A Different Pacific War...

On December 7th, the U.S.'s Pacific carriers (I believe Enterprise and Lexington at that time) are at Pearl Harbor and are sunk there.

Simultaneously, the Japanese are able to seriously damage the Panama Canal (they designed the B1 submarine to do it, but I think that was exceptionally unlikely to succeed, so here's my idea). They do this by taking two merchant ships and scuttling one in the Gaillard Cut while another explodes in a Texas City size blast, taking with it the Gatun Locks. The crews of both ships, IJN personnel in disguise, are either killed or commit suicide.

How long is the Panama Canal out and what is affected?

My take on things: the Battle of the Coral Sea is butterflied away because no Lexington and Yorktown, which probably in turn means Japan takes all of New Guinea and the Solomons, is able to finish the airfield on and otherwise reinforce Guadalcanal, and the fact the Shokaku and Zuikaku are able to participate in the Battle of Midway, coupled with the now-depeleted U.S. forces available for that battle, means (at least to me) that the Japanese likely occupy Midway, although this will of course be unsuccessful in allowing Japan to take or bomb heavily the rest of Hawaii or in forcing the U.S. to sue for peace. With Midway won, the Japanese defensive picket is complete and they likely occupy New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa, along with other areas.

Any other ideas? Am I full of crap? Would that be enough to cause the Japanese to give into their egos and launch some sort of ground campaign in Australia?

Thanks.
 
In before the usual "no matter what, they still lose":)

Imo, what you say is perfectly realistic, it could have happened. It is this kind of scenario that makes me think there is a small chance (as opposed to 0 as some fervently believe) for a negotiated armistice, perhaps they manage to neutralize Australia and India and the US will suffer alot heavier loses when they will start their offensive. Question is, will the US swallow the losses or at some point they will think enough is enough. As the front line is further away for longer, more resources and more oil reaches the mainland Japan which means more production, which means stronger opposition and more delays to the US advance etc. etc. Yes i know about the atomic bombs, perhaps actually they will bring that negotiated armistice even if Japan will have to give a lot but avoiding the unconditional surrender in OTL.

Of course, the basic weaknesses still remain i guess, they will be outproduced, the US submarine campaign will constantly increase, the inteligence problem presumbly remains a serious one (however, what if I-1 is not captured?) they really do need changes like in their submarine and ASW doctrine to be more effective, hence more costly for US etc.
 
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Perhaps another item can be included; more cooperation with the Germans, as they were quite destructive on the Atlantic in 1942, at least near the US coast. Have more U-Boote do their thing there, instead of just the OTL handfull and seatrade and supply might come to a complete halt there as well, locking the USN into the Virginia bases, unable to get out, due to the U-Boote activities there. (OTL USN in 1942 had little ASW, to none at all, capable of dealing with submarines.)

In theory, the USA could have been brought to a situation where the homeland itself was fully intact, but the means to get to more oversea territories was limmited, as a result of enemy invested oceans. This could have resulted in a USA isolating itself from the other allies, while they were badly needed to suply them. Even if the USA would win eventually, which is not so sure by the way in such a situation, the ties with the European Allies would not have been the same, especially with the USSR, which might even get more than her share in a future world.
 
Yeah, I should have mentioned to begin with that I'm fully aware it's still hopeless for Japan if the U.S. (and likely the Commonwealth countries) come at the Japanese swinging.

An interesting butterfly is what happens when the Soviets get involved. Obviously this is going to significantly delay the defeat and surrender date of Japan, especially if the U.S. decides the situation is so far gone that they'll go with a true "Germany first" effort and relegate the Pacific War effort to the goals of defending Hawaii and Australia. In that case, the Soviets are going to have a lot more time to fight in the Pacific rather than the OTL one month. They probably take all of Korea, and it's very likely that they manage to get a blow in on mainland Japan, whether that's by sacrificing an airborne division or two or by taking their navy through the Northwest Passage in the two weeks of the year it's open and hitting the Japanese from Vladivostok. That's going to be repulsed by the Japanese, but it's going to give the Soviets a claim on half of Japan when the war is over and territory is getting carved up. The Soviets now have useful ports on the Pacific that aren't hopelessly bottlenecked by U.S.-friendly countries like Vladivostok is in the Sea of Japan in OTL. They also have a secure flank without South Korea existing. There's a shorter Chinese Civil War, and if the Soviets and the Maoists go far enough south in China, it's even possible the Soviets could launch a Crete-style invasion of Taiwan with airborne divisions, eliminating the main flashpoint OTL between China and the West. I'm not sure if they get all the way to Southeast Asia; the main problem would be logistics, but the Soviets had better ones than the Axis throughout the war, and they would have had a ton of local support from the areas they liberated. The butterfly effects are interesting to think about.
 
Perhaps another item can be included; more cooperation with the Germans, as they were quite destructive on the Atlantic in 1942, at least near the US coast. Have more U-Boote do their thing there, instead of just the OTL handfull and seatrade and supply might come to a complete halt there as well, locking the USN into the Virginia bases, unable to get out, due to the U-Boote activities there. (OTL USN in 1942 had little ASW, to none at all, capable of dealing with submarines.)

In theory, the USA could have been brought to a situation where the homeland itself was fully intact, but the means to get to more oversea territories was limmited, as a result of enemy invested oceans. This could have resulted in a USA isolating itself from the other allies, while they were badly needed to suply them. Even if the USA would win eventually, which is not so sure by the way in such a situation, the ties with the European Allies would not have been the same, especially with the USSR, which might even get more than her share in a future world.


I think off the top of my head that that might be a thing that could only happen in theory. The reason is that ASW warfare was a different deal back then as opposed to today; submarines had to have a ton of time on the surface to recharge their batteries, and that made them extremely vulnerable. They also couldn't range far away from the U.S. coast if they wanted to keep enough of a presence to relegate the U.S. Navy to a fleet-in-being. The U.S.'s industrial capabilities were so vast that we could easily have filled every square inch of sky within a hundred mile belt of our coastline with radar-equipped Liberators and hammered the U-Boats every time they tried to surface. This forces the U-Boats back further from the coast, giving the U.S. convoys time to get to sea, making it still harder for the U-Boats to intercept them because (at least underwater) they were so much slower than surface vessels. From there, the U.S. would have just thrown so many ships at them that we would have just won the naval war of attrition.

Basically, it's the naval Battle of Britain.

The Germans were at a profound disadvantage during the whole thing because every time they lost a plane, they lost the thing wholesale—crew and equipment. The British differed in that they were generally able to retrieve crew (who often were able to learn from their experiences) and repair aircraft.

Same deal here—the Germans will realistically lose all of their planes and subs that are hit on the surface, and their crews with them, whereas many U.S. ships that are hit will be able to limp back to port.

Add to that the fact that they're trying to fight a war against an enemy with a vastly superior industrial capability and a much closer base (compared to the German one an ocean away), and I think it's pretty decisively a losing game if they try.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
The thing which makes the Japanese winning the Pacific War hard is basically a combination of two factors.


1) The US can build a carrier fleet far larger than the Japanese can possibly handle inside about three years (by the end of 1944 there are twelve Essex in operation as against a maximum possible CV fleet of nine for the Japanese - and that's assuming every pre-war US carrier is sunk and none of the Japanese ones are.)

2) The US was really pissed off.


That second one is the reason they would likely stick in the fight long enough for the first one to tell.


Of course, there are mitigating factors both ways.

The mitigating factor for the American desire for war is that war weariness is a thing.
...on the other hand I didn't even list the Royal Navy CV fleet, which was not exactly tiny. By the comparison point the Royal Navy had seven CVs in their own right - six of them armoured carriers. Lower in capacity, but much tougher.



I guess what I'm saying is that it would take a political PoD in which the US despairs that the war can be won, and it'll take a while for that to burn through the mix of indignation/fury/patriotism and at least a bit of genuine racism.
It also requires the Japanese to obtain loaded dice from someone, of course - every lost Japanese carrier is a boon to the US war effort.
 

Puzzle

Donor
The Panama canal being wrecked also doesn't seal off the Pacific. It does make it harder for the ships built on the East Coast shipyards to get there, adding ~8,000 miles but that's only ten or twelve days. Japan still can't win and the war probably won't be too much longer.
 
I think off the top of my head that that might be a thing that could only happen in theory. The reason is that ASW warfare was a different deal back then as opposed to today; submarines had to have a ton of time on the surface to recharge their batteries, and that made them extremely vulnerable. They also couldn't range far away from the U.S. coast if they wanted to keep enough of a presence to relegate the U.S. Navy to a fleet-in-being. The U.S.'s industrial capabilities were so vast that we could easily have filled every square inch of sky within a hundred mile belt of our coastline with radar-equipped Liberators and hammered the U-Boats every time they tried to surface. This forces the U-Boats back further from the coast, giving the U.S. convoys time to get to sea, making it still harder for the U-Boats to intercept them because (at least underwater) they were so much slower than surface vessels. From there, the U.S. would have just thrown so many ships at them that we would have just won the naval war of attrition.

Basically, it's the naval Battle of Britain.

The Germans were at a profound disadvantage during the whole thing because every time they lost a plane, they lost the thing wholesale—crew and equipment. The British differed in that they were generally able to retrieve crew (who often were able to learn from their experiences) and repair aircraft.

Same deal here—the Germans will realistically lose all of their planes and subs that are hit on the surface, and their crews with them, whereas many U.S. ships that are hit will be able to limp back to port.

Add to that the fact that they're trying to fight a war against an enemy with a vastly superior industrial capability and a much closer base (compared to the German one an ocean away), and I think it's pretty decisively a losing game if they try.
Sadly thou forget Ernest King had to support the damn deployments in the first place, he was Japan first and our oil supplies were really in danger in late 42 because of the Cape Hatteras Massacres. Had Japan even given a week's warning to Germany and Operation Drumroll might be successful enough to wreck the US offensive strategy for another few months buying time for Germany and Japan.

Post-war this might be positive, beginning of the war though? I hate to be flying a US flag anywhere in the West Pacific regions or on the East coast for the next couple of months to a year.
 
Simultaneously, the Japanese are able to seriously damage the Panama Canal (they designed the B1 submarine to do it, but I think that was exceptionally unlikely to succeed, so here's my idea). They do this by taking two merchant ships and scuttling one in the Gaillard Cut while another explodes in a Texas City size blast, taking with it the Gatun Locks. The crews of both ships, IJN personnel in disguise, are either killed or commit suicide.

How long is the Panama Canal out and what is affected.

Two problems here. The first is timing. You can either hit the Panama Canal in a suprise attack, or you can hit the Panama Canal in a surprise attack. Not both. Unless the Japanese suddenly develop magic communications equipment they simply can't coordinate across the Pacific that well. No one can.

The minute the Americans get word of war Panama will be on a full war footing,any Japanese ship isn't getting anywhere near it. Unless you can figure out a way to get MacArthur in charge there of course. But then that means the Philippines defense is carried out competently, which arguably fucks the Japanese over even worse.

Second, even before the United States entered WWII the Panama Canal was HEAVILY guarded and defended. They searched ships for cameras, and turned back any suspicious ship. A ship laden end with enough explosives to do what you suggest is going to get either sent home or flat out destroyed (since there is NO reason to have those explosives EXCEPT attempted sabotage.)
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
The Canal was a MUCH more difficult target than seems to be considered here.

The U.S., as of August 26, 1939, placed a series of measures in place to defend the Canal. These included limiting ALL Commercial traffic to on side of the locks (thereby greatly limited the damage that a ship could cause), requiring inspection of ALL vessels, including American Flagged merchant vessels prior to approaching the Canal proper, and the placement of armed troops on each vessel while passing through the Canal (the only exceptions to this were USN, RN, and until the Fall of France, FM vessels). By mid 1941 the U.S. had a full BATTALION of troops assigned to transit guard duties, with the size of the guard varying according to the nationality of the vessel (even U.S. and UK flagged ships had at least 10 guards). Also, at the end of July 1941, when the U.S. Trade Embargo was put into place, the Japanese were entirely cut off from access to the Canal. The last Japanese ship to pass through the Canal before the war was on 22 July, 1941 (and it was heavy with security, there being a rumor that the Japanese were going to attack the Canal on or about 20 July, 1941)

So to make any sort of covert attack would require the hijacking of a ship, replacement of the crew (or the subversion of the crew through bribery or other means), loading explosives in such a way as to avoid detection, and then evasion of the armed guards to allow the explosives to be detonated when the ship was in the locks. Ships had to be pre-scheduled for the Canal, regardless of Flag, so you also need to do all this far enough in advance to make the schedule. By Fall of 1941 the Canal Zone security force had probably the highest degree of alert and suspicion of any unit in the U.S. military. Assuming ALL of these steps can be evaded, you still only disable one side of the lock system, leaving the other in use.

edit: BTW: If Enterprise and Lexington are lost at Pearl, what get butterflied away is the Doolittle Raid. The U.S. still has Yorktown, Hornet, and maybe even Wasp available for Coral Sea. Interestingly, since the Doolittle Raid was the reason that Yamamoto decided he had to finish off the U.S. carriers ASAP, the loss of the two ships at Pearl also almost certainly butterflies away Midway.
 
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The mitigating factor for the American desire for war is that war weariness is a thing.

The contrary factor for American war weariness was PH. I think that it was Halsey who said after PH that the only place that Japanese will be spoken is hell. After PH there is zero chance that the US is going to have a negotiated settlement with Japan.
 
I can't see the Canal attack being realistic, either.

But it's possible to catch two carriers at Pearl Harbor. That certainly would complicate things for Nimitz. Like the battleships, they could presumably be salvaged, but it would take the balance of a year to do so, at least.

Not sure I agree that Doolittle is certainly butterflied away, but it makes it a good deal less likely. The U.S. still has five fleet carriers (though Ranger will not see use in the Pacific, being too slow), but those carriers become much more valuable, and that was a mighty risky way to use them.

But if it is butterflied away, you still get Coral Sea, since Nimitz still has Rochefort's intercepts, and he still has the carriers to do something about it. They'd just be different carriers. And instead of Midway, you get him trying some variant of Operation FS in the summer. But that's still going to be a high risk enterprise for Yamamoto, for reasons discussed some other recent threads here: the objective islands (New Cal, Fiji, Samo, Efatu) were all garrisoned far more heavily than the Japanese realized, and their logistics and exposure to air attack would have been brutal - and Nimitz was reading some of his mail.
 
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Alright, thanks guys. I wasn't aware of how heavily the canal was defended. Back to the drawing board, I guess.
 
Asp said:
Simultaneously, the Japanese are able to seriously damage the Panama Canal (they designed the B1 submarine to do it, but I think that was exceptionally unlikely to succeed, so here's my idea). They do this by taking two merchant ships and scuttling one in the Gaillard Cut while another explodes in a Texas City size blast, taking with it the Gatun Locks. The crews of both ships, IJN personnel in disguise, are either killed or commit suicide.
Credible IMO.
Asp said:
How long is the Panama Canal out and what is affected?
It does depend on how easy it is to replace the lock doors & repair the damage, & have no real idea...:eek:
Asp said:
My take on things: the Battle of the Coral Sea is butterflied away because no Lexington and Yorktown
Dubious IMO; they could as easily come around the Cape.
Asp said:
able to finish the airfield on and otherwise reinforce Guadalcanal
Possible.
Asp said:
and the fact the Shokaku and Zuikaku are able to participate in the Battle of Midway, coupled with the now-depeleted U.S. forces available for that battle, means (at least to me) that the Japanese likely occupy Midway
Possible Nagumo does better, maybe sinking 2 CV instead of 1. Occupying Midway is a non-starter.
Asp said:
the Japanese defensive picket is complete and they likely occupy New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa, along with other areas.
This is just so far beyond Japan's logistical capacity as to be ASB.

Consider something else: crippling the Panama Canal impacts British supply shipments across the Pacific... It put them at hazard in the South Atlantic, offering (somewhat) improved opportunities for U-boats. (It also makes the efforts of the Brazilian Navy more important.) There's also added delay in transit time to take account of, which absorbs more hulls & has serious knock-ons....
 
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