A different 1866 peace

[LordKalvan]

Oh, I agree in principle, I was just expecting that the Italian Navy might be able to pull some stunts when the French military would break down after P-I major land victories. IIRC, a large part of French sailors fought in the siege of Paris IOTL (or likely ITTL, sieges of Paris and Marseilles). I expect that when things go that level of bad, the French Navy would not be left in any real capability to fight the Italian one, even if it was superior at the start of the war.

OTL 1870 war was a purely land affair, and the French navy had practically nothing to do. TTL G-I-F affair will certainly include a naval component (IMHO the French will be outperformed on land, and this will be a push to look for some glory on the seas: shelling Genoa, La Spezia and Leghorn would be a classic). The Italian navy will have to play a defensive role this time, protecting the Thyrrenian coast: I don't think that they can afford to try and force a naval battle, given the disparity of forces. A more offensive role can come in play toward the end of the war, when victory is clear: if Italy wants a piece of Algeria, they will have to put up a good show and get it (not that it would be too difficult).

Hmm, true to a limited degree, but mind it, Britain and the Ottomans are going to have rather more pressing concerns than North Africa soon. With France and Austria prostrated, the frormer likely needing the better part of the 1870s to truly recover, and the latter most likely not long for this world, Russia has the way open to Constantinople, I expect that ITTL the Russo-Turkish War occurs a bit earlier if Austria is partitioned (the power vacuum would be an irresisitble lure for St. Petersburg, esp. since the peace with the P-I and likely political convulsions would leave France weak longer). Without reliable allies in Europe at the moment, Britain would have to focus its energies wholly on keeping Russia outside Constantinople, and likely to accept an ATL-Congress of Berlin's outcome somewhat less congenial to its wishes. IOTL, at that Congress France got a greenlight to annex Tunisia and Italy Libya, ITTL Italy would obviously get both (or at the very least Tunisia and Tripolitania both), so I expect Italy would gain Tunisia in the mid-late 1870s at the latest.

The problem is that everyone and his uncle has a lot of "pressing concerns" ITTL. Look:

1. Germany has clearly outperformed their own OTL success, but the sheer size of their achievement means that they have to choose (and do it now) what is their own true strategic goal (leaving aside the alliance with Italy, which is a given). In other words, they have to choose between UK and Russia (or possibly play one against the other: TTL Bismarck can still be a "Honest Broker").
2. If Germany has outperformed OTL, Italy has done better by a couple of orders of magnitude. IOTL they were isolated (and clearly a second rank power) and 1866 war had not been a good performance (even if they got Venetia out of it). ITTL the balance of power is completely changed: Italy's has almost become the Prussia of 18th century (in more than one sense: they are needing a lot of soldiers, which put a strain on both manpower resources and budget), and they have found a buddy whose strategic objectives are aligned almost 100%. In 10 years Italy has achieved a territorial expansion which was unthinkable (and probably unthought) and has effectively put out of play the two big bad historical neighbours, Austria and France. On the flip side, there are no money trees: who is going to pay for the army, the navy, the necessary industrialization, the infrastructure which have to be built? Not to mention that Austria's demise is certainly welcome under many aspects, but it will dramatically increase the instability in the Balkans and Russian appetites too.
3. Russia has seen a lot of changes in the 15 years which have lapsed since the Crimean war, but has not been a major player in any of them. Not to mention that the break up of A-H will not be truly welcome news for the czar: if a multinational empire fractures so quickly and completely, who's to guarantee that the same fate is not coming for Russia too? Russia is probably gaining a piece of old Poland (Galicia? Krakow?) when A-H passes away, but it's not their main goal: I can see the Russians stepping up their penetration in the Balkans (ITTL Serbia and Montenegro will get more officers and supplies, and Romania will be hard pressed too), but the big question in St. Petersburg is what Germany is going to do when Russia targets Costantinople.
4. A-H has got the wrong ticket in the evolutionary lottery and will disappear soon. However (given the high number of boiling pots at the end of 1860s, I think I will cast a vote in favor of an half-baked Ausgleich, which will delay the imperial demise for a few (not many) years.
5. France has been ganged upon, and lost big time. The peace imposed by G-I has not been lenient (besides territorial losses I expect hefty reparations (and the shares in Suez Canal could be a downpayment on them). The question is what is going to happen in France after the end of the war. A commune in Paris is certain, coupled with major civil unrest in the other major cities. Much worse than OTL, even iif I believe that Boulanger will be successful in putting them down. I also expect a more Boulangist France, and certainly a big emphasis on revenge. Can we have a Bourbon restoration (IOTL IIRC it failed but was touch and go). Another funky idea (assuming that France goes rightist and ultra-catholic) might be the Pope leaving Rome when the Italians take the city, and repairing first to Spain, but ultimately to France: from there he might thunder against the excommunicated Italians as well as against the Germans (not much more than that, since there is no more friendly catholic powers; however the Kulturkampf would be hotter than OTL and probably will include Italy too).
6. Spain succession crisis is obviously on the agenda: the two strongest candidates are a Hoenzollern and a Savoy, but I'm not sure that forcing either of them on Spain would be the best solutions. Some balance is required.
7. Last (but most certainly not least) is UK, which is in an interesting quandary. The balance of power in western Europe would push them to support France (or what remains of it) and to oppose an Italian or German candidate in Spain. However this policy would likely push Germany toward an entente (if not a firm alliance) with Russia, with the result that it would be very difficult to keep the Russians from getting to Costantinople and beyond.

IMHO, a European Congress has to come, as soon as possible. Maybe at The Hague or Copenhagen if Bismarck does not manage to paint a credible portrait as "honest broker".

Well, this would be a rather interesting butterfly. But if some foreseeing Italian diplomat gets the idea, German ones would surely latch on to it, so we could expect Germany and Italy splitting the French shares, which would be a rather interesting development, indeed.

As I said before, the shares could be an installment of the war reparations paid by France.

True, but it would not amount to anything. Like the Alsace and Lorraine folks, Corses would be widely deemed Italians with a false consciousness at least, they were very similar to Sardinians and that would be deemed enough to assume their Italian-ness.

No problem: it's not a gain for Italy, but not much of a problem either.

True. After our ongoing discussion, and further reflection, I've come to the conclusion that the most likely and feasible peace deal ITTL would be: Luxemburg, Alsace and all Lorraine to Germany, Nice, Savoy, Corsica, and Oran to Italy. It fulfills what I see a necessary diplomatic principle of keeping gains of both allies roughly balanced, and the various concerns we have been discussiong.

Fine with me.

As I said above, I see the Russo-Turkish war a very likely window for Italy to get Tunisia, but I am dubious about Crete. It is more likey that they seek and get a mandate to annex Tunisia and Libya, they were their main priorities in the Mediterranean. Even expansion in the Aegean came later than that IOTL.

Any further expansion must come by the way of a Congress (and I do not envisage any difficulty in getting Tunisia, Tripolitania and Crete as Italian sphere of interest). The key result to achieve is an agreement on the Balkans, re-drawing the map (and the spheres of influence) after A-H demise and considering Ottomans problems (Bosnia-Hercegovina, Serbia, Bulgaria, Kossovo jusat to start).

But again, don't forget that France is most likely to go and try all its best (and worst) to secure that Carlist succession, too, since it paves the way to a Franco-Spanish personal union, which it is its best option to rebalance itself vs. the G-I axis.

I'd give in and let a Carlist obtain the crown, aginst considerations in Fra East

In 1870, true. But again, when Austria buys the farm, the ripples of that are going to start the Russo-Turkish War into motion, and that shall open the way to Tunis. Assuming a F vs. P-I war in 1867-68 over Luxemburg, and a collapse and partition of Austria in 1868-69, we may expect a Russo-Turkish War in 1873-74 at the latest, quite possibly a couple of years later.

That's the reason why I want a Congress; and why I changed my mind and now want to keep A-H breathing a few more years. Too many variables, too many changes: need to buy some time.

 

[Onkel Willie]

Shameless advertisement : I wrote a TL about a German-Russian-Italian Triple Alliance although with a much different PoD. It's the second link in my sig.

 

[Eurofed]

OTL 1870 war was a purely land affair, and the French navy had practically nothing to do. TTL G-I-F affair will certainly include a naval component (IMHO the French will be outperformed on land, and this will be a push to look for some glory on the seas: shelling Genoa, La Spezia and Leghorn would be a classic). The Italian navy will have to play a defensive role this time, protecting the Thyrrenian coast: I don't think that they can afford to try and force a naval battle, given the disparity of forces. A more offensive role can come in play toward the end of the war, when victory is clear: if Italy wants a piece of Algeria, they will have to put up a good show and get it (not that it would be too difficult).

Your analysis of the war is IMO essentially correct. Of course, French "last hurrah" naval exploits shall be added motivation for the G-I to build up their navies in coming decades. I wonder whether Germany would entirely task Italy with naval defense of their alliance in the Mediterranean, or they would go and build a (minor) Mediterranean fleet of their own, to supplement the Italian one. The latter might be a sensible thing to do. The partition of the Habsburg Empire is not going to leave Grossdeutchsland with a Mediterranean fleet, but Germany would easily get basing rights in Italian ports, either in Trieste or some other good Italian military port (Naples, La Spezia, Taranto, etc.). I dunno whether the partition would leave Fiume to Italy or to Hungary. Perhaps Italy is satisfied enough, with Istria and Dalmatia, as to allow Hungary to keep one good port and be happier. Hungary, too, is going to have a fleet of their own if it has a decent port and most likely shall be an ally of Germany and Italy, but its fleet shall be at most comparable to the OTL Austrian one.

Regardless of whether the G-I ally with Britain or with Russia (which largely determines the kind of fleet they build, and in turn influences and is influenced of the kind of colonial expansion they undergo), they would seek some serious naval power projection, both to sustain theri colonial expansion and imperialistic influence in Africa, Middle East, and the far East, and to guard against French revanchism.

The problem is that everyone and his uncle has a lot of "pressing concerns" ITTL. Look:

Your analysis of course quite correct and actually rather fascinating, it pins down the challenges that the great powers face.

Germany has clearly outperformed their own OTL success, but the sheer size of their achievement means that they have to choose (and do it now) what is their own true strategic goal (leaving aside the alliance with Italy, which is a given). In other words, they have to choose between UK and Russia (or possibly play one against the other: TTL Bismarck can still be a "Honest Broker").

Well, this is quite true, Germany has completed its unification to any reasonable extent and then some (gaining some rather valuable stuff in the process), and may play the satisfied power to a large extent at least for a while, even if the colonial bug is going to hit her eventually. It needs a little nation-building (and to absorb its new minorities) but it has very solid groundwork. It has found a buddy that complements its own strength well, with a little build-up. But indeed it needs to choose its other main partner in the geopolitical game. Honestly, this alliance choice, London or St.Petersburg, is THE choice of TTL, to a large degree it shapes the history of western Eurasia in the next century. As you say, Germany can defer the final choice for a while, indeed while Bismarck is in charge he may well play the one against the other, but by the turn of the century at most, it becomes necessary. IMO there are good reasons (ands political-dplomatic butterflies) to pick either, even if I would expect Bismarck to lean on Russia for various reasons, even if he prefers to play the "broker" game.

If Germany has outperformed OTL, Italy has done better by a couple of orders of magnitude. ITTL the balance of power is completely changed: Italy's has almost become the Prussia of 18th century (in more than one sense: they are needing a lot of soldiers, which put a strain on both manpower resources and budget), and they have found a buddy whose strategic objectives are aligned almost 100%. In 10 years Italy has achieved a territorial expansion which was unthinkable (and probably unthought) and has effectively put out of play the two big bad historical neighbours, Austria and France. On the flip side, there are no money trees: who is going to pay for the army, the navy, the necessary industrialization, the infrastructure which have to be built? Not to mention that Austria's demise is certainly welcome under many aspects, but it will dramatically increase the instability in the Balkans and Russian appetites too.

Very true, as well. The analogy with early Prussia is striking (and wholly contrary to clichè that ITTL the fortunes of Italy as a great power are built on military success), just like the strategic partnership with Germany is a very precious opportunity. It is wholly true that they need to supplement such strokes of luck with some serious nation-building, which takes some time. OTOH, this Italy has rather better reasons to be a satisfied power for a while, even if the colonial bug is going to hit her eventually as well. About the financial constraints you mention, they are very true (French reparations come nice here, be them in cash, Suez canal shares, French ships, or a mix of the above). However, I would point out that in all likelihood, close links with Germany, the demise of Austria, a better foothold in the Balkans, and the weakning of France all act as a powerful stimulus to the economic development of Italy. Historically Italian industrialization was and is largely complementary to the German one, IMO it is wholly reasonable to expect that ITTL the pace of Italian industrialization is accelerated by 60-70 years in comparison to OTL. So indeed this is now a time for consolidation but the premises are rather promishing.

Russia has seen a lot of changes in the 15 years which have lapsed since the Crimean war, but has not been a major player in any of them. Not to mention that the break up of A-H will not be truly welcome news for the czar: if a multinational empire fractures so quickly and completely, who's to guarantee that the same fate is not coming for Russia too?

True, but there is a big difference: Russia is a big multinational empire with a solid national core that makes for most of its strength. The Habsburg empire was a dynastic structure with no such core, held together by loyalty to the throne and little else. For the Habsburg, the writing has been on the wall since 1848 if not Napoleon, Russia has shown no such terminal signs of weakeness and actually has been steadily expanding, even if it is in terrible need of modernization.

Russia is probably gaining a piece of old Poland (Galicia? Krakow?) when A-H passes away,

Galicia, Krakow, and Bukovina.

but it's not their main goal: I can see the Russians stepping up their penetration in the Balkans (ITTL Serbia and Montenegro will get more officers and supplies, and Romania will be hard pressed too), but the big question in St. Petersburg is what Germany is going to do when Russia targets Costantinople.

Well, yes, this is the other big question of the TL, the one coming in the very next few years. It is absolutely true that Russia shall step up its penetration of the Balkans and pressure to partition the Ottoman Empire as well, considerably. I would expect the engines of the Russo-Turkish War to start soon after the collapse of the Habsburg. Germany has various choices in this situation, but again with the Habsburg gone and France at its knees, its actions are one if not the main factor to decide how big of a success the Russians reap in the Balkans. Unless Bismarck sides with Britain decisively (and I see little reasons for that happening, Bismarck was always very mindful of the need to keep Russia content at least), I definitely expect Russian interests to be rather more successful in TTL Congress of Berlin than IOTL. Britain has less leverage on the continent to contain Russia. Bismarck likely would not want Russia to be totally victorious, Britain humiliated, and Turkey totally destroyed, but I cannot see him strongly supporting Britain, either. he would rather want to make Germany more secure by diverting Russian interests in an area (Southern and Eastern Balkans) that holds limited interest for Germany. The only German vital interest here is that Russia doesn't control Hungary. Italy isamde happy by recognizing its interests in North Africa, the western coast of the Balkans, and the Aegean, something that does not directly collide with Russian interests.

Therefore, I would expect that the outcome of TTL's Congress of Berlin is rather more likely to the Treaty of St.Stephen and/or OTL settlement after the First Balkan War, with Ottoman presence in the Balkans essentially dismantled, even if the British dig their heels to keep the Russians out of the Straits and Anatolia.

This is all rather tentative, but I would propose a plausible settlement: Serbia, Romania, and Bulgaria go fully independent, Bulgaria gets Eastern Rumelia, Western Thrace, and Vardar Macedonia, Serbia gets Kosovo, Greece gets Thessaly, Aegean Macedonia, Epirus, and Crete, Turkey keeps the Straits and Eastern Thrace, Russia gets Armenian and Georgian territories in the Caucasus and Southern Bessarabia, Britain gets Cyprus (and a free ticket to Egypt), Italy gets Albania and Montenegro (and a free ticket to Tunisia and Tripolitania). Bosnia is a thorny issue. Depending on whether Hungary (and its German-Italian backers) prefers to have some expansion of its own and check the Serbians, or does not want to burden itself with yet more Slavs and deems moderate expansion mjay make Serbia a satisfied power, Bosnia may go either to Hungary or to Serbia.

A-H has got the wrong ticket in the evolutionary lottery and will disappear soon. However (given the high number of boiling pots at the end of 1860s, I think I will cast a vote in favor of an half-baked Ausgleich, which will delay the imperial demise for a few (not many) years.

Your point has merit. However I would counter-argue that the partition of the Habsburg, if it adds to the mixture, it also strongly "clears the ground". By removing a dying state, it allows the great powers to restablish a more stable geopolitical equilibrium, where the Balkans only remain the main major area in bad need of a new settlement. A General Congress resettlement is much easier after their demise. Moreover, a Habsburg collapse is somewhat more plausible soon after defeat rather than later (although it remains wholly likely a few years later). Having said that, I can also see an half-baked Ausgleich delaying their demise by a few years, but absolutely not beyond its first renewal schedule due in 1877-78 or so. Then again, things are easier if it happens earlier and the Great Powers only have to resettle the Balkans.

France has been ganged upon, and lost big time. The peace imposed by G-I has not been lenient (besides territorial losses I expect hefty reparations (and the shares in Suez Canal could be a downpayment on them).

True.

The question is what is going to happen in France after the end of the war. A commune in Paris is certain, coupled with major civil unrest in the other major cities.

Indeed, also because ITTL Marseilles and Lyon are going to be attacked and besieged in the last phase of the war much like Paris, adding to the civil unrest that fueled the Commune.

Much worse than OTL, even iif I believe that Boulanger will be successful in putting them down.

Indeed, even if I dunno whether Boulanger himself would be a position in the French military chain of command high enough in 1867-71 to manage the repression of the Commune and later rise to be the strongman of France. But if not him, someone much like him gets to play the part. Historically France has no dearth of that kind of generals. A larger Commune that sweeps other major French cities has no chance to succeed (if nothing else and homegrown French repression would fail, because occupying G-I troops would never allow a hotbed of Communist subversion on their borders; IOTL Bismarck released French PoWs to facilitate the repression of the Commune and it would happen ITTL as well) but it would exaust France even more. coupled with the harsh peace, France likely does not recover to true great power status for 5-10 years.

I also expect a more Boulangist France, and certainly a big emphasis on revenge. Can we have a Bourbon restoration (IOTL IIRC it failed but was touch and go).

Absolutely yes to both, IMO. A Bourbon restoration figurehead with a charismatic general as strongman. Again if not Boulanger himself, the regime that is born out of the twin shocks of defeat and the Commune is going to be very Boulangist, a proto-fascist authoritarian-nationalist mix fueled by revanchism and reactionary Catholicism. Whether soon after the peace, or after a few years of political convulsions under the instable Third Republic, it does not matter.

Another funky idea (assuming that France goes rightist and ultra-catholic) might be the Pope leaving Rome when the Italians take the city, and repairing first to Spain, but ultimately to France: from there he might thunder against the excommunicated Italians as well as against the Germans (not much more than that, since there is no more friendly catholic powers; however the Kulturkampf would be hotter than OTL and probably will include Italy too).

Yup, this might well happen, with Pius IX and France and Austria gone or prostrated, it's the kind of crusade-like shenanigans that he could try, go and try an ultra-catholic regime change in France and Spain. Of course, if this happens (and indeed it makes such a regime change all that more likely, given the political instability in France and Spain), you have the ideological basis for a nifty Cold War to blossom in Western Europe between ultra-right France & Spain and conservative-liberal Germany and Italy. This would heighten the anti-clerical policy in the latter countries significantly, but not radically so (Italy is almost entirely Catholic and Grossdeutchsland half so). No true religious persecution, only even more harsh limitations to the political activities and resources of Catholic clergy and militants. Not that the hegemony of the ruling conservative-liberal classes in Germany and Italy would ever be in danger from Catholic unrest, such hegemony had strong socio-economic basis, and ideologically nationalism is a powerful check to religious-based unrest. All that Bismarck and the Italian liberals have to do is to paint the Pope and his followers as treasonous or misguided dupes of the French. But again, such a Cold War would fuel the flames of antagonism between the French(-Spanish) and the Italo-Germans (and make a rematch all the more likely in the long run).

Spain succession crisis is obviously on the agenda: the two strongest candidates are a Hoenzollern and a Savoy, but I'm not sure that forcing either of them on Spain would be the best solutions. Some balance is required.

Both for balance of power considerations, for the ideological issues above, and because seizing control of Spain would be one of the easiest effective ways for Boulangist France to reaffirm its power and make good on its rethoric, I really expect that a Bourbon-Boulangist France would go to all means (diplomatic pressure, courting British support, supplies and "volunteers" to Carlist groups, even a well-timed intervention when the other great powers are distracted) to secure a Carlist dynasty-regime change in Spain. Soon enough, the Borboun and the Carlist pretendant in France and Spain shall be the same person. A Boulangist-Carlist personal union of France and Spain would redress the balance of power somewhat. France would need some skill and luck to pull it off (securing British support, Germany and Italy distracted in the Balkans or elsewhere), but it is doable, London might accept it to balance the Berlin-Rome bloc. It might even happen as an effect of the Pope fueling his own "crusade".

As an aside, the ideological furor of Pius IX's fight against G-I is not going lto last in full force beyond his death, following Popes likely gradually seek an unspoken detente when Bismarck and the Italian liberals prove far too strong, even if Boulangist France keeps using reactionary ultra-catholicism to fuel its own propaganda for a long time.

Last (but most certainly not least) is UK, which is in an interesting quandary. The balance of power in western Europe would push them to support France (or what remains of it) and to oppose an Italian or German candidate in Spain. However this policy would likely push Germany toward an entente (if not a firm alliance) with Russia, with the result that it would be very difficult to keep the Russians from getting to Costantinople and beyond.

Yup, this is a very interesting and novel geopolitical quandary (which mirrors the necessary alliance choice of the G-I axis between UK and Russia in the long term, by the way) for London. They can no more secure both a balance of power in western Europe and their hegemony in the Middle East through their decaying Ottoman proxy. If they support France against the rising G-I stars, they maintain a balance of power in Western Europe (esp. if Spain takes the side of France, or some other medium power like Sweden) but they have to abandon the Ottomans and the Persians to the Russians. Note however, that in the end, such balance of power would grow illusory anyway: as Germany, Russia, and Italy industrialize, their combined land power would steamroll whatever rival alliance in Europe the Anglo-French can muster, but for a few decades, and for ordinary diplomatic play, it can suffice. On the other hand, if they seek the friendship of Germany, they can check Russia in the Middle East but they have to concede lasting hegemony in Western Europe to the Central Powers, however friendly. Anyway, traditional "divide et impera" balance of power that London so reveres is shattered, they have to pick a side and what is truly vital to their interests. I love seeing the British put in this position.

IMHO, a European Congress has to come, as soon as possible. Maybe at The Hague or Copenhagen if Bismarck does not manage to paint a credible portrait as "honest broker".

I concur, such a general congress would be truly useful and is coming but again, whatever deliberations it takes would be a waste of ink if the collapse of the Habsburg and the Russo-Turkish War have not preceded it. You can't rebuild an equilibrium in Europe that can last beyond a few years if the Habsburg and Balkan Ottoman zombies are still part of it.

I would expect the Hague or Bruxelles to be suitable "real neutral" locations for the Congress, in alternative to Berlin, since Denmark has fought germany just a few years before and is still too close to London.

As I said before, the shares could be an installment of the war reparations paid by France.

A nifty idea.

No problem: it's not a gain for Italy, but not much of a problem either.

Fine with me.

Very good.

Any further expansion must come by the way of a Congress (and I do not envisage any difficulty in getting Tunisia, Tripolitania and Crete as Italian sphere of interest). The key result to achieve is an agreement on the Balkans, re-drawing the map (and the spheres of influence) after A-H demise and considering Ottomans problems (Bosnia-Hercegovina, Serbia, Bulgaria, Kossovo jusat to start).

I agree. However, any barely stable equilibrium is based on the realization that the Ottoman rule in the Balkans has become a zombie just like the Habsburg. Turkey may still have a future as the hegemon of the Arab lands, but in the Balkans a new equilibrium needs a sensible redrawing of the map among the successor states and their great powers supporters' spheres of influence.

I'd give in and let a Carlist obtain the crown, aginst considerations in Fra East

Yup, moreover, propping up a puppet regime in Spain is likely more effort for the CPs than it is worth anyway, a good entente/alliance with Britain or Russia is better to keep their backs secure from France.

That's the reason why I want a Congress; and why I changed my mind and now want to keep A-H breathing a few more years. Too many variables, too many changes: need to buy some time.

Nonetheless, you can only rebuild a real equilibrium when the dead wood is burned to the ground: the 1859-71 wars are half of the job, the Habsburg collapse and the Russo-Turkish War is the other half.

 

[LordKalvan]

Your analysis of the war is IMO essentially correct. Of course, French "last hurrah" naval exploits shall be added motivation for the G-I to build up their navies in coming decades. I wonder whether Germany would entirely task Italy with naval defense of their alliance in the Mediterranean, or they would go and build a (minor) Mediterranean fleet of their own, to supplement the Italian one. The latter might be a sensible thing to do. The partition of the Habsburg Empire is not going to leave Grossdeutchsland with a Mediterranean fleet, but Germany would easily get basing rights in Italian ports, either in Trieste or some other good Italian military port (Naples, La Spezia, Taranto, etc.). I dunno whether the partition would leave Fiume to Italy or to Hungary. Perhaps Italy is satisfied enough, with Istria and Dalmatia, as to allow Hungary to keep one good port and be happier. Hungary, too, is going to have a fleet of their own if it has a decent port and most likely shall be an ally of Germany and Italy, but its fleet shall be at most comparable to the OTL Austrian one.

I would be in favor of granting Fiume to the Hungarian-Croat Kingdom. Hungary would probably get a portion of the old A-H fleet, but nothing to write home about.
OTOH, there is no reason for Germany to plan a Mediterranean fleet: the two partners have each his own bailiwick, Germany in the Baltic and Northern seas and Italy in the Mediterranean.
It's quite obvious that a lot depends on which will be the third partner (Russia or UK), but I would submit that in either case Germany should not start a naval race.

Regardless of whether the G-I ally with Britain or with Russia (which largely determines the kind of fleet they build, and in turn influences and is influenced of the kind of colonial expansion they undergo), they would seek some serious naval power projection, both to sustain theri colonial expansion and imperialistic influence in Africa, Middle East, and the far East, and to guard against French revanchism.

Colonial expansions requires mostly cruisers and destroyers; certaqinly gunboats, but no need for capital ships unless there is an European war.

Your analysis of course quite correct and actually rather fascinating, it pins down the challenges that the great powers face.

You're very kind.

Well, this is quite true, Germany has completed its unification to any reasonable extent and then some (gaining some rather valuable stuff in the process), and may play the satisfied power to a large extent at least for a while, even if the colonial bug is going to hit her eventually. It needs a little nation-building (and to absorb its new minorities) but it has very solid groundwork. It has found a buddy that complements its own strength well, with a little build-up. But indeed it needs to choose its other main partner in the geopolitical game. Honestly, this alliance choice, London or St.Petersburg, is THE choice of TTL, to a large degree it shapes the history of western Eurasia in the next century. As you say, Germany can defer the final choice for a while, indeed while Bismarck is in charge he may well play the one against the other, but by the turn of the century at most, it becomes necessary. IMO there are good reasons (ands political-dplomatic butterflies) to pick either, even if I would expect Bismarck to lean on Russia for various reasons, even if he prefers to play the "broker" game.

TTL Bismarck has been significantly more successful than his OTL counterpart; more importantly the map of Europe has changed in a big way, and I cannot believe that old Otto will not recognise it. The demise of A-H and the substantial weakening of France make Russia a less attractive partner for the future: Germany has got all they wanted in the west; future expansion (and I am thinking more in terms of economic Lebensraum rather than a political one) can only be to the East. Both Germany and Italy have become affluent and now have a position to defend: they will be looking for stability, which is not exactly a given when there is a big Russian bear bordering them in the East, and ready to gobble up the Balkans and Constantinople. I can go for Bismarck being a "broker" for the time being and playing Russia vs. UK. However Russia cannot be allowed to get Constantinople and this means that the Ottomans cannot be so easily taken off the map of the Balkans. More about this later.

Very true, as well. The analogy with early Prussia is striking (and wholly contrary to clichè that ITTL the fortunes of Italy as a great power are built on military success), just like the strategic partnership with Germany is a very precious opportunity. It is wholly true that they need to supplement such strokes of luck with some serious nation-building, which takes some time. OTOH, this Italy has rather better reasons to be a satisfied power for a while, even if the colonial bug is going to hit her eventually as well. About the financial constraints you mention, they are very true (French reparations come nice here, be them in cash, Suez canal shares, French ships, or a mix of the above). However, I would point out that in all likelihood, close links with Germany, the demise of Austria, a better foothold in the Balkans, and the weakning of France all act as a powerful stimulus to the economic development of Italy. Historically Italian industrialization was and is largely complementary to the German one, IMO it is wholly reasonable to expect that ITTL the pace of Italian industrialization is accelerated by 60-70 years in comparison to OTL. So indeed this is now a time for consolidation but the premises are rather promishing.

Italy has a couple of major problems even in a very successful TL: the first one is to raise capitals for industrialization and infrastructure (French and A-H reparations are certainly a good thing, but they will not even pay for the war, much less additional development); the second problem is that they risk to copy the worst traits of Prussia (junkers, army dominance, insufficient limitations to the king's prerogatives. Mind, the Savoys were in love with these things IOTL too, figure it ITTL).
IOTL there were two major countries with surplus capitals available for investments abroad: UK and France. ITTL, France surplus is much smaller, and certainly they will not invest in Germany or Italy. If the partners antagonise UK too, were is the money coming from?
The second risk is even more of a danger in my view: if Russia becomes a full partner in the alliance, there will be a sharp conservative (maybe conservative is not strong enough a word) turn: it will be another Drei Kaiserbund.
Plus there is always a risk of a too successful Russia that ultimately swallows the partners too. Give me UK please, with all the problems that such a choice might bring.

True, but there is a big difference: Russia is a big multinational empire with a solid national core that makes for most of its strength. The Habsburg empire was a dynastic structure with no such core, held together by loyalty to the throne and little else. For the Habsburg, the writing has been on the wall since 1848 if not Napoleon, Russia has shown no such terminal signs of weakeness and actually has been steadily expanding, even if it is in terrible need of modernization.

There is a ussian core, for sure: the old Muscovy. All the rest of the country has been taken by the sword. Look what happened in 1917 (and again in 1991).

Well, yes, this is the other big question of the TL, the one coming in the very next few years. It is absolutely true that Russia shall step up its penetration of the Balkans and pressure to partition the Ottoman Empire as well, considerably. I would expect the engines of the Russo-Turkish War to start soon after the collapse of the Habsburg. Germany has various choices in this situation, but again with the Habsburg gone and France at its knees, its actions are one if not the main factor to decide how big of a success the Russians reap in the Balkans. Unless Bismarck sides with Britain decisively (and I see little reasons for that happening, Bismarck was always very mindful of the need to keep Russia content at least), I definitely expect Russian interests to be rather more successful in TTL Congress of Berlin than IOTL. Britain has less leverage on the continent to contain Russia. Bismarck likely would not want Russia to be totally victorious, Britain humiliated, and Turkey totally destroyed, but I cannot see him strongly supporting Britain, either. he would rather want to make Germany more secure by diverting Russian interests in an area (Southern and Eastern Balkans) that holds limited interest for Germany. The only German vital interest here is that Russia doesn't control Hungary. Italy isamde happy by recognizing its interests in North Africa, the western coast of the Balkans, and the Aegean, something that does not directly collide with Russian interests.
Therefore, I would expect that the outcome of TTL's Congress of Berlin is rather more likely to the Treaty of St.Stephen and/or OTL settlement after the First Balkan War, with Ottoman presence in the Balkans essentially dismantled, even if the British dig their heels to keep the Russians out of the Straits and Anatolia.

I am not saying to get Russia's goat, but St. Stephen was too much of a Russian dream. I'm strongly convinced that something along the lines of Berlin 1878 is the natural default, and keeping a reasonably strong Ottoman presence in the Balkans is a must.

This is all rather tentative, but I would propose a plausible settlement: Serbia, Romania, and Bulgaria go fully independent, Bulgaria gets Eastern Rumelia, Western Thrace, and Vardar Macedonia, Serbia gets Kosovo, Greece gets Thessaly, Aegean Macedonia, Epirus, and Crete, Turkey keeps the Straits and Eastern Thrace, Russia gets Armenian and Georgian territories in the Caucasus and Southern Bessarabia, Britain gets Cyprus (and a free ticket to Egypt), Italy gets Albania and Montenegro (and a free ticket to Tunisia and Tripolitania). Bosnia is a thorny issue. Depending on whether Hungary (and its German-Italian backers) prefers to have some expansion of its own and check the Serbians, or does not want to burden itself with yet more Slavs and deems moderate expansion mjay make Serbia a satisfied power, Bosnia may go either to Hungary or to Serbia.

Here I am not on the same page. This partitioning of the Balkans is an obvious disaster waiting to happen (like it did IOTL when the same map came out of the Balkan wars). Independence for Serbia and Romania is kinda ok, not for Bulgaria (which should get a semi-autonomous regime, but still as a part of the Ottoman empire). Greece might get Thessaly, but no more than that. UK gets Cyprus, and Italy Crete. Tunisia is recognised in the Italian sphere of influence, same as Tripolitania. Egypt status does not change.
I would create an autonomous principate out of Bosnia-Hercegovina, with a prince to be agreed by the powers. Give a slice of Kossovo to Serbia. Russia gets Bessarabia and bits and pieces in the Caucasus.

Your point has merit. However I would counter-argue that the partition of the Habsburg, if it adds to the mixture, it also strongly "clears the ground". By removing a dying state, it allows the great powers to restablish a more stable geopolitical equilibrium, where the Balkans only remain the main major area in bad need of a new settlement. A General Congress resettlement is much easier after their demise. Moreover, a Habsburg collapse is somewhat more plausible soon after defeat rather than later (although it remains wholly likely a few years later). Having said that, I can also see an half-baked Ausgleich delaying their demise by a few years, but absolutely not beyond its first renewal schedule due in 1877-78 or so. Then again, things are easier if it happens earlier and the Great Powers only have to resettle the Balkans.

Assuming a F-I-G war in occasion of the Luxembourg crisis, and anticipating a bit the Bulgarian crisis, the following timetable could be drawn:

• 1868: F-I-G war and Ausgleich
• 1869: German empire proclaimed, Italy occupies Rome, Pope leave on a Spanish ship to Barcelona.
• 1870: excommunication of Italian king by Pope, who also speaks against the ungodly German government. Tumults in France, Austria, Hungary.
• 1871: Kulturkampf starts in Germany, soon imitated by Italy (strong impulse on state education to counter catholic schools). A council is convened in Barcelona by Pius IX. Germany and Italy ask for an oath of fealty by bishops before allowing them to attend. All Church property in Rome and Latium is seized by Italian state (with the only exception of the Vatican)
• 1872: doctrine of papal infallibility voted in council with poor attendance. Stronger reactions in catholic world, liberal bishops objecting strongly to it. Russia fuels incidents in Bulgaria.
• 1873: Bulgarian situation gets worse; Serbia and Montenegro send an ultimatum to the Porte and declare war. Russia backs S and M, but fails to obtain A-H support. Balkan crisis precipitates a worse crisis in the Austrian empire.
• 1874: Serbian troops routed by Ottomans, who advance toward Belgrade. Russian ultimatum to the Porte, confrontation across the Danube. Monarchy voted back by French parliament (the comte de Chambord accepts the tricolor). Riots in Vienna, Belgrade, Prague. The emperor leaves the capital for Salzburg. Government falls, Hungarian parliament votes for independence.
• 1875: Russian troops enter Bulgaria, Romania drags her feet. Consultations between Berlin, Rome and London. Front in Bulgaria stabilizes at Varna. Ultimatum of the 3 powers to Russia, Serbia and Porte for a cease fire. A pan-european congress colled for May 1876 at the Hague to address the Balkan crisis and to mediate the almost-civil-war status in A-H

Indeed, even if I dunno whether Boulanger himself would be a position in the French military chain of command high enough in 1867-71 to manage the repression of the Commune and later rise to be the strongman of France. But if not him, someone much like him gets to play the part. Historically France has no dearth of that kind of generals. A larger Commune that sweeps other major French cities has no chance to succeed (if nothing else and homegrown French repression would fail, because occupying G-I troops would never allow a hotbed of Communist subversion on their borders; IOTL Bismarck released French PoWs to facilitate the repression of the Commune and it would happen ITTL as well) but it would exaust France even more. coupled with the harsh peace, France likely does not recover to true great power status for 5-10 years.

Obviously Boulanger would still be a captain or something similar in 1869. It should not be difficult to find some strong man in the French army, though.

Absolutely yes to both, IMO. A Bourbon restoration figurehead with a charismatic general as strongman. Again if not Boulanger himself, the regime that is born out of the twin shocks of defeat and the Commune is going to be very Boulangist, a proto-fascist authoritarian-nationalist mix fueled by revanchism and reactionary Catholicism. Whether soon after the peace, or after a few years of political convulsions under the instable Third Republic, it does not matter.

In 1873 there was a monarchist majority in parliament, and the Orleanist pretender choose not to press his case. The last Bourbon pretender (Henri, comte de Chamborde) started a progress toward Paris, but everything collapsed when he refused to accept the tricolor as French flag. ITTL he might be better advised (however when he dies in 4 or 5 years the heir will be the Carlist pretender).

Yup, this might well happen, with Pius IX and France and Austria gone or prostrated, it's the kind of crusade-like shenanigans that he could try, go and try an ultra-catholic regime change in France and Spain. Of course, if this happens (and indeed it makes such a regime change all that more likely, given the political instability in France and Spain), you have the ideological basis for a nifty Cold War to blossom in Western Europe between ultra-right France & Spain and conservative-liberal Germany and Italy. This would heighten the anti-clerical policy in the latter countries significantly, but not radically so (Italy is almost entirely Catholic and Grossdeutchsland half so). No true religious persecution, only even more harsh limitations to the political activities and resources of Catholic clergy and militants. Not that the hegemony of the ruling conservative-liberal classes in Germany and Italy would ever be in danger from Catholic unrest, such hegemony had strong socio-economic basis, and ideologically nationalism is a powerful check to religious-based unrest. All that Bismarck and the Italian liberals have to do is to paint the Pope and his followers as treasonous or misguided dupes of the French. But again, such a Cold War would fuel the flames of antagonism between the French(-Spanish) and the Italo-Germans (and make a rematch all the more likely in the long run).

One of the butterflies is that Vatican 1st is not convened in Rome (papal infallibility). As I said before, Pius IX might call for a council from his exile in Spain, but I think the attendance will be limited. Stronger kulturkampf in Germany and stronger anti-clericalism in Italy. The pope will be painted as a dupe of the French, but also as an autocrat who wants to roll back the clock. Most likely the bishops will be forced to swear fealty to the king. IOTL there was a minor schism after Vatican 1st: the "old catholics" refused to accept the doctrine of papal infallibility (and Bismarck tried to use them in his kulturkampf, but in the end agreed a concordat with the pope). ITTL the ideological divide (and also the personal positions) might be much harder to mediate: the schism might be really successful, opposing the liberal wing of the church to the conservative one.

Both for balance of power considerations, for the ideological issues above, and because seizing control of Spain would be one of the easiest effective ways for Boulangist France to reaffirm its power and make good on its rethoric, I really expect that a Bourbon-Boulangist France would go to all means (diplomatic pressure, courting British support, supplies and "volunteers" to Carlist groups, even a well-timed intervention when the other great powers are distracted) to secure a Carlist dynasty-regime change in Spain. Soon enough, the Borboun and the Carlist pretendant in France and Spain shall be the same person. A Boulangist-Carlist personal union of France and Spain would redress the balance of power somewhat. France would need some skill and luck to pull it off (securing British support, Germany and Italy distracted in the Balkans or elsewhere), but it is doable, London might accept it to balance the Berlin-Rome bloc. It might even happen as an effect of the Pope fueling his own "crusade".

As an aside, the ideological furor of Pius IX's fight against G-I is not going lto last in full force beyond his death, following Popes likely gradually seek an unspoken detente when Bismarck and the Italian liberals prove far too strong, even if Boulangist France keeps using reactionary ultra-catholicism to fuel its own propaganda for a long time.

I'm quite in favor of this development. However what makes you think that Pius IX will be again followed by Leo XIII? ITTL the "religion war" will certainly be harsher and a more conservative and hard-assed pope might be elected.

Yup, this is a very interesting and novel geopolitical quandary (which mirrors the necessary alliance choice of the G-I axis between UK and Russia in the long term, by the way) for London. They can no more secure both a balance of power in western Europe and their hegemony in the Middle East through their decaying Ottoman proxy. If they support France against the rising G-I stars, they maintain a balance of power in Western Europe (esp. if Spain takes the side of France, or some other medium power like Sweden) but they have to abandon the Ottomans and the Persians to the Russians. Note however, that in the end, such balance of power would grow illusory anyway: as Germany, Russia, and Italy industrialize, their combined land power would steamroll whatever rival alliance in Europe the Anglo-French can muster, but for a few decades, and for ordinary diplomatic play, it can suffice. On the other hand, if they seek the friendship of Germany, they can check Russia in the Middle East but they have to concede lasting hegemony in Western Europe to the Central Powers, however friendly. Anyway, traditional "divide et impera" balance of power that London so reveres is shattered, they have to pick a side and what is truly vital to their interests. I love seeing the British put in this position.

Maybe the British too must learn to make difficult choices: they had it too easy over the previous couple of centuries.

I concur, such a general congress would be truly useful and is coming but again, whatever deliberations it takes would be a waste of ink if the collapse of the Habsburg and the Russo-Turkish War have not preceded it. You can't rebuild an equilibrium in Europe that can last beyond a few years if the Habsburg and Balkan Ottoman zombies are still part of it.

I would expect the Hague or Bruxelles to be suitable "real neutral" locations for the Congress, in alternative to Berlin, since Denmark has fought germany just a few years before and is still too close to London.

The Hague it is, but don't sell the Ottomans down the river (yet).

 

[Eurofed]

I would be in favor of granting Fiume to the Hungarian-Croat Kingdom. Hungary would probably get a portion of the old A-H fleet, but nothing to write home about.

I am in full agreement about this.

OTOH, there is no reason for Germany to plan a Mediterranean fleet: the two partners have each his own bailiwick, Germany in the Baltic and Northern seas and Italy in the Mediterranean.
It's quite obvious that a lot depends on which will be the third partner (Russia or UK), but I would submit that in either case Germany should not start a naval race.

I agree on pretty much everything, I envisaged the German Mediterranean fleet as a possible German ploy just to ease the financial burden a little from Italy of defending the southern side of the alliance, and nothing more. But indeed it's not necessary. And indeed a lot on this amounts on which third partner the alliance picks, if they pick Russia they need to do all the naval defense by themselves, since UK and the Ottomans would bottle the Russian Black sea in the Straits (well, Russian Baltic fleet would still strenghten the German flett, however). If they pick Britain, their naval defence needs are basically covered, they then need to focus on big armies to keep the Russo-French at bay. However, even if they pick the UK, I still assume that Germany and Italy would each claim naval parity with whatever potential enemy nation gets the bigger fleet, France or Russia, out of genuine concerns over national security, and I don't think that UK would object to such a ratio, given that they go for their own France + Russia standard. Such a naval treaty would most likely be one of the first steps in a UK-GR-IT-HU Quadruple Alliance.

Colonial expansions requires mostly cruisers and destroyers; certaqinly gunboats, but no need for capital ships unless there is an European war.

Very true, although I still think that Berlin and Rome would go for a capital ship parity with a hopelessly hostile France.

You're very kind.

I appreciate insightful and productive discourse.

TTL Bismarck has been significantly more successful than his OTL counterpart; more importantly the map of Europe has changed in a big way, and I cannot believe that old Otto will not recognise it. The demise of A-H and the substantial weakening of France make Russia a less attractive partner for the future: Germany has got all they wanted in the west; future expansion (and I am thinking more in terms of economic Lebensraum rather than a political one) can only be to the East. Both Germany and Italy have become affluent and now have a position to defend: they will be looking for stability, which is not exactly a given when there is a big Russian bear bordering them in the East, and ready to gobble up the Balkans and Constantinople. I can go for Bismarck being a "broker" for the time being and playing Russia vs. UK. However Russia cannot be allowed to get Constantinople and this means that the Ottomans cannot be so easily taken off the map of the Balkans. More about this later.

You make compelling points on why Bismarck would be less of a Russophile ITTL than IOTL. And they make so that this Bismarck would have roughly equal chances to pick either side, or for the duration of his charge, play one side off the other and let his successors pick a definitive side when Anglo-Russian antagonism becomes too strong (again with roughly equal chances of htem choosing either). I would, however, argue, that they do not necessarily make a compelling argument for Germany necessarily picking Britain.

Concerning the Russian expansion in the Balkans, the only compelling German-Italian interest here is to keep such expansion off some zones that are vital to their national security and imperial interests: roughly speaking, Hungary-Croatia for Germany and Balkans' western coast and Greece for Italy. If Russian-sponsored Pan-Slavism and/or Romanian irrendetism start to encroach in these "red zones", G-I and Russia are going to be enemies. If not, Russian expansionism in the eastern-southern Balkans and the Middle East is not by itself so inimical to G-I interests that they they must perforce oppose it. If they stay friendly to Russia, they have as equally good perspectives of prospering developing economic links to Russian markets as to Ottoman ones, and from their viewpoint, a Russian- or British-dominated Middle East is not radically different.

Italy has a couple of major problems even in a very successful TL: the first one is to raise capitals for industrialization and infrastructure (French and A-H reparations are certainly a good thing, but they will not even pay for the war, much less additional development); the second problem is that they risk to copy the worst traits of Prussia (junkers, army dominance, insufficient limitations to the king's prerogatives. Mind, the Savoys were in love with these things IOTL too, figure it ITTL).
IOTL there were two major countries with surplus capitals available for investments abroad: UK and France. ITTL, France surplus is much smaller, and certainly they will not invest in Germany or Italy. If the partners antagonise UK too, were is the money coming from?
The second risk is even more of a danger in my view: if Russia becomes a full partner in the alliance, there will be a sharp conservative (maybe conservative is not strong enough a word) turn: it will be another Drei Kaiserbund.

The first reason you quote is indeed one of best, if not the best reasons why the G-I Alliance could prefer to pick the British alliance rather than the Russian one, apart from from Russia messing with what they perceive with their turf in the Balkans. I think French economy shall be less successful in TTL late 1800s, with the loss of western Lorraine too, heavier reparations, and more post-war severe political civil unrest, there shall not be that much of a surplus to share around anyway. I honestly dunno if late 1800s German and Italian rulers shall be clever enough to think of the trade and investment opportunities as a reason to prefer alliance with London, they might well be, or they might not.

As for the second reason, I do not find it all that compelling. It is true that late 1800s German & Italian political systems were very similar (one more reason why the alliance shall be rock-solid), a conservative-liberal hybrid, from the constitution to the makeup of the elites (an alliance of landowners from the relatively backward areas of the country and urban trading-industrialist elites from the most dynamic ones in both cases). However, both systems showed a consistent drive to evolve towards more progressive liberalism from the unification to WWI. Alliance with Russia, or with Britain, is not going to play a major role in influencing domestic policies either way, given that such alliances are not going to be any really ideologized (unless quite possibly it gets to be moderate conservative-liberal Germany-Italy vs. ultrareactionary-jingoist France-Spain cold War, but that would push towards more liberalism). If anything, such an alliance might be a minor nudge for Russia to liberalize.

Plus there is always a risk of a too successful Russia that ultimately swallows the partners too.

Hmm, Russia might grow very successful, but the Germany-Italy-Hungary core would always be its equal check, I'd reckon.

Give me UK please, with all the problems that such a choice might bring.

Well, you have given very good reasons why Britain would be a good choice, both for the economic benefits (mostly), for being an ally that is less overbearing in continental Europe, and one that comes with excellent naval protection, free of charge. I would only contend that there are other good reasons to pick Russia: it does not bind the Central Powers to expend themselves to defend a decaying multinational empire, it gives just as good if not better market opportunities if not nearly as good investments, it makes them supreme on the continent, and plausible colonial directions of expansion for G-I may collide with Russia or with UK just as likely, if in different areas. As such, I would deem that there is not an obvious choice, like the Berlin-Rome bloc was, it is a toss-up, with different butterflies we may easily see equally-probable TLs where either alliance blocs occur. The beauty of the choice is that they make for radically different outcomes, although in both Germany-italy and the continental European bloc they would build is equally very successful (although they still have to pass a World Wars crucible).

There is a Russian core, for sure: the old Muscovy. All the rest of the country has been taken by the sword. Look what happened in 1917 (and again in 1991).

True, but the Habsburg had no real core: Austria alone was wholly not up to the task, it would have needed a Germanized Czechia and/or Croatia for that, and the German-Magyar partnership never really get off.

I am not saying to get Russia's goat, but St. Stephen was too much of a Russian dream. I'm strongly convinced that something along the lines of Berlin 1878 is the natural default, and keeping a reasonably strong Ottoman presence in the Balkans is a must.

Hmm, you may be right about St.Stephen. However, I'm still strongly convinced that the OTL Congress of Berlin settlement was an unlivable and unworkable British dream. For better or worse, the Ottomans keeping overlordship over millions of Balkan Christian Europeans was an unseemely and embarassing zombie in the late 1800s. The Ottomans might be helped to keep a "corridor" and give some stability to those pontentially most contested (and contentious) areas from Thrace to Albania (where Muslim presence was crowded, by the way) but trying to keep half of Greece and Bulgaria under Constantinople was just a dumb, dumb attempt on London's part. More on that later.

Here I am not on the same page. This partitioning of the Balkans is an obvious disaster waiting to happen (like it did IOTL when the same map came out of the Balkan wars). Independence for Serbia and Romania is kinda ok, not for Bulgaria (which should get a semi-autonomous regime, but still as a part of the Ottoman empire). Greece might get Thessaly, but no more than that. UK gets Cyprus, and Italy Crete. Tunisia is recognised in the Italian sphere of influence, same as Tripolitania. Egypt status does not change.

Coming from the point I've expressed above, a different settlement may keep an Ottoman presence in the Balkans but compressing Greek and Bulgarian sensible national aspirations beyond reason is doomed to fail soon just like it did IOTL. Besides, with the demise of Austria, it really does not stand to reason that UK and the Ottomans are just as successful as IOTL, even if Germany and Italy play Britain and Russia against each other. The power equation is just less favorable to the Ottomans.

Therefore I counter-propose that the Ottomans keep Albania, Macedonia, and Thrace. Serbia, Romania, and Bulgaria go independent. Greece gets Thessaly, Epirus, and Crete. Bulgaria gets eastern Rumelia and modern borders. Serbia gets either a northern slice of Kosovo and Macedonia, or most of Kosovo. Montenegro may go independent or an Italian protectorate. Bosnia may go independent or an Hungarian protectorate. Italy gets its sphere of influence recognized over Tunisia and Tripolitania, and basing rights in Crete (not need for Italy to pick a serious irredentist feud with Greece over Crete, the island was much more central to Greek nationalism than Dodecaneso ever was, if Italy wants a foothold in eastern Mediterranean that much, better to seek theri sphere of influence extended to Cyrenaica as well), and/or the Ionian Islands. Britain gets Cyprus as usual.

I would create an autonomous principate out of Bosnia-Hercegovina, with a prince to be agreed by the powers. Give a slice of Kossovo to Serbia. Russia gets Bessarabia and bits and pieces in the Caucasus.

This is fine with me. I suppose you mean Southern Bessarabia, since the rest has been Russian for a long while.

Assuming a F-I-G war in occasion of the Luxembourg crisis, and anticipating a bit the Bulgarian crisis, the following timetable could be drawn:

• 1868: F-I-G war and Ausgleich
• 1869: German empire proclaimed, Italy occupies Rome, Pope leave on a Spanish ship to Barcelona.
• 1870: excommunication of Italian king by Pope, who also speaks against the ungodly German government. Tumults in France, Austria, Hungary.
• 1871: Kulturkampf starts in Germany, soon imitated by Italy (strong impulse on state education to counter catholic schools). A council is convened in Barcelona by Pius IX. Germany and Italy ask for an oath of fealty by bishops before allowing them to attend. All Church property in Rome and Latium is seized by Italian state (with the only exception of the Vatican)
• 1872: doctrine of papal infallibility voted in council with poor attendance. Stronger reactions in catholic world, liberal bishops objecting strongly to it. Russia fuels incidents in Bulgaria.
• 1873: Bulgarian situation gets worse; Serbia and Montenegro send an ultimatum to the Porte and declare war. Russia backs S and M, but fails to obtain A-H support. Balkan crisis precipitates a worse crisis in the Austrian empire.
• 1874: Serbian troops routed by Ottomans, who advance toward Belgrade. Russian ultimatum to the Porte, confrontation across the Danube. Monarchy voted back by French parliament (the comte de Chambord accepts the tricolor). Riots in Vienna, Belgrade, Prague. The emperor leaves the capital for Salzburg. Government falls, Hungarian parliament votes for independence.
• 1875: Russian troops enter Bulgaria, Romania drags her feet. Consultations between Berlin, Rome and London. Front in Bulgaria stabilizes at Varna. Ultimatum of the 3 powers to Russia, Serbia and Porte for a cease fire. A pan-european congress colled for May 1876 at the Hague to address the Balkan crisis and to mediate the almost-civil-war status in A-H

Hmm, as I said, I'm not that convinced that the Habsburg would life in them to last almost another decade, so I would anticipate the start of theri collapse to 1872 or so, with the polarization caused by the Pope's actions as the trigger. You then have riots in Vienna, Prague, and Budapest by 1873, Hungary is in open secession by 1874 and Austria, Czechia, and Croatia close to civil war, in 1875 Germany, Italy, and Russia enact a military intervention and de facto partition of the Habsburg lands. Germany and Italy are in an uneasy stance towards Russia, on one hand they are defacto allies with Russia about the Habsburg partition, on the other they fear Russian expansion in Hungary and Croatia. So they support Britain's call for a general congress. Why is Romania dragging its feet ? it seems odd to me. It didn't IOTL and with Austria going dodo it has even less reason to. Apart from this, your TL seems fine.

Obviously Boulanger would still be a captain or something similar in 1869. It should not be difficult to find some strong man in the French army, though.

So very true, OTL France from 1799 to 1961 has shown no dearth of ambitious would-be strongman generals.

In 1873 there was a monarchist majority in parliament, and the Orleanist pretender choose not to press his case. The last Bourbon pretender (Henri, comte de Chamborde) started a progress toward Paris, but everything collapsed when he refused to accept the tricolor as French flag. ITTL he might be better advised (however when he dies in 4 or 5 years the heir will be the Carlist pretender).

Maybe with the ultrareactionary Catholics raising hell in support of the Pope, some clergy close supporter advises him to make a compromise on "minor" issues like the flag for the greater good of making France a stronghold for their cause. It seems like the kind of advice a smart Jesuit could give. And yep, the whole dynastic ploy could also be played, both by French nationalists and ultra-Catholics on both sides of the Pyrenees, as a big plan to rebuild the Bourbon-Carlist French-Spanish union as a reactionary strongold. With strong ultra-Catholic support, and the other great powers distrcted in the Balkans, this can easily succeed. Possibly, the Pope sets up shop again in Avignon (the place has tradition) as a pampered guest and living propaganda piece of the reactionary French-Spanish ruling clique. A very clever ploy in many ways. Of course, it has its own drawbacks, the Pope is buying his ticket to a new Western Schism. More on this later.

One of the butterflies is that Vatican 1st is not convened in Rome (papal infallibility). As I said before, Pius IX might call for a council from his exile in Spain, but I think the attendance will be limited. Stronger kulturkampf in Germany and stronger anti-clericalism in Italy. The pope will be painted as a dupe of the French, but also as an autocrat who wants to roll back the clock. Most likely the bishops will be forced to swear fealty to the king. IOTL there was a minor schism after Vatican 1st: the "old catholics" refused to accept the doctrine of papal infallibility (and Bismarck tried to use them in his kulturkampf, but in the end agreed a concordat with the pope). ITTL the ideological divide (and also the personal positions) might be much harder to mediate: the schism might be really successful, opposing the liberal wing of the church to the conservative one.

This is absolutely right. All of this would happen, and tying resistance to the Pope with nationalism could easily give the fuel to lets the Old Catholics movement really take off. If they do, Bismarck and the Italian liberal government is going to take a two-prongs approach to crush ultra-Catholic opposition, a mix of police repression and economic confiscations against them as well as giving patronage to the Old Catholics as the "patriotic" Church against the treasonous dupes of the French. Expect comparisons with the Avignon Papacy to be played a lot. Ooh, this is really interesting, if Germany and Italy play their cards well, you could easily see most of their Catholics switching to Old Catholic-liberal Catholic allegiance. Basically, it's a modern version of the Western Schism getting entrenched, as well as abudant ideological fuel for a late 19th century Cold War. Well, this might be an additional ideological justification for Germany and Italy seeking an alliance with liberal Britain. We would have two nice Cold War blocs, ultra-Catholic France-Spain and Tsarist Russia vs. liberal Britain and moderate conservative-liberal Germany-Italy-Hungary.

It works, but a note: all of this shall make the "Boulangist" regime really nasty, the Inquistion crossbreed with proto-fascism, much like an amped-up Franco's Spain. And as the SCW analogy indicates, when this Cold War inevitably turns hot sooner or later, it shall not be a nice war. I can totally see the "Boulangists" turning to atrocities, crusade mentalities do not make for chivalrous soliders.

I'm quite in favor of this development. However what makes you think that Pius IX will be again followed by Leo XIII? ITTL the "religion war" will certainly be harsher and a more conservative and hard-assed pope might be elected.

So very true, especially following the "Western Schism redux" development I've described, with a Crusade-Cold War mentality getting entrenched.

Hmm, we have just laid the basis for a very different Catholic Church in the 20th century. Barring wild military butterflies, when the Liberal Quadruple Alliance wins WWI, and the Old Catholic-liberal faction gets the upper hand in the Church as a result, hardcore Catholic social and political conservativism and Papal infallibility are going to become taboo and an heresy (esp. if the Boulangists go really nasty before and after the war). You would see an early and much more radical Vatican II Council.

Maybe the British too must learn to make difficult choices: they had it too easy over the previous couple of centuries.

Indeed, time to realize that not every continental European hegemony is the devil.

The Hague it is, but don't sell the Ottomans down the river (yet).

I do not, but frankly, their overlordship over Balkan European Christian nations in 1878 was as politically viable as the HRE after the French Revolution. The Albanian-Macedonian-Thracian "corridor" is very much the best they may keep, with or without the efforts of the London-Berlin-Rome bloc to prop them up.

 

[LordKalvan]

I agree on pretty much everything, I envisaged the German Mediterranean fleet as a possible German ploy just to ease the financial burden a little from Italy of defending the southern side of the alliance, and nothing more. But indeed it's not necessary. And indeed a lot on this amounts on which third partner the alliance picks, if they pick Russia they need to do all the naval defense by themselves, since UK and the Ottomans would bottle the Russian Black sea in the Straits (well, Russian Baltic fleet would still strenghten the German fleet, however). If they pick Britain, their naval defence needs are basically covered, they then need to focus on big armies to keep the Russo-French at bay. However, even if they pick the UK, I still assume that Germany and Italy would each claim naval parity with whatever potential enemy nation gets the bigger fleet, France or Russia, out of genuine concerns over national security, and I don't think that UK would object to such a ratio, given that they go for their own France + Russia standard. Such a naval treaty would most likely be one of the first steps in a UK-GR-IT-HU Quadruple Alliance.

I am not so convinced that the time has come for a real pan-European naval treaty. It will come naturally over the years, but if there is no real crisis and the players are honest, the formalization can wait. Not to mention that naval warfare is changing very fast over these decades and any kind of parity has truly no long-lasting meaning.
Having a look at the two different alternatives, I would say that a G-I-GB alliance does not require any significant adjustments: the three partners will go along as before. The focus will obviously be bottling the Russians in the Baltic and Black seas and keeping a capital ship avantage over France (quite easy - and if the new Franco-Spanish union believes that they can truly participate in a naval race they are truly deluded and will wreck their economies for nothing).

You make compelling points on why Bismarck would be less of a Russophile ITTL than IOTL. And they make so that this Bismarck would have roughly equal chances to pick either side, or for the duration of his charge, play one side off the other and let his successors pick a definitive side when Anglo-Russian antagonism becomes too strong (again with roughly equal chances of htem choosing either). I would, however, argue, that they do not necessarily make a compelling argument for Germany necessarily picking Britain.

I do honestly believe that Bismarck will try to play Russia against GB: it looks like the thing he would naturally do and ITTL he does not really need to pick a partner in the immediate.
The decision cannot be delayed forever, though. The true issue in delaying is that the decision point might come when Bismarck is getting long in the tooth and when his internal political position might be weaker.
Another reason for choosing England - btw - is that Russia is potentially a giant but will require significant investments and some serious luck to become a truly developed nation. If the line-up is F-S-R, France would have to scrape the bottom of the barrel to find money to invest in both Spain and Russia; the same however would apply to a Germany trying to pay the bill for everyone, even if the stress would be significantly lower.
OTOH, GB-F-Spain would have no problem at all in raising capitals, and would enjoy an uncontestable supremacy on the seas; same thing would obviously happen with a G-I-GB line-up (which would have an overwhelming superiority also in terms of armies).
IMHO, the only thing which must be avoided at all costs is GB entering into an alliance with France: which means that the British desires in the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean cannot be just dismissed.

Concerning the Russian expansion in the Balkans, the only compelling German-Italian interest here is to keep such expansion off some zones that are vital to their national security and imperial interests: roughly speaking, Hungary-Croatia for Germany and Balkans' western coast and Greece for Italy. If Russian-sponsored Pan-Slavism and/or Romanian irrendetism start to encroach in these "red zones", G-I and Russia are going to be enemies. If not, Russian expansionism in the eastern-southern Balkans and the Middle East is not by itself so inimical to G-I interests that they they must perforce oppose it. If they stay friendly to Russia, they have as equally good perspectives of prospering developing economic links to Russian markets as to Ottoman ones, and from their viewpoint, a Russian- or British-dominated Middle East is not radically different.

I have already addressed the issues you are describing here; let me add that there is a substantial difference between allowing unbridled Russian expansionism and keep most of the status-quo, tossing a bone or two to the Russians but keeping the Ottomans in at least nominal control. What will happen in Middle East, and who's going to control that region, is a question for the future: in 1870 ME and Arabia are not on the top list of anyone.

The first reason you quote is indeed one of best, if not the best reasons why the G-I Alliance could prefer to pick the British alliance rather than the Russian one, apart from from Russia messing with what they perceive with their turf in the Balkans. I think French economy shall be less successful in TTL late 1800s, with the loss of western Lorraine too, heavier reparations, and more post-war severe political civil unrest, there shall not be that much of a surplus to share around anyway. I honestly dunno if late 1800s German and Italian rulers shall be clever enough to think of the trade and investment opportunities as a reason to prefer alliance with London, they might well be, or they might not.

Hope they will be visionary enough, or clever enough, as you want.

As for the second reason, I do not find it all that compelling. It is true that late 1800s German & Italian political systems were very similar (one more reason why the alliance shall be rock-solid), a conservative-liberal hybrid, from the constitution to the makeup of the elites (an alliance of landowners from the relatively backward areas of the country and urban trading-industrialist elites from the most dynamic ones in both cases). However, both systems showed a consistent drive to evolve towards more progressive liberalism from the unification to WWI. Alliance with Russia, or with Britain, is not going to play a major role in influencing domestic policies either way, given that such alliances are not going to be any really ideologized (unless quite possibly it gets to be moderate conservative-liberal Germany-Italy vs. ultrareactionary-jingoist France-Spain cold War, but that would push towards more liberalism). If anything, such an alliance might be a minor nudge for Russia to liberalize.

Well, maybe I was a bit unclear here: no doubt that Germany and Italy will not factor liberalism in their geopolitical decisions. The second reason was strictly a personal one: why I had a so strong preference for a British alliance.

Hmm, Russia might grow very successful, but the Germany-Italy-Hungary core would always be its equal check, I'd reckon.

Maybe. I've still in mind Stalin and his divisions, though.

Well, you have given very good reasons why Britain would be a good choice, both for the economic benefits (mostly), for being an ally that is less overbearing in continental Europe, and one that comes with excellent naval protection, free of charge. I would only contend that there are other good reasons to pick Russia: it does not bind the Central Powers to expend themselves to defend a decaying multinational empire, it gives just as good if not better market opportunities if not nearly as good investments, it makes them supreme on the continent, and plausible colonial directions of expansion for G-I may collide with Russia or with UK just as likely, if in different areas. As such, I would deem that there is not an obvious choice, like the Berlin-Rome bloc was, it is a toss-up, with different butterflies we may easily see equally-probable TLs where either alliance blocs occur. The beauty of the choice is that they make for radically different outcomes, although in both Germany-italy and the continental European bloc they would build is equally very successful (although they still have to pass a World Wars crucible).

Market opportunities would be as good (or better) in alliance with GB too. Russia will always need to buy industrial goods.
"Defending a decaying multi-national empire" will not require too strenuous efforts: a strong diplomatic posture will suffice, if not a couple of blows on the nose of the Russian bear should be more than enough.

True, but the Habsburg had no real core: Austria alone was wholly not up to the task, it would have needed a Germanized Czechia and/or Croatia for that, and the German-Magyar partnership never really get off.

They still had a better and longer grip on the empire than the Romanovs.

Hmm, you may be right about St.Stephen. However, I'm still strongly convinced that the OTL Congress of Berlin settlement was an unlivable and unworkable British dream. For better or worse, the Ottomans keeping overlordship over millions of Balkan Christian Europeans was an unseemely and embarassing zombie in the late 1800s. The Ottomans might be helped to keep a "corridor" and give some stability to those pontentially most contested (and contentious) areas from Thrace to Albania (where Muslim presence was crowded, by the way) but trying to keep half of Greece and Bulgaria under Constantinople was just a dumb, dumb attempt on London's part. More on that later.

We'll have to agree to disagree.

Coming from the point I've expressed above, a different settlement may keep an Ottoman presence in the Balkans but compressing Greek and Bulgarian sensible national aspirations beyond reason is doomed to fail soon just like it did IOTL. Besides, with the demise of Austria, it really does not stand to reason that UK and the Ottomans are just as successful as IOTL, even if Germany and Italy play Britain and Russia against each other. The power equation is just less favorable to the Ottomans.

Therefore I counter-propose that the Ottomans keep Albania, Macedonia, and Thrace. Serbia, Romania, and Bulgaria go independent. Greece gets Thessaly, Epirus, and Crete. Bulgaria gets eastern Rumelia and modern borders. Serbia gets either a northern slice of Kosovo and Macedonia, or most of Kosovo. Montenegro may go independent or an Italian protectorate. Bosnia may go independent or an Hungarian protectorate. Italy gets its sphere of influence recognized over Tunisia and Tripolitania, and basing rights in Crete (not need for Italy to pick a serious irredentist feud with Greece over Crete, the island was much more central to Greek nationalism than Dodecaneso ever was, if Italy wants a foothold in eastern Mediterranean that much, better to seek theri sphere of influence extended to Cyrenaica as well), and/or the Ionian Islands. Britain gets Cyprus as usual.

Let me address the Cretan issue first: the population mix is very similar to Cyprus (roughly 60% Greeks and 40% Turkish) and an annexation to Greece would be a potential disaster. IOTL the island was administered by the Powers from 1898 to 1905 IIRC to prepare the transfer to Greece and build up enough of a civil administration to make the transfer feasible. It might be something of the same kind here. Italian interest in Crete is obviously naval: keeping an eye on Egypt and the Canal.
Greece should be happy enough with Thessaly; the more you go to the North, the higher the percentage of Moslem population and the more acute the integration problems will be.
There is no reason to grant full independence to Bulgaria: for the reasons mentioned earlier (but also to avoid too strong a Russian presence near the Straits) a status of autonomous principality under Ottoman suzerainety would be best.
Serbia (who has underperformed in their short bout with the Ottomans) should be more than happy with a piece of Kosovo and a slice of Bosnia, together with full independence.
I would give the Romanians a piece of Transylvania, even if the Hungarians will scream murder: ethnically t makes sense, and it makes sense also if the target is to keep Romania close to Germany and Italy rather than remaining a Russian pawn.

This is fine with me. I suppose you mean Southern Bessarabia, since the rest has been Russian for a long while.

Yup

Hmm, as I said, I'm not that convinced that the Habsburg would life in them to last almost another decade, so I would anticipate the start of theri collapse to 1872 or so, with the polarization caused by the Pope's actions as the trigger. You then have riots in Vienna, Prague, and Budapest by 1873, Hungary is in open secession by 1874 and Austria, Czechia, and Croatia close to civil war, in 1875 Germany, Italy, and Russia enact a military intervention and de facto partition of the Habsburg lands. Germany and Italy are in an uneasy stance towards Russia, on one hand they are defacto allies with Russia about the Habsburg partition, on the other they fear Russian expansion in Hungary and Croatia. So they support Britain's call for a general congress. Why is Romania dragging its feet ? it seems odd to me. It didn't IOTL and with Austria going dodo it has even less reason to. Apart from this, your TL seems fine.

IOTL Romania dragged its feet a lot at the beginning of hostilities, and participated in full only in the second part of the operations. It might be just lack of supply and poor organization of the army (which was certainly true); ITTL might also be the result of some pressures on Carol from his German buddies.
I like your take of the dissolution of the A-H empire. Maybe it could be made even more smoothier if the start is a German intervention in Bohemia, to restore civil order (maybe all starts with a request from Austrian authorities).
Once the Germans are in Prague, the whole house of cards fall down: Hungary proclaims independence, in union with Croatia; Italians enter lower Austria and Slovenia, and Russia claims civil unrest on its border to enter Galicia and Krakow. Then London calls for a truce and a congress.

Maybe with the ultrareactionary Catholics raising hell in support of the Pope, some clergy close supporter advises him to make a compromise on "minor" issues like the flag for the greater good of making France a stronghold for their cause. It seems like the kind of advice a smart Jesuit could give. And yep, the whole dynastic ploy could also be played, both by French nationalists and ultra-Catholics on both sides of the Pyrenees, as a big plan to rebuild the Bourbon-Carlist French-Spanish union as a reactionary strongold. With strong ultra-Catholic support, and the other great powers distrcted in the Balkans, this can easily succeed. Possibly, the Pope sets up shop again in Avignon (the place has tradition) as a pampered guest and living propaganda piece of the reactionary French-Spanish ruling clique. A very clever ploy in many ways. Of course, it has its own drawbacks, the Pope is buying his ticket to a new Western Schism. More on this later.

There is a personal letter of the pope to the count of Chambord exhorting him to pick up the French crown and restore the most catholic kingdom, blah blah, blah.
Avignon would be an obvious choice (even if the pope gave up the Avignon feud at the Congress of Vienna, IIRC). It would be most cheeky, considering that it will be almost on the Italian border. I do agree that it's the beginning of a very real new western schism.

This is absolutely right. All of this would happen, and tying resistance to the Pope with nationalism could easily give the fuel to lets the Old Catholics movement really take off. If they do, Bismarck and the Italian liberal government is going to take a two-prongs approach to crush ultra-Catholic opposition, a mix of police repression and economic confiscations against them as well as giving patronage to the Old Catholics as the "patriotic" Church against the treasonous dupes of the French. Expect comparisons with the Avignon Papacy to be played a lot. Ooh, this is really interesting, if Germany and Italy play their cards well, you could easily see most of their Catholics switching to Old Catholic-liberal Catholic allegiance. Basically, it's a modern version of the Western Schism getting entrenched, as well as abudant ideological fuel for a late 19th century Cold War. Well, this might be an additional ideological justification for Germany and Italy seeking an alliance with liberal Britain. We would have two nice Cold War blocs, ultra-Catholic France-Spain and Tsarist Russia vs. liberal Britain and moderate conservative-liberal Germany-Italy-Hungary.

It works, but a note: all of this shall make the "Boulangist" regime really nasty, the Inquistion crossbreed with proto-fascism, much like an amped-up Franco's Spain. And as the SCW analogy indicates, when this Cold War inevitably turns hot sooner or later, it shall not be a nice war. I can totally see the "Boulangists" turning to atrocities, crusade mentalities do not make for chivalrous soliders.

You make a lot of good points. The schism will be quite successful ITTL, what with the much greater support by governments and the very strong political polarization. I would expect that it will draw sympathies also in London, where will be see as similar to what Henry VIII did. I do wonder what kind of reception will get in the Americas (even if I would say that the principle of separation between state and church will make it very popular in the USA too).
I am quite convinced that this will make "Boulangism" nastier and your definition (a cross-breed of proto-Fascism and Inquisition) is quite apt.
OTOH, all ideological wars and guerrillas were quite nasty IOTL and maybe it's better to pull the tooth as early as possible.
I would also anticipate that the schism break lines will leave the liberal church all in the Old-Catholic field and that there will be a much stronger participation of this liberal church in the social field. I would not be surprised to see a strong mix of Christianity and socialism prevailing in the society with a similar reduction of the marxist influence.

So very true, especially following the "Western Schism redux" development I've described, with a Crusade-Cold War mentality getting entrenched.

Hmm, we have just laid the basis for a very different Catholic Church in the 20th century. Barring wild military butterflies, when the Liberal Quadruple Alliance wins WWI, and the Old Catholic-liberal faction gets the upper hand in the Church as a result, hardcore Catholic social and political conservativism and Papal infallibility are going to become taboo and an heresy (esp. if the Boulangists go really nasty before and after the war). You would see an early and much more radical Vatican II Council.

It will go much faster than this: the main tenet of the Old-catholics is that any decision in terms of doctrine can only be taken by the whole church in assembly (and this will also fuel the democratic appeal of the schismatics). The most likely outcome will be the birth of national churches in full communion but where only the major issues will have to be decided in common

Agreed - as I said before - that this church will be stronly oriented toward liberalism and democracy.

Indeed, time to realize that not every continental European hegemony is the devil.

Very true

I do not, but frankly, their overlordship over Balkan European Christian nations in 1878 was as politically viable as the HRE after the French Revolution. The Albanian-Macedonian-Thracian "corridor" is very much the best they may keep, with or without the efforts of the London-Berlin-Rome bloc to prop them up.

An Ottoman overlordship in the Balkans might not be the best theoretical solution but it might be the most practical one at least for the time being and remembering that there will be Capitulations in place. The alternative would be most likely either pan-slavism (which is a nice way of naming a Russian egemony in the region) or round after round of vicious infighting, ethnical cleansing, exasperated nationalism (which more or less describes in a sentence the last 150 years of Balkan history).
This is one of the reasons for which I proposed an independent (or at least autonomous) Bosnia-Hercegovina under an European prince chosen by the powers: B-H with its mix of moslems, catholics and orthodox might be the right place to try a kind of social experimentation and prove (or disprove) that these different segments of the population can live and prosper together.
What I don't want (and I believe that Germany and Italy would promptly agree with me) is an ante-litteram Yugoslavia, with the Serbs lording over everyone else. By all means give Serbia some portions of the Kossovo (not all of it: the areas with an Albanian majority should not be handed over) and possibly a slice of Bosnia. Leave the Croats and the Slovaks in the Hungarian kingdom (it's rather unlikely it will work in the long term, but it's a reasonable solutione in the immediate) and have Slovenia raised to the status of independent grand-duchy (again under an European prince: strangely enough - given the slant of this TL - I would suggest Ferdinand of Habsburg Lothringen, the last grand-duke of Tuscany. He's young enough to be flexible and was raised in a liberal court away from Vienna. The name should have also an allure for the Slovenians). As a side note, I do hope that Bismarck can prevail in not having Bohemia integrated in the German empire: strip away the border areas with a German majority, if one must, but avoid having a second non-German minority within the borders of the empire.

 

[Workable Goblin]

Awesome ideas guys, looking forward to the TL

 

[Eurofed]

I am not so convinced that the time has come for a real pan-European naval treaty. It will come naturally over the years, but if there is no real crisis and the players are honest, the formalization can wait. Not to mention that naval warfare is changing very fast over these decades and any kind of parity has truly no long-lasting meaning.

Urm, sorry, I misexplained myself. I indeed agree that this is far too early for a Pan-european naval treaty. I was speaking of a naval ratio between Britain, Germany, and Italy that could arise (either as an informal agreement or a formal treaty) as part of their alliance. As the naval race was the stumbling block that killed any prospect of an Anglo-German Alliance and Britain joining the Triple Alliance IOTL, I was expecting that such an agreement would happen to make London fully at ease with its new allies.

Of course, it also depends on when the alliance would solidify. The German capital ship naval craze was a 1890s phenomenon, and Britain became seriously interested into an European alliance in the same decade. If G-I and UK are already allied or in full detente by then, most likely, the idea of a capital ship naval race would never occur to Germany and Italy or they would quickly bury it in order to appease an ally, and shielded by the RN, they would just focus on developing a different type of fleet for themselves, one more suited to colonial expansion. When do you think this G-I-GB Triple Alliance would solidify ITTL ?

Having a look at the two different alternatives, I would say that a G-I-GB alliance does not require any significant adjustments: the three partners will go along as before. The focus will obviously be bottling the Russians in the Baltic and Black seas and keeping a capital ship avantage over France (quite easy - and if the new Franco-Spanish union believes that they can truly participate in a naval race they are truly deluded and will wreck their economies for nothing).

All very true. Well, to a degree I would expect that the French-Spanish shall seriously strain their economies for military build-up, even if they may split their efforts between land armies to counter the Italo-Germans, and a fleet to counter the British. Theirs shall be a regime built on crusading ultra-reactionary Catholicism and jingoist proto-fascism, the mix calls for a really serious military build-up. Of course, the regime can go on for a while promishing the final battle and deferring it (but not for ever, since there is no MAD to hold them back) out of various excuses, and appeasing the masses with the colonial race in the meanwhile, but a lot of cannons is a necessary component to give their regime (and propaganda) credibility and teeth. Yeah, it shall strain the economy: the masses shall feel the pinch, that's what propaganda is for and failing that, the secret police (if they are going to ally with Tsarist Russia, I bet they get to learn some clues from the Okrana, and then again, they have the Inquisition as a role model, probably ITTL the Boulangist regime trailblazes the world in inventing the modern police state).

I do honestly believe that Bismarck will try to play Russia against GB: it looks like the thing he would naturally do and ITTL he does not really need to pick a partner in the immediate.
The decision cannot be delayed forever, though.

Indeed to both.

The true issue in delaying is that the decision point might come when Bismarck is getting long in the tooth and when his internal political position might be weaker.

Very true. However, I would also point out that a parallel issue is when London becomes truly interested into an European alliance. IOTL it did not really happen before the 1890s. Now, if somehow ITTL international tensions could push both Bismarck and Whitehall to make a committment in the mid-1880s at latest, Bismarck was still sufficiently strong to entrench the alliance. Not to mention, ITTL Bismarck, and his Italian counterparts, are even more successful than IOTL, whatever foreign policy precedent they set, shall be regarded with greatest deference.

Another reason for choosing England - btw - is that Russia is potentially a giant but will require significant investments and some serious luck to become a truly developed nation. If the line-up is F-S-R, France would have to scrape the bottom of the barrel to find money to invest in both Spain and Russia; the same however would apply to a Germany trying to pay the bill for everyone, even if the stress would be significantly lower.
OTOH, GB-F-Spain would have no problem at all in raising capitals, and would enjoy an uncontestable supremacy on the seas; same thing would obviously happen with a G-I-GB line-up (which would have an overwhelming superiority also in terms of armies).

So very true. The economic benefits of the British option are undeniable. And I agree that France shall seriously strain its resources to gear up itself as well as Spain and Russia, but given that it's going to be a proto-totalitarian regime, it's also going to have significantly more leeway to squeeze money out of its subjects' pockets. With all due political differences, I would point out to the analogy of the Nazi and Soviet military-industrial build-ups. True, like in both examples, it cannot go on forever, but I would expect that when the French economic situation starts to go south, the regime just pushes for the long-deferred general war.

IMHO, the only thing which must be avoided at all costs is GB entering into an alliance with France: which means that the British desires in the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean cannot be just dismissed.

Very reasonable.

I have already addressed the issues you are describing here; let me add that there is a substantial difference between allowing unbridled Russian expansionism and keep most of the status-quo, tossing a bone or two to the Russians but keeping the Ottomans in at least nominal control. What will happen in Middle East, and who's going to control that region, is a question for the future: in 1870 ME and Arabia are not on the top list of anyone.

I agree. However, my main concern here was that the Quadruple Alliance may make a committment to support faltering Ottoman control in the Balkans against national aspirations of peoples in the region beyond any reasonable viability, besides any Pan-Slav or Pan-Orthodox trouble Russia may or may not stir up. I would loathe to see London, Berlin, and Rome committ themselves to be the Balkan Metternichs. More on this later.

By the way, I think that IC the Alliance shall be officially called a Quadruple one in diplomatic circles, to appease Magyar-Croat pride, but how shall TTL journalists, and later historians, call it, Triple or Quadruple Alliance (well, the Ottomans shall likely become a full partner, too, so it would be Quintuple Alliance, but I would expect it to happen much later, at the verge of WWI, much like IOTL, when names shall have become entrenched) ? Maybe the latter, since in all likelihood London joins the alliance somewhat later Berlin, Rome, and Budapest found it. By the way, does it still become known as the "Central Powers", too, even if Britain is the odd appendix ? In practice, they are the liberal bloc, in comparison to the Tsarists and Boulangists.

I suppose that "Entente" may still be as a good name for the F-S-R bloc as any (even if the British propaganda no doubt shall invent all kinds of derogatory labels and nicknames for their enemies: a funny thing is that "Huns" no doubt gets slapped on the shoulders of the Russians ITTL, besides the mandatory comparison with the "Mongol hordes"; I wonder what they shall invent for the Boulangists; maybe they dust off "Popists", or "New Inquisition").

Hope they will be visionary enough, or clever enough, as you want.

Well, it is not a given, but there's a definite possibility, since as you point out, there are very definite strategic benefits from a British alliance to supplement the economic benefits. The strategtic benefits are likely more familiar than the economic ones to Bismarck and the Italian liberals, although a leap of insight about the latter ones cannot be ruled out.

As you said, this alliance requires on Berlin and Rome's part a genuine committment to share British concerns in the Balkans and Middle East (and I would add, no capital ship race). On London's part, a genuine committment to share the military burden of fighting the F-S-R block (in other words, if German grenadiers and Italian bersaglieri have to die to hold back the Russian hordes, the British have to churn out a serious BEF). Also an effort to make the allies' colonial expansion directives mutually compatible, but I do not think it shall be a serious problem. Of course, I think all of this can be done rather easily once the political will develops.

Well, maybe I was a bit unclear here: no doubt that Germany and Italy will not factor liberalism in their geopolitical decisions.

Very true, even if as the Cold War/Western Schism antagonism with Boulangist France-Spain heats up, they are going to start using it as an ideological rallying point, and it shall definitely become a significant one during WWI.

The second reason was strictly a personal one: why I had a so strong preference for a British alliance.

Then rest your concerns, since as you see, I see ample ground for such an alliance to happen. I do not see it as a given, but definitely a very strong possiblity.

Maybe. I've still in mind Stalin and his divisions, though.

Well, you happen to discuss with an hardcore Uralist, who is fully convinced that without American help, the plausible best that Stalin could hope for was a Brest-Litovsk peace.

Market opportunities would be as good (or better) in alliance with GB too. Russia will always need to buy industrial goods.

Very true.

"Defending a decaying multi-national empire" will not require too strenuous efforts: a strong diplomatic posture will suffice, if not a couple of blows on the nose of the Russian bear should be more than enough.

Intimidating the Russian bear into behaving does not really concern me. As you point out, it can be done without excessive effort for a long time (even in the long term, a WWI cannot be avoided, esp. when Russia has modernized enough to risk the gamble, or France-Spain deems it has to make good on its rethoric or lose credibility/suffer economic collapse from overspending). I am worried about having to deploy forces and/or stage frequent military interventions to keep down the unwilling subjects of the Ottomans.

Let me address the Cretan issue first: the population mix is very similar to Cyprus (roughly 60% Greeks and 40% Turkish) and an annexation to Greece would be a potential disaster. IOTL the island was administered by the Powers from 1898 to 1905 IIRC to prepare the transfer to Greece and build up enough of a civil administration to make the transfer feasible. It might be something of the same kind here. Italian interest in Crete is obviously naval: keeping an eye on Egypt and the Canal.

I see. Well, the argument is good. But again, Greek irredentism shall make the island quite unruly. I wonder whether it would be better for Italy to administer it alone, or make it a joint effort with its allies. Naval bases would be good either way.

Greece should be happy enough with Thessaly; the more you go to the North, the higher the percentage of Moslem population and the more acute the integration problems will be.

The same conditions that apply to Thessaly also apply to southern Epirus, it was an overwhelmingly Greek and Christian area, therefore I deem that to deny either to Greece is just to court unnecessary trouble.

There is no reason to grant full independence to Bulgaria: for the reasons mentioned earlier (but also to avoid too strong a Russian presence near the Straits) a status of autonomous principality under Ottoman suzerainety would be best.

Ok, for the political status, but again, I'm absolutely convinced that the Bulgarian autonomus principality ought to enjoy national unification. No zany division into northern Bulgaria and eastern Rumelia. The latter was overwhelmingly Bulgarian and to force its division is just to court trouble by committing the Great Powers to enforce a denial of national feeling that is unlivable in the medium term. Again, do not repeat Metternich's mistakes.

Serbia (who has underperformed in their short bout with the Ottomans) should be more than happy with a piece of Kosovo and a slice of Bosnia, together with full independence.

Granted.

I would give the Romanians a piece of Transylvania, even if the Hungarians will scream murder: ethnically t makes sense, and it makes sense also if the target is to keep Romania close to Germany and Italy rather than remaining a Russian pawn.

Well, theoretically the right slice to do this would be southern Transylvania & the Banat, which were strongly Romanian. However, I am dubious that Germany and Italy would be willing to do this, for various reasons: Hungarians would indeed scream murder, if the integrity of the Kingdom of St-Stephen is compromised, and for G-I a content Hungary is much more important than a friendly Romania; there was a sizable German minority in Transylvania, and probably Germany is happier to see them under satellite Hungary (given that IOTL they were typically extempt from Magyarization) than under dubious friend Romania; in a future war against Russia, it is much better if the integrity of the Carpathians natural border is not breached. It is theoretically possible, and more just from the point of national self-determination, but I do not see G-I much willing to do this, frankly to them a loyal and easily defensible Greater Hungary-Croatia is much more useful than a friendly Romania. They are only going to do this if Hungarian control over Transylvania seriously starts to slip in the face of Romanian irredentism.

IOTL Romania dragged its feet a lot at the beginning of hostilities, and participated in full only in the second part of the operations. It might be just lack of supply and poor organization of the army (which was certainly true); ITTL might also be the result of some pressures on Carol from his German buddies.

OK

I like your take of the dissolution of the A-H empire. Maybe it could be made even more smoothier if the start is a German intervention in Bohemia, to restore civil order (maybe all starts with a request from Austrian authorities).

Either this, or German Austrians Pan-German liberal-nationalists gain the upper hand in Vienna and make a plead to join the German Empire. Or both. These are calls that Bismarck politically cannot ignore, despite his personal feelings.

Once the Germans are in Prague, the whole house of cards fall down: Hungary proclaims independence, in union with Croatia; Italians enter lower Austria and Slovenia, and Russia claims civil unrest on its border to enter Galicia and Krakow. Then London calls for a truce and a congress.

I fully expect Russians to occupy and later claim Bukovina as well, but otherwise very plausible. We are in full agreement here.

There is a personal letter of the pope to the count of Chambord exhorting him to pick up the French crown and restore the most catholic kingdom, blah blah, blah.

Probably ITTL Chambord meets the Pope when he flights to France, and the message gets heard in full.

Avignon would be an obvious choice (even if the pope gave up the Avignon feud at the Congress of Vienna, IIRC). It would be most cheeky, considering that it will be almost on the Italian border. I do agree that it's the beginning of a very real new western schism.

The Pope indeed lost ownership of Avignon in 1815. However, this would not stop him from setting up court there again as a pampered guest of the Bourbon-Carlist monarchy. Closeness to the Italian border might raise theoretical concerns about the Pope's safety in case of war, but it is not an overwhelming issue IMO, since the border is not that close. A possible prestigious alternative for the Papal residence would be Santiago de Compostela. However, I think Avignon would be the preferred choice, for various reasons, it has all the clout of hoary precedent, and the Church loves tradition, it has good logistical accommodation (although the Papal palace was a military barrack back in the 1870s, so a renovation shall be in order), and it would highlight the French committment to the Papal cause. Of course, setting shop in Avignon also means that German-Italian and Old Catholic propaganda shall make good of the analogy with the corrupt, schismatic, and French-pawn Middle Age Avignon Papacy, but nothing is perfect and history sometimes repeats itself.

You make a lot of good points. The schism will be quite successful ITTL, what with the much greater support by governments and the very strong political polarization. I would expect that it will draw sympathies also in London, where will be see as similar to what Henry VIII did. I do wonder what kind of reception will get in the Americas (even if I would say that the principle of separation between state and church will make it very popular in the USA too).

All very true, the schism shall draw a lot of sympathy in Britain and America, and of course Hungary shall follow the lead of its German and Italian allies in supporting it. Allegiances are going to be rather more divided in Ireland, Poland, Belgium, and South America, where the clash between reactionary and liberal Catholics shall be fierce. Netherlands and Switzerland, I think, shall follow the lead of Germany.

I point out to a possible butterfly: given that Catholicism was pretty much the only unifying element that 19th Belgium had, the spread of the schism there, quite possibly with a split between the pro-German Flemish and the pro-French Wallons, could spell the collapse of the kingdom and its partition between Netherlands and France.

I am quite convinced that this will make "Boulangism" nastier and your definition (a cross-breed of proto-Fascism and Inquisition) is quite apt.
OTOH, all ideological wars and guerrillas were quite nasty IOTL and maybe it's better to pull the tooth as early as possible.

Very true. Of course, when and what ITTL triggers a WWI is another worthy topic of discussion. Do we speculate ?

I would also anticipate that the schism break lines will leave the liberal church all in the Old-Catholic field and that there will be a much stronger participation of this liberal church in the social field. I would not be surprised to see a strong mix of Christianity and socialism prevailing in the society with a similar reduction of the marxist influence.

Very true and I would add that this shall also mightly foster the evolution of German and Italian political systems towards full liberalism. This brand of liberal christian-democratic activism shall create the basis for mass parties that are less scary to the conservative elites, because they are not ambigously tied to the reactionary-theocratic Church hierarchy nor to revolutionary marxism.

It will go much faster than this: the main tenet of the Old-catholics is that any decision in terms of doctrine can only be taken by the whole church in assembly (and this will also fuel the democratic appeal of the schismatics). The most likely outcome will be the birth of national churches in full communion but where only the major issues will have to be decided in common.

Very interesting. A crossbreed of liberal Orthodox and episcopalism in practice. A question for you, when the Schism really takes off and the liberal Old Catholics finds themselves with the allegiance of half Europe, do you think they downgrade the Papal role to that of "Patriarch of Rome", the head of the Italian Church, primus inter pares with the heads of the other national churches, or do they keep it as an international chairman but reduce its power to a figurehead who has to answer to the Council's authority ?

Agreed - as I said before - that this church will be stronly oriented toward liberalism and democracy.

Which in addition to social activism and lack of support for authoritarian regimes shall make the personal lives of countless Catholics much more at ease with their consciences, later in the 20th century. E.g. this Church shall surely be much more open to compromise on contraception, divorce, abortion, and homosexuality. I wonder whether the shift in Catholicism shall influence the fortunes of Protestant Fundamentalism as well or not.

An Ottoman overlordship in the Balkans might not be the best theoretical solution but it might be the most practical one at least for the time being and remembering that there will be Capitulations in place. The alternative would be most likely either pan-slavism (which is a nice way of naming a Russian egemony in the region) or round after round of vicious infighting, ethnical cleansing, exasperated nationalism (which more or less describes in a sentence the last 150 years of Balkan history).

Oh, I fully agree with your concerns, here. I'm just convinced that the Quadruple Alliance dotting a Metternich hat and spending themselves to enforce Ottoman rule on restive nationalities is not a solution, either. I agree that continued Ottoman rule of those areas of the Balkans that are strongly ethnically/religiously mixed and would be an hotbed of conflict may be a decent (temporary) solution. However, trying to enforce it on areas that are overwhelmingly of one nationality and Christian is just an harmful and futile overkill. Therefore, do keep Ottoman rule on Albania, most of Kosovo, Macedonia, and Thrace, keep Cyprus and Crete under the administration of the Great Powers, set up Bosnia as an independent state, if really necessary delay Bulgaria's access to full independence. But nothing more than that. Let Greece have Thessaly and most of Epirus, and Bulgaria eastern Rumelia. Learn Metternich's lesson.

This is one of the reasons for which I proposed an independent (or at least autonomous) Bosnia-Hercegovina under an European prince chosen by the powers: B-H with its mix of moslems, catholics and orthodox might be the right place to try a kind of social experimentation and prove (or disprove) that these different segments of the population can live and prosper together.

Oh, I'm in full agreement here.

What I don't want (and I believe that Germany and Italy would promptly agree with me) is an ante-litteram Yugoslavia, with the Serbs lording over everyone else. By all means give Serbia some portions of the Kossovo (not all of it: the areas with an Albanian majority should not be handed over) and possibly a slice of Bosnia.

Again, in full agreement here.

Leave the Croats and the Slovaks in the Hungarian kingdom (it's rather unlikely it will work in the long term, but it's a reasonable solutione in the immediate) and have Slovenia raised to the status of independent grand-duchy (again under an European prince: strangely enough - given the slant of this TL - I would suggest Ferdinand of Habsburg Lothringen, the last grand-duke of Tuscany. He's young enough to be flexible and was raised in a liberal court away from Vienna. The name should have also an allure for the Slovenians).

I share your reservation about the future of Hungary, because of the hegemon nationality's obsession for Magyarization, but I also agree that it is a better (temporary) solution than the alternative. Of course, it would be much better if Hungary-Croatia would evolve to a federal compact with reasonable autonomies for its minorities and a confederation with Romania but alas this is a futile dream as long as the Magyar ruling class keeps a deathgrip on power. Maybe if Hungary experiences strong economic development as part of the German-Italian-British bloc, is influenced by the new liberal Old Catholic Church, and as a result liberalizes. A confederation with Romania is likely only going to happen as a result of CP victory in WWI, but it might be a very effective solution for Transylvania.

As a side note, I do hope that Bismarck can prevail in not having Bohemia integrated in the German empire: strip away the border areas with a German majority, if one must, but avoid having a second non-German minority within the borders of the empire.

Sorry, there is no real political chance of this. Look at the 1848 precedent, 19th century German nationalism was adamant to include Bohemia-Moravia in Grossdeutchsland if the latter becomes a true chance, it deemed the Czech an integral part of the old HRE Germansphere, relapsed Slavs in denial of their Germanization. Besides, the area was far too economically and strategically valuable. Bismarck would be wholly overruled by German nationalists and the rest of the ruling elite. Besides, he has already annexed French Lorraine on historical, economic, and strategic ground, trumping ethnic-cultural concerns. He has no plausible excuse to not do the same with Bohemia-Moravia, too. However, the picture is not so bad: as this German Empire likely liberalizes more quickly and extensively, because of the factors we discussed above, the Czech minority shall be able to make good use of the federal nature of the Empire to reap a reasonable degree of autonomy. The German areas of Bohemia-Moravia have already be carved out to different states of the Empire (Prussia and Austria) ITTL, so the Czech shall be the overwhelming majority in their own state.

 

[LordKalvan]

Urm, sorry, I misexplained myself. I indeed agree that this is far too early for a Pan-european naval treaty. I was speaking of a naval ratio between Britain, Germany, and Italy that could arise (either as an informal agreement or a formal treaty) as part of their alliance. As the naval race was the stumbling block that killed any prospect of an Anglo-German Alliance and Britain joining the Triple Alliance IOTL, I was expecting that such an agreement would happen to make London fully at ease with its new allies.

Of course, it also depends on when the alliance would solidify. The German capital ship naval craze was a 1890s phenomenon, and Britain became seriously interested into an European alliance in the same decade. If G-I and UK are already allied or in full detente by then, most likely, the idea of a capital ship naval race would never occur to Germany and Italy or they would quickly bury it in order to appease an ally, and shielded by the RN, they would just focus on developing a different type of fleet for themselves, one more suited to colonial expansion. When do you think this G-I-GB Triple Alliance would solidify ITTL ?

It will take some time for the alliance to solidify, and a lot will be predicated on what's going to happen in the Holy Alliance (which might be a good name for the Franco-Spanish block - and might easily be expanded to include Russia too). At the beginning I'm looking forward to GB recognizing a commonality of interests with the G-I block (do you think that calling it Pact of Steel after two victorious wars in the same line-up would be too kinky? ). I can see three main areas where this commonality can develop: the shoring up of the Ottoman empire is certainly one, and it would tie up well with keeping the Russian bear caged; a G-I guarantee to Belgium (and possibly Switzerland) against French appetites would also sit well with London; the third area might be Far East: Franco-Spanish looking for expansion in the China sea coupled with Russians penetrating from the North would not be the best way to keep British minds at peace. I would again submit that a possible solution might be accepting the Carlist pretender in Spain under the condition that Spain would give away their holdings in the Philippines and the Pacific. I do believe that German and Italy might be interested in purchasing these assets at a reasonable price (which again might come out of the war reparations account). The naval ratio will also develop in a natural way provided that the three partners share a common strategic design.

All very true. Well, to a degree I would expect that the French-Spanish shall seriously strain their economies for military build-up, even if they may split their efforts between land armies to counter the Italo-Germans, and a fleet to counter the British. Theirs shall be a regime built on crusading ultra-reactionary Catholicism and jingoist proto-fascism, the mix calls for a really serious military build-up. Of course, the regime can go on for a while promishing the final battle and deferring it (but not for ever, since there is no MAD to hold them back) out of various excuses, and appeasing the masses with the colonial race in the meanwhile, but a lot of cannons is a necessary component to give their regime (and propaganda) credibility and teeth. Yeah, it shall strain the economy: the masses shall feel the pinch, that's what propaganda is for and failing that, the secret police (if they are going to ally with Tsarist Russia, I bet they get to learn some clues from the Okrana, and then again, they have the Inquisition as a role model, probably ITTL the Boulangist regime trailblazes the world in inventing the modern police state).

I'll remind you that Napoleonic France was quite advanced in terms of "modern police state": Fouchet anyone? IMHO, the heirs of Fouchet and Torquemada will not need to get tips from Okhrana

Very true. However, I would also point out that a parallel issue is when London becomes truly interested into an European alliance. IOTL it did not really happen before the 1890s. Now, if somehow ITTL international tensions could push both Bismarck and Whitehall to make a committment in the mid-1880s at latest, Bismarck was still sufficiently strong to entrench the alliance. Not to mention, ITTL Bismarck, and his Italian counterparts, are even more successful than IOTL, whatever foreign policy precedent they set, shall be regarded with greatest deference.

IOTL Europe was much less set in alliances in the 1870s and 1880s, and it's quite natural that GB was not looking for one either. This put them in a bit of a tight spot at the time of the Russo-Ottoman war, when they had a lot of difficulties in committing to serious actions. The Holy Alliance would not be a good sell to the British public, and an alliance with Russia is almost unthinkable given the conflict of interests in the Balkans, the Ottoman empire, Persia, North-west Indian border, China and again Russia is perceived by the public as a barbaric autocracy. An entente with civilised nations who are not perceived as opposed to strategic British interests and have shown restraint and vision in the Balkans would be much more palatable. Having a daughter of Victoria on the German throne does not cause any harm either.

So very true. The economic benefits of the British option are undeniable. And I agree that France shall seriously strain its resources to gear up itself as well as Spain and Russia, but given that it's going to be a proto-totalitarian regime, it's also going to have significantly more leeway to squeeze money out of its subjects' pockets. With all due political differences, I would point out to the analogy of the Nazi and Soviet military-industrial build-ups. True, like in both examples, it cannot go on forever, but I would expect that when the French economic situation starts to go south, the regime just pushes for the long-deferred general war.

I have a lot of doubts on the feasibility of selling to the French a policy of "no butter and a lot of cannons" over a long period. It would not be impossible to have another internal upheaval (after 1830, 1848 and the recent Communal epysodes) which topples the monarco-clerical regime - at least in France. For sure it will happen when France and Spain get into another major war and things start to go pear-shaped.

I agree. However, my main concern here was that the Quadruple Alliance may make a committment to support faltering Ottoman control in the Balkans against national aspirations of peoples in the region beyond any reasonable viability, besides any Pan-Slav or Pan-Orthodox trouble Russia may or may not stir up. I would loathe to see London, Berlin, and Rome committ themselves to be the Balkan Metternichs. More on this later.

By the way, I think that IC the Alliance shall be officially called a Quadruple one in diplomatic circles, to appease Magyar-Croat pride, but how shall TTL journalists, and later historians, call it, Triple or Quadruple Alliance (well, the Ottomans shall likely become a full partner, too, so it would be Quintuple Alliance, but I would expect it to happen much later, at the verge of WWI, much like IOTL, when names shall have become entrenched) ? Maybe the latter, since in all likelihood London joins the alliance somewhat later Berlin, Rome, and Budapest found it. By the way, does it still become known as the "Central Powers", too, even if Britain is the odd appendix ? In practice, they are the liberal bloc, in comparison to the Tsarists and Boulangists.

I suppose that "Entente" may still be as a good name for the F-S-R bloc as any (even if the British propaganda no doubt shall invent all kinds of derogatory labels and nicknames for their enemies: a funny thing is that "Huns" no doubt gets slapped on the shoulders of the Russians ITTL, besides the mandatory comparison with the "Mongol hordes"; I wonder what they shall invent for the Boulangists; maybe they dust off "Popists", or "New Inquisition").

"Entente" is a French word which should not be very popular ITTL
I do wonder if it would it not be possible to call it "Alliance for European Security" or AES (which means that in case of war the troops will be named "allies").
Derogatory labels and nicknames for the Holy Alliance guys will be easy to find ("Popists" or "Black Inquisitors" are obvious, same as "mongol hordes").

Well, it is not a given, but there's a definite possibility, since as you point out, there are very definite strategic benefits from a British alliance to supplement the economic benefits. The strategtic benefits are likely more familiar than the economic ones to Bismarck and the Italian liberals, although a leap of insight about the latter ones cannot be ruled out.

As you said, this alliance requires on Berlin and Rome's part a genuine committment to share British concerns in the Balkans and Middle East (and I would add, no capital ship race). On London's part, a genuine committment to share the military burden of fighting the F-S-R block (in other words, if German grenadiers and Italian bersaglieri have to die to hold back the Russian hordes, the British have to churn out a serious BEF). Also an effort to make the allies' colonial expansion directives mutually compatible, but I do not think it shall be a serious problem. Of course, I think all of this can be done rather easily once the political will develops.

Yup, genuine commitment to stability in the Balkans and shoring up the Ottomans on the G-I side (and guaranteeing Belgium and Switzerland would also be appreciated); London will be expected to fund development and to allow her allies to find some goodies in the colonial game. I believe GB will have to commit to a BEF mostly for "specials" (say the Ottoman theatre or possibly a landing in Spain or France) and obviously to control the Channel and the Atlantic on behalf of the allies. Which should include Portugal, btw, who's going to be pretty scared by the FRanco-Spanish union.

Very true, even if as the Cold War/Western Schism antagonism with Boulangist France-Spain heats up, they are going to start using it as an ideological rallying point, and it shall definitely become a significant one during WWI.

Assuming there is a WW1 - see my point about Boulangism imploding (and Russia could end up the same way too. If Japan is groomed to be the alliance doorstopper in the north Pacific (same ploy as OTL, but much more focussed on Korea-Manchuria), a local war with Russia is quite likely. Defeat would be the spark for a Russian revolution, which might succeed ITTL (or at least weaken enough the czarist regime to start the fragmentation of Russian west.

Then rest your concerns, since as you see, I see ample ground for such an alliance to happen. I do not see it as a given, but definitely a very strong possiblity.

Reasonable. My take is that the benefits of a specific alliance are much more obvious with the benefit og hindsight

Intimidating the Russian bear into behaving does not really concern me. As you point out, it can be done without excessive effort for a long time (even in the long term, a WWI cannot be avoided, esp. when Russia has modernized enough to risk the gamble, or France-Spain deems it has to make good on its rethoric or lose credibility/suffer economic collapse from overspending). I am worried about having to deploy forces and/or stage frequent military interventions to keep down the unwilling subjects of the Ottomans.

It would be more of police actions and diplomatic interventions rather than repressive interventions Congress-of-Vienna's style. I am pretty sure that it should not be too hard, assuming that the Ottomans are kept to the letter of their promises and no one plays fast-and-loose with pan-slavic nationalism.

I see. Well, the argument is good. But again, Greek irredentism shall make the island quite unruly. I wonder whether it would be better for Italy to administer it alone, or make it a joint effort with its allies. Naval bases would be good either way.

Crete might be under Italian management for a few years only, just to prepare it for union with Greece. What is important are certainly naval bases, but also making sure that Greece will not become Russia's cat's paw in the Mediterranean.

The same conditions that apply to Thessaly also apply to southern Epirus, it was an overwhelmingly Greek and Christian area, therefore I deem that to deny either to Greece is just to court unnecessary trouble.

Southern Epyrus is not a real issue: granted.

Ok, for the political status, but again, I'm absolutely convinced that the Bulgarian autonomus principality ought to enjoy national unification. No zany division into northern Bulgaria and eastern Rumelia. The latter was overwhelmingly Bulgarian and to force its division is just to court trouble by committing the Great Powers to enforce a denial of national feeling that is unlivable in the medium term. Again, do not repeat Metternich's mistakes.

I have not checked ethnic split in Eastern Rumelia. Assuming that it is overwhelmingly Christian, I see no real issue in making a larger principlaity under Ottoman suzerainety. The message conveyed by the powers should however be "no ethnic cleansing".

Well, theoretically the right slice to do this would be southern Transylvania & the Banat, which were strongly Romanian. However, I am dubious that Germany and Italy would be willing to do this, for various reasons: Hungarians would indeed scream murder, if the integrity of the Kingdom of St-Stephen is compromised, and for G-I a content Hungary is much more important than a friendly Romania; there was a sizable German minority in Transylvania, and probably Germany is happier to see them under satellite Hungary (given that IOTL they were typically extempt from Magyarization) than under dubious friend Romania; in a future war against Russia, it is much better if the integrity of the Carpathians natural border is not breached. It is theoretically possible, and more just from the point of national self-determination, but I do not see G-I much willing to do this, frankly to them a loyal and easily defensible Greater Hungary-Croatia is much more useful than a friendly Romania. They are only going to do this if Hungarian control over Transylvania seriously starts to slip in the face of Romanian irredentism.

You make sense here, in the short term at least. Long-term, Transylvania is likely to become an issue.

Either this, or German Austrians Pan-German liberal-nationalists gain the upper hand in Vienna and make a plead to join the German Empire. Or both. These are calls that Bismarck politically cannot ignore, despite his personal feelings.

Pan-German nationalists and liberals are also a good spark.

I fully expect Russians to occupy and later claim Bukovina as well, but otherwise very plausible. We are in full agreement here.

OK

Probably ITTL Chambord meets the Pope when he flights to France, and the message gets heard in full.

I'll go one up and have Pius IX crown the new Bourbon king in St. Denis.

The Pope indeed lost ownership of Avignon in 1815. However, this would not stop him from setting up court there again as a pampered guest of the Bourbon-Carlist monarchy. Closeness to the Italian border might raise theoretical concerns about the Pope's safety in case of war, but it is not an overwhelming issue IMO, since the border is not that close. A possible prestigious alternative for the Papal residence would be Santiago de Compostela. However, I think Avignon would be the preferred choice, for various reasons, it has all the clout of hoary precedent, and the Church loves tradition, it has good logistical accommodation (although the Papal palace was a military barrack back in the 1870s, so a renovation shall be in order), and it would highlight the French committment to the Papal cause. Of course, setting shop in Avignon also means that German-Italian and Old Catholic propaganda shall make good of the analogy with the corrupt, schismatic, and French-pawn Middle Age Avignon Papacy, but nothing is perfect and history sometimes repeats itself.

All good points, and Henri can very well donate again the Avignon fief to the pope.

All very true, the schism shall draw a lot of sympathy in Britain and America, and of course Hungary shall follow the lead of its German and Italian allies in supporting it. Allegiances are going to be rather more divided in Ireland, Poland, Belgium, and South America, where the clash between reactionary and liberal Catholics shall be fierce. Netherlands and Switzerland, I think, shall follow the lead of Germany.

I point out to a possible butterfly: given that Catholicism was pretty much the only unifying element that 19th Belgium had, the spread of the schism there, quite possibly with a split between the pro-German Flemish and the pro-French Wallons, could spell the collapse of the kingdom and its partition between Netherlands and France.

In Russian Poland the czar will ensure the pope remains in charge
I don't think that Belgium can really split (or is allowed to split): there will be a lot of pressure and of money spent to ensure that the Old Catholics prevail there. By the same token Portugal will be likely to become Old-catholic.

Very true. Of course, when and what ITTL triggers a WWI is another worthy topic of discussion. Do we speculate ?

At this stage I can envisage a limited war in the late 1880s, assuming that the regime in France does not collapse before that.
I don't really know if there is going to be a real World War ITTL, and if yes who the contenders will be. I might as well envisage a scenario where France and Spain are defeated/cowed and finally brought back into the fold of a true Council of Europe. If properly set up, the CoE would have the teeth to enforce a ban on war on the continent. Longer-lasting colonial empires too, and overall a slower technological and social development. Possibly a more boring world than OTL, most likely none of the big tragedies that OTL witnessed in the 20th century.

Very true and I would add that this shall also mightly foster the evolution of German and Italian political systems towards full liberalism. This brand of liberal christian-democratic activism shall create the basis for mass parties that are less scary to the conservative elites, because they are not ambigously tied to the reactionary-theocratic Church hierarchy nor to revolutionary marxism.

Very true. Also a much earlier and larger participation of catholics in political activities.
All positive points.

Very interesting. A crossbreed of liberal Orthodox and episcopalism in practice. A question for you, when the Schism really takes off and the liberal Old Catholics finds themselves with the allegiance of half Europe, do you think they downgrade the Papal role to that of "Patriarch of Rome", the head of the Italian Church, primus inter pares with the heads of the other national churches, or do they keep it as an international chairman but reduce its power to a figurehead who has to answer to the Council's authority ?

IMHO it must go through the abolition of the Papacy. National (or in some cases even regional) patriarchates will ensure more democracy and more closeness and understanding of the issue prevailing on a specific territory.

Which in addition to social activism and lack of support for authoritarian regimes shall make the personal lives of countless Catholics much more at ease with their consciences, later in the 20th century. E.g. this Church shall surely be much more open to compromise on contraception, divorce, abortion, and homosexuality. I wonder whether the shift in Catholicism shall influence the fortunes of Protestant Fundamentalism as well or not.

I do agree in principle, but - as I noted before - I've a feeling that social progress might be slower ITTL. Maybe I am wrong.
I see the old catholics get much closer to episcopalians and anglicans and orthodox churches too: a full communion here would be less controversial for sure. However I do believe that this will not necessarily influence the fortunes of Protestant Fundamentalism (which will fight hard against the new liberal leanings of the old-catholic church)

Oh, I fully agree with your concerns, here. I'm just convinced that the Quadruple Alliance dotting a Metternich hat and spending themselves to enforce Ottoman rule on restive nationalities is not a solution, either. I agree that continued Ottoman rule of those areas of the Balkans that are strongly ethnically/religiously mixed and would be an hotbed of conflict may be a decent (temporary) solution. However, trying to enforce it on areas that are overwhelmingly of one nationality and Christian is just an harmful and futile overkill. Therefore, do keep Ottoman rule on Albania, most of Kosovo, Macedonia, and Thrace, keep Cyprus and Crete under the administration of the Great Powers, set up Bosnia as an independent state, if really necessary delay Bulgaria's access to full independence. But nothing more than that. Let Greece have Thessaly and most of Epirus, and Bulgaria eastern Rumelia. Learn Metternich's lesson.

Metternich (and Alexander) wanted not only to stop the clock but even turn it back: their failure was pre-ordained. What I am trying to engineer here is a kind of bloodless (as-much-as-possible bloodless ) evolution - with the emphasys on evolution, mind. I don't think one can plan the world future with any accuracy: let's see where TTL is in the late 1880 (say 1888 when the kaiser dies) and I might possibly make an educated guess for the next 15-20 years.

I share your reservation about the future of Hungary, because of the hegemon nationality's obsession for Magyarization, but I also agree that it is a better (temporary) solution than the alternative. Of course, it would be much better if Hungary-Croatia would evolve to a federal compact with reasonable autonomies for its minorities and a confederation with Romania but alas this is a futile dream as long as the Magyar ruling class keeps a deathgrip on power. Maybe if Hungary experiences strong economic development as part of the German-Italian-British bloc, is influenced by the new liberal Old Catholic Church, and as a result liberalizes. A confederation with Romania is likely only going to happen as a result of CP victory in WWI, but it might be a very effective solution for Transylvania.

Why complicate things? If TTL is evolving toward a very early EU there is no need for large entities. Even the Hungarian kingdom can dissolve into Magyar and Croat components if the cohabitation does not work. Liberalization and economic development might do the trick but I feel that Hungarians will always lord over Croats.

Sorry, there is no real political chance of this. Look at the 1848 precedent, 19th century German nationalism was adamant to include Bohemia-Moravia in Grossdeutchsland if the latter becomes a true chance, it deemed the Czech an integral part of the old HRE Germansphere, relapsed Slavs in denial of their Germanization. Besides, the area was far too economically and strategically valuable. Bismarck would be wholly overruled by German nationalists and the rest of the ruling elite. Besides, he has already annexed French Lorraine on historical, economic, and strategic ground, trumping ethnic-cultural concerns. He has no plausible excuse to not do the same with Bohemia-Moravia, too. However, the picture is not so bad: as this German Empire likely liberalizes more quickly and extensively, because of the factors we discussed above, the Czech minority shall be able to make good use of the federal nature of the Empire to reap a reasonable degree of autonomy. The German areas of Bohemia-Moravia have already be carved out to different states of the Empire (Prussia and Austria) ITTL, so the Czech shall be the overwhelming majority in their own state.

I know that you are right. Still it's a mistake, a bad precedent and a bad message to the rest of Europe. Pity.

 

[Eurofed]

It will take some time for the alliance to solidify, and a lot will be predicated on what's going to happen in the Holy Alliance (which might be a good name for the Franco-Spanish block - and might easily be expanded to include Russia too).

Tree, and Holy Alliance is an apt name, IMO.

At the beginning I'm looking forward to GB recognizing a commonality of interests with the G-I block (do you think that calling it Pact of Steel after two victorious wars in the same line-up would be too kinky? ).

True as well, and Pact of Steel is fine with me, but mind it, I've faced your typical Polish chauvinist troll throwing me wild accusations of crypto-fascism because I fancied Italo-German wanks and big sprawling successful empires, using that kind of terminology is begging for such abuse, I have warned you.

I can see three main areas where this commonality can develop: the shoring up of the Ottoman empire is certainly one, and it would tie up well with keeping the Russian bear caged; a G-I guarantee to Belgium (and possibly Switzerland) against French appetites would also sit well with London; the third area might be Far East: Franco-Spanish looking for expansion in the China sea coupled with Russians penetrating from the North would not be the best way to keep British minds at peace.

All very reasonable concerns which this alliance can solidify around, indeed.

I would again submit that a possible solution might be accepting the Carlist pretender in Spain under the condition that Spain would give away their holdings in the Philippines and the Pacific. I do believe that German and Italy might be interested in purchasing these assets at a reasonable price (which again might come out of the war reparations account).

Hmm, I'm ill-willed about the Philippines idea because I dislike this Triple Alliance getting a potential strategic rivalry with America over it. Far better for the nasty Boulangist regime picking such an unnecessary fight and reaping yet more another enemy in WWI, I say.

The naval ratio will also develop in a natural way provided that the three partners share a common strategic design.

So very true.

I'll remind you that Napoleonic France was quite advanced in terms of "modern police state": Fouchet anyone? IMHO, the heirs of Fouchet and Torquemada will not need to get tips from Okhrana

True as well. But even an old hand can learn a couple extra tricks from another experienced colleague. I was just thinking that depending on how the 20th century turns out, Boulangism can easily become the closest thing that TTL shall know how the horrors of totalitarianism. More on this later.

IOTL Europe was much less set in alliances in the 1870s and 1880s, and it's quite natural that GB was not looking for one either. This put them in a bit of a tight spot at the time of the Russo-Ottoman war, when they had a lot of difficulties in committing to serious actions. The Holy Alliance would not be a good sell to the British public, and an alliance with Russia is almost unthinkable given the conflict of interests in the Balkans, the Ottoman empire, Persia, North-west Indian border, China and again Russia is perceived by the public as a barbaric autocracy. An entente with civilised nations who are not perceived as opposed to strategic British interests and have shown restraint and vision in the Balkans would be much more palatable. Having a daughter of Victoria on the German throne does not cause any harm either.

Very true, and speaking of the latter bit, further dynastic ties between the Saxon-Coburg, the Hohenzollern, and the Savoy become quite likely to cement the alliance.

I have a lot of doubts on the feasibility of selling to the French a policy of "no butter and a lot of cannons" over a long period. It would not be impossible to have another internal upheaval (after 1830, 1848 and the recent Communal epysodes) which topples the monarco-clerical regime - at least in France. For sure it will happen when France and Spain get into another major war and things start to go pear-shaped.

It is a sure thing that France and Spain are plunge into major civil unrest and revolution when they lose their "crusading" general war. But I would not bet on the regime imploding before the war. If anything, when the economic situation begins to deteriorate, the regime would unleash a general war, these guys have no MAD to keep them back and a war is the typical escape for a dictatorship in trouble.

I do wonder if it would it not be possible to call it "Alliance for European Security" or AES (which means that in case of war the troops will be named "allies").

I am not entirely sure that "security" would be in-period as diplomatic jargon but it is surely worth a try. We can always expect some diplomat or journalist to get creative. After all, Tsar Alexander I pulled "Holy Alliance" out of his butt in a flight of fancy, basically.

Derogatory labels and nicknames for the Holy Alliance guys will be easy to find ("Popists" or "Black Inquisitors" are obvious, same as "mongol hordes").

Good. I have always found "Frogs" to be terribly dumb, as slurs go (and "Huns" unfair, for Germans).

Yup, genuine commitment to stability in the Balkans and shoring up the Ottomans on the G-I side (and guaranteeing Belgium and Switzerland would also be appreciated); London will be expected to fund development and to allow her allies to find some goodies in the colonial game. I believe GB will have to commit to a BEF mostly for "specials" (say the Ottoman theatre or possibly a landing in Spain or France) and obviously to control the Channel and the Atlantic on behalf of the allies. Which should include Portugal, btw, who's going to be pretty scared by the FRanco-Spanish union.

All very true, but don't forget that even at WWI total mobilization levels, Britain shall have a shoulder a large part of the burden at manning the Ottoman front (even if Germans and Italians might spare some troops for that, too) and the Persian & Afghan fronts shall be its entirely sole responsibility. I'm not too convinced that they can spare the troops for pulling the major landings that British peripheral strategy so fancies. Encircling the Bear to strangulation is a huge task, even if one that this Alliance can shoulder well, given a little time.

Assuming there is a WW1 - see my point about Boulangism imploding (and Russia could end up the same way too. If Japan is groomed to be the alliance doorstopper in the north Pacific (same ploy as OTL, but much more focussed on Korea-Manchuria), a local war with Russia is quite likely. Defeat would be the spark for a Russian revolution, which might succeed ITTL (or at least weaken enough the czarist regime to start the fragmentation of Russian west.

My thought on this is the following: it is almost guaranteed that barring catastrophical bad generalship on the AES part, the power equation between the blocs are such that we are not going to see something like *our* WWI, lasting four years and having that kind of casualties and resources comsummation. The blood and money bill would be much less for the AES, and they would end the war much less crippled than OTL Europe was. However, most definitely, we are to expect *a* WWI, albeit rather shorter (1-2 years) and less destructive. Boulangism and Tsarist Russia are not going to let mounting economic difficulties and proxy wars wear them down as the USSR did, since there are no nukes to hold them back. At the first real sign that things go badly for them, either economically or in a limited war, they are going to call their allies in and escalate to a general war to dig themselves out of trouble. The Russo-Japanese war could be a WWI trigger, as it might trouble in the Balkans, Persia, some colonial clash, or Boulangist expansionism in Belgium or Switzerland. But I definitely see a general war coming.

The AES may or may not be able to pull a successful Plan Schliffen on France (assuming it goes for a France First strategy) and kill it in a few months, surely with BEF assistance in Belgium and the Italians punding on the Alps and sending troops in A-L and Belgium likely giving right of passage it has a much better chance of succeeding, but I suspect that the contribution of Spanish troops might as easily be able to counter it. if it fails or the AES goes for a Russia First streategy then the Allies would have to bleed and wear down Franco-Spanish and Russian resources to exhaustion with Turkish and Japanese assistance. Surely a doable task, but one that IMO would take no less than 3-4 seasons and no more than two years. Very likely Turkey and Japan would join the AES, at least a couple between Serbia, Bulgaria, and Romania is going to take Russia's side (Serbia and Bulgaria surely pick opposite sides). America may easily stay neutral, unless it has a score to settle with France-Spain or the latter messes with its merchant shipping too badly. Norway-Sweden (with Britain and Germany buddies it is quite possible that their union never breaks down) may stay neutral, or it may get a taste for the liberation of Finland. So it would still be a WWI in size and shape, if not in duration and destructiveness. And the AES wins it in rather better shape than OTL. Hopefully, so much that they can stage a timely intervention and prevent Communism from getting entrenched in France and/or Russia when they collapse into revolution. This would eliminate one major cause of a WWII.

As for the other major cause, revanchist fascism developing later in either country, avoiding it is possible but not guaranteed. Hopefully ITTL a couple of catastrophic tries at aggressive imperialist-authoritarian regimes with Napoleon III and the Boulangists would cure French collective mind out of the revanchist bug like WW2 did for Germany, but it is not a given. Avoiding it in Russia would be more tricky, they might easily follow the same path to fascism that Germany did IOTL. Of course, it also depends on how much the AES would be able to stabilize the defeated powers economically and politically, avoid a Great Depression, snuff out a revanchist regime while it's still weak, and so on.

Reasonable. My take is that the benefits of a specific alliance are much more obvious with the benefit og hindsight

Very true, and all the reason why I think Italy and Britain should whack themselves with a very big stick for not siding with the CPs in WWI.

It would be more of police actions and diplomatic interventions rather than repressive interventions Congress-of-Vienna's style. I am pretty sure that it should not be too hard, assuming that the Ottomans are kept to the letter of their promises and no one plays fast-and-loose with pan-slavic nationalism.

And if the AES does not attempt to compress reasonable national aspirations of Greeks and Bulgarians unduly, I would add. "Greater" X in mixed areas is a non-no, but they should be allowed self-rule and national unity of anything that is blatantly made up of their folks.

Crete might be under Italian management for a few years only, just to prepare it for union with Greece. What is important are certainly naval bases, but also making sure that Greece will not become Russia's cat's paw in the Mediterranean.

Ok, this is wholly reasonable.

Southern Epyrus is not a real issue: granted.

I have not checked ethnic split in Eastern Rumelia. Assuming that it is overwhelmingly Christian, I see no real issue in making a larger principlaity under Ottoman suzerainety.

If this much can be granted, I indeed think that the settlement would sufficiently stable and balanced that the Great Powers can call it a success (as long as it is feasible for the Balkans, anyway). In the long term, you are still going to see some trouble, but at least this is something that would not explode again the moment the Great Powers turn their head.

The message conveyed by the powers should however be "no ethnic cleansing".

Of course, but I think that with this kind of settlement we have been hammering out, it may be done.

If I can sum it up, the settlement of the Congress of Le Hague, ca. 1876, would be:

Russia gains southern Bessarabia and the Caucasus stuff, Romania gets independence and northern Dobruja, Serbia gets independence and northern Kosovo, Bulgaria gets self-rule in modern borders, Greece gains Thessaly and southern Epirus, Britain gets Cyprus, Italy gets a sphere of influence in Tunisia and Tripolitania, Crete us put under the adminsitraiton of the Great Powers, Bosnia becomes a (self-ruling or independent ?) principality under a sovreign picked by the powers. Montenegro gets independent under Italian protectorate. The Ottomans keep everything else and are bound by the powers to enact a strrong set of capitulations and internal reform for their Christian subjects. The powers proscribe every state and principality from enacting abuses on their minorities.

In a separate treaty, the powers recognize the partition settlement of the former Habsburg empire enacted by Germany, Italy, Russia, and Hungary-Croatia. Germany annexes German Austria and Bohemia-Moravia as two component states of its federal empire, Italy annexes Kustenland and Dalmatia, Russia gets Krakow, Galicia, and Bukovina, Slovenia becomes an independent principality under German-Italian protectorate, Hungary-Croatia becomes an independent kingdom.

Does it look right ? Did I forget anything ? Do you have any suggestions for the monarchs of all the new states ?

You make sense here, in the short term at least. Long-term, Transylvania is likely to become an issue.

True. Personally I think the only sensible long-term solutions would be a partition (northern-western Transylvania to Hungary, southern Transylvania and the Banat to Romania), a Hungary-Croatia-Romania confederation, merging both states in a strong EU set up by the AES after WWI, Hungary-Croatia evolving into a federal state, or a mix of the above. Sadly none of this is very feasible before WWI happens, defangs Panslavism, and knocks some sense in the thick skulls of the Magyar ruling class.

 

[Eurofed]

I'll go one up and have Pius IX crown the new Bourbon king in St. Denis.

And the next Pope crowning his successor as king of France and Spain, too. A classy touch, I like it.

All good points, and Henri can very well donate again the Avignon fief to the pope.

Very true. of course, such a "fief" is not going to fare very well when AES troops or French revolutionaries occupy it at the end of WWI, but such are the drawbacks of being a buttress to obscurantist proto-fascism and bullheaded sticking to temporal power ?

By the way, what do you think is the fate of the Boulangist Church, when the Holy Alliance has its WWI Gotterdammerung ? Does it face complete ostracization and it is reabsorbed by the Old Catholics in shame (esp. if the Boulangists go nasty with wartime atrocities and the ASE plays the collective guilt propaganda card well) or it sticks around as a nasty neo-fascist-like fringe that won't go away ?

In Russian Poland the czar will ensure the pope remains in charge
I don't think that Belgium can really split (or is allowed to split): there will be a lot of pressure and of money spent to ensure that the Old Catholics prevail there. By the same token Portugal will be likely to become Old-catholic.

Very true to both, I hand't thought of the ample leverage that the Tsar and the British-Germans can apply in those lands. However, as it concerns Belgium and Portugal, remind that France-Spain can throw a lot of pressure and money too, so they are more liekly to become contested and polarized lands (and hence prime targets for a Boulangist "liberation").

At this stage I can envisage a limited war in the late 1880s, assuming that the regime in France does not collapse before that.
I don't really know if there is going to be a real World War ITTL, and if yes who the contenders will be. I might as well envisage a scenario where France and Spain are defeated/cowed and finally brought back into the fold of a true Council of Europe.

See my point above. The kind of ideological and imperialist rivalry we have puzzled out is not going to be unknot without a major war in the pre-nukes age, and a regime like the Boulangist one is going down from economic and and political pressure, without seeking an escape in war. Nor I would expect Russia meekily accepting encircling containtment and marginalization, or the downfall of its only major ally, without a big fight, too. As I said above, it is going to a be relatively shorter and less destructive general war, in comparison to our WWI, and indeed quite possibly one occurring decades earlier than OTL, but a recognizable WWI nonetheless. Maybe the late 1880s, maybe the early to late 1890s.

As for the contenders, I very tentatively propose:

ASE: Britain, Germany, Italy, Hungary, Ottomans, Japan (after the 1880s)

HA: France-Spain, Russia, Serbia, Romania

Political and military butterflies and the war tigger can easily throw some neutrals, such as Belgium, Switzerland, Portugal, Norway-Sweden, in the fray, or switch the allegiance of the Balkan states ot either bloc or to neutrality.

As for a CoE emerging from final ASE victory, it is almost a given (hopefully Britain shall be far less paranoid about European integration if they are part of the triumvirate on top), but I'm not entirely sure that one WWI would be enough to purge the nationalist/totalitarian bug of Europe. It may easily be, but its is not a given (esp. Russia would not have gotten so ample experience about the self-destructive nature of such a path as France).

If properly set up, the CoE would have the teeth to enforce a ban on war on the continent. Longer-lasting colonial empires too, and overall a slower technological and social development. Possibly a more boring world than OTL, most likely none of the big tragedies that OTL witnessed in the 20th century.

Absolutely, but again some care must be exercised by the ASE to prevent a Communist/Fascist Russia.

Very true. Also a much earlier and larger participation of catholics in political activities.
All positive points.

Indeed. This could pave the way for Germany and Italy to jumpstart their socio-political evolution by 70 years, without the republics, pacifism, and collective guilt of course. Very good for Europe.

IMHO it must go through the abolition of the Papacy. National (or in some cases even regional) patriarchates will ensure more democracy and more closeness and understanding of the issue prevailing on a specific territory.

Very Fine with me. Much more often than not, the autocratic Papacy has been a stone around the neck of modern society IMO.

I do agree in principle, but - as I noted before - I've a feeling that social progress might be slower ITTL. Maybe I am wrong.

Well, without the Holocaust you can expect ideas like racism (esp. against dark-skinned folks, as opposed to anti-semitism), colonialism, and imperialism remainign legitimate much longer, and political correctness to remain the concern of a loony extremist fringe. It is however possible, depending on how much of a cultural pariah status Boulangism and its pet reactionary Church get after the Great War, that some cultural backlash against right-wing ideas still occurs, and this in turn depends on how much the ASE play the ideological card during the Cold War build-up and the war itself, and how much nasty Boulangism gets (I'm not saying that it woule ever go as homicidal as OTL totalitarism, but it could easily go for a mix of heavy-handed political repression and wartime atrocities in occupied territories, which could still make a powerful impression in a TL that may never know OTL genocides, everything is relative).

However, I still fully expect that the Sexual Revolution, women parity (if not PC feminism), and the youth counterculture shall happen on schedule, they were ultimately caused by socio-economic changes unleashed by industrialization, which these PoDs would not change (if anything, the UK-G-I bloc stands for a bigger, ealier industrialization of continental europe, and this may accelerate those social changes).

I see the old catholics get much closer to episcopalians and anglicans and orthodox churches too: a full communion here would be less controversial for sure. However I do believe that this will not necessarily influence the fortunes of Protestant Fundamentalism (which will fight hard against the new liberal leanings of the old-catholic church)

True to both, a full communion and ecumenic reconciliation between the "new" liberal Old Catholics Church, episcopalians, and anglicans ought ot be relatively easy, esp. in the spirit of cooperation endengered by the ASE alliance and the war. As for the orthodox, it would have to wait the General War and the fall of the Tsarist regime, and it might be made difficult by Russian revanchist resentment. But I am much happy about butterflying the likes of John Paul II and Benedict XVI away.

Why complicate things? If TTL is evolving toward a very early EU there is no need for large entities. Even the Hungarian kingdom can dissolve into Magyar and Croat components if the cohabitation does not work. Liberalization and economic development might do the trick but I feel that Hungarians will always lord over Croats.

Well, history of Europe indicates that (con)federationism is the way to defuse all these nasty nationalist feuds, and the earliest the EU happens, the better. At that point, the size and shapes of the component states becomes that much less important. Hungary and Croatia may have a peaceful divorce, or manage to reform their dysfunctional marriage into a working (con)federal domestic partnership. All fine by me, even if I prefer to have as less borders (and separate buraucracies and professional politician classes) as possible.

I know that you are right. Still it's a mistake, a bad precedent and a bad message to the rest of Europe. Pity.

However, this Germany has a good chance of evolving into a fully liberal and federal state relatively quickly, which would ensure ample leeway of autonomy for the Czech, with language rights, federal self-rule, and all that. Frankly, without the bad blood of the World Wars, there are good economic and cultural reasons why a working (con)federal domestic partnership would be to the mutual benefit of both Germans and Czechs.

 

[Aranfan]

ASE: Britain, Germany, Italy, Hungary, Ottomans, Japan (after the 1880s)

HA: France-Spain, Russia, Serbia, Romania

Does America get involved? If so, which side?

 

[Eurofed]

Does America get involved? If so, which side?

The ASE side, if this war somehow gets interwined with the SAW (either in the first place or because America gets a beating then, and seeks revenge later in the Great War), or France-Spain messes up with the American merchant shipping too bad. Otherwise, neutral. America allying with the Boulangists is politically ASB in the lack of severe Anglo-American antagonism which has no special reason to exist so far ITTL.

 

[Abdul Hadi Pasha]

I really have a hard time with Prussia annexing Hapsburg territories as a result of an Italian victory. Why would Bismarck and everyone else want to risk a huge mess to the South and an almost certain general war? The collapse of Hapsburg power might also bring down the Ottomans in Europe (no Hapsburgs to keep the Russians at bay) and send the whole half of the continent into a death spiral.

 

[Workable Goblin]

True to both, a full communion and ecumenic reconciliation between the "new" liberal Old Catholics Church, episcopalians, and anglicans ought ot be relatively easy, esp. in the spirit of cooperation endengered by the ASE alliance and the war. As for the orthodox, it would have to wait the General War and the fall of the Tsarist regime, and it might be made difficult by Russian revanchist resentment. But I am much happy about butterflying the likes of John Paul II and Benedict XVI away.

Considering that (Utrecht Union of) Old Catholics and Anglicans, at least (BTW, Episcopalians--at least the American kind--are an element of the worldwide Anglican Communion, splits or no) actually have gotten into communion with each other, this seems not just possible, but probable.

I really have a hard time with Prussia annexing Hapsburg territories as a result of an Italian victory. Why would Bismarck and everyone else want to risk a huge mess to the South and an almost certain general war? The collapse of Hapsburg power might also bring down the Ottomans in Europe (no Hapsburgs to keep the Russians at bay) and send the whole half of the continent into a death spiral.

Bismarck doesn't, but with the Austrians effectively in collapse (all their field armies annihilated), patriotic sentiment (and there certainly was such in Germany at the time) leads to them annexing bits of Bohemia (mostly the German-speaking bits) and Silesia. When the broken Hapsburg realm finally collapses, they annex the left-over German bits and the rest of the Czech lands, and set up a puppet Hungary-Croatia.

 

[Eurofed]

What TIL said. And because Prussian and Italian territorial gains are relatively moderate, given the depth of Austrian defeat, France does not intervene, although it has to pull a lot of weigh to (temporarily) save Austria from further losses, reaping much bad blood in Berlin & Florence. Britain & Russia do not bother. Later Nappy III foolishly picks a fight with P-I over Luxemburg, France gets its butt on a plate as a result, again Britain and Russia do not bother saving the skin of an aggressor. In the meanwhile the depth of the Habsburg defeat sends the empire to final collapse, Bismarck is politically forced and the Italians are eager to intervene, they partition the empire with Hungary-Croatia, Russia takes its slice and exploits the opportunity to attempt the butchering of the Ottomans, Berlin and Rome make an about-face and combine with Britain to enforce a compromise in the Balkans, thus proving that an effective balance in the region and great powers equilibrium in Europe can be maintained without the Habsburg zombie. Satisfied Germany and Italy pool with Britain and Hungary-Croatia to establish an effective power bloc, France channels its revanchism and the shock of defeat and the Commune into establishing a nasty Catholic-reactionary proto-fascist Bourbon-Boulangist regime, which soon pupates into a Bourbon-Carlist French-Spanish union. Isolated Russia allies with the F-S union. The reactionary Pope escapes to France to wage his ideological crusade against Italy and Germany, this feeds the liberal Old Catholic opposition to Papal infallibility into a second Western Schism that splits European Catholicism in half, feeding the ideological Cold War between reactionary France-Spain-Russia and liberal Britain-Germany-Italy.

 

[LordKalvan]

I really have a hard time with Prussia annexing Hapsburg territories as a result of an Italian victory. Why would Bismarck and everyone else want to risk a huge mess to the South and an almost certain general war? The collapse of Hapsburg power might also bring down the Ottomans in Europe (no Hapsburgs to keep the Russians at bay) and send the whole half of the continent into a death spiral.

Bismarck doesn't, but with the Austrians effectively in collapse (all their field armies annihilated), patriotic sentiment (and there certainly was such in Germany at the time) leads to them annexing bits of Bohemia (mostly the German-speaking bits) and Silesia. When the broken Hapsburg realm finally collapses, they annex the left-over German bits and the rest of the Czech lands, and set up a puppet Hungary-Croatia.

Bismarck's problem ITTL is that he's been too successful
I think it was Voltaire who once said that if the devil triumphed over God, he would be compelled to assume all the perquisites of divinity.
IOTL Bismarck used the Austrian cat's paw as a proxy in the Balkans: whatever his mealy mouthed reassurances to Russia (including the famous quip that all the Balkans were not worth the life of a Prussian grenadier), he would never have allowed Russia to gobble them up unopposed.
ITTL the outcome of the 1866 war was quite worse for Austria, and it's most reasonable to assume that the Ausgleich will be less than successful. Once the cat is out of the bag, there is no chance that Bismarck will be suckered in propping up a corpse (not to mention that all the Grossdeutschland fans will start celebrating the final union of all German people: the annexation of Austria and Bohemia is almost automatic, same as the support to the establishment of a successor kingdom in Hungary and Croatia (the German chancellor will have already his reservations on the annexation of Bohemia: no way he would accept to integrate more slavs in the German empire, nor that he can accept Hungary becoming a Russian vassal). Propping up the Ottomans in the Balkans will also be an obvious default choice: there is no alternative to it if some stability has to be preserved.

 

[LordKalvan]

And the next Pope crowning his successor as king of France and Spain, too. A classy touch, I like it.

Obviously it's the black of the inquisitors' tunics that gives the scene a truly classy overtone
On a slightly more serious tone, I wonder which flag will be adopted for the united kingdom of France and Spain, given the major hassle Henri had to jump when he was crowned.

Very true. of course, such a "fief" is not going to fare very well when AES troops or French revolutionaries occupy it at the end of WWI, but such are the drawbacks of being a buttress to obscurantist proto-fascism and bullheaded sticking to temporal power ?

By the way, what do you think is the fate of the Boulangist Church, when the Holy Alliance has its WWI Gotterdammerung ? Does it face complete ostracization and it is reabsorbed by the Old Catholics in shame (esp. if the Boulangists go nasty with wartime atrocities and the ASE plays the collective guilt propaganda card well) or it sticks around as a nasty neo-fascist-like fringe that won't go away ?

Wherever the pope decides to hoist his stendard, it will go up in flame and retribution when the revolution comes. The papacy will be certainly discredited, but in all honesty I believe that the personal fate of the pope in charge at the end (as well as the fate of his major henchmen) will depend on his/their personal behavior and accountancy. We're still in the 19th century and I frankly do not see any possible equivalent of a Nuremberg trial coming up. IMHO the boulangist church is likely to remain, as a bad smell that does not go away (and possibly even prosper in some south American country: my best candidate would be Brazil).

Very true to both, I hand't thought of the ample leverage that the Tsar and the British-Germans can apply in those lands. However, as it concerns Belgium and Portugal, remind that France-Spain can throw a lot of pressure and money too, so they are more liekly to become contested and polarized lands (and hence prime targets for a Boulangist "liberation").

That's quite reasonable: very sharp polarization and civil unrest is to be expected.

See my point above. The kind of ideological and imperialist rivalry we have puzzled out is not going to be unknot without a major war in the pre-nukes age, and a regime like the Boulangist one is going down from economic and and political pressure, without seeking an escape in war. Nor I would expect Russia meekily accepting encircling containtment and marginalization, or the downfall of its only major ally, without a big fight, too. As I said above, it is going to a be relatively shorter and less destructive general war, in comparison to our WWI, and indeed quite possibly one occurring decades earlier than OTL, but a recognizable WWI nonetheless. Maybe the late 1880s, maybe the early to late 1890s.

As for the contenders, I very tentatively propose:

ASE: Britain, Germany, Italy, Hungary, Ottomans, Japan (after the 1880s)

HA: France-Spain, Russia, Serbia, Romania

Political and military butterflies and the war tigger can easily throw some neutrals, such as Belgium, Switzerland, Portugal, Norway-Sweden, in the fray, or switch the allegiance of the Balkan states ot either bloc or to neutrality.

As for a CoE emerging from final ASE victory, it is almost a given (hopefully Britain shall be far less paranoid about European integration if they are part of the triumvirate on top), but I'm not entirely sure that one WWI would be enough to purge the nationalist/totalitarian bug of Europe. It may easily be, but its is not a given (esp. Russia would not have gotten so ample experience about the self-destructive nature of such a path as France).

I do agree on all your points: my take is that the boulangist regime cannot be expected to last more than 20 or 30 years.
A possible solution to the revanchist/nationalist/totalitarian bug might be a complete break up of France and Spain into regional entities; the same will apply to Russia too, breaking away all that can be broken easily (Poland, Baltic countries, Finland, Ukraine, Caucasus, central asian lands. I'm quite doubtful on what will happen of Siberia: it might come under direct administration of the council of Europe, possibly.

Absolutely, but again some care must be exercised by the ASE to prevent a Communist/Fascist Russia.

ITTL Marx might be right on the money, with communism prevailing in an industrialised country (France). What happens in Russia might as well be something weird, mixing up millenaristic expectations, anarchy and warlords.

Indeed. This could pave the way for Germany and Italy to jumpstart their socio-political evolution by 70 years, without the republics, pacifism, and collective guilt of course. Very good for Europe.

That's is my dearest hope.

Very Fine with me. Much more often than not, the autocratic Papacy has been a stone around the neck of modern society IMO.

As well as the albatross on the neck of Italy since the time of Romulus Augustolus.

Well, without the Holocaust you can expect ideas like racism (esp. against dark-skinned folks, as opposed to anti-semitism), colonialism, and imperialism remainign legitimate much longer, and political correctness to remain the concern of a loony extremist fringe. It is however possible, depending on how much of a cultural pariah status Boulangism and its pet reactionary Church get after the Great War, that some cultural backlash against right-wing ideas still occurs, and this in turn depends on how much the ASE play the ideological card during the Cold War build-up and the war itself, and how much nasty Boulangism gets (I'm not saying that it woule ever go as homicidal as OTL totalitarism, but it could easily go for a mix of heavy-handed political repression and wartime atrocities in occupied territories, which could still make a powerful impression in a TL that may never know OTL genocides, everything is relative).

However, I still fully expect that the Sexual Revolution, women parity (if not PC feminism), and the youth counterculture shall happen on schedule, they were ultimately caused by socio-economic changes unleashed by industrialization, which these PoDs would not change (if anything, the UK-G-I bloc stands for a bigger, ealier industrialization of continental europe, and this may accelerate those social changes).

I can easily see a recrudescence of anti-semitism in France and Spain, but I am sure that anything like the Holocaust is impossible.
Can also agree on some kind of sexual revolution, but IMHO women parity got a big boost by the 2 WW, when women had to replace men in all sectors of civil life. ITTL this effect will be quite marginal.

True to both, a full communion and ecumenic reconciliation between the "new" liberal Old Catholics Church, episcopalians, and anglicans ought ot be relatively easy, esp. in the spirit of cooperation endengered by the ASE alliance and the war. As for the orthodox, it would have to wait the General War and the fall of the Tsarist regime, and it might be made difficult by Russian revanchist resentment. But I am much happy about butterflying the likes of John Paul II and Benedict XVI away.

Hear hear

Well, history of Europe indicates that (con)federationism is the way to defuse all these nasty nationalist feuds, and the earliest the EU happens, the better. At that point, the size and shapes of the component states becomes that much less important. Hungary and Croatia may have a peaceful divorce, or manage to reform their dysfunctional marriage into a working (con)federal domestic partnership. All fine by me, even if I prefer to have as less borders (and separate buraucracies and professional politician classes) as possible.

Well, here we disagree: a strong and liberal confederation can certainly manage regional entities, which in turn would be closer to the needs of their people. Not to mention that Lombardy and Bavaria are much more likely to have common interests than Lombardy and Sicily or Bavaria and Prussia.

However, this Germany has a good chance of evolving into a fully liberal and federal state relatively quickly, which would ensure ample leeway of autonomy for the Czech, with language rights, federal self-rule, and all that. Frankly, without the bad blood of the World Wars, there are good economic and cultural reasons why a working (con)federal domestic partnership would be to the mutual benefit of both Germans and Czechs.

When there are 90 Germans and 10 Czech I somehow doubt that the latter will benefit as much as the former Any chance of having a Czech prince on the throne of Bohemia?

 

[LordKalvan]

True as well, and Pact of Steel is fine with me, but mind it, I've faced your typical Polish chauvinist troll throwing me wild accusations of crypto-fascism because I fancied Italo-German wanks and big sprawling successful empires, using that kind of terminology is begging for such abuse, I have warned you.

Accusations of crypto-fascism in a pre-1900 TL are more humorous than annoying. I know where you coming from, though

Hmm, I'm ill-willed about the Philippines idea because I dislike this Triple Alliance getting a potential strategic rivalry with America over it. Far better for the nasty Boulangist regime picking such an unnecessary fight and reaping yet more another enemy in WWI, I say.

In the early 1870s the USA are more concerned with reconstruction and Indian wars than with anything as exotic as Philippines. They have not even started to sniff seriously around Hawai'i. IMHO the purchase of Philippines, Guam and Marianas would not make a ripple in Washington.

True as well. But even an old hand can learn a couple extra tricks from another experienced colleague. I was just thinking that depending on how the 20th century turns out, Boulangism can easily become the closest thing that TTL shall know how the horrors of totalitarianism. More on this later.

"Every police state can be made better and tighter. " Second law of Beria.

Very true, and speaking of the latter bit, further dynastic ties between the Saxon-Coburg, the Hohenzollern, and the Savoy become quite likely to cement the alliance.

Good point, and I would really like to start with Umberto of Savoy who ITTL might avoid the marriage with his cousin Margherita in 1868: let him have a good and fertile German princess with blonde hair, wide hips and a sunny personality. This might make Umberto less tight-assed and hopefully less of a stuck-up conservative; getting rid of OTL Vittorio Emanuele would be a side benefit but certainly non a minor one

It is a sure thing that France and Spain are plunge into major civil unrest and revolution when they lose their "crusading" general war. But I would not bet on the regime imploding before the war. If anything, when the economic situation begins to deteriorate, the regime would unleash a general war, these guys have no MAD to keep them back and a war is the typical escape for a dictatorship in trouble.

OTOH, French in general and Parisians in particular have a remarkable record of three kings and an emperor sent packing (or worse) in 80 years; and I even keep Nappy I out of the count

I am not entirely sure that "security" would be in-period as diplomatic jargon but it is surely worth a try. We can always expect some diplomat or journalist to get creative. After all, Tsar Alexander I pulled "Holy Alliance" out of his butt in a flight of fancy, basically.

Cannot fault you, and to tell the truth I'm not in love with the name either: I did not have any bright idea, sad to say.

All very true, but don't forget that even at WWI total mobilization levels, Britain shall have a shoulder a large part of the burden at manning the Ottoman front (even if Germans and Italians might spare some troops for that, too) and the Persian & Afghan fronts shall be its entirely sole responsibility. I'm not too convinced that they can spare the troops for pulling the major landings that British peripheral strategy so fancies. Encircling the Bear to strangulation is a huge task, even if one that this Alliance can shoulder well, given a little time.

It should be a classic case of France first and Russian second (and given the early war, Russia will be evn slower to mobilise). I do believe that Persia and North-west frontier will be side shows, managed with Indian troops (even if I would like a thrust into the soft belly of Asian Russia); Japan can and will take care of the North. IMHO the British will have to prop up the Ottomans (I can see a BEF in Salonika, which is still Ottoman) and save the Portuguese bacon: it's not too much of a commitment, therefore I look forward to see a major landing in France (Bordeaux? Normandy? Pas-de-Calais? there are good reason for any of them) to clinch the deal and dispose of the French half of the Holy Alliance.

My thought on this is the following: it is almost guaranteed that barring catastrophical bad generalship on the AES part, the power equation between the blocs are such that we are not going to see something like *our* WWI, lasting four years and having that kind of casualties and resources comsummation. The blood and money bill would be much less for the AES, and they would end the war much less crippled than OTL Europe was. However, most definitely, we are to expect *a* WWI, albeit rather shorter (1-2 years) and less destructive. Boulangism and Tsarist Russia are not going to let mounting economic difficulties and proxy wars wear them down as the USSR did, since there are no nukes to hold them back. At the first real sign that things go badly for them, either economically or in a limited war, they are going to call their allies in and escalate to a general war to dig themselves out of trouble. The Russo-Japanese war could be a WWI trigger, as it might trouble in the Balkans, Persia, some colonial clash, or Boulangist expansionism in Belgium or Switzerland. But I definitely see a general war coming.

The AES may or may not be able to pull a successful Plan Schliffen on France (assuming it goes for a France First strategy) and kill it in a few months, surely with BEF assistance in Belgium and the Italians punding on the Alps and sending troops in A-L and Belgium likely giving right of passage it has a much better chance of succeeding, but I suspect that the contribution of Spanish troops might as easily be able to counter it. if it fails or the AES goes for a Russia First streategy then the Allies would have to bleed and wear down Franco-Spanish and Russian resources to exhaustion with Turkish and Japanese assistance. Surely a doable task, but one that IMO would take no less than 3-4 seasons and no more than two years. Very likely Turkey and Japan would join the AES, at least a couple between Serbia, Bulgaria, and Romania is going to take Russia's side (Serbia and Bulgaria surely pick opposite sides). America may easily stay neutral, unless it has a score to settle with France-Spain or the latter messes with its merchant shipping too badly. Norway-Sweden (with Britain and Germany buddies it is quite possible that their union never breaks down) may stay neutral, or it may get a taste for the liberation of Finland. So it would still be a WWI in size and shape, if not in duration and destructiveness. And the AES wins it in rather better shape than OTL. Hopefully, so much that they can stage a timely intervention and prevent Communism from getting entrenched in France and/or Russia when they collapse into revolution. This would eliminate one major cause of a WWII.

As for the other major cause, revanchist fascism developing later in either country, avoiding it is possible but not guaranteed. Hopefully ITTL a couple of catastrophic tries at aggressive imperialist-authoritarian regimes with Napoleon III and the Boulangists would cure French collective mind out of the revanchist bug like WW2 did for Germany, but it is not a given. Avoiding it in Russia would be more tricky, they might easily follow the same path to fascism that Germany did IOTL. Of course, it also depends on how much the AES would be able to stabilize the defeated powers economically and politically, avoid a Great Depression, snuff out a revanchist regime while it's still weak, and so on.

It is a reasonable scenario. I may disagree on the follow up, since I believe that France (and Spain too) might be broken down into a number of regional states: it would make sense, given the history of last century. Russia will have to be peeled like an onion, and pushed back to the borders of old Muscovy. After which the "coalition of the winnings" will have to stay awake to snuff out any totalitarian and/or revanchist regime which might surface from time to time, but it would not be too big an effort and might be done under the umbrella of ETO (European Treaty Organization )

Very true, and all the reason why I think Italy and Britain should whack themselves with a very big stick for not siding with the CPs in WWI.

You know what, I believe the biggest culprit for what happened IOTL in the 20th century is old Bismarck

And if the AES does not attempt to compress reasonable national aspirations of Greeks and Bulgarians unduly, I would add. "Greater" X in mixed areas is a non-no, but they should be allowed self-rule and national unity of anything that is blatantly made up of their folks.

Article 23 of ETO Pact: The term "Greater" is reserved for the use of Great Britain, Grossdeutschland and Grande Italia

If this much can be granted, I indeed think that the settlement would sufficiently stable and balanced that the Great Powers can call it a success (as long as it is feasible for the Balkans, anyway). In the long term, you are still going to see some trouble, but at least this is something that would not explode again the moment the Great Powers turn their head.

Even by exploring the totality of the multiverse it is almost impossible to isolate a TL where the Balkans are both inhabited and trouble-free
However I trust that TTL is a reasonable attempt to engineer a workable solution.

Of course, but I think that with this kind of settlement we have been hammering out, it may be done.

If I can sum it up, the settlement of the Congress of Le Hague, ca. 1876, would be:

Russia gains southern Bessarabia and the Caucasus stuff, Romania gets independence and northern Dobruja, Serbia gets independence and northern Kosovo, Bulgaria gets self-rule in modern borders, Greece gains Thessaly and southern Epirus, Britain gets Cyprus, Italy gets a sphere of influence in Tunisia and Tripolitania, Crete us put under the adminsitraiton of the Great Powers, Bosnia becomes a (self-ruling or independent ?) principality under a sovreign picked by the powers. Montenegro gets independent under Italian protectorate. The Ottomans keep everything else and are bound by the powers to enact a strrong set of capitulations and internal reform for their Christian subjects. The powers proscribe every state and principality from enacting abuses on their minorities.

In a separate treaty, the powers recognize the partition settlement of the former Habsburg empire enacted by Germany, Italy, Russia, and Hungary-Croatia. Germany annexes German Austria and Bohemia-Moravia as two component states of its federal empire, Italy annexes Kustenland and Dalmatia, Russia gets Krakow, Galicia, and Bukovina, Slovenia becomes an independent principality under German-Italian protectorate, Hungary-Croatia becomes an independent kingdom.

Does it look right ? Did I forget anything ? Do you have any suggestions for the monarchs of all the new states ?

It looks like you covered all the bases, well done.
Possible monarchs for the new states and principalities would mostly come from Germany, where there is an abundancy of presentable, possibly not-too-bright and certainly ambitious princelings; I would give a chance to the cadet line of the Savoys (Savoia Aosta) and would keep in mind the guy I mentioned to you a couple of days ago: Ferdinand of Habsburg Lothringen, the last grand duke of Tuscany. I would really appreciate finding a local candidate for the throne of Bohemia.

True. Personally I think the only sensible long-term solutions would be a partition (northern-western Transylvania to Hungary, southern Transylvania and the Banat to Romania), a Hungary-Croatia-Romania confederation, merging both states in a strong EU set up by the AES after WWI, Hungary-Croatia evolving into a federal state, or a mix of the above. Sadly none of this is very feasible before WWI happens, defangs Panslavism, and knocks some sense in the thick skulls of the Magyar ruling class.

I'm afraid you're right, so much the pity

 

[Eurofed]

Obviously it's the black of the inquisitors' tunics that gives the scene a truly classy overtone

Of course. If there is something totalitarian regimes are good at, it's kickass ceremonies.

On a slightly more serious tone, I wonder which flag will be adopted for the united kingdom of France and Spain, given the major hassle Henri had to jump when he was crowned.

Sorry, I suck at graphics. I would assume it might be a quadricolor (white, blue, red, and gold) with a coat of arms at the center which fuses the french white lilies in blue background and the Spanish coat of arms. Actually, the latter already does include the former, but it would obviously given more visibility. Actually union with Spain simplifies the falg hassle because it makes all the French tricolor colors, traditional. White and blue aslready were for France, red and gold are for Spain. It needs to be a quadricolor, but it's no problem. And the fusion justifies making some rearrangement in the coat of arms. Besides, they have the Pope in their pocket, he and the old HRE Emperor are the traditional "founts of honor", if they say a new title, flag, or coat are legitimate, they are from the legitimist PoV. So the Boulangists have actually leeway here (also a good reason why the Pope may remove Henri's scruples about the flag).

Wherever the pope decides to hoist his stendard, it will go up in flame and retribution when the revolution comes. The papacy will be certainly discredited, but in all honesty I believe that the personal fate of the pope in charge at the end (as well as the fate of his major henchmen) will depend on his/their personal behavior and accountancy. We're still in the 19th century and I frankly do not see any possible equivalent of a Nuremberg trial coming up.

For them of course not, although I think it might be quite possible for the top officers of the Boulangist regime to face an international trial, esp. if it goes rather nasty before and during the Great War. Remember, the Entente wanted to put William II and some German leaders on trial after our WWI, and in all evidence they were way less guilty of war crimes and human rights abuses than the top Boulangists are going to be. As it concerns their pet Pope of the time and his major henchmen, I think the only plausible outcome is the St.Helen treatment. They are put by the ASE to house arrest into some suitably remote island for the duration of their natural lives (likely not long, given the average age of Popes and top Cardinals) with some equivalent of a Bill of Attainder. The Old Catholics may hold a formal Council to reaffirm their condemnation of the Boulangist "heresy", highlighting how its "satanic" lust for power and violence led the world to an unprecedented bloodbath.

IMHO the boulangist church is likely to remain, as a bad smell that does not go away (and possibly even prosper in some south American country: my best candidate would be Brazil).

As a fringe movement, certainly, but I think that the Great War would be the end of them as a major force in international politics or global culture, especially in Europe. However, local strongholds may indeed stubbornly resist in some corners of the World, such as indeed parts of South America, where local dictators and oligarchies may exploit the authoritarian nature of the boulangist church as a prop. I think the loose analogy with Communism works here. Rather than Brazil, I would think of countries like Paraguay, Nicaragua, Haiti, and if peronism is not butterflied away, Argentina. Brazilian Catholicism IIRC has always been split between left-wing and right-wing sympathies, os I do not see it as a Boulangist stronghold. However, the United States may not be so keen at getting widespread diffusion of Boulangism into key South American countries (e.g. Mexico, Cuba, Venezuela) and may take steps to oppose it.

That's quite reasonable: very sharp polarization and civil unrest is to be expected.

Which might be easily exploited by F-S as an excuse for military intervention, if the timing is right.

I do agree on all your points: my take is that the boulangist regime cannot be expected to last more than 20 or 30 years.

Well in time to unleash the Great War as its swan song in the 1890s-1900s.

A possible solution to the revanchist/nationalist/totalitarian bug might be a complete break up of France and Spain into regional entities; the same will apply to Russia too, breaking away all that can be broken easily (Poland, Baltic countries, Finland, Ukraine, Caucasus, central asian lands. I'm quite doubtful on what will happen of Siberia: it might come under direct administration of the council of Europe, possibly.

Uhm, I'm all in favor of breaking down the Tsarist monster into something manageable by giving independence to all the non-Russian nationalities that you listed, and that shall be easily to do for the CoE. As it concerns France and Spain, it may well be that Catalonia and Brittany are inspired by the Boulangist defeat into claiming independence, and that can be easily supported by the CoE, too. As it concerns the Basques, their nationalism has been so nasty that I fear what they could do of an independent country. As it concerns the rest of France or Spain, their national identity is so well established that any partition would be wholly artificial, an harmful and violent cohercion of self-determination, doomed to fail. Pretty much all that could be reasonably carve away from France has always been done so in 1868. You could give French Flanders to Belgium (actually, I am well in favor of giving Flanders to Netherlands and French Flanders to Belgium), the Riviera to Italy. But for the rest, France and Spain could be put through a De-Boulangification and temproary military occupation regime kinda similar to Germany after WW2 and hope that it sticks, and if not, staging a new intervention when a revanchist regime takes over.

ITTL Marx might be right on the money, with communism prevailing in an industrialised country (France). What happens in Russia might as well be something weird, mixing up millenaristic expectations, anarchy and warlords.

Yup, methinks that CoE troops may be stay a bit longer or be headed back in the defeated countries soon after the peace treaty is signed, in order to quell Communist/Anarchist uprisings. As it concerns France and Spain, a CoE counterinsurgency intervention is actually rather easy, a few months' job at worst, and part of it mopping up. As it concerns Russia, it may be geographically more tricky, probably the CoE should have to do it by a mix of arming sympathetic locals and using its own troops, and the insurgencies may fester longer.

I can easily see a recrudescence of anti-semitism in France and Spain, but I am sure that anything like the Holocaust is impossible.

Probably, but let's not forget that pre-WWI France was one of the strongholds of antisemitism. I would not expect something like the Holocaust, but IMO Boulangist Inquisition would be wholly able of something like a slightly less in-depth right-wing version of Stalinist purges, think mass round-ups and executions or internment in terrible conditions of liberals, Protestants, atheists, left-wingers, republicans, homosexuals, Jews, etc. etc. Jews would be one among many of the victimized "undesirable" minorities. The Inquisition would stage a serious attempt to purge France and Spain of the 1789 "bug".

Can also agree on some kind of sexual revolution, but IMHO women parity got a big boost by the 2 WW, when women had to replace men in all sectors of civil life. ITTL this effect will be quite marginal.

Maybe, but remember that industrialization was the main driving force behind women emancipation, the WW drafts only gave the process an acceleration. Anyway, TTL is still going to see a Great War, if halved in duration, with its huge mass levies, so to some amount there shall be women factory and service workers.

Any chance of having a Czech prince on the throne of Bohemia?

I think it's wholly possible. Someone with believable pedigree as a sub-king would be necessary of course. I think of some high-ranking Czech noble family that optimally married into the Habsburg or German royal families, or maybe a branch of Habsburg or German noble family that "went native" some generations ago. Someone like Radetsky, if not some descendant of him.