Shadow Master said:
it is definately beyond me as to why they would suddenly try to do something along the lines of my OP.
I can't think of a good reason, either.
Shadow Master said:
OTOH, if you yourself would care to try your hand with this aspect, I'd be willing to listen.
My first suggestion would be, get rid of Yamamoto. Say, when he threatens to resign, Nagano says, "Okay." And NGS adopts the Fiji strategy. (IDK how close the call was...but it's an easy place to change it.)
Shadow Master said:
I think that TTL alternate campaign would suffice to provoke the 'decisive battle', but I would see it as something more like the OTL Coral Sea, but with bigger forces on both sides.
It might look like it to us, but don't forget, IJN was dominated by BB admirals. They wanted a gunfight, not a carrier battle, which this would certainly be.
Shadow Master said:
A word on port Moresby. The Australians were already there and dug in, which means a costly and lengthy land battle.
Not if Japan goes in about Feb '42...

There's about one lousy militia company defending the Kokoda Track, then: the Japanese force that landed after MO would have had a virtual cakewalk.
Shadow Master said:
you are taking basically undefended islands
For the U.S. (or the Allies)? That presumes the reaction is fast enough, & at this point, Japan is still in the "shock & awe" 10-feet-tall stage.

So Japan is likely to achieve at least as much as she did OTL...& with an emphasis on SWP
v CPac, maybe there's a base at Tulagi before the U.S. can respond. An advance this fast threatens the U.S. setups in South Central Pacific (I want to say Samoa & Fiji, but memory's faulty).
OTOH, this puts Japan's SLOCs at even greater hazard, & they were precarious at best even OTL.

IJN was incompetent to defend them against subs, & Japan's shipbuilding couldn't keep up with losses.
If this causes Withers' (or Doyle's) boats to be pulled back to Pearl, instead of being sent to Oz, this is worse for Japan... (It's really hard to make it better, isn't it?

)
Shaby said:
declaring the central attack the most promising one because of the following factors:
a) It created a threat to Hawaii Islands
b) It removed the American base nearest to the home islands
c) Through a combination of above ensured the American reaction with maximum force allowing the IJN to destroy the core of USN in one decisive engagement, an objective that eluded them at PH
One possible way would be to make the Japanese believe that the USN will react with maximum forces in order to prevent isolation of Australia. The trouble is the Japanese themselves never planned on this.
That captures the problem really well. Yet, there was a constituency for Samoa & Caledonia...so it's not impossible.
Shaby said:
IMHO, extending the defensive perimeter on Samoa/Fiji would not benefit and furthermore, might only hinder the Japanese. It would place new demands on their (already strained beyond breaking point) logistical system and add new requirements for forces they did not have to begin with.
Agreed. OTOH, Japan didn't seem to understand the logistical limits...
Shaby said:
Had they just stopped in May 1942, withdrawn their carriers to Truk or even Home Islands, they would have even been better off. The centrally based fleet would be able to react to any US threat from an interior line of communications, the islands could be more fortified and there would not be the infinite waste of ships, planes and men in the futile Guadalcanal campaign.
That sounds good, but it's really not an option.
In the first place, Home Islands are too far from the probable battle zone, so Truk is the base of choice.
In the second, Japan simply can't cover the length of the perimeter well enough with the few CVs she's got, & the U.S. can strike where & when she pleases.
In the third, Japan is still suffering the logistic problems she did OTL, especially (as usual) oil.
In the fourth, if the U.S. feels Oz is more threatened, there's a chance of more airpower based in Queensland, & of subs being pulled back, both bad for Japan... Even if no more air is sent, & only subs are pulled back (under greater threat from Japanese air), this is bad for Japan.