A different first US LMG – a different doctrine path?

[Driftless]

The first US Army Light Machine Gun was the Hotchkiss M1909 Benet-Mercie.

(Photo from Wikipedia)

It was a 30 round strip fed, 12kg/26.5 portable automatic rifle. The basic design was used in a number of countries. But, as it was a pioneering effort, it proved to be an imperfect answer and ultimately had a short service life for the US. It’s first combat use was against the night-time raid against Colombus, NM by Pancho Villa. The cavalry troopers had insufficient training and virtually no live fire experience with the gun and the somewhat finnicky ammunition strips, so there was some success and some frustration with the gun. It got a public bad-rap out of the skirmish. An Army investigation identified the training and experience issue as being the root of the problem. Other countries also used variants of the Hotchkiss Portative with varying success.

The other side of the coin for the M1909, was the size and field transportation of the weapon and its accouterments. The Army treated the gun like a piece of mountain artillery, where it was normally transported with the gun, ammunition(in crates), and other gear spread across two pack mules. The gun and its various parts, in that arrangement totaled up to 46kg/101lbs and pack frames and leatherwork were another 100+ lbs*. That arrangement worked adequately for use by the US Cavalry, where the fire teams would break the packs down, set up the guns, while the cavalry formed up into attack (or defensive) positions. *The M1909 weight breakdown comes from “Handbook of the Benet-Mercie Machine Rifle Model of 1909”

That two-mule setup wasn’t very handy – for an infantry squad/platoon level portable weapon. That’s my PoD. Were there a better path out there that would lead the US along different LMG lines and squad doctrine lines than we historically took?

The first weapon that comes up in this thought is the Lewis Gun, but that’s an outside shot…. Its development was enough behind the Hotchkiss, where it mostly missed the testing phase. Of course, somewhat famously, the antipathy between Col. Lewis and General Wm. Crozier (Head of US Army Ordnance) had a huge impact. A third piece was in the early days, the Lewis didn’t work so well in .30-06. It worked fine with .303 and other cartridges. A fourth consideration is that its weight was similar to the gun weight of the M1909.


Another candidate from that general developmental timeframe was the Vickers-Berthier. It was a detachable box magazine-fed unit, and about 10% lighter than the M1909. You’d have the NIH issue to deal with though…..

The other candidate that pre-dates them all, is the Madsen. It's often mocked in some circles here for its unique firing mechanism, but it was a more modern design in a couple of respects. It was a detachable box fed, notably lighter (9kg/20lbs), and had a respectable track record for durability. Not a wonder-weapon to be sure, but a better candidate for use on the squad level.

Are there other practical man-portable options out there in the 1908 – 1910 time frame?

Perhaps a PoD is for the US Army to decide in the Philippine War, that more firepower was needed on a squad level for tramping through the jungle, swamp, or tall grass. Ditch the mules as transport, and develop the idea of a lighter weight automatic weapon where extra magazines are carried by the other members of the squad. The weapon deployed is secondary (at this time) to the idea that automatic fire is needed at that most basic infantry formation and is man-portable. Whatever weapon follows uses that idea at its core. Does that thought lead to a different path than the BAR?

 

[ArtosStark]

Another candidate from that general developmental timeframe was the Vickers-Berthier.

It wasn’t the Vickers-Berthier until 1925. Until then it was the Berthier (with various year models). It was offered to the US in 1918 but they turned it down, probably in preference to the BAR.
It really only has a year on the Lewis gun and was designed in 8mm level, AIUI. I doubt it would be any more likely to be adopted.

Crozier seemed against adopting almost anything at the time, and a mass production machine gun in particular. Without removing him I doubt you change the story much from OTL.

Considering the ridiculously small numbers of Benet-Mercie guns in service I am not sure that it actually had that great of an effect on American doctrine? Seems like they had to learn what to do with a light machine gun at the same time as everyone else did.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

The other side of the coin for the M1909, was the size and field transportation of the weapon and its accouterments. The Army treated the gun like a piece of mountain artillery, where it was normally transported with the gun, ammunition(in crates), and other gear spread across two pack mules. The gun and its various parts, in that arrangement totaled up to 46kg/101lbs and pack frames and leatherwork were another 100+ lbs*. That arrangement worked adequately for use by the US Cavalry, where the fire teams would break the packs down, set up the guns, while the cavalry formed up into attack (or defensive) positions. *The M1909 weight breakdown comes from “Handbook of the Benet-Mercie Machine Rifle Model of 1909”

That two-mule setup wasn’t very handy – for an infantry squad/platoon level portable weapon. That’s my PoD. Were there a better path out there that would lead the US along different LMG lines and squad doctrine lines than we historically took?

Advice from a old Marine veteran of the Banana Wars to a newly minted Second LT. Circa 1940. "The first thing you do in a ambush is shoot your pack mule. Otherwise it bolts with all your spare ammo."

 

[Driftless]

Crozier seemed against adopting almost anything at the time, and a mass production machine gun in particular. Without removing him I doubt you change the story much from OTL.

Considering the ridiculously small numbers of Benet-Mercie guns in service I am not sure that it actually had that great of an effect on American doctrine? Seems like they had to learn what to do with a light machine gun at the same time as everyone else did.

Probably so with Crozier. He contributed to some real solid, enduring choices, but he was a closed-minded autocrat.

The M1909's high mark for the US was in the Pancho Villa pursuit, where they were used to good effect in a couple of occasions. That's were I'm thinking if there's an earlier start, (1901-1904ish) you might get some change on the doctrine front. The US Army was undergoing a re-evaluation of its infantry doctrine - in general - in that time frame, Also, maybe the Marines jump in for their small scale interventions in the "aughts". Of course, that may frost Crozier's thought process

 

[Crowbar Six]

It wasn’t the Vickers-Berthier until 1925. Until then it was the Berthier (with various year models). It was offered to the US in 1918 but they turned it down, probably in preference to the BAR.
It really only has a year on the Lewis gun and was designed in 8mm level, AIUI. I doubt it would be any more likely to be adopted.

Crozier seemed against adopting almost anything at the time, and a mass production machine gun in particular. Without removing him I doubt you change the story much from OTL.

Considering the ridiculously small numbers of Benet-Mercie guns in service I am not sure that it actually had that great of an effect on American doctrine? Seems like they had to learn what to do with a light machine gun at the same time as everyone else did.

The big issue for the US Army pre WW1 is that they had next to bugger all money.

These guns were all really expensive and other than the Russo-Japanese war no one had used machine-guns in a modern war, most modern militaries didn't take much note of what happened there as the Russians were considered a bit of a joke and they got beaten by the Japanese.

There would need to be a good reason for the change. LMG's are ideal for assault where troops need to take the MG's forward rapidly and deploy them to give fire support against dug in opposition, that concept didn't really exist before WW1. One possibility would be if the US had some sort of Guerrilla war in the Philippines in the years running up to WW1 where the locals were equipped with Madsen LMG's and Mauser rifles the US military decides to do something about it and either buy their own Madsen's.

 

[Gannt the chartist]

That two-mule setup wasn’t very handy – for an infantry squad/platoon level portable weapon. That’s my PoD. Were there a better path out there that would lead the US along different LMG lines and squad doctrine lines than we historically took?

Shoot Pershing.

The US has no particular need for an LMG - pre WW1 BTW the terminology would be automatic rifle. The general view was that riflemen, who can move much more quickly than gun teams expending vast quantities of ammunition which also has to be carried around can do the job

The US army's job for the period was chasing bandits into Spanish speaking countries and murdering ranch hands, or chasing Philippino's armed with yo yos around the bush, for both mobility is at a premium.

If they want to look at a war the one they will choose is the Spanish American which features US infantry storming an entrenched position held by regular infantry with Machine Guns and Krupp artillery with their rifles and good old american can do attitude.

When they do enter WW1 they do so with already obsolete information from the French on the Automatic Rifle, and with very limited WW1 experience to counterbalance Pershing, stormer of Kettle Hill is able to reemphasise the rifle.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Shoot Pershing.

The US has no particular need for an LMG - pre WW1 BTW the terminology would be automatic rifle. The general view was that riflemen, who can move much more quickly than gun teams expending vast quantities of ammunition which also has to be carried around can do the job.

The US needed its own Boer War to change things. Light infantry doctrine as demonstrated in the PI Insurrection or Banana Wars is fine and necessary for some situations, but heavy firepower for the battalion and company is necessary as well. I would digress slightly and note that like many armies the US Army was prone to attach light artillery to its rifle battalions. A pair of light 37mm or medium 3" field guns went a long way in adding weight to a assault battalions fire power. At least that was the assumption.

 

[Driftless]

Shoot Pershing.

The US has no particular need for an LMG - pre WW1 BTW the terminology would be automatic rifle. The general view was that riflemen, who can move much more quickly than gun teams expending vast quantities of ammunition which also has to be carried around can do the job

The US army's job for the period was chasing bandits into Spanish speaking countries and murdering ranch hands, or chasing Philippino's armed with yo yos around the bush, for both mobility is at a premium.

If they want to look at a war the one they will choose is the Spanish American which features US infantry storming an entrenched position held by regular infantry with Machine Guns and Krupp artillery with their rifles and good old american can do attitude.

When they do enter WW1 they do so with already obsolete information from the French on the Automatic Rifle, and with very limited WW1 experience to counterbalance Pershing, stormer of Kettle Hill is able to reemphasise the rifle.

Pershing seems destined for the McArthur path of un-deification on this site and elsewhere . The more I read of him,the more mixed picture comes through. He was given some exceedingly difficult tasks to achieve and he got partway there (Building an army from virtual scratch for deployment as an expeditionary force). He was also extraordinarily stubborn (sometimes a good thing, often time not....) and he arrived at several dubious and very costly conclusions based on events and data he could and did see with his own eyes.

Even at the storming of Kettle Hill, it was the late-in-the-day deployment of the Gatling guns and their suppressive fire that allowed for the dismounted cavalry to take the hills. Pershing also seems to have downplayed the machine gun carnage he saw in the Russo-Japanese War, where he went as an observer (Japanese side) I believe Peyton March, who was also an observer, came back with a different view of the way of battle and also of the abilities of the Japanese soldiers IIRC.

Pershing was definitely a fan of the individual rifleman with fixed bayonet carrying the day. Was that a by-product of West Point using the US Civil War as their educational focus on teaching tactics? Cripes, those close-order lines, and volley fire were rapidly becoming murderously obsolete even back then. Pershing was openly scornful of trench raids and trench warfare in general and his mantra of open warfare attack wasn't much different than the 1914 French model - in its costly results.

 

[Gannt the chartist]

Pershing was openly scornful of trench raids and trench warfare in general and his mantra of open warfare attack wasn't much different than the 1914 French model - in its costly results.

Pretty much. Pershing is entirely in the mainstream of thinking everywhere in 1914, the problem is he is still there in 1919/1920 which makes things really hard forever after. Added to which the US is determined on neutrality so light infantry makes perfect sense, even more so with the M1 coming on.

The US needed its own Boer War to change things.

Boer war is too early. The problem between say 1900 and 1914 is all the armies are juggling the implications of spitzer bullets, Maxim Mgs and QF artillery.

The spitzer in particular pushes effective infantry fire out by at least 50% of which by far the most important is QF artillery.

The Hotchkiss Portatative for this is the Benet Mercie in most places is designed as a lighter weight MG for cavalry not as an lmg there are no LMG because is no role for an LMG. The big thing is not the technical spec of the guns but how to use them. Bear in mind that there are maybe two potential lmg available in the world. The Hotchkiss and the Lewis. The other thing available is the Automatic rifle, which is really a semi auto rifle that can do a limited burst fire. This is not enough to provide suppressive fire.

It takes time to learn how to use the very new weapons on the very new battlefields. There is a thing Paddy Griffiths quote about the most important man on the battlefield which goes from colonel to corporal between 1914 and 1918. In 1914 the most important man on the battlefield is a colonel with 20 years experience he is commanding a battalion of about 500 men armed with rifles, and maybe a couple of new MMG. He might have to coordinate with an artillery battery and that is the way warfare has been since the 1650s.

In 1918 the corporal is commanding a section of 10 men divided into specific functional groups with LMG, Rifle and hand grenades, rifles and engineering kit and is expected to integrate its actions with other sections operating semi autonomously, artillery tanks and aircraft. And so has it been ever since.

The US army simply does not have the experience that leads to this from WW1 and can counter the real world experience of Pershing and the older generals. And its notable that the leading lights of the US army in the run up to WW2 are not combat officers and those that are are not infantry officers or junior staff officers who have had to deal with the issues. Its also notable that this does not apply to the USMC whose officer corps has more experience of WW1 and has Lejeune with that experience as commandant for nearly decade in the 20s. What they don't have is money.

Even in 1942 their tactical useage of the BAR is 1916 style in the manuals.

The Boer war has some effect maybe in that it emphasises firepower, and mobility, in the British army and makes it receptive to the Vickers ( which is about half the weight of other Maxim types) and to any weapon that improves firepower, and happens to have the portative and Lewis available which they buy as fast as can be made.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

The US needed its own Boer War to change things. Light infantry doctrine as demonstrated in the PI Insurrection or Banana Wars is fine and necessary for some situations, but heavy firepower for the battalion and company is necessary as well. I would digress slightly and note that like many armies the US Army was prone to attach light artillery to its rifle battalions. A pair of light 37mm or medium 3" field guns went a long way in adding weight to a assault battalions fire power. At least that was the assumption.

Perhaps the Madsen is adopted instead of the 1909 - picked for its reliability and portability

(This after the Battles in Cuba that resulted in the US version of the Boer war changes)

Perhaps then have the US get involved in the earlier parts of the Mexican Civil war and the gun proves itself (no fumbling with Hotchkiss ammo strips in the dark)

 

[Gannt the chartist]

Perhaps the Madsen is adopted instead of the 1909 - picked for its reliability and portability

But it could not be.

Madsen is not an LMG its an automatic rifle that can fire 2-3 round bursts if needed. try tp fire in any sort of sustained way it will overheat and jam. Its use is in the very last [art of an assault when all the other support weapons ( Arty MGs) cannot fire for fear of hitting your own troops. The MG has a totally different purpose. Its job is to put a lot of fire down suppress a line of riflemen defending a position until your own riflemen can close and dominate.

This is an oversimplification btw.

The US is looking for an MG as that actually adds to their ability the Madsen actually does not in most circumstances they will face pre war.

 

[tomo pauk]

Perhaps the Madsen is adopted instead of the 1909 - picked for its reliability and portability

(This after the Battles in Cuba that resulted in the US version of the Boer war changes)

Perhaps then have the US get involved in the earlier parts of the Mexican Civil war and the gun proves itself (no fumbling with Hotchkiss ammo strips in the dark)

The Madsen LMG seems like a very no-nonsense & useful weapon, basically the Bren of early 20th century.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

But it could not be.

Madsen is not an LMG its an automatic rifle that can fire 2-3 round bursts if needed. try tp fire in any sort of sustained way it will overheat and jam. Its use is in the very last [art of an assault when all the other support weapons ( Arty MGs) cannot fire for fear of hitting your own troops. The MG has a totally different purpose. Its job is to put a lot of fire down suppress a line of riflemen defending a position until your own riflemen can close and dominate.

This is an oversimplification btw.

The US is looking for an MG as that actually adds to their ability the Madsen actually does not in most circumstances they will face pre war.

That sounds like you need a Vickers gun then not an LMG

 

[Gannt the chartist]

That sounds like you need a Vickers gun then not an LMG

The US 1909 procurement is looking for a sustained fire weapon not an AR the 4 Benet Mercie at Columbus the 4 US MGs fire 5000 rounds in a 90 minute fight this is pretty much sustained fire.

The choice available would be a very heavy Maxim clone or the M1895, the Heavier Hotchkiss or the Benet Mercie. Perfectly fine decision, its lighter than the average MG does not need a water supply which is handy on the Mexican border and lets be fair its not like the US army is going to be going up against a first class opponent.

Lots of people want an Automatic Rifle pre WW1 ( well everyone does) to provide suppressive fire in the last instant. The French do that with several types of rifle.

In many ways the reason the US is uninterested in the BAR Interwar is because they have the M1 coming along nicely and that will serve all their needs in providing firepower in the last part of the assault. Part of the reason the UK and France and Germany are not prioritising a semi auto rifle is because their solution is a portable LMG that can do the job.

The US is not looking forward with the M1 programme its looking back and missing the lessons of WW1 at low level.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

I concede the Paddy Griffith point/quote by Gaant on how a battalion was expected to fight as late as 1914 - with the company being the lowest manoeuvre element, the platoon administrative and the Squad/section for mess purposes.

I cannot see anything beside a full on Western front experience changing this as it did.

I am looking at the Madsen with my 2021 flying goggles on not how the US Army (and other armies for that matter) intended to fight in the first decade of the 20C

So in that respect......I got to say upon reflection the M1909 is looking like a reasonable choice actually

The British pre WW1 went with 6 Vickers MMGs for each battalion (well that's what they wanted by 1914 they only had 2 per battalion).

On the M1909 I would add that the British made about 40,000 of them in WW1 almost as many made as the more famous (and IMO Better) Lewis gun

Now the Lewis gun - was an American Gun - but again I cannot see a reasonable POD to have it in service earlier than it was - particularly with the US Army

Perhaps have the US Marines adopt it in small numbers in 1913ish?

Not sure if the US Marine Corps had the ability to choose and purchase its own guns separate to the army!

Nah - I'm not seeing it either

 

[Driftless]

The USMC went to France with Lewis Guns, but the AEF switched them over to Chauchat's ( a. to simplify logistics, b. Crozier hated Lewis, c. Yes, on both counts).

My original thought was to by-pass the Hotchkiss, mostly for its limited utility to the infantry. For them, it wasn't a practical weapon on the march, being mule-packed, nor did it really supply sustained fire power, so it was neither fish-nor-fowl.

I'd heard the firing recommendation of short bursts for the Hotchkiss, but not the Madsen, so that's new to me.

 

[marathag]

The choice available would be a very heavy Maxim clone or the M1895, the Heavier Hotchkiss or the Benet Mercie.

Or Colt M1895/17 modernized to gas operation and more aluminum construction, as was done in WWI for tank and aircraft armament by Marlin to replace Vickers, but sooner as a LMG for the Army ground forces

 

[McPherson]

The first US Army Light Machine Gun was the Hotchkiss M1909 Benet-Mercie.

(Photo from Wikipedia)

It was a 30 round strip fed, 12kg/26.5 portable automatic rifle. The basic design was used in a number of countries. But, as it was a pioneering effort, it proved to be an imperfect answer and ultimately had a short service life for the US. It’s first combat use was against the night-time raid against Colombus, NM by Pancho Villa. The cavalry troopers had insufficient training and virtually no live fire experience with the gun and the somewhat finnicky ammunition strips, so there was some success and some frustration with the gun. It got a public bad-rap out of the skirmish. An Army investigation identified the training and experience issue as being the root of the problem. Other countries also used variants of the Hotchkiss Portative with varying success.

The other side of the coin for the M1909, was the size and field transportation of the weapon and its accouterments. The Army treated the gun like a piece of mountain artillery, where it was normally transported with the gun, ammunition(in crates), and other gear spread across two pack mules. The gun and its various parts, in that arrangement totaled up to 46kg/101lbs and pack frames and leatherwork were another 100+ lbs*. That arrangement worked adequately for use by the US Cavalry, where the fire teams would break the packs down, set up the guns, while the cavalry formed up into attack (or defensive) positions. *The M1909 weight breakdown comes from “Handbook of the Benet-Mercie Machine Rifle Model of 1909”

That two-mule setup wasn’t very handy – for an infantry squad/platoon level portable weapon. That’s my PoD. Were there a better path out there that would lead the US along different LMG lines and squad doctrine lines than we historically took?

The first weapon that comes up in this thought is the Lewis Gun, but that’s an outside shot…. Its development was enough behind the Hotchkiss, where it mostly missed the testing phase. Of course, somewhat famously, the antipathy between Col. Lewis and General Wm. Crozier (Head of US Army Ordnance) had a huge impact. A third piece was in the early days, the Lewis didn’t work so well in .30-06. It worked fine with .303 and other cartridges. A fourth consideration is that its weight was similar to the gun weight of the M1909.


Another candidate from that general developmental timeframe was the Vickers-Berthier. It was a detachable box magazine-fed unit, and about 10% lighter than the M1909. You’d have the NIH issue to deal with though…..

The other candidate that pre-dates them all, is the Madsen. It's often mocked in some circles here for its unique firing mechanism, but it was a more modern design in a couple of respects. It was a detachable box fed, notably lighter (9kg/20lbs), and had a respectable track record for durability. Not a wonder-weapon to be sure, but a better candidate for use on the squad level.

Are there other practical man-portable options out there in the 1908 – 1910 time frame?

Perhaps a PoD is for the US Army to decide in the Philippine War, that more firepower was needed on a squad level for tramping through the jungle, swamp, or tall grass. Ditch the mules as transport, and develop the idea of a lighter weight automatic weapon where extra magazines are carried by the other members of the squad. The weapon deployed is secondary (at this time) to the idea that automatic fire is needed at that most basic infantry formation and is man-portable. Whatever weapon follows uses that idea at its core. Does that thought lead to a different path than the BAR?

1. I hate that machine gun. It was upside down and fed from the right with an inverted pawl and feed ramp. Crozier was also an idiot who had a financial interest in that debacle.

2. Aside from those two observations?

Colt–Browning M1895/14 machine gun in 7mm Mauser caliber, possibly used in the Mexican Revolution. (wiki)

John Moses Browning needed to refine the operating rod so the "potato digger" feature and operator charging problem could be resolved. Marlin will do that. (The citation is from a history of machine guns posted as part of the Hyperwar project.)

3. Then there is this guy.

Chapter 4 that follows Browning covers him. He is Lawrence Vincent Benet, United States Navy. He invented or rather got the Obrice Austrian gas system to work in the "French" Hotchkiss machine gun in 1895. In that photo, he is doing the weapon proof for the US Army on that very machine gun. I think it was 1896? Anyway, HE is the Benet in the Benet-Mercie. Crozier bought the evolved machine gun (the Portative) and in typical Army Ordnance fashion ignored Benet's advice on making sure the feed tray, stripper clip, and the pawls were robust and that the bipod legs be sturdy and in a penny wise move !@#$ed the final product up.

The big issue for the US Army pre WW1 is that they had next to bugger all money.

These guns were all really expensive and other than the Russo-Japanese war no one had used machine-guns in a modern war, most modern militaries didn't take much note of what happened there as the Russians were considered a bit of a joke and they got beaten by the Japanese.

4. Pershing was one of those idiots.

There would need to be a good reason for the change. LMG's are ideal for assault where troops need to take the MG's forward rapidly and deploy them to give fire support against dug in opposition, that concept didn't really exist before WW1. One possibility would be if the US had some sort of Guerrilla war in the Philippines in the years running up to WW1 where the locals were equipped with Madsen LMG's and Mauser rifles the US military decides to do something about it and either buy their own Madsen's.

5. ATL Mexico goes tango uniform in 1905 and the US has a full scale border war on her hands.

6. It is Leonard Wood who is the Russo Japanese War observer.

7. Teddy Roosevelt pays as much attention to machine guns as he did the rifles. Seriously, if the Spanish had Maxims and used them properly at Kettle Hill, "Old Rough and Ready" would have put the effort in as a personal lesson learned, as he did for the Springfield rifle.

Shoot Pershing.

8. He is near the top of the list for the "rifle fire reform effort" Stalin style in 1914.

The US has no particular need for an LMG - pre WW1 BTW the terminology would be automatic rifle. The general view was that riflemen, who can move much more quickly than gun teams expending vast quantities of ammunition which also has to be carried around can do the job.

9. Hence the BAR, but with a little refinement a two man potato digger team is earlier quite possibly pre-Russo-Japanese War. See (7.).

The US army's job for the period was chasing bandits into Spanish speaking countries and murdering ranch hands, or chasing Philippino's armed with yo yos around the bush, for both mobility is at a premium.

10. The battle of the crater would have taught them different lessons; "if" the Moros had rifles instead of rocks.

If they want to look at a war the one they will choose is the Spanish American which features US infantry storming an entrenched position held by regular infantry with Machine Guns and Krupp artillery with their rifles and good old american can do attitude.

11. Or a German aided Illustrado movement (Katipunan) in the Filipino-American War. Or if one does not like that one, there are the Japanese. Aguinaldo was negotiating with both of them against the Americans.

When they do enter WW1 they do so with already obsolete information from the French on the Automatic Rifle, and with very limited WW1 experience to counterbalance Pershing, stormer of Kettle Hill is able to reemphasise the rifle.

12. Or with Spanish-German-American war experience they will show up in France 1917 with tripod mounted Marlin pull handle to the rear M1895/1910 Brownings with quick change barrels and the Germans will say; "Mist. Es sind wieder die Braunmäntel mit ihren gottverdammten Kartoffelgräbern. Haben wir sie nicht auf den Philippinen gesehen?"

Do you need a translation? (Crap. It is the Browncoats with their goddamned potato diggers again. Didn't we see them in the Philippine Islands?)

Pershing seems destined for the McArthur path of un-deification on this site and elsewhere . The more I read of him,the more mixed picture comes through. He was given some exceedingly difficult tasks to achieve and he got partway there (Building an army from virtual scratch for deployment as an expeditionary force). He was also extraordinarily stubborn (sometimes a good thing, often time not....) and he arrived at several dubious and very costly conclusions based on events and data he could and did see with his own eyes.

13. Short version. Wilson liked him and both of them were idiots who failed to execute the mission properly, leaving ANOTHER Roosevelt to clean up their collective mess.

Even at the storming of Kettle Hill, it was the late-in-the-day deployment of the Gatling guns and their suppressive fire that allowed for the dismounted cavalry to take the hills. Pershing also seems to have downplayed the machine gun carnage he saw in the Russo-Japanese War, where he went as an observer (Japanese side) I believe Peyton March, who was also an observer, came back with a different view of the way of battle and also of the abilities of the Japanese soldiers IIRC.

14. Wrong man sent to France.

Pershing was definitely a fan of the individual rifleman with fixed bayonet carrying the day. Was that a by-product of West Point using the US Civil War as their educational focus on teaching tactics? Cripes, those close-order lines, and volley fire were rapidly becoming murderously obsolete even back then. Pershing was openly scornful of trench raids and trench warfare in general and his mantra of open warfare attack wasn't much different than the 1914 French model - in its costly results.

15. One of the criticisms about Colonel Custer, made at the time, (Sheridan) was that he left his Gatling guns behind. That was 1876. The US Army was not entirely filled with braindead racist bigotted idiots.

 

[Karelian]

Are there other practical man-portable options out there in the 1908 – 1910 time frame?

The Norwegian Hotchkiss M/98 was 25kg, so it was team-portable by WW1 standards.
https://www.kvf.no/vaapen.php?type=MG&weaponid=MG0002
They also built linkable and foldable ammo belts for the thing instead of the original solid ammo clips: https://www.kvf.no/ammo/65x55/patroner/Patron-65x55-Hotchkiss-Rustmester-Morch-HA-helmantel-4.JPG

 

[Reggieperrin]

The US 1909 procurement is looking for a sustained fire weapon not an AR the 4 Benet Mercie at Columbus the 4 US MGs fire 5000 rounds in a 90 minute fight this is pretty much sustained fire.

Am I doing my math wrong or is this about 14 rpm, or one round per 4 and a bit seconds per weapon? Half a feed strip per minute?

That’s an extremely brisk rate of fire for a bolt action rifle but it doesn’t seem like sustained fire by proper machine gun standards. 4 maxim guns could do 5.000 rounds in about 10 minutes of short bursts at a practical 125 rpm, or in 3 seconds of full rate fire.