A different Coral Sea

Shadow Master said:
I think I would need to explain how the Japanese suddenly decide to look more realistically at what they can hope to achieve/hold, like concentration on one area till it's a done deal.
Which is about what I said: why does Yamamoto delay his "decisive battle" in favor of isolation?
Shadow Master said:
If the Japanese want to isolate Australia, the best way is going to be with land based air interdiction from forward airbases. And to get these forward airbases they need to capture the islands where these bases need to be. Using their (at the time, and not going to last forever) naval advantage to complete this task, then free's up the KB for a maximum effort against Midway a bit later.
Which is why there were proposals to seize Moresby, Fiji, Samoa, & New Caledonia, all of which fell afoul of the "decisive battle" option...:rolleyes:
Shadow Master said:
the Japanese didn't know that Doolittles bombers flew off the Hornet.:rolleyes:
I did know that.:rolleyes: They believed (for reasons that escape me:confused:) the bombers had come all the way from Midway.:eek:
 
A decisive battle isn't just going to happen, it has to be provoked somehow. The interwar view was that the USN would advance across the Pacific to relieve the Phillipines. Once the war started the decisive naval battle had to be provoked by other operations, Midway was one of those.
 
My question is, what would have happened if (for whatever reason), the Japanese sent every carrier that OTL went to MW/AI, to a delayed Coral Sea?

Which is about what I said: why does Yamamoto delay his "decisive battle" in favor of isolation?
Not really sure how to give you what you want on this one. I cannot give a plausible reason for why the Japanese did what they DID DO, so it is definately beyond me as to why they would suddenly try to do something along the lines of my OP. OTOH, if you yourself would care to try your hand with this aspect, I'd be willing to listen.:)

Which is why there were proposals to seize Moresby, Fiji, Samoa, & New Caledonia, all of which fell afoul of the "decisive battle" option...:rolleyes:
Yep, except the Port Moresby part, which I consider not as part of isolating Australia so much as attacking it, I would just say 'why not'? After all, we all know what they did do, even if their reasoning was flawed to our way of thinking. Basically, I don't think that my temperment is well suited to coming up with 'reasons' for some bloke that died before I was born, to do something other than what he did. Not and make them interesting and worthy of the fine folks here at AHDB to spend their valuable lesiure time reading.:cool:

I did know that.:rolleyes: They believed (for reasons that escape me:confused:) the bombers had come all the way from Midway.:eek:
That and the possibility of them having been staged from the western most Aleutians. Dispite the fact that they had scouted the waters off Attu and Kiska before the war began.

A decisive battle isn't just going to happen, it has to be provoked somehow. The interwar view was that the USN would advance across the Pacific to relieve the Phillipines. Once the war started the decisive naval battle had to be provoked by other operations, Midway was one of those.
I think that TTL alternate campaign would suffice to provoke the 'decisive battle', but I would see it as something more like the OTL Coral Sea, but with bigger forces on both sides.

A word on port Moresby. The Australians were already there and dug in, which means a costly and lengthy land battle. Ignore this, and go island hopping (as OTL USA did), and you get the same effect, but without the delay because you are taking basically undefended islands without major armies in place needing to be efeated. Also, if you have a wall of land based air backing you up, the KB is not going to be taken from behind by the US carriers, and you will also have land based bombers and fighters hitting along side the KB aircraft.
 

ccdsah

Donor
A decisive battle isn't just going to happen, it has to be provoked somehow. The interwar view was that the USN would advance across the Pacific to relieve the Phillipines. Once the war started the decisive naval battle had to be provoked by other operations, Midway was one of those.

Actually, there would be no decisive battle with USN; even if Midway is an unmitigated disaster for USN with all carriers lost, Midway occupied and no Japanese losses (pretty much ASB) US would not sue for peace, it would continue to build new carriers, it would continue to work on nukes and the final result would the same instant sunshine on Japan, maybe even worse
 
Not really sure how to give you what you want on this one. I cannot give a plausible reason for why the Japanese did what they DID DO, so it is definately beyond me as to why they would suddenly try to do something along the lines of my OP. OTOH, if you yourself would care to try your hand with this aspect, I'd be willing to listen.:)

The trouble is, the IJN plan has worked perfectly, save for one thing - they did not get the 'decisive battle'. When this was realized, they already were in the colloquially known 'Now what?' phase of the operational plan. Their plan has not elicited the expected result of Americans acceding to the Japanese demands and they needed more convincing. This resulted in an ill conceived and ill prepared operation MI.

The Japanese had three options they could try and they tried all three (Aleutians, Central Pacific or Southwest Pacific), declaring the central attack the most promising one because of the following factors:

a) It created a threat to Hawaii Islands
b) It removed the American base nearest to the home islands
c) Through a combination of above ensured the American reaction with maximum force allowing the IJN to destroy the core of USN in one decisive engagement, an objective that eluded them at PH

One possible way would be to make the Japanese believe that the USN will react with maximum forces in order to prevent isolation of Australia. The trouble is the Japanese themselves never planned on this. Australia in a campaign planned by the Japanese figured very little if at all. Their entire strategy hinged on an early defeat of USN, establishing the primacy over the Pacific and hoping the Allies will come to seeking terms. Or, failing that, they would at least be crippled for long enough so the Japanese would establish an unassailable barrier to the home Islands behind which they could wait indefinitely, inflicting grievous losses upon the Allied forces. From this perspective, drawing enemy forces in decisive battle held priority over everything else.

Anyway, since the Japanese themselves never planned to invade Australia it never occurred to them that the USN would be drawn to battle over it. IMHO, extending the defensive perimeter on Samoa/Fiji would not benefit and furthermore, might only hinder the Japanese. It would place new demands on their (already strained beyond breaking point) logistical system and add new requirements for forces they did not have to begin with.

I think that TTL alternate campaign would suffice to provoke the 'decisive battle', but I would see it as something more like the OTL Coral Sea, but with bigger forces on both sides.

I think so too. Furthermore, the Japanese could not be worse off had they done nothing more. Had they just stopped in May 1942, withdrawn their carriers to Truk or even Home Islands, they would have even been better off. The centrally based fleet would be able to react to any US threat from an interior line of communications, the islands could be more fortified and there would not be the infinite waste of ships, planes and men in the futile Guadalcanal campaign. Alas, it was not in their temparament to sit still. They wanted to dictate events and force peace upon the Allies. Instead of defending their possessions they squandered the core of their fleet in an attack on an unimportant piece of rock.
 
My question is, what would have happened if (for whatever reason), the Japanes had been forced to delay the OTL Coral Sea battle, and in the meantime decide to put the midway/aleutian campaign on hold until after Australia is well and truely isolated by capture of the island groups east of the solomons, and sent these 9 carriers to enforce the advance?

Any ideas for how this campaign might have gone?

The first problem is that the premise of an isolation of Australia is not true; capturing Fiji or even Samoa stretches the supply line east and south of the optimal route, but certainly does not cut Australia off. Therefore, an advance on this axis seems alarming to the Allies, but not necessarily the type of thing that will compel Nimitz to throw 4 carriers against 9. Nimitz's would naturally look for a 'Midway' style ambush opportunity, but if that does not show itself in the intel data, then he's probably thinking more along the lines of counterattack later then actinve defence now. (Like at Midway, the USN had the option to come back with 1st USMC and retake Fiji or Samoa after the Combined Fleet returned to Truk).

An advance on the axis Tulagi-Fiji seems to show ample anchorages available for IJN seaplanes and flying boats, meaning that this offensive should be one that is more difficult for a carrier ambush.
 
Assuming the USN intell. knew about the strength of the IJN in the Coral Sea region, a more likely Nimitz style counter would be to strike in a different location, since the opposition was away. A direct strike on either Kwajalein, or the Marshall islands was possible, or even on Truk, once the Kido Butai wa in the Coral Sea. This sort of irritating attacks might force the Japanese to react, rather than take the innitiative, allowing the Allies to respond with setting a trap. Under no circumstances would Nimitz allow a far more superior number of IJN forces overtake a numerically weaker USN force, as his carriers were all he had.

If Port Moresby was lost, New Gunea was lost, but that still did not mean Australia was lost. It would have been a setback, but not a fatal one, as Port Moresby would also draw away large Japanese military resources, which could then not be deployed elsewhere. It would also extend the supplylines from Japan to support the troops on the large island.
 
Shadow Master said:
it is definately beyond me as to why they would suddenly try to do something along the lines of my OP.
I can't think of a good reason, either.:p
Shadow Master said:
OTOH, if you yourself would care to try your hand with this aspect, I'd be willing to listen.:)
My first suggestion would be, get rid of Yamamoto. Say, when he threatens to resign, Nagano says, "Okay." And NGS adopts the Fiji strategy. (IDK how close the call was...but it's an easy place to change it.)
Shadow Master said:
I think that TTL alternate campaign would suffice to provoke the 'decisive battle', but I would see it as something more like the OTL Coral Sea, but with bigger forces on both sides.
It might look like it to us, but don't forget, IJN was dominated by BB admirals. They wanted a gunfight, not a carrier battle, which this would certainly be.
Shadow Master said:
A word on port Moresby. The Australians were already there and dug in, which means a costly and lengthy land battle.
Not if Japan goes in about Feb '42...:eek: There's about one lousy militia company defending the Kokoda Track, then: the Japanese force that landed after MO would have had a virtual cakewalk.
Shadow Master said:
you are taking basically undefended islands
For the U.S. (or the Allies)? That presumes the reaction is fast enough, & at this point, Japan is still in the "shock & awe" 10-feet-tall stage.:eek: So Japan is likely to achieve at least as much as she did OTL...& with an emphasis on SWP v CPac, maybe there's a base at Tulagi before the U.S. can respond. An advance this fast threatens the U.S. setups in South Central Pacific (I want to say Samoa & Fiji, but memory's faulty).

OTOH, this puts Japan's SLOCs at even greater hazard, & they were precarious at best even OTL.:rolleyes: IJN was incompetent to defend them against subs, & Japan's shipbuilding couldn't keep up with losses.

If this causes Withers' (or Doyle's) boats to be pulled back to Pearl, instead of being sent to Oz, this is worse for Japan... (It's really hard to make it better, isn't it?:p)
Shaby said:
declaring the central attack the most promising one because of the following factors:

a) It created a threat to Hawaii Islands
b) It removed the American base nearest to the home islands
c) Through a combination of above ensured the American reaction with maximum force allowing the IJN to destroy the core of USN in one decisive engagement, an objective that eluded them at PH

One possible way would be to make the Japanese believe that the USN will react with maximum forces in order to prevent isolation of Australia. The trouble is the Japanese themselves never planned on this.
That captures the problem really well. Yet, there was a constituency for Samoa & Caledonia...so it's not impossible.
Shaby said:
IMHO, extending the defensive perimeter on Samoa/Fiji would not benefit and furthermore, might only hinder the Japanese. It would place new demands on their (already strained beyond breaking point) logistical system and add new requirements for forces they did not have to begin with.
Agreed. OTOH, Japan didn't seem to understand the logistical limits...:rolleyes:
Shaby said:
Had they just stopped in May 1942, withdrawn their carriers to Truk or even Home Islands, they would have even been better off. The centrally based fleet would be able to react to any US threat from an interior line of communications, the islands could be more fortified and there would not be the infinite waste of ships, planes and men in the futile Guadalcanal campaign.
That sounds good, but it's really not an option.

In the first place, Home Islands are too far from the probable battle zone, so Truk is the base of choice.

In the second, Japan simply can't cover the length of the perimeter well enough with the few CVs she's got, & the U.S. can strike where & when she pleases.

In the third, Japan is still suffering the logistic problems she did OTL, especially (as usual) oil.

In the fourth, if the U.S. feels Oz is more threatened, there's a chance of more airpower based in Queensland, & of subs being pulled back, both bad for Japan... Even if no more air is sent, & only subs are pulled back (under greater threat from Japanese air), this is bad for Japan.
 
IMHO, extending the defensive perimeter on Samoa/Fiji would not benefit and furthermore, might only hinder the Japanese. It would place new demands on their (already strained beyond breaking point) logistical system and add new requirements for forces they did not have to begin with.

Fiji/Samoa being unsustainable had nothing to do with Japanese logistics, which were just fine in 1942 and nowhere near 'strained to the breaking point'.

The problem was operational. The IJN's fleet base was Truk. It could not move forward from that for fear of carrier surprise attack. Samoa was maybe 3,000 miles from Truk - that's too far for effective support even allowing for IJN carrier superiority.

Proximate to Samoa and Fiji were tons of small islands, presumably some suitable for Allied air bases. These could be surpressed by carrier raids, but not for long. So, inevitably, the Japanese position looks like it must degrade on Fiji/Samoa, and a counterattack looks inevitable. That's was the difficulty of the position.

I think so too. Furthermore, the Japanese could not be worse off had they done nothing more. Had they just stopped in May 1942, withdrawn their carriers to Truk or even Home Islands, they would have even been better off.

Holding the line Port Moresby-Guadalcanal and reverting to the defensive was a valid option, albiet one that threw away any percieved chance of an IJN decisive victory. Bobby Lee had a similar choice in the winter before Gettysburg, and he too took the long-shot offensive option.

The centrally based fleet would be able to react to any US threat from an interior line of communications, the islands could be more fortified and there would not be the infinite waste of ships, planes and men in the futile Guadalcanal campaign.

That disposition would keep the front stable until 1944.

Alas, it was not in their temparament to sit still. They wanted to dictate events and force peace upon the Allies. Instead of defending their possessions they squandered the core of their fleet in an attack on an unimportant piece of rock.

Yamamoto appears to have dismissed the possiblity that a defence could be successful, and seeing what was coming for 1944, one can hardly blame him.
 
Oh, I readily accept they are scr*wed royally anyway, so they won't be any worse off had they went on to defensive. If anything they might get to sink a few USN carriers in circumstances similar to Midway in reverse. But yes, in 1944 an avalanche of US carriers is xoming and there is no escaping this.
 
Yamamoto could not rule out the chance that a successful offensive would end the war in a comprimise peace. For him, the only course of action that was certain to fail was to revert to the defensive. Therefore, working only from what he knew, his only rational option was to attack, and not to await events.
 
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