A different 1866 peace

Eurofed

Banned
We have discussed a more extreme version of this PoD in a previous thread, the recent discussion about a more lenient 1871 peace has inspired me to dust it off in a more moderate version.

Let's assume that in 1866 some changes occur in the Italian military chain of command that leave the Italian Army and Navy with better commanders. As a result, Italy wins as decisive a land victory at Custoza as Prussia does at Sadowa, while the naval battle of Lissa is another complete Italian victory. Austria is left without an intact army and navy and comes to the brink of internal collapse, so is forced to plead for a beggar's peace.

The Prussian King and generals claim the annexation of Bohemia-Moravia, while Italy claims Venetia, Trento, Kustenland, and Dalmatia. Bismarck resists such extreme demands, fearing French (and British) intervention, however he lacks any good ground with the rest of the Prussian elite and Italian allies to give Austria a truly lenient peace. Napoleon III and Britain oppose a radical dismemberment of Austria, however, given the depth of Austrian defeat and its internal instability, not to mention Russian support for "sensible" Prusso-Italian gains, they are willing to acknowledge a one-sided peace for Prussia and Italy.

The final peace settlment sees Prussia annexing all its OTL gains plus Saxony (Austria is in no position to call for it being spared as IOTL), Austrian Silesia, and the areas of northern Bohemia and Moravia with a German majority which border the new boundaries of Prussia. Prussian generals and diplomats successfully argue with Bismarck that annexing Austrian Silesia alone is too trivial a gain, and German areas of northern Bohemia-Moravia, even if they are no definite historical region, are rather valuable strategically and economically and make a good compromise between annexing AS and whole Bohemia-Moravia, which France (and Britain) would oppose. Italy annexes Venetia, Trento, Belluno, and Gorizia-Gradisca, even if Austria, with French support, successfuly resists Italian claims on Trieste, Istria, and Dalmatia, affirming that their ports are too vital to Austrian economy. France is further appeased by Bismarck with half-insincere secret promises of Prussian and Italian support for French annexation of Wallonia and/or Luxemburg. Britain deems that the adjustment to the balance of power is not radical enough to warrant its intervention in continental affairs, and moreover German and Italian unifications are popular among the British. Russia maintains its partnership with Prussia and plans to exploit Austrian weakness to help reverse the limits imposed on itself by the Crimean War, an expectation Bismarck supports.

Prussia and Italy are both pleased with the outcome of their military cooperation and reaffirm their secret defensive alliance against France and Austria alike. When France attacks Prussia, Italy honors the alliance, expecting to end French protection of Papal Latium and to recover Nice and Savoy with a victory.

The Franco-Prussian-Italian War may occur either as an excalation of the Luxemburg Crisis, or as IOTL, of the Spanish Succession controversy. Although still fundamentally moderate, Bismarck ITTL is moved to be somewhat less so since greater military and diplomatic success makes both the rest of the Prussian elite and German nationalists bolder. On his part, Napoleon III is even more eager than OTL to seize some (apparently) quick and easy diplomatic success, territorial gain, or military victory to reaffirm waning French power in Europe in the face of rising Prussian might and the budding Prussian-Italian axis. In all likelihood, Austria is left too weak by recent defeat and internal national contrasts to dare taking the side of France against widespread German nationalist sentiment aroused by French aggression.

The outcome of the war is a decisive Prusso-Italian victory which quickly triggers the formation of the German Empire. If the war occurs about the Luxemburg Crisis, Germany annexes Alsace-Lorraine and Luxemburg. If it triggers about the Spanish Succession, Germany annexes the whole Alsace and Lorraine provinces, and places the new Franco-German border on the Maas/Meuse. In the second scenario, Prussian generals and diplomats successfully argue against the weakness of the German claim on French-speaking western Lorraine quoting the better strategic and economic value of the Maas border, as well as the historical presence of such territories in the old HRE. However, it is also quite possible that in the first scenario, Germany gets all of Alsace and Lorraine, in addition to Luxemburg. In both cases, Italy regains Nice and Savoy, quite likely Corsica too, and completes its national unification with the annexation of Rome. Italy might also gain Eastern Algeria, or at the very least would make France recognize its own future claim on Tunisia.

Pleased with the ongoing success of their strategic partnership, Germany and Italy reaffirm it publicly in their Dual Alliance, which quickly entrenches as a cornerstone of the European alliance system all the way to WWI.

Both variants of the Franco-Prussian-Italian War are quite plausible, even if given the background of the scenario (and for the sake of originality), I assume it's somewhat more probable that the war occurs over Luxemburg.

Prussia quickly forms the Northern German Confederation (a true federation despite its name) with the surviving German states north of the Main, but the NGF also includes both halves of the Great Duchy of Hesse and Bavarian Rhenish Palatinate. After the war with France, Bavaria, Baden, and Wuttenberg, pushed by German nationalist feeling aroused by the patriotic war, quickly acknowledge the inevitability of unification and join it to form the German Empire.

Austria is left by crushing defeat in the grip of severe internal instability. The Habsburg dynasty and ruling elite has suffered another decisive defeat after 1859 and are largely discredited, Hungarians, Czechs, and Croats are again on the brink of open revolt, Austrian Germans' supremacy in the empire is further weakened since most Germans in Bohemia-Moravia have been lost to Prussia. The crisis may end up in the total collapse of the Habsburg Empire, in a German-Hungarian co-rule much like IOTL, however even more instable, or in a federal reform of the Empire which places Germans, Czechs, Hungarians, and Croats on an equal base, probably in this rough order of likelihood.

If the Empire collapses (and this is likely the most probable outcome), Germany and Russia reluctantly but quickly acknowledge that the Habsburg are an hopeless lost cause and Bismarck that Grossdeutchsland is inevitable, so they partition the Empire. Germany annexes Austria and Bohemia-Moravia, Russia gains Galicia and Bukovina, Italy annexes Trieste, Istria, and Dalmatia, while Hungary-Croatia is made an independent kingdom, and a satellite of Germany and/or Russia, still multinational but with a more manageable mix of nationalities. In the following decades, it is possible that Germany, Italy, and Russia gradually entrench their budding partnership, initally just a component of Bismarck's complex diplomatic game, after his time it becomes a fixed military alliance and one side of the European alliances system as France and Britain close ranks against the Eastern block and rally other medium powers like Spain, Sweden, and the Ottoman Empire into their alliance. Alternatively it is also possible that Germany and Russia have a falling out if they develop competing ambitions over the Balkans and the Middle East. In such a case, France and Russia would surely grow closer and make an alliance, while Germany and Italy would strengten their strategic partnership. In this case, the place of Britain in the European alliance system becomes a toss-up, there are plausible chances that they would side with France-Russia, fearing German naval build-up, or with Germany-Italy, fearing Russian expansionism in the Middle East, and Central Asia, or that they would remain neutral, deeming Germany and Russia equally threatening and both alliances sufficiently balanced. In this scenario, Hungary is going to forsake major expansionism in the Balkans, focusing on keeping its multinational state united, although it would be very hostile to any attempt by neighboring Balkan states to stir up irredentism in its territories. It would become a satellite of Germany and/or of Russia, courting patronage in various and shifting degrees from both if the German-Russian alliance holds, sticking to either if they have a falling out, picking whatever patron seems to offer better chances of ensuring the integrity of its possessions. In this regard, Germany is the favorite option (Berlin is quite unlikely to support Pan-Slav and Romanian irredentism unless Hungary forces its hand by becoming hostile), but Russia cannot be ruled out (St.Petersburg may decide that Hungary makes a better Balkan proxy than its irredentist neighbors, and push Pan-Slavism to focus southward against the Ottomans).

If a shaky Ausgleich occurs and somehow barely stabilizes (likely the second most probable outcome), the Empire steps back from ultimate ruin, but remains rather instable and fraught with national contrasts, so Bismarck does not trust making a public alliance committment to it as a part of his diplomatic system. While ostensibly playing the part of the "honest broker", he privileges partnership with Russia and signs another public Dual Alliance with it. It quickly unfolds into the German-Russian-Italian Triple Alliance, while making a secret Reinsurance Treaty with Austria. After Bismarck leaves office, the Treaty of Reassurance is left to wither by his successors, so Austria, feeling weak and isolated, signs a Dual Entente alliance with France, which is eager to end its own isolation and seek allies against the German-Italian axis, however suboptimal as a main ally Austria may be. Eventually Britain, fearing the potential of the German-Russian alliance, ends its "splendid isolation" and joins the Triple Entente with France and Austria. Trying to balance the stronger Triple Alliance, France and Britain may attempt to woo Spain, Sweden, and the Ottomans in the Entente with various degrees of success. The rival alliance systems gradually entrench all the way to WWI.

If the Habsburg Empire evolves into a more stable federal Quadruple Monarchy (the least likely option of all), events still unfold into the formation of a German-Austrian-Italian Triple Alliance like IOTL, however Italy, having less irredentist claims (albeit still substantial) against a more stable Austria, facing greater revanchist and colonial hostility from France, and traditionally committed to a long-lasting alliance with Germany, remains true to the Triple Alliance in the wake of WWI, even it manages to wrest guarantees of further territorial gains from Austria (Trieste and Istria) as compensation for its intervention.

Honestly I don't know which of the three variants may be more likely, although the collapse-partition and the instable Ausgleich seem equally probable and somewhat more so than the federal Quadruple Monarchy reform.
 
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Fascinating and on the surface seems plausible. I'll have to defer to those more versed in the diplomacy and military of the time for deeper insight, though.

How likely is the initial Italian victory here?
 

Eurofed

Banned
How likely is the initial Italian victory here?

Quite likely if some key wholly incompetent generals and admirals are put out of command. The Italian equipment and organization and the officer corps were decent for the standards of the period, even if they suffered the growth pangs of integrating the armies of the various preunitary Italian states in the Piedmontese framework, and the stress of recent counterinsurgency in the South. But a decisive victory in 1866 was wholly within the potential of the Italian Army if the aforementioned integration woes had not butterflied some incompetent generals into leadership.
 

Eurofed

Banned
To add some extra considerations about the great powers' game ITTL, France is still going to assume its fundamentally revanchist stance up to WWI, only somewhat even more so since it lost more territory (Nice and Savoy certainly, possibly western Lorraine too) and it heaps some of its revanchist animosity on Italy too. Colonial rivalry with Germany and Italy is going to be even more intense, whileas the one with Britain more toned down, as Paris is eager to reap allies to counterbalance a more solid and powerful Triple Alliance, surely Britain (when it ends its splendid isolation in the face of rising German and Russian threat) and either Austria or less likely Russia.

Britain is still going to leave its imperial isolation and committ to the European alliance system and the Entente, in the face of growing German power and/or Russian expansionism in the Middle East and Central Asia, esp, as it is more likely the two powers make an increasingly solid-looking alliance. This could accelerate such a committment significantly but not radically if the German-Russian-Italian Triple Alliance squares off against the Franco-Austrian-Ottoman bloc, or more substantially if the Habsburg Empire got partitioned, and the Triple Alliance with a satellite Hungary would only face France and the Ottomans otherwise. The more the Triple Alliance looks daunting, the more the Franco-British are going to try and woo other medium powers, like Spain and Sweden, in the Entente bloc. This may or may not change the outcome of the Spanish-American War if the Entente intervenes on the side of Spain. However, such an intervention would make America strongly hostile to the Entente and friendly to the CPs. Since nothing in this scenario is espeically likely to butterfly the German naval build-up away, it is to be assumed that Britain most likely would still join the Entente in the end. If Germany and Russia form an alliance, this is practically a given, even more so if they partition Austria with Italy.

Austria, even admitting it survives, and is not partitioned to a cowed Hungarian satellite of Germany, in the second most likely scenario is left fragile from national contrasts and encircled by potential enemies on three sides. It would almost surely seek protection in an alliance with France and Britain, even if it would be more cautious to make committments in the Balkans, so Russian expansionism in the Balkans would be less cautious and only kept into check by Britain and France giving support to the Ottomans. Therefore, Austrian defensive reaction against Pan-Slavism is not that likely as a trigger for WWI. On the other hand, colonial and imperial rivalries between Britain and Russia in the Balkans and Middle East/Central Asia, between France and Germany in Africa, and between Italy, France, and the Ottomans in the Balkans and North Africa are going to be just as or even more intense and may all be plausible flashpoints for WWI. Such rivalries could however be further precipitated by conflicts in the Balkans between the great powers and between therir proxies, as the Balkan Wars are just as likely to happen, albeit maybe in different forms.

Germany, Italy, and Russia are not going to act radically different from OTL, except of course they have a increasingly solid alliance system, Germany is less going to make extensive committments to the Balkans, only giving some support to the actions of its Russian and Italian allies and possibly its Hungarian satellite, and instead it focuses on imperial build-up in Africa and East Asia. Italy has little reason to put its strategic partnership with Germany in question, and focuses on developing its own colonial empire in northeastern Africa (and quite possibly riding on the coattails of Germany in East Asia), albeit it may do some power projection on the Balkan coast, too. Russia is definitely committed to carve the Ottoman Empire up and seize hegemony in the eastern Balkans, the Middle East and after a point in the Far East as well.

Britain is very likely to try and prop up Japan, and/or maybe Korea, if the butterflies flutter the right way, as proxies to check Germany and Russia even more so than IOTL.

America in all likelihood remains neutral in European imperial rivalries, except maybe the Entente may grow close to Spain and support it during the SAW, in such a case the USA grow close to the CPs.
 
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In the peace of 1866 why not take away Tyrol and Salzburg as well.

Perhaps give the Trentino to Italy to strenghten their alliance.
This way Germany and Italy would have a common border. Could be of use in WW I.
 

wormyguy

Banned
I doubt that French intervention would affect the outcome of the Spanish-American War. The result of the French fleet sailing to the other side of the Atlantic in 1898 would be similar to the Russian Baltic fleet sailing to the Pacific in 1904. (Even worse, because I believe the American navy was as large or larger than the French fleet by that time, and also more modern).
 
I doubt that French intervention would affect the outcome of the Spanish-American War. The result of the French fleet sailing to the other side of the Atlantic in 1898 would be similar to the Russian Baltic fleet sailing to the Pacific in 1904. (Even worse, because I believe the American navy was as large or larger than the French fleet by that time, and also more modern).

I think you better check any sources you were consulting. There is no comparison between the French fleet of 1898 and the Russian fleet of 1904. The French eclipse the US in size, those questionable quality of modern ships, and will be operating out of bases in the Caribbean. The French would heavily influence the Spanish-American War if they were to intervene.
 

Eurofed

Banned
In the peace of 1866 why not take away Tyrol and Salzburg as well.

Perhaps give the Trentino to Italy to strenghten their alliance.
This way Germany and Italy would have a common border. Could be of use in WW I.

Italy already gets Trentino (meaning the modern Trento province, not the Bolzano/Bozen one) ITTL.

As for Tyrol and Salzburg, the idea is indeed fascinating strategically but after due consideration, I have to deem it definitely unplausible for various reasons:

First and foremost, even ITTL Prussia has not yet unified with Bavaria in 1866, so it lacks a border with Tyrol and Salzburg. It shall happen soon in the wake of the war with France, quite possibly as soon as next year if it happens over Luxemburg, but not yet. The Prussian generals and diplomats reasoning at the Vienna peace table as if German unification would be already complete is likely giving them more foresight than appropriate.

Second, the alliance between Prussia/Germany and Italy (and the opposite one between France and Austria) is still a newborn, tentative, opportunistic thing in 1866 even if the war's outcome makes it quite promishing for the future. It takes time, a new successful test against France, ongoing Triple Alliance cooperation, and gradual entrenchment to blossom it into a long-lasting strategic partnership. So does expecting and preparing the next war against the Franco-Austrian alliance. What looks obvious in the 1870s-1890s, building a common border between "natural" long-term allies across the lands of the common enemy, does not look so obvious at the start.

Third, there is even more strategically and economically valuable stuff that Prussia and Italy would want, Czechia and Trieste/Istria/Dalmatia, if they could afford to make an harsher peace it's what they would grab, but they are giving it up so that France and Britain are kept content and are not going to backstab them while they still have most of their armies in Austria. The turn of France shall come soon, but not yet, so they have to be and look moderate.

Now, in all evidence German and Italian military planners in the late 1800s shall look back to this "missed" chance to cut the Tyrol barrier with wistful regret. When they wargame the next war against France and Austria they shall in all evidence plan conquering Tyrol and seizing control of the Brenner lifeline as the very opening move of the war (just like the Franco-Austrians shall try and go to all ends to connect before Austria is overrun, ITTL the neutrality of Switzerland does not look safe at all during WWI, the likelihood that France would invade it is very high when they fail to break through in A-L and the Alps).

However, the strategic perspective of the German-Italian alliance in the next run against Austria is not so bad even without a common border: Germany controls the natural border in Bohemia-Moravia with the Sudetenland, Italy has a much better border than IOTL with Trent, Belluno, Gorizia and Gradisca.

Of course, their natural strategy is to go on the defensive against the Anglo-French (besides defending the Aps and its coasts, Italy will have to prepare for a war by building stockpiles of coal and other commodities to fuel its war economy until a land connection can be re-established with Germany), carve up Austria in tandem with Russia, then throw their pooled resources against the Western front.

Just like Entente natural strategy is to carve a land connection to Austria in southern Germany, northern Italy, the Alps, and the Balkans, plus defending the Ottomans, Persia, and India. Again, the neutrality of Belgium and Switzerland does not look safe at all, France is going to seek a way through them if and when it fails to break through German and Italian fortifications; who knows, it might even plan it for the start, a kind of reverse Schliffen, although going for it as a desperate ploy when Alt-Plan XVII fails is more likely. Britain is going to be an Entente ally and hypocritically looking the other way if not taking part in the invasion, but other neutrals shall not look kindly upon France trampling its neutral neighbors, this Entente can forget getting American help, quite likely France gets vilified by the CPs during and after this WWI as much as the Germany was by the Entente IOTL (I wonder which ethnic slurs this WWI shall birth). Maybe Netherlands might be moved to join the CPs if France invades Belgium, and a Entente invasion of Switzerland would be a substantial blow to its neutrality.
 

Eurofed

Banned
I think you better check any sources you were consulting. There is no comparison between the French fleet of 1898 and the Russian fleet of 1904. The French eclipse the US in size, those questionable quality of modern ships, and will be operating out of bases in the Caribbean. The French would heavily influence the Spanish-American War if they were to intervene.

Very true, such a naval intervention would in all likelihood be victorious and look like an "easy" boost to French grandeur. However, such a victory would also have dire consequences for the Entente further down the road. America would not forget or forgive getting humiliated in the SAW. The month after the peace it would start building up a huge army and navy and drafting alliances with the CPs. Teddy Roosevelt looks the part of the war president leading America to revenge during WWI. Goodbye Canada, it was nice while you lasted.
 
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Why do we presume that the Central Powers Alliance in this scenario will hold together? Is Kaiser Wilhelm butterflied away somehow? If he is still Kaiser then it is almost guaranteed that Germany will screw it up diplomatically somewhere. Maybe the Italians, maybe the Hungarians or the Russians. Unless his mouth is bricked up of course.
 

Eurofed

Banned
Why do we presume that the Central Powers Alliance in this scenario will hold together?

For the usual reasons because alliances do: they have compatible aims and interests, and believable common enemies. IOTL Italy switched sides because of underlying tensions with Austria. ITTL Italy has got a long-term good strategic partnership with Germany for decades, and all its rivals and potential enemies are on the other side, it has got no reason to betray. As it concerns Russia, it had a good relationship and a quasi-alliance with Prussia/Germany from the 1860s to the 1890s, when preferential relationship between Germany and Austria alienated it away. Here the roles are reversed, so it is Austria that gets alienated away, and Germany-Russia make "natural" allies against France-Britain, as in the early 19th century. Alliances do crumble because there are solid (geo)political, strategic, ideological, or economic reasons to do so, not because occasionally a partner gets a boorish leader, diplomacy exists to gloss over such trivialities and keep sight of the hard facts. Nobody is ever going to kick Italy out of the NATO and EU because Berlusconi has got a big mouth, the same principle applies.

Is Kaiser Wilhelm butterflied away somehow? If he is still Kaiser then it is almost guaranteed that Germany will screw it up diplomatically somewhere. Maybe the Italians, maybe the Hungarians or the Russians. Unless his mouth is bricked up of course.

His blunders are not going to cause more than a temporary and limited cooling off of relationships, if ever, but again, it takes much more to make or destroy an alliance. Willy's antics are terribly overrated as the cause of Germany's alliance difficulties prior to WWI. It was crazy German naval build-up that fundamentally alienated Britain, and unreasoning German preference for the Habsburg zombie that fundamentally alienated Russia and Italy. Besides, IOTL Willy never made any real blunder to offend Italy, Russia, or Austria, his antics only really played a role in further alienating the British away. ITTL Britain is in all likelihood going to be a potential enemy nonetheless. Willy's role only ensures that it shall be even more likely to go Entente, but it would have required an immortal Bismarck at his best to keep it neutral, the combination of German and Russian resources and power would scare Whitehall s*tless anyway.
 
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*Shameless advertising (or whatever I'm supposed to say)*. I am writing a TL (Italy, a Destiny Fulfilled, link below), and the direction I am going with it mimics this directly (basically)! Anyways, this is very good, maybe cuz i'm biased in opinion, but nonetheless, excellent
 
Let's assume that in 1866 some changes occur in the Italian military chain of command that leave the Italian Army and Navy with better commanders. As a result, Italy wins as decisive a victory at Custoza as Prussia does at Sadowa, while Lissa is an unconclusive naval battle without a clear victor. Austria is left without an intact army and is on the brink of internal collapse, so is forced to plead for a beggar's peace.
IMHO, a better Italian performance in 1866 (which is not so difficult to manage: the army and the navy were in good shape and modern, in particular the latter. The problems were coming from the difficulties of integrating the different components after the unification and - even more than that - from the abysmal quality of Italian high command) would most likely see a major win at Lissa and a draw at Custoza: Lissa can be a major contender for the all-time snatch-defeat-from-the-jaws-of-victory contest. The italian navy was quite modern and massively outgunned the Austrian one (Tegethoff commenting after the OTL victory spoke of "wooden ships and iron heads against iron ships and wooden heads") and Lissa island had already been occupied by Italians the day before the naval action (which actually was not a "real" Austrian victory in tactical terms: however it was a huge triumph in strategic terms since the Italian navy left the scene and steamed for Ancona) and only an idiot like the unlamented admiral Persano could have managed not to destroy the Austrians.
If the Italians win at Lissa (gaining control of the upper Adriatic sea and threatening landings at Trieste, Monfalcone or Pola, the outcome of Custoza is somehow irrelevant, since the Austrians communication lines get Threatened and they have to retreat. IIRC, the battle of Custoza was forced by the Italian high command to obviate the poor performance at Lissa: the original plan was just to contain the Austrians and wait for developments in the east, but obviously the strategic defeat at Lissa took the cat out of the bag and the Italian army had to attack against strong positions and before all the troops had been deployed.

The outcome of the war is a decisive Prusso-Italian victory which quickly triggers the formation of the German Empire. If the war occurs about the Luxemburg Crisis, Germany annexes Alsace-Lorraine and Luxemburg. If it triggers about the Spanish Succession, Germany annexes the whole Alsace and Lorraine provinces, and places the new Franco-German border on the Maas/Meuse. In the second scenario, Prussian generals and diplomats successfully argue against the weakness of the German claim on French-speaking western Lorraine quoting the better strategic and economic value of the Maas border, as well as the historical presence of such territories in the old HRE. In both cases, Italy regains Nice and Savoy. .
I would assume that Latium also is occupied as per OTL (neither France nor Austria can step up as protectors of the Pope). I wonder if Italy might not ask for Eastern Algeria too (say from Orano to the Tunisian border), which would also be a nice way to set up a claim on Tunisia too in the near future.

Austria is left by crushing defeat in the grip of severe internal instability. The Habsburg dynasty and ruling elite has suffered another decisive defeat after 1859 and are largely discredited, Hungarians, Czechs, and Croats are again on the brink of open revolt, Austrian Germans' supremacy in the empire is further weakened since most Germans in Bohemia-Moravia have been lost to Prussia. The crisis may end up in the total collapse of the Habsburg Empire, in a German-Hungarian co-rule much like IOTL, however even more instable, or in a federal reform of the Empire which places Germans, Czechs, Hungarians, and Croats on an equal base.

Honestly I don't know which of the three variants may be more likely, although the collapse-partition and the instable Ausgleich seem equally probable and somewhat more so than the federal Quadruple Monarchy reform.

An empire successfully undertaking a major reform after a couple of bad defeats is a very rare animal indeed. My 2-cents worth would be that the Hungarians become even more obnoxious (and the reduction in the number of German-speaking population would play well for them): therefore the most likely outcome is disintegration, either immediately or after some kind of half-baked attempt to arrange Ausgleich.
 

Eurofed

Banned
IMHO, a better Italian performance in 1866 (which is not so difficult to manage: the army and the navy were in good shape and modern, in particular the latter. The problems were coming from the difficulties of integrating the different components after the unification and - even more than that - from the abysmal quality of Italian high command) would most likely see a major win at Lissa and a draw at Custoza: Lissa can be a major contender for the all-time snatch-defeat-from-the-jaws-of-victory contest. The italian navy was quite modern and massively outgunned the Austrian one (Tegethoff commenting after the OTL victory spoke of "wooden ships and iron heads against iron ships and wooden heads") and Lissa island had already been occupied by Italians the day before the naval action (which actually was not a "real" Austrian victory in tactical terms: however it was a huge triumph in strategic terms since the Italian navy left the scene and steamed for Ancona) and only an idiot like the unlamented admiral Persano could have managed not to destroy the Austrians.
If the Italians win at Lissa (gaining control of the upper Adriatic sea and threatening landings at Trieste, Monfalcone or Pola, the outcome of Custoza is somehow irrelevant, since the Austrians communication lines get Threatened and they have to retreat. IIRC, the battle of Custoza was forced by the Italian high command to obviate the poor performance at Lissa: the original plan was just to contain the Austrians and wait for developments in the east, but obviously the strategic defeat at Lissa took the cat out of the bag and the Italian army had to attack against strong positions and before all the troops had been deployed.

You are quite right about Lissa. I have however to remark that your are apparently wrong about Custoza, since it happened before Lissa, not after. Lissa was an attempt to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat, not Custoza. However, I still deem that a decisive Italian land victory was both wholly feasible (by giving the Italians a better high command that shall be able to coordinate its various forces efficiently to trap and crush the Austrians into a pincer) and necessary for the purpose of the TL: destruction of the Austrian Army of Italy puts Austria at the mercy of Prussia and Italy as they have no intact army left, so Austria only manages to survive dismemberment (for now) because France (and Britain to a lesser degree) apply diplomatic pressure. Moreover, suffering such a crushing defeat fosters a slide back to severe instability within Austria and gives it a well-deserved reputation for military and political weakness, explaining why Bismarck would privilege partnership with Russia and Italy instead of Austria. Also a decisive land victory against the Austrians help explain why Italy feels confident and committed to join Prussia against France and why Germany would value alliance with Italy more.

However, I may follow your advice and edit the scenario so that Italy wins decisive victories at Custoza and Lissa both, that fulfills it even better. The worst Austria loses, the more France shall have to pull weight to save it from dismemberment, which help justifies the later French-Prussian-Italian war.

I would assume that Latium also is occupied as per OTL (neither France nor Austria can step up as protectors of the Pope).

That's a given. Liberation of Rome from Papal yoke and near-complete national unification shall be even more confidence-building for Italy if it happens in the midst of a string of major victories against Austria and France.

I wonder if Italy might not ask for Eastern Algeria too (say from Orano to the Tunisian border), which would also be a nice way to set up a claim on Tunisia too in the near future.

That's a definite possiblity, esp. if Germany snatches western Lorraine, too (I am assuming that in the peace deals with Austria and France, Prussia/Germany and Italy keep their respective territorial gains roughly balanced). I'm only uncertain whether Italy would prefer to claim Corsica or Eastern Algeria. Eastern Algeria may be more economically valuable than Corsica, and as you point out is a very good stepping stone to Tunisia, which was very coveted by Italy. However Corsica may be more strategically valuable and is more signfiicant as a nationalist-irredentist claim, and Italy could certainly force France to recognize Italian claim over Tunisia in the peace treaty. I'm uncertain whether France would resent more the loss of Corsica or of Eastern Algeria. Tentatively, I'm leaning towards claiming Corsica and future protectorate over Tunisia.

Anyway, France would only sign such a peace in the face of total defeat, but this the almost-guaranteed outcome, a two-front war with Prussia/Germany and Italy in 1867-70 is surely a French defeat even more monumental than IOTL, I think we could expect that in addition to Prussian siege of Paris we could expect an Italian siege of Marseilles or Lyon and a second Commune in either city. Unless the French defeat, with the two-front war, is so swift that they surrender before such sieges become necessary, but in such a case we may still expect Commune-like convulsions just after the war. However, given how much territory they would lose to Prusso-Italian requests, the most likely outcome is that they initially refuse peace, German-Italian armies overrun northeastern and southeastern France, pre-war regular French army is wiped out or captured, the French attempt a 1793-like comeback with mass levies and the french-tireurs that utterly fails, the Commune is brewing, so they eventually give up to the inevitable (and start nursing a decades-long rabid revanchist grudge against the Italo-Germans, mixed with political convulsions).

An empire successfully undertaking a major reform after a couple of bad defeats is a very rare animal indeed. My 2-cents worth would be that the Hungarians become even more obnoxious (and the reduction in the number of German-speaking population would play well for them): therefore the most likely outcome is disintegration, either immediately or after some kind of half-baked attempt to arrange Ausgleich.

I agree with your advice, that's why I earmarked collapse and partition or a very instable Ausgleich as the most likely outcomes. Of course, the latter may easily be the prelude to the former.
 
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Eurofed

Banned
I've slightly rewritten the scenario to include some changes suggested by subsequent discussion, such as Italy winning clear victories at Custoza and Lissa both, gaining Corsica and a claim on Tunisia too at the peace table, and I have expanded discussion of the alliances in the post-Habsburg partition scenario.

I still think that with this different Austro-Italo-Prussian war, the most likely flashpoint for the later war with France is Luxemburg. However, if this happens, a Hohenzollern or Savoia dynasty in Spain becomes a real possibility. France however would feel encircled, and would fight it bitterly. A immediate revanchist comeback against the Italo-German alliance would be suicidal, at least until they can secure a solid alliance with Britain or Russia, but they may attempt to break the encirclement by making a proxy war (e.g. supporting another Carlist insurrection) or making an internvetion during some Spanish political crisis. E.g. post-defeat political convulsions could bring a right-wing authoritarian-nationalist regime that could restore the monarchy as a figurehead. After a point, the Bourbon pretender to the throne of France was also the Carlist pretender to the throne of Spain, buttressing French power in Europe with a Bourbon French-Spanish union may look like an irresistible opportunity.

I have come to realize that maybe the collapse of the Habsburg empire is the most likely outcome, if they suffer a really bad 1866 defeat, the dynastic empire would be severely discredited and weakened by the 59-66 one-two, the Hungarians nay easily decide they can get better fortunes outside, and a weakened Habsburg army may fail to subdue them. I wonder whether this is more likely to happen immediately after the war, a couple years later after clumsy attempts to set up an half-baked Ausgelich fail, or maybe because Austria suicidally seeks a rematch by siding with France.

However, the most pressing question is, if the Habsburg empire really collapses, the "nice" Berlin-Rome Axis is in all likelihood set for the ages, a 19th century monarchical version of the 20th US-UK strategic partnership, and France is its sworn enemy, but which side are Britain and Russia most likely to take, in the new balance of power and alliance game ? It seem very unlikely that despite their strong rivalry in Asia, they still end up in the same alliance. If Russia sides with I-G, Britain would perforce side with France, if Russia chooses France, they may side with the CPs (esp. if Hungary sides with Russia) or even stay neutral (if GR-IT-HU seems to balance FR-RU). As for Hungary, if Germany and Russia are friendly, they are the cowed satellites of both, if they get stranged, Hungary looks rather more likely to side with I-G (a new Triple Alliance, but more stable), but alliance with Russia may not be ruled out, if Russia makes Hungarian stuff taboo to Pan-Slavs. The Ottomans shall surely side against the alliance that includes Russia.
 
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You are quite right about Lissa. I have however to remark that your are apparently wrong about Custoza, since it happened before Lissa, not after. Lissa was an attempt to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat, not Custoza. However, I still deem that a decisive Italian land victory was both wholly feasible (by giving the Italians a better high command that shall be able to coordinate its various forces efficiently to trap and crush the Austrians into a pincer) and necessary for the purpose of the TL: destruction of the Austrian Army of Italy puts Austria at the mercy of Prussia and Italy as they have no intact army left, so Austria only manages to survive dismemberment (for now) because France (and Britain to a lesser degree) apply diplomatic pressure. Moreover, suffering such a crushing defeat fosters a slide back to severe instability within Austria and gives it a well-deserved reputation for military and political weakness, explaining why Bismarck would privilege partnership with Russia and Italy instead of Austria. Also a decisive land victory against the Austrians help explain why Italy feels confident and committed to join Prussia against France and why Germany would value alliance with Italy more.
My bad: this should teach me not to go by memory and check dates.
I am still convinced that the navy should have come into play straight at the beginning of the war. Its superiority over the ustrian fleet should have ensured dominance in the Adriatic and open up a lot of opportunities. As a side note, Italian high command showed the same miopy in WW1 too: a plan to confront the Austrian navy at the beginning of the war, with the aim of destroying (or at least bottling up in Pola) the Austrian fleet and to establish a beach head near Trieste was scuppered by gen. Cadorna, who thereafter went on with his masterplan of trying to break the Isonzo front. Talk about not learning from the mistakes of the past.



However, I may follow your advice and edit the scenario so that Italy wins decisive victories at Custoza and Lissa both, that fulfills it even better. The worst Austria loses, the more France shall have to pull weight to save it from dismemberment, which help justifies the later French-Prussian-Italian war.
I'd also add that a good naval victory would also mean more proactive role for the navy.


That's a definite possiblity, esp. if Germany snatches western Lorraine, too (I am assuming that in the peace deals with Austria and France, Prussia/Germany and Italy keep their respective territorial gains roughly balanced). I'm only uncertain whether Italy would prefer to claim Corsica or Eastern Algeria. Eastern Algeria may be more economically valuable than Corsica, and as you point out is a very good stepping stone to Tunisia, which was very coveted by Italy. However Corsica may be more strategically valuable and is more signfiicant as a nationalist-irredentist claim, and Italy could certainly force France to recognize Italian claim over Tunisia in the peace treaty. I'm uncertain whether France would resent more the loss of Corsica or of Eastern Algeria. Tentatively, I'm leaning towards claiming Corsica and future protectorate over Tunisia.

Anyway, France would only sign such a peace in the face of total defeat, but this the almost-guaranteed outcome, a two-front war with Prussia/Germany and Italy in 1867-70 is surely a French defeat even more monumental than IOTL, I think we could expect that in addition to Prussian siege of Paris we could expect an Italian siege of Marseilles or Lyon and a second Commune in either city. Unless the French defeat, with the two-front war, is so swift that they surrender before such sieges become necessary, but in such a case we may still expect Commune-like convulsions just after the war. However, given how much territory they would lose to Prusso-Italian requests, the most likely outcome is that they initially refuse peace, German-Italian armies overrun northeastern and southeastern France, pre-war regular French army is wiped out or captured, the French attempt a 1793-like comeback with mass levies and the french-tireurs that utterly fails, the Commune is brewing, so they eventually give up to the inevitable (and start nursing a decades-long rabid revanchist grudge against the Italo-Germans, mixed with political convulsions).

IIRC, Corsica was never at the top of the wish list for Italian irredentism. Maybe because there were more attractive places of that list maybe because gaining a poor and rocky island whose inhabitants have traditionally been opposed to any external domination does not strike me as a good move.
OTOH, Eastern Algeria is a good settlers' colony which could take a significant number of Italian colonists (and Orano has a strategic value much higher than Corsica).
Alternatively, Italy might go for Indochina: IOTL there were a couple of naval missions there in the early 1870s (commanded by Nino Bixio, who died of cholera in Aceh in 1873), so the idea is not completely farfetched.
A sphere of influence in Tunisia and a protectorate in Indochina would be a good start.
 

Eurofed

Banned
I am still convinced that the navy should have come into play straight at the beginning of the war. Its superiority over the ustrian fleet should have ensured dominance in the Adriatic and open up a lot of opportunities. As a side note, Italian high command showed the same miopy in WW1 too: a plan to confront the Austrian navy at the beginning of the war, with the aim of destroying (or at least bottling up in Pola) the Austrian fleet and to establish a beach head near Trieste was scuppered by gen. Cadorna, who thereafter went on with his masterplan of trying to break the Isonzo front. Talk about not learning from the mistakes of the past.

Oh, I'm absolutely in agreement with you about this too. Actually I am seriously thinking that since we make better Italian commanders the PoD, they could easily stage landings in Trieste, Istria, and Dalmatia after the naval victory. This would push the Habsburg empire all that way closer to collapse, and would make a very good case for both Germany and Italy (despite Bismarck's misgivings, but I think this is really a case where the rest of the Prussian ruling elite would overrule him) pushing for their maximum claims at their peace table, Bohemia-Moravia, Kustenland, and Dalmatia. They would only be forced to back down by explicit French threats of war, which the P-I can ill afford at that moment, with most of their armies in Austria. They would reluctantly back down, but the anti-French mood in the Prussian and Italian public and ruling elite from seeing the full fruits of their great victory snatched away would be very strong, and it explains why they are determined to escalate in the next crisis with France over Luxemburg.

It also helps justify why Germany and Italy are willing to go with partition when the Habsburg empire collapses (again despite Bismarck's reluctance over Grossdeutchsland; he would have to answer to nationalist feelings in the German public to "rescue" Austrian Germans from the Habsburg wreck and prevent the birth of an independent Bohemia on historical HRE land; heck, if and when Hungary successfully secedes, Austrian Germans might easily plead themselves for union with Germany).

I'd also add that a good naval victory would also mean more proactive role for the navy.

Very true, likely in the Franco-German-Italian War it supports Italian advance and/or landings in the French Riviera and nearby Marseilles. When early major Prussian victory cripple the French army, the Italians have prairies to swarm in southeastern France, all the way to Marseilles and maybe Lyon as well. Later we may expect an early conquest of Tunisia, Eritrea, and Somalia, in the early-mid 1870s, and possibly a joint Italo-German effort to secure strongholds in East Asia. Maybe a joint Italo-German protectorate in Indochina.

IIRC, Corsica was never at the top of the wish list for Italian irredentism. Maybe because there were more attractive places of that list maybe because gaining a poor and rocky island whose inhabitants have traditionally been opposed to any external domination does not strike me as a good move.

OTOH, Eastern Algeria is a good settlers' colony which could take a significant number of Italian colonists (and Orano has a strategic value much higher than Corsica).

Oh, you are right about the intrinsec value, but mind it, Corsica was essentially as nationally Italian as Sardinia in the 19th century, and Italian nationalists would push for "liberating" an island full of Italian-ish folks well before caring about securing a stretch of land full of Arab folks. Nationalism does not always work according to cold-blooded economic-strategic calculations. Nice and Savoy were always top score as it concerns French stuff, with Corsica and Tunisia sharing the next ladder in importance. I think that Italy would secure Corsica and Tunisia first in the peace treaty (with a strong fleet that did not get the Lissa debacle, they can establish the protectorate over Tunisia well before the early 1880s). Eastern Algeria IMO would possibly come only as an extra afterthought, to balance German gains if Berlin does go really greedy and claims western Lorraine in addition to A-L and Luxemburg.

Honestly, I am uncertain whether these "maximum" gains (western Lorraine, Eastern Algeria) would be enforced by G-I at the 1867-71 peace table, in addition to the "obvious" ones (A-L, Luxemburg, Nice, Corsica, Savoy, Tunisia) or after the next WWI-like round, in 1890-1910. As I aid, if France comes down hard on them to save Habsburg butt (for a little while), Berlin and Rome have reason to be a bit more vengeful when Paris is at their feet, but Bismarck and 1860s italian liberals were fundamentally moderate. OTOH, if France starts and loses a war of revanche, I can totally see the CPs to enforce more painful territorial losses less justified by sensible irrendentist concerns.

Alternatively, Italy might go for Indochina: IOTL there were a couple of naval missions there in the early 1870s (commanded by Nino Bixio, who died of cholera in Aceh in 1873), so the idea is not completely farfetched.
A sphere of influence in Tunisia and a protectorate in Indochina would be a good start.

Quite true, although as I said, I've come to the realization that with a strong fleet, Italy would almost surely move and annex Tunisia immediately after peace with France, while expansion in Indochina would be a slightly later and more gradual affair, and done in tandem with Germany. So it' more like "sphere of influence in Indochina and a protectorate in Tunisia".
 
Oh, I'm absolutely in agreement with you about this too. Actually I am seriously thinking that since we make better Italian commanders the PoD, they could easily stage landings in Trieste, Istria, and Dalmatia after the naval victory. This would push the Habsburg empire all that way closer to collapse, and would make a very good case for both Germany and Italy (despite Bismarck's misgivings, but I think this is really a case where the rest of the Prussian ruling elite would overrule him) pushing for their maximum claims at their peace table, Bohemia-Moravia, Kustenland, and Dalmatia. They would only be forced to back down by explicit French threats of war, which the P-I can ill afford at that moment, with most of their armies in Austria. They would reluctantly back down, but the anti-French mood in the Prussian and Italian public and ruling elite from seeing the full fruits of their great victory snatched away would be very strong, and it explains why they are determined to escalate in the next crisis with France over Luxemburg.

It also helps justify why Germany and Italy are willing to go with partition when the Habsburg empire collapses (again despite Bismarck's reluctance over Grossdeutchsland; he would have to answer to nationalist feelings in the German public to "rescue" Austrian Germans from the Habsburg wreck and prevent the birth of an independent Bohemia on historical HRE land; heck, if and when Hungary successfully secedes, Austrian Germans might easily plead themselves for union with Germany).
We're completely on the same page here


Very true, likely in the Franco-German-Italian War it supports Italian advance and/or landings in the French Riviera and nearby Marseilles. When early major Prussian victory cripple the French army, the Italians have prairies to swarm in southeastern France, all the way to Marseilles and maybe Lyon as well. Later we may expect an early conquest of Tunisia, Eritrea, and Somalia, in the early-mid 1870s, and possibly a joint Italo-German effort to secure strongholds in East Asia. Maybe a joint Italo-German protectorate in Indochina.
IMHO, the Italian navy would not be strong enough to take on the full brunt of the French navy in 1867-1870: the P-I vs. F war would be mostly fought on land, with the navy mostly in a supporting role and tasked with protecting the coast. After the successful conclusion of the war it would be a horse of a different color, in particular if the peace treaty hands over to Italy some of the most modern French units. Tunisia cannot just be "conquered" so easily in the 1870s: the bey is still nominally a vassal of the Ottomans, and the British would not be happy with the same country controlling both sides of the channel of Sicily: penetration into Tunisia should be mostly economical at this stage, avoiding to step on too many toes.
However a visionary strategy might recognise the immense value to Italy of the recently completed Suez canal: might Italy obtain the French shares in the Canal company at the peace table? If this happens, I can certainly see an early presence in the Red sea and Erythrea being acquired from the khedive. But again the British must be properly managed.


Oh, you are right about the intrinsec value, but mind it, Corsica was essentially as nationally Italian as Sardinia in the 19th century, and Italian nationalists would push for "liberating" an island full of Italian-ish folks well before caring about securing a stretch of land full of Arab folks. Nationalism does not always work according to cold-blooded economic-strategic calculations. Nice and Savoy were always top score as it concerns French stuff, with Corsica and Tunisia sharing the next ladder in importance. I think that Italy would secure Corsica and Tunisia first in the peace treaty (with a strong fleet that did not get the Lissa debacle, they can establish the protectorate over Tunisia well before the early 1880s). Eastern Algeria IMO would possibly come only as an extra afterthought, to balance German gains if Berlin does go really greedy and claims western Lorraine in addition to A-L and Luxemburg.
You should ask the Corses if they feel Italians or not: the answer would surprise you. Mind, even Sardinia was not much Italian (except in the main towns) when it was handed over to Savoy after the Spanish succession war (and like Corsica the local language is quite different from Italian) but in the early 1700 nationality was not an issue. To my knowledge, no Corsican was ever involved in any of the Italian independence wars (while on the other hand there were quite a number of patriots from Dalmatia) and there was no movement on the island for a union with Italy.
France cannot hand over a "protectorate" over Tunisia (which they don't own at this stage): best they can do is to recognise that Tunisia falls withing a vague Italian sphere of influence (but they can certainly hand over Oran and/or their trading posts and strongholds in Indochina).

Honestly, I am uncertain whether these "maximum" gains (western Lorraine, Eastern Algeria) would be enforced by G-I at the 1867-71 peace table, in addition to the "obvious" ones (A-L, Luxemburg, Nice, Corsica, Savoy, Tunisia) or after the next WWI-like round, in 1890-1910. As I aid, if France comes down hard on them to save Habsburg butt (for a little while), Berlin and Rome have reason to be a bit more vengeful when Paris is at their feet, but Bismarck and 1860s italian liberals were fundamentally moderate. OTOH, if France starts and loses a war of revanche, I can totally see the CPs to enforce more painful territorial losses less justified by sensible irrendentist concerns.
Best way to formalise a protectorate over Tunisia would likely be to "buy it" from the Ottomans: the opportunity might come in occasion of the revolt on Crete (one of the many which happened), where Italy might intervene "to restore civil unrest". Another good opportunity would be the Russo-Turkish war over Bulgaria: Italy might despatch navy units to Constantinople, in agreement with the British and to support the Sultan. At the European conference (which ITTL might or might not be in Berlin) Italy gets a protectorate on both Crete and Tunisia.
The key here is having a strategy in place; obviously having some capacity of projecting power, the French cowed and Germany as a reliable ally does not hurt at all :D


Quite true, although as I said, I've come to the realization that with a strong fleet, Italy would almost surely move and annex Tunisia immediately after peace with France, while expansion in Indochina would be a slightly later and more gradual affair, and done in tandem with Germany. So it' more like "sphere of influence in Indochina and a protectorate in Tunisia".

See above: for me it would be "a protectorate in Indochina" and a "sphere of influence in Tunisia". Indochina could certainly be a joint Italo-German enterprise (be it protectorate or sphere of influence), and would be a nice stepping stone for when China opens; maybe I'm forcing the story a bit, but it might be possible to play some game in the Philippines too (the Spanish succession is coming up, and the strogest candidates are Italians and Germans: accepting a Carlist king with the Philippines as a compensation?) or even Formosa. Tunisia however cannot be more than a sphere of influence as of 1870: it will take almost a decade to become a protectorate.
 
Interesting ideas, certainly, and the idea of the German-Italian Alliance sounds interesting. However, it's not really all too original. The German-Italian-Russian Triple Alliance has been discussed before, with also the partitioning of Austria-Hungary and all. Also, I'm a moderate Austria-fan, so I have to admit I prefer the third scenario that Eurofed came up with:

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If the Habsburg Empire evolves into a more stable federal Quadruple Monarchy (the least likely option of all), events still unfold into the formation of a German-Austrian-Italian Triple Alliance like IOTL, however Italy, having less irredentist claims (albeit still substantial) against a more stable Austria, facing greater revanchist and colonial hostility from France, and traditionally committed to a long-lasting alliance with Germany, remains true to the Triple Alliance in the wake of WWI, even it manages to wrest guarantees of further territorial gains from Austria (Trieste and Istria) as compensation for its intervention.
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I understand that this is probably really unlikely, but I'd love it so much if Austria would manage to survive...

The other ideas are nice too, though, although, once more out of originality, I'd prefer the FR-RU against GR-IT-HU-BR instead of GR-IT-HU-RU and FR-BR. The latter would stand less of a chance, it's been discussed before, and the first would be more original (although it would leave less of Africa to gain for the Triple Alliance, which would favour getting as many as possible in the Franco-Prussian/Italian War, before Britain joins up...)

It would be nice if France and Russia would get so desperate that they'd join up with the Ottoman Empire as well, forgetting the Russian-Ottoman hatred, which gives Britain, Germany and Italy (in that order) the Middle-East to partition as well. That chance would be unlikely, of course... unless the Quadruple Alliance becomes so strong that Russia is too afraid, but that would make the Ottomans even more reluctant of an alliance, even if Russia gives in. They'd probably have to give up Azerbaijan and Armenia in order to convince the Ottomans. And we'd probably have to have an Alliance China and Japan in order to get Russia that desperate...

And perhaps, to make things more fun, when France and Russia are almost defeated, we might see the USA on the French side, perhaps if the Brits accidentally do something to provoke them by something happening in French Guinea or something like that. The chance is small, I know, but it would be so interesting...
 

Eurofed

Banned
We're completely on the same page here

Nice. :D

IMHO, the Italian navy would not be strong enough to take on the full brunt of the French navy in 1867-1870: the P-I vs. F war would be mostly fought on land, with the navy mostly in a supporting role and tasked with protecting the coast.

Oh, I agree in principle, I was just expecting that the Italian Navy might be able to pull some stunts when the French military would break down after P-I major land victories. IIRC, a large part of French sailors fought in the siege of Paris IOTL (or likely ITTL, sieges of Paris and Marseilles). I expect that when things go that level of bad, the French Navy would not be left in any real capability to fight the Italian one, even if it was superior at the start of the war.

After the successful conclusion of the war it would be a horse of a different color, in particular if the peace treaty hands over to Italy some of the most modern French units.

True.

Tunisia cannot just be "conquered" so easily in the 1870s: the bey is still nominally a vassal of the Ottomans, and the British would not be happy with the same country controlling both sides of the channel of Sicily: penetration into Tunisia should be mostly economical at this stage, avoiding to step on too many toes.

Hmm, true to a limited degree, but mind it, Britain and the Ottomans are going to have rather more pressing concerns than North Africa soon. With France and Austria prostrated, the frormer likely needing the better part of the 1870s to truly recover, and the latter most likely not long for this world, Russia has the way open to Constantinople, I expect that ITTL the Russo-Turkish War occurs a bit earlier if Austria is partitioned (the power vacuum would be an irresisitble lure for St. Petersburg, esp. since the peace with the P-I and likely political convulsions would leave France weak longer). Without reliable allies in Europe at the moment, Britain would have to focus its energies wholly on keeping Russia outside Constantinople, and likely to accept an ATL-Congress of Berlin's outcome somewhat less congenial to its wishes. IOTL, at that Congress France got a greenlight to annex Tunisia and Italy Libya, ITTL Italy would obviously get both (or at the very least Tunisia and Tripolitania both), so I expect Italy would gain Tunisia in the mid-late 1870s at the latest.

However a visionary strategy might recognise the immense value to Italy of the recently completed Suez canal: might Italy obtain the French shares in the Canal company at the peace table?

Well, this would be a rather interesting butterfly. But if some foreseeing Italian diplomat gets the idea, German ones would surely latch on to it, so we could expect Germany and Italy splitting the French shares, which would be a rather interesting development, indeed.

If this happens, I can certainly see an early presence in the Red sea and Erythrea being acquired from the khedive. But again the British must be properly managed.

Very true.

You should ask the Corses if they feel Italians or not: the answer would surprise you. Mind, even Sardinia was not much Italian (except in the main towns) when it was handed over to Savoy after the Spanish succession war (and like Corsica the local language is quite different from Italian) but in the early 1700 nationality was not an issue. To my knowledge, no Corsican was ever involved in any of the Italian independence wars (while on the other hand there were quite a number of patriots from Dalmatia) and there was no movement on the island for a union with Italy.

True, but it would not amount to anything. Like the Alsace and Lorraine folks, Corses would be widely deemed Italians with a false consciousness at least, they were very similar to Sardinians and that would be deemed enough to assume their Italian-ness.

France cannot hand over a "protectorate" over Tunisia (which they don't own at this stage): best they can do is to recognise that Tunisia falls withing a vague Italian sphere of influence (but they can certainly hand over Oran and/or their trading posts and strongholds in Indochina).

True. After our ongoing discussion, and further reflection, I've come to the conclusion that the most likely and feasible peace deal ITTL would be: Luxemburg, Alsace and all Lorraine to Germany, Nice, Savoy, Corsica, and Oran to Italy. It fulfills what I see a necessary diplomatic principle of keeping gains of both allies roughly balanced, and the various concerns we have been discussiong.

Best way to formalise a protectorate over Tunisia would likely be to "buy it" from the Ottomans: the opportunity might come in occasion of the revolt on Crete (one of the many which happened), where Italy might intervene "to restore civil unrest". Another good opportunity would be the Russo-Turkish war over Bulgaria: Italy might despatch navy units to Constantinople, in agreement with the British and to support the Sultan. At the European conference (which ITTL might or might not be in Berlin) Italy gets a protectorate on both Crete and Tunisia.

As I said above, I see the Russo-Turkish war a very likely window for Italy to get Tunisia, but I am dubious about Crete. It is more likey that they seek and get a mandate to annex Tunisia and Libya, they were their main priorities in the Mediterranean. Even expansion in the Aegean came later than that IOTL.

The key here is having a strategy in place; obviously having some capacity of projecting power, the French cowed and Germany as a reliable ally does not hurt at all :D

Very true.

Indochina could certainly be a joint Italo-German enterprise (be it protectorate or sphere of influence), and would be a nice stepping stone for when China opens;

We in full agreement here.

maybe I'm forcing the story a bit, but it might be possible to play some game in the Philippines too (the Spanish succession is coming up, and the strogest candidates are Italians and Germans: accepting a Carlist king with the Philippines as a compensation?) or even Formosa.

All good possibilities. But again, don't forget that France is most likely to go and try all its best (and worst) to secure that Carlist succession, too, since it paves the way to a Franco-Spanish personal union, which it is its best option to rebalance itself vs. the G-I axis.

Tunisia however cannot be more than a sphere of influence as of 1870: it will take almost a decade to become a protectorate.

In 1870, true. But again, when Austria buys the farm, the ripples of that are going to start the Russo-Turkish War into motion, and that shall open the way to Tunis. Assuming a F vs. P-I war in 1867-68 over Luxemburg, and a collapse and partition of Austria in 1868-69, we may expect a Russo-Turkish War in 1873-74 at the latest, quite possibly a couple of years later.
 
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