None actually, warfare and tactics change very fast being prepared for strategies used in 1940 was different when the US Army faced rommel in north Africa.
The M6 would have to be reworked in order to be problem free, the M4 jumbo strained its suspension systems and made it slower while making it more survivable. The problem with the 9cm was the shells you'd still have to target the rear and sides.
In all the M6 becomes the pershing heavy Tank.
That would make it quite practical against the Panzer IV and Tiger what would be the British reception of the tank?
The problem which is ignored is that the US tank destroyer doctrine did not evolve in a vacuum. It evolved in response to the battlefield situations of 1940, when the Battle of France stunned American military observers and left them scrambling to figure out a doctrinal response to the idea of a rapid armored breakthrough as had happened at Sedan. The Americans designed their tank destroyers to provide units with the operational mobility to be able to plug exactly such a hole, and to be able to stop the catastrophe of 1940 from happening to them. Based on what happened in 1940, its an entirely reasonable idea and responds well to the disaster that the French faced, and for an army which had no experience in anti-tank warfare was hardly a bad idea. ...
There was a huge failure in US Army intelligence in this. Actually multiple failures. One was a gross misunderstanding of the number of tanks the Germans had. I've found Army publications from 1942 placing 12,000 tanks used in the assault on the Allied armies. Thats not a typo. The senior Army leaders were operating under the assumption the German armored forces were over three times their actual strength. Other problems were bad information on the actual nature of the battles. Things like the shortage of French AT guns was not known, the use of reserves, the attrition of the German tanks. These gross misunderstandings were aggravated by the results and interpretation of the large maneuvers the US Army conducted from late 1940 through 1941. These seemed to validate the ideas behind the embryonic TD doctrine that some parties were pushing. Doubts were raised as further large scale excesses tested the assorted Army doctrines in 1942, but the TD proponents got a boost in early 1943 when in Tunisia two TD battalions executed a text book TD operation (with a few flaws). This one action was used to validate the entire concept and doctrine as set out by the TD Corps/Branch.
As the corps and army commanders gained further experience in training in the in 1943 they ended up rejecting the underlying concept for the TD battalions & groups. When these generals deployed to Europe in 1944 they rejected the doctrine across the board, assigning the TD battalions to specific divisions. They did the same for the independent armor battalions. Ike, Devers, Patch, Clark, Bradley, Patton, Hodges, Simpson, and Kruger in the Pacific all ditched the TD Branch doctrine. The numerous group HQ for the TD and independent Armor battalions remained for the most part in the US, and were dissolved in 1944. The Army commanders said they did not need them and asked for more engineers, and infantry instead. The few TD Group HQ sent to Europe were not used doctrinally and eventually dissolved.
That's a logical reaction to the events of 1940. But that line of thinking also has another element of reactive human nature: to expect the same set of conditions in the next occurrence. How much anticipation of planning for offensive warfare went into the doctrine and weapons development?
Those gross overestimates persisted through the war.
I have an official US Armed Forces history of WW2, given to the troops in 1945, shortly after the Japanese Surrender, that suggests the Allies shot down 1200 planes in Tunisia, when Germany didn't even have 300 planes in theater.
The idea that tanks are primaraly meant to fight other tanks, would lead to very different tank designs and not to OTL Shermans. The first tank designed primaraly to fight other tanks (as opposed to a tank destroyer or a cruiser/cavalry tank) was probably the Panther. It was fast, had most of its armor at the front for long range head on fights and the best AT gun available in its country that would fit. The US had all the needed parts to build such a tank, and I guess it would look more like a M10 with a closed turret and more frontal armor.
The idea that tanks are primaraly meant to fight other tanks, would lead to very different tank designs and not to OTL Shermans. The first tank designed primaraly to fight other tanks (as opposed to a tank destroyer or a cruiser/cavalry tank) was probably the Panther. It was fast, had most of its armor at the front for long range head on fights and the best AT gun available in its country that would fit. The US had all the needed parts to build such a tank, and I guess it would look more like a M10 with a closed turret and more frontal armor.
——————————————————————————I think weighing down the infantry with towed AT guns would be very detrimental as a whole.
Given the absolute disaster of what happened in 1940 and the incredible urgency to avoid it, developing a reactive strategy to avoid it was an important thing. Yes, it was reactive - but it was a threat which legitimately needed countering. As for offensive warfare - well, certainly the US proved proficient about that given its historical record, although I can't really say much about it.That's a logical reaction to the events of 1940. But that line of thinking also has another element of reactive human nature: to expect the same set of conditions in the next occurrence. How much anticipation of planning for offensive warfare went into the doctrine and weapons development?
A M10 with a closed turret and more frontal armor is a good way to describe the M4 Sherman with the 76 mm gun.The idea that tanks are primaraly meant to fight other tanks, would lead to very different tank designs and not to OTL Shermans. The first tank designed primaraly to fight other tanks (as opposed to a tank destroyer or a cruiser/cavalry tank) was probably the Panther. It was fast, had most of its armor at the front for long range head on fights and the best AT gun available in its country that would fit. The US had all the needed parts to build such a tank, and I guess it would look more like a M10 with a closed turret and more frontal armor.
It certainly seemed that everybody had horrible over-estimates of the Germans strengths, French estimates ran up to 10,000 tanks for the Germans, and in some models they had 5,000 to 7,000 heavy tanks, despite of course the Germans having no model of such a type. Their divisional estimates were 205, rather than 157, and aircraft numbers for the Germans and Italians assumed from my recollections 12,000 aircraft with large reserves. And all of that supported by a very sustainable and long term war economy capable of massive mobilization. Certainly with such poor intelligence any army can make poor responses: I suppose we can be thankful that we got something relatively benevolent and unimportant out of it as a failing, instead of something like the French army changing around their battlefield operational plan in response and getting their country overrun as a result.There was a huge failure in US Army intelligence in this. Actually multiple failures. One was a gross misunderstanding of the number of tanks the Germans had. I've found Army publications from 1942 placing 12,000 tanks used in the assault on the Allied armies. Thats not a typo. The senior Army leaders were operating under the assumption the German armored forces were over three times their actual strength. Other problems were bad information on the actual nature of the battles. Things like the shortage of French AT guns was not known, the use of reserves, the attrition of the German tanks. These gross misunderstandings were aggravated by the results and interpretation of the large maneuvers the US Army conducted from late 1940 through 1941. These seemed to validate the ideas behind the embryonic TD doctrine that some parties were pushing. Doubts were raised as further large scale excesses tested the assorted Army doctrines in 1942, but the TD proponents got a boost in early 1943 when in Tunisia two TD battalions executed a text book TD operation (with a few flaws). This one action was used to validate the entire concept and doctrine as set out by the TD Corps/Branch.
As the corps and army commanders gained further experience in training in the in 1943 they ended up rejecting the underlying concept for the TD battalions & groups. When these generals deployed to Europe in 1944 they rejected the doctrine across the board, assigning the TD battalions to specific divisions. They did the same for the independent armor battalions. Ike, Devers, Patch, Clark, Bradley, Patton, Hodges, Simpson, and Kruger in the Pacific all ditched the TD Branch doctrine. The numerous group HQ for the TD and independent Armor battalions remained for the most part in the US, and were dissolved in 1944. The Army commanders said they did not need them and asked for more engineers, and infantry instead. The few TD Group HQ sent to Europe were not used doctrinally and eventually dissolved.
and weigh down the infantry with lots more towed AT guns, like the excellent 57mm six pounder, or the too heavy 3" towed AT gun.
The M6 would have to be reworked in order to be problem free, the M4 jumbo strained its suspension systems and made it slower while making it more survivable. The problem with the 9cm was the shells you'd still have to target the rear and sides.
In all the M6 becomes the pershing heavy Tank.
Thing was, the M6 was ready for full production by time of Pearl Harbor, ahead of the Tiger ...
An M6 with a 105 extraordinary, the M6 would have been than match for tiger both can knock out one another. German tank crews would be wary of running into an M6, however it comes down to commanders the famous German tank ace would've simply killed one.
The German Tank Manuals handed out to the Panzer crews for familiarization, listed the M6 as the
'M1 Dreadnought'
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Seems they expected them to be used, check the date on the above