effect there on personal grip on power in their respective nations. Yemen was actually a client of Saddam’s and whist open to buying small arms from Iraq is looking to get the US to supply it after seeing Saddam fail in the Gulf War.
Saleh, president of Yemen sense reunification in 1990
* In 1977 he founded the Petra bank with Crown Prince Hassan, the Kings brother. In 1989 the central bank decreed that all banks had to deposit 35% of their profits into the central bank and Petra was the only one that failed to do so. An investigation found evidence of embezzlement and false accounting causing Chalab to flee. He was tried in absentia and found guilty and sentenced a 22 year prison sentence. He claimed the Saddam was responsible for the charges.
The next regional one will look at the effects of the election results
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The Council's structure, whilst meant to be representation based, created a certain amount of chaos when trying to control things on a national level as there weren't ministers to speak of.
Better for USA
I am enjoying this time line. Based on this timeline, I can see a better future for the USA. It is my understanding that one of the things that was motivation for Bin Laden was the American military presence in the Middle East especially in Saudi Arabia. The reason that the US was there was the need to maintain the no fly zones over Iraq. If Saddam Hussein is gone then there is no need for the no fly zones. If there is no need for the no fly zone, then the American presence would be smaller and more low key. With the reduced American presence, then there would not have been the 9/11 attack. With out the 9/11 attacks, then there would not have been a "War on Terror". Therefore a lot of people would be alive or not crippled due to the war.
Regards
Stubear1012
I am enjoying this time line. Based on this timeline, I can see a better future for the USA. It is my understanding that one of the things that was motivation for Bin Laden was the American military presence in the Middle East especially in Saudi Arabia. The reason that the US was there was the need to maintain the no fly zones over Iraq. If Saddam Hussein is gone then there is no need for the no fly zones. If there is no need for the no fly zone, then the American presence would be smaller and more low key. With the reduced American presence, then there would not have been the 9/11 attack. With out the 9/11 attacks, then there would not have been a "War on Terror". Therefore a lot of people would be alive or not crippled due to the war.
Regards
Stubear1012