A Day in July: An Early 20th Century Timeline

[Zulfurium]

How did central Asia actually look like at this point, culturally, politcally, economically and demographically? Was it still mainly tribal, like Afghanistan, or did an industrial base and some modern infrastructure already exist? I know the Soviets settled lots of Russians in the area, but i’m not sure there were many Russians there before that.

I always wondered how IOTL the Soviets managed to hold on to the area in their early years. Surely it would have been easy for the peoples of the region to go independent during the Civil War? Or was the region more integrated into Russia then one might expect?

To my knowledge it had a relatively low population at the time. As for how the Soviets managed to hold onto it, that comes down to economic dependency as Nyvis stated and a willingness to coopt or destroy any opposition. Central Asia is pretty far from everywhere else, so there wasn't really anyone who could provide any significant aid outside of the Turks, who were themselves undergoing a rather cataclysmic experience.

Just had an idea, could Anastasia marry the future Edward VIII? Might be dumb though, considering he was a womanizer all his life.

The match seems unlikely, both because there is little to recommend it for either party (Britain is primarily invested in the Don Whites and view the Siberians as a ramshackle monstrosity propped up by little more than American might). Furthermore, Anastasia isn't exactly thrilled by the idea of marrying anyone due to the way in which it would threaten her ability act as an independent power.

Note: after I finish eating dinner I will be posting the last section of the current update.

 

[Zulfurium]

Society in Flux

English Version of Trotsky's Autobiography

A Clash of Ideas​

The 1920s were a time of significant political drift within the United States as ideological convictions began to sharpen and distinct factions rose to power within their respective parties. While the progressive paradigm had dominated governmental policy since Theodore Roosevelt's rise to power early in the century, even surviving governmental changes and divergent incumbents, 1920 had seen the start of a sea change, as the progressive faction within the Republican Party slowly alienated the increasingly powerful conservative wing of the party while nativist and nationalistic forces rose to prominence within the Democratic Party.

This period was also marked by a nadir for the Socialist fringe of American politics as its brightest lights spent much of the early 1920s imprisoned. Eugene V. Debs, a five-time presidential candidate for the Socialist Party of America, sickened and died while incarcerated in 1923 and Victor L. Berger, a former congressman, was left to rot in prison. In the meanwhile, former party stalwarts such as Meyer London and Allan Benson departed the party in favour of the Social Democratic League of America, initially an anti-pacifist refuge for those in the Socialist Party opposed to the party's policy of opposing the war but in the post-war years increasingly mirroring itself on the German SPD, while the SPA's more radical followers flocked to the Communist Party of America, associated with support for a Communist regime change and allied with the IWW labor movement which had found growing success from the hard-handed labor policies of the Wood Presidency (19).

The Progressive Party as an entity had largely remained inert in the years between its dissolution in 1916 and its sudden reemergence under Robert la Follette in 1924. The sheer scale of the successes of the Progressives in the elections of 1924 caught many by surprise but could largely be attributed to a couple factors. First of all, it represented a major consolidation of progressive sentiment within the United States which had previously been split between the major parties, there was significant movement from amongst the moderates in the Socialist camp into that of the Progressives, with both the SPA and SDLA supporting la Follette's campaign and was also partly the result of an exodus of Irish American membership in the Democratic Party in response to anti-Catholic and nativist sentiments in that party (20).

The middle years of the 1920s were thus characterised by a further consolidation of these rising ideologically aligned parties, the parties increasingly moving from a regional identity towards an ideological one. On the far-left was the Communist Party of America which remained revolutionary in outlook and outside of polite society. Next was the Socialist Party of America, which found its support dwindling in favour of the more energetic Progressive and Communist parties, followed by the Social Democratic League of America, although they would soon become little more than a subsection of the Progressive Party alongside Farmer-Labour Parties and a smattering of Catholic parties primarily associated with Latino, Italian and Irish communities. The Progressive Party represented the left-wing of polite society, drawing on its connection to Theodore Roosevelt and the recently deceased Robert la Follette for legitimacy.

The Democratic Party's former progressive agenda became increasingly populist and nativist in nature, favouring protectionist trade policies, state-sponsored subsidising of accepted citizenry and the removal or alienation of unwanted segments of society - primarily Catholic, Black or Asian, doubling down on its cultural conservatism in the process. The Republican Party was marked more than anything else by the shedding of its Progressive wing, including the powerful Roosevelt machine, to the Progressive Party leaving its staunch conservatives in charge with recently elected Senator from Illinois Frank Lowden and Charles Curtis emerging as the dominant forces within the party alongside the quiet Calvin Coolidge. Finally, there was a right-wing fringe which looked for inspiration in the Sidonist movement in Portugal, the Fascist movement in Italy and various other autocratic movements, although few were larger than a couple hundred members at most (21).

Communism as an ideology had gone through considerable changes in the years since its emergence as a synthesis of Leninist-Marxist socialism and anarchism in the cauldron of the Russian Revolution. There were few things in common between the early experimentations with anarcho-syndicalism and Leninist vanguardism and the complex ideological construct which emerged from the Russian Civil War. Central to the ideology was the belief in a Vanguard Party which could bring together the disparate strands of leftist ideology and unite its followers against the threat of bourgeois oppression and counter-revolution. This concept was the single most significant legacy of Leninism to survive the emergence of Communism, with the establishment of a central committee consisting of party leadership through which state decisions should be taken for the good of all becoming another key feature. To complement the leadership of the Central Committee were a series of democratic councils, called Soviets in Russia, from the lowly factory, neighbourhood or village soviet electing representatives to a district soviet wherefrom representatives to a provincial soviet were elected, which in turn elected representatives to the State Soviet. This State Soviet served as a consultative body to the Central Committee and had the power to present legislation for consideration to the Central Committee.

However, it would be with the arrival of Leon Trotsky that the concept of perpetual world revolution became enshrined as a core precept of the Communist Movement while the two-stage theory was formally rejected. Proclaiming that while the spread of the Communist Revolution had seemingly been brought to a temporary halt, it was the duty of the Communist Party to work in any and every way possible to further the spread of revolution. This led to the ideation cultural supremacy as a venue for the spread of revolution and the adoption of diplomatic revolution as a means of spreading Communism, most significantly seen in the form of embassy openings in Berlin, Paris, Copenhagen, Stockholm and Istanbul to compliment the pre-existing embassies in Tehran, Khiva, Mexico City and Rome. Support for revolutionary movements on an international stage were also furthered through the expansion and internationalisation of the Third International.

There were also those who called for open, armed, support for leftist revolutionary movements across the world but these efforts would be stymied by the Central Committee, where in a special secret session it was determined that while the revolutionary arms of Yekaterinburg could be used for this purpose, it would be disadvantageous for the Communist movement as a whole to be associated with such violent means of revolution-making. After the conclusion of the Italian Civil War in the mid-1920s, it was hoped by many in Moscow that revolution would naturally spill over into the neighboring states, setting off a series of dominoes whereby one state after another would fall. When this did not happen, it proved a body blow to the ideological convictions of many in Moscow. However, Trotsky would soon present a solution to this failures, with the West now closed to all but cultural and diplomatic influence, it was time to turn eastward to the masses of Asia. Here were peoples aplenty toiling under autocratic rule as the Russian people had until recently. Here there were the beginnings of an indigent communist movement which with support and nurture might well rise to unimagined heights (22).

One of the most interesting ideological developments of the 1920s came in the form of the German Liberty movement, the result of what its founders described as a National Conservative Revolution. Breaking with the German conservative consensus and with the statist nature of the DNVP, the movement was spearheaded by a number of bombastic self-promoting war heroes who had risen to national fame either during or in the aftermath of the Great War. Perhaps most significant of these war heroes were the author Ernst Jünger, whose famous memoir described the soldiers' mystical experience of the Great War to the German public like few others, and Manfred von Richthofen, whose own memoir had sold by the millions.

While Jünger had spent the early years of the decade largely writing and studying whatever caught his fancy, including everything from marine biology and entomology to philosophy and zoology, Richthofen had entered local politics as a Reichstag delegate for the DKP from East Prussia, making a name for himself by opposing land reform and championing the creation of an independent Air Force from the Marine and Army Air Services. Both men, and those who would in time congregate around them, were skeptical of governmental power and yearned back to what they termed the "Age of German Liberty" under the Holy Roman Empire in which every man was a lord in-and-unto-himself, with rights and obligations which went both ways with the sovereign. With the support of the political theoretician Edgar Julius Jung and the philosopher Martin Heidegger these vague ideals of liberty through autocratic rule and a neo-feudalist belief noblesse obligé were sharpened and expanded on, with Heidegger's own recently published philosophical works serving to aid in the creation of a philosophical groundwork for the emergent ideology of National Liberty while Edgar Jung presented the ideology's call for the replacement of all state structures with the bonds of feudalism as a return to the roots of German conservatism while condemning the centralised autocracy advocated by the DNVP and the statist centralism of the SPD.

They would soon find themselves supported by the Georgekreis, a collection of poets, historians and writers who formed around the poet Stefan George and who were determined to save German culture from what they viewed as its moral degradation under bourgeois and worker influence. In its place they presented a world of Great Men and highlighted a Heroic Age freed of the strictures of bourgeois governance and a world of Germanic Liberty. Historians such as Ludwig von Pastor, Percy Schramm and Ernst Kantorowicz were swift to join these efforts, merging their paradigmatic works on the medieval age with a focus on the bonds of feudal-vassalage, the role of the Church in society and most significantly the importance of German Liberty to the rise of the German Reich to European hegemony (23).

In 1927, in preparation for the coming elections, the German Liberty movement decided to make a push for political legitimacy - accepting that only by voicing their opposition to the current state of Germany to the public would they be able to achieve their goals - and as such established the German Liberty Party (DFP/Deutsche Freiheitspartei) under the leadership of Manfred von Richthofen. Inspired by the medieval confraternal chivalric orders, Richthofen would come to be referred to as the Grand Master of the Party, while its membership were granted various other party titles, and he immediately began campaigning both through his seat in the Reichstag and through the conservative press to spread the message of the DFP (24).

The Exile of the Vatican from Italy had a profound impact on both the Catholic Church itself and its wider congregation. With anti-clericalism at an unprecedented height, although a general trend opposing the power of the Church had been present for over a century in many Catholic nations by this point in time, there was a natural counter-reaction as believers rose up to protect the Church. In France this was expressed in the form of a rise in Catholic and Monarchist right-wing support and in Mexico it found expression in the violent rising against the anti-clerical central government by Cristeros rebels. In the United States it appeared as a general departure of Catholics from the Democratic Party while in Germany it spurred support for the Centre Party.

However, the most significant impact of the Vatican's exile and the period of limbo in France would be on the actual ability of the Catholic Church to enforce its will upon the wider church hierarchy. This was most prominently exemplified by the reemergence of modernist tendencies in the American Church under the auspices of powerful liberal Archbishops like George Mundelein of Chicago and Austin Dowling of St. Paul, while more conservative voices such as the Archbishops of Boston and New York found themselves increasingly forced to take up the fight for the orthodox integralist position with the Vatican showing a rather significant degree of disinterest. Thus while modernist and integralist positions remained at the heart of the struggle over the Catholic Church in the United States, the disengagement of the Vatican from the struggle evened out what had previously been an uneven struggle for the modernists and opened up for the possibility of a more liberal Church.

At the same time, the weakening of the Catholic Church opened up avenues for non-Catholic Christian groups such as Pentecostals, Jehovah's Witnesses and Mormons and Four Square Gospels to all make inroads in the Catholic community, particularly in the United States and Latin America, as they experienced their early rise to prominence. The loss of Rome deeply divided the Catholic Church with some claiming it as a sign that the Papacy had engaged too deeply in worldly affairs, or even rejected the Church as a whole in favour of another branch of Christianity, and thus rejected the integralist line of thought which had grown so popular in Church circles in the early years of the century in favour of progressive or modernist tendencies or claimed that the church had proven too lax in its enforcement of God's Will.

This divide between modernists and integralists would prove central to the divisions within the German Centre Party and saw Catholic society divided more firmly than at any point in the last half-century into integralist and modernist camps. Pope Gregory VII remained firmly in the integralist camp and maintained the sanctions imposed upon modernist tendencies by his predecessors, but found himself more occupied by the struggle to ensure the Church's survival. He held complicated and difficult negotiations with the Catholic governments both in the Old World and the New in hopes of finding a more permanent home for the Catholic Church until Rome could be liberated from the grasps of the Communists (25).

Footnotes:

(19) The Socialist leaders imprisoned during the Great War are not released ITTL and as a result the Socialist Party loses many of its strongest and most popular voices, leading to a steady collapse in popularity. By the middle of the decade, Morris Hillquit remains one of the few major national figures in the Socialist Party still around, with his protégé Norman Thomas seeming like one of the few future leaders with potential still in the party, most having left for either the Progressive Party or the Communist Party.

(20) I don't know how much people know about why the Irish-American community ended up in the Democratic camp when they arrived despite being so different from much of the rest of the party. It mostly had to do with the Democrats being able to function as an oppositional force to the traditional power of the Republican Party in the northern sections of the United States where the Irish settled most heavily. In Massachusetts it was used as a vehicle of opposition to the WASP elites who otherwise dominated the state, allowing the Irish-Americans to organize and develop their own political organization without WASP involvement. This, however, came into conflict with much of the national Democratic Party on numerous occasions throughout the first half of the twentieth century and was a core dynamic within the party. ITTL the entire Irish political establishment basically just changed the banner under which they were contesting political posts (Democratic->Progressive) but otherwise largely kept going as before. They are effectively a semi-independent force within the party with some rather sharp contrasts to other sections of the party - the Roosevelt Progressives, the Farmer-Labour Progressives (largely German-American) and Democratic Progressives being three other major factions.

(21) I hope that gives a good spectrum of the political alignment in the United States and explains some of the political transition which has happened in those parties. While IOTL the conservatives in the Republican Party were able to emerge victorious in 1922 with the ascendancy of Calvin Coolidge and subordinated the progressive wing of the party to their rule, ITTL the progressives bolt for their own party. In general this is a period in which political ideologies consolidate within parties to a greater degree than in the past. One force not mentioned here, but which is important to keep in mind is the Ku Klux Klan which sort of sprawls across the spectrum stretching from the Democratic Party and into the political fringe right, with some spillover into the Republican party due to the continued regional identity of both parties (this is particularly the case in Indiana, where the Indiana Klan is Republican on a state-level and Democratic in national alignment).

(22) There shouldn't be too much new information in this section, it is largely a summary of pre-existing events. While I didn't get into it in the direct text, it should be mentioned that a key force in the Communist movement is its continued openness towards new ideological propositions and relatively weak censorship outside of outright calls for Tsarist restoration or the like. Communist Russia is not exactly an out-and-out democracy and particularly the opaque nature of how people rise to the Central Committee remains an issue, particularly in the international communist movement, but while the State Soviet is quite limited in power, the same cannot be said for the three lowest tiers of soviets. At that level, all local government is managed through the soviets with their regional chairmen elected from amongst their number and running most local affairs. The further you get from the State level, the more power the democratic institutions have.

(23) Alright, this is probably a bit hard to understand, I confused myself half the time with it, so I can't imagine how it read to everyone else. This is essentially a brand new ideology which I formulated based on some of the comments in the thread, research on some of the thought processes of the period and experimentation. At its most simple the National Liberty ideology can be described as an anti-statist right-wing ideology with strong neo-feudal overtones. In essence its supporters want to remove most of the modern state in favor of a system of lord-vassal relationships in which individuals pledge loyalty and fealty to others, forging overlapping sets of rights and responsibilities on the basis of these bonds in a complex web with the German Emperor at its center. It harkens back to the ancient principle of German Liberty, which effectively means that the authorities only have a right to intervene in inter-personal relationships when it directly threatens the another's inalienable rights. Please ask me to explain in greater detail or clarify if there is anything that doesn't make sense - it is an ideology I cooked and I want it to make as much sense as possible. And yes, I know how weird fanboying over the weak nature of state control in the HRE might seem, but considering the shit the Nazis were able to go for IOTL it shouldn't be too implausible.

(24) If this reads like some sort of nostalgic boys club for medievalist fanboys, then good, I got the tone right. That is basically what it is to begin with, a bunch of lesser noblemen and arch-conservatives who all want to feel like they are part of something exciting. That said, the notion of reducing government interference in personal affairs should prove appealing to some, while the whole feudalist element has a lot of the nobility rather interested.

(25) If anyone knows more about early 20th Century Catholicism, then please let me know if this doesn't make sense. I have tried researching it, but I am still uncertain. As I understand it, the key division at the time was between liberal-modernists and conservative-integralists with the former wanting to strengthen the church by shifting its ideological framework to better align with modern thought - such as accepting the division between church and state - while integralists wished to integrate the Catholic Church with society, breaking with the church-state barrier of modern life and involving the Church in daily life to a greater extent. As can be imagined the fall of Rome and exile of the Vatican has profound consequences for a Catholic faith already in turmoil and under assault. The most significant consequence is that church structures are at least temporarily weakened and distracted, opening up for a resurgence in modernist thought, particularly in America. It is still too early for something like liberation theology to emerge, but I would expect to see it appear earlier than IOTL and probably be more influential. I will deal, at least partly, with the immediate fate of the Vatican in the following update.

Summary:

Diverse and disparate cultural movements come to dominate the 1920s.

Women's suffrage and wider engagement with society has major consequences for the development of society in Europe.

Technological developments lead to the emergence of mass consumerism while eugenics augur a worrying future.

From the Catholic Church to the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the 1920s are a time of ideological flux as new ideas emerge and old ones rise to challenge them.

End Note:

And that ends our journey through the many disparate elements of the 1920s from culture and society to technology and ideology. I hope you found it enlightening, but I am really looking forward to returning to the more ordinary type of updates. I was wondering what format people enjoy most - one section at a time, two at a time or a full update at a time (bearing in mind that they are from fastest to slowest update speed). There are some interesting developments in this section, ranging from a new ideology and the transformation of Communism to a shifting Catholic Church and a realignment of ideology in the United States.

I don't quite know when the next update will be, but keep an eye out for late next week. I hope you all enjoyed.

 

[Radigan]

The Jünger-Richthofen-Heidegger dream team hype is real

 

[Zulfurium]

The Jünger-Richthofen-Heidegger dream team hype is real

Jünger and Heidegger were friends IOTL and I have a hard time imagining Richthofen wouldn't have ended up in similar circles to Jünger had he followed this path. IOTL he was preparing a memoir for publication similar to what many others came out with - including Jünger. While I don't think Richthofen would be as talented a writer as Jünger, I do think that his war-time fame would be sufficient to make it sell.

Any comments on the actual German Liberty Ideology?

 

[Rufus]

Any comments on the actual German Liberty Ideology?

It‘s similar to what i had in mind in an earlier post, where i described something called ‚romantic conservatism‘. I like that you brought up Heidegger and Jünger, they are just the kind of people to get into something like this. Overall it feels very ‚German‘, if that makes any sense, and definitely fits into the German idealistic tradition. It could also achieve quite a bit of appeal across different parts of the political spectrum. As you already mentioned, it could appeal to reactionaries and lower nobility, but also to liberals who are socially conservative, to conservative/integralist catholics (if the movement is inter-confessional), to protestant clergymen, and thanks to the involvement of Richthofen to normal nationalists as well. The involvement of war heroes like Richthofen also could lead to support from veterans associations and Freikorps etc. I would also expect them to favor the kind of decentralized political structure i mentioned before. Overall, it could become a kind of ‚third position‘ ideology, similar to fascism IOTL, and could shake up the established political system in a similar way.

As an ideology it also has the potential to spread outside of Germany, especially in catholic countries with large rural (and conservatively inclined) populations like Spain, or even France. OTL‘s Action Francaise for example not only wanted to restore the monarchy, but also the pre-revolutionary liberties of France‘s ancient provinces, in opposition to the centralized departmental system of the Republic, so there is already some overlap there.

 

[TheHandsomeBrute]

I like it allot and its ability to both get Liberals and Conservatives working with them. If Richthofen is/becomes a great public speaker he could change German political leanings forever and create a third great political ideology that counter balances both Socialist and Conservatives.

 

[Radigan]

Yeah, the ideology itself is really neat. It's an interesting way for conservative-reactionary thought to develop. I'm willing to bet Oswald Spengler will be pretty deeply involved as well.

one question I have - is Jünger still developing his thoughts on Total Mobilisation and the Worker? I do see them fitting in with the German Liberty neofeudalist model ITTL, compared to the more National Bolshevik leanings he had OTL with Niekisch.

 

[Zulfurium]

It‘s similar to what i had in mind in an earlier post, where i described something called ‚romantic conservatism‘. I like that you brought up Heidegger and Jünger, they are just the kind of people to get into something like this. Overall it feels very ‚German‘, if that makes any sense, and definitely fits into the German idealistic tradition. It could also achieve quite a bit of appeal across different parts of the political spectrum. As you already mentioned, it could appeal to reactionaries and lower nobility, but also to liberals who are socially conservative, to conservative/integralist catholics (if the movement is inter-confessional), to protestant clergymen, and thanks to the involvement of Richthofen to normal nationalists as well. The involvement of war heroes like Richthofen also could lead to support from veterans associations and Freikorps etc. I would also expect them to favor the kind of decentralized political structure i mentioned before. Overall, it could become a kind of ‚third position‘ ideology, similar to fascism IOTL, and could shake up the established political system in a similar way.

As an ideology it also has the potential to spread outside of Germany, especially in catholic countries with large rural (and conservatively inclined) populations like Spain, or even France. OTL‘s Action Francaise for example not only wanted to restore the monarchy, but also the pre-revolutionary liberties of France‘s ancient provinces, in opposition to the centralized departmental system of the Republic, so there is already some overlap there.

I did draw a good deal of inspiration from your earlier posts but mixed in some feudalist attitudes as well. I am happy to hear that it comes across as plausible. That said, I am still not sure quite how far the ideology will go and what level of support it would gain. It can, as you state, gain support from a pretty broad spectrum but at the same time it is a rather fringe ideological framework to begin with. While Richthofen and other war heroes should draw in people, the foundational figures in the ideology are more a bunch of intellectuals caught up in a romanticisation of the past.

I could see it inspiring Action Francaise and other movements like it, but I also have other ideas for what direction to take them in.

I like it allot and its ability to both get Liberals and Conservatives working with them. If Richthofen is/becomes a great public speaker he could change German political leanings forever and create a third great political ideology that counter balances both Socialist and Conservatives.

Richthofen seems to have been a pretty charismatic figure, if a rather archtypical junker in many of his attitudes. That said, happy to hear it comes across well.

Yeah, the ideology itself is really neat. It's an interesting way for conservative-reactionary thought to develop. I'm willing to bet Oswald Spengler will be pretty deeply involved as well.

one question I have - is Jünger still developing his thoughts on Total Mobilisation and the Worker? I do see them fitting in with the German Liberty neofeudalist model ITTL, compared to the more National Bolshevik leanings he had OTL with Niekisch.

Spengler does seem like the sort of person who would jump head-first into this. I would expect him to be a pretty significant figure, just as he was in the OTL Conservative Revolutionary movement which German Liberty has sort of replaced ITTL.

TBH, I haven't read up in detail on Jünger's ideological beliefs. That said, I doubt Jünger would present his Total Mobilisation concept ITTL given that the core thesis is based on the victory of democratic states over monarchical rule. Given that ITTL it was the monarchical state which emerged victorious, Jünger is further convinced of his belief in the Heroic Spirit of the Monarchical State - viewing the neo-feudalist model of German Liberty as the ultimate expression of that spirit. It could be I am also misunderstanding his understanding of the Worker, but that also seems to go in the complete opposite direction of what he believes ITTL. I think the most important part to note is that the lack of national humiliation ITTL has a profound impact on the right-wing in Germany as does the lack of a functioning fascist state and the relatively limited nature of autocracy in Red Russia. They are far less forward-looking without the shattering of the monarchical world and as such instead turn their focus backward to the HRE for inspiration. Napoleon's dismantling of the First Reich becomes a major point of cultural lamentation in right-wing literature around this point in time.

 

[Rufus]

That said, I am still not sure quite how far the ideology will go and what level of support it would gain. It can, as you state, gain support from a pretty broad spectrum but at the same time it is a rather fringe ideological framework to begin with. While Richthofen and other war heroes should draw in people, the foundational figures in the ideology are more a bunch of intellectuals caught up in a romanticisation of the past.

I think the biggest strength of the ideology is the fact that it is kind of vague, and that its practical implementations could look different depending on where the focus lies. It‘s kind of like ‚communism‘ in this regard, since the vision of how exactly a communist society would look like has never really been agreed upon, even to this day. I think this is one of the reasons why communism was so successful in the 20th century - people could basically project their own wishes and desires into this imaginary future society. However, there are a number of policies that all communist movements had in common wherever they came to power, with the nationalization of the means of production (especially the major industries) being the most famous of course.

Consequently, there would need to be a number of core proposals as part of of the official program of the German Liberty Party as well. Obviously, it‘s impossible to literally return to medieval feudalism, but certain aspects of it could certainly be translated into the 20th century. The kind of ‚soviet’-like political hierarchy i mentioned earlier could be something that fits into this framework, especially if combined with a strict fiscal hierarchy, meaning that direct taxation is restricted to cities, towns and municipalities, while the German states can only raise revenue by taxing their cities and municipalities, and the federal government in turn can only do so by taxing the states. This would basically mirror the feudal hierarchy of the High Middle Ages, where the King/Emperor could only tax and rule over his direct vassals, but not his vassal‘s vassals, while those vassals could in turn only tax and rule over their own direct vassals and so on (at least in theory).

Another proposal could be the abolition of civil marriage, meaning that weddings can only be performed under the auspices of the Christian denominations couples belong to, and not by government officials. I could see something like this being proposed, not due to some kind of Christian fundamentalism, but as a means to remove the influence of the state (perceived as secular and materialist) from the institution of marriage. IOTL this is still the case in Israel for example (interestingly, based on laws inherited from the Ottomans), where marriage and divorce are under the jurisdiction of the Chief Rabbinate.

Another big question is economics, of course. Obviously, ‚German Liberty‘ doesn‘t sound like something that would endorse any kind of socialism, but i doubt ‚capitalism‘ as such is something that would be endorsed either (though private property would certainly be supported). If political decentralization is a core idea of this movement, then economical decentralization might be another. If taxes (including corporate taxes) are restricted to the local level, then large corporations that operate on a national or international level naturally wouldn‘t be taxed on a national level. In fact, corperations as such wouldn’t be taxed at all - it would be their local branches/factories/offices that would be taxed instead (or rather, the incomes those local branches brings in), which means tax revenue is much more spread out compared to centralized tax systems. Basically, municipalities would regard those local branches/factories/offices as their own corporations, and probably wouldn‘t care about the overall corperation those branches belong to at all. In fact, a more radical proposal would be to break up large corperations entirely into their local parts, and to prevent the formation of such entities in the first place, thus creating an economy based on small and medium sized businesses - though something like this would probably be a bit too alienating for certain circles, and might be restricted to the ‚left‘ wing of the movement, similar to the Strasser wing of the NSDAP IOTL. Also, if cities and municipalities have total fiscal autonomy, then they would also be able to support/privilege their local economy to a certain extent - they could implement a sales tax from which the products of local businesses would be exempt, for example.



But this economics talk reminds me: how exactly is the economy in Red Russia being run? Is it centrally planned, with five year plans similar to OTL? Or do different regions and localities have their own ‚plans‘? Or is it a kind of mixed economy?

Also, are there any major differences between the Russian and Italian regimes at this point? I‘m not sure why, but for some reason i‘m under the impression that the Italian communists are more comparable to OTL communists.

 

[Zulfurium]

I think the biggest strength of the ideology is the fact that it is kind of vague, and that its practical implementations could look different depending on where the focus lies. It‘s kind of like ‚communism‘ in this regard, since the vision of how exactly a communist society would look like has never really been agreed upon, even to this day. I think this is one of the reasons why communism was so successful in the 20th century - people could basically project their own wishes and desires into this imaginary future society. However, there are a number of policies that all communist movements had in common wherever they came to power, with the nationalization of the means of production (especially the major industries) being the most famous of course.

Consequently, there would need to be a number of core proposals as part of of the official program of the German Liberty Party as well. Obviously, it‘s impossible to literally return to medieval feudalism, but certain aspects of it could certainly be translated into the 20th century. The kind of ‚soviet’-like political hierarchy i mentioned earlier could be something that fits into this framework, especially if combined with a strict fiscal hierarchy, meaning that direct taxation is restricted to cities, towns and municipalities, while the German states can only raise revenue by taxing their cities and municipalities, and the federal government in turn can only do so by taxing the states. This would basically mirror the feudal hierarchy of the High Middle Ages, where the King/Emperor could only tax and rule over his direct vassals, but not his vassal‘s vassals, while those vassals could in turn only tax and rule over their own direct vassals and so on (at least in theory).

Another proposal could be the abolition of civil marriage, meaning that weddings can only be performed under the auspices of the Christian denominations couples belong to, and not by government officials. I could see something like this being proposed, not due to some kind of Christian fundamentalism, but as a means to remove the influence of the state (perceived as secular and materialist) from the institution of marriage. IOTL this is still the case in Israel for example (interestingly, based on laws inherited from the Ottomans), where marriage and divorce are under the jurisdiction of the Chief Rabbinate.

Another big question is economics, of course. Obviously, ‚German Liberty‘ doesn‘t sound like something that would endorse any kind of socialism, but i doubt ‚capitalism‘ as such is something that would be endorsed either (though private property would certainly be supported). If political decentralization is a core idea of this movement, then economical decentralization might be another. If taxes (including corporate taxes) are restricted to the local level, then large corporations that operate on a national or international level naturally wouldn‘t be taxed on a national level. In fact, corperations as such wouldn’t be taxed at all - it would be their local branches/factories/offices that would be taxed instead (or rather, the incomes those local branches brings in), which means tax revenue is much more spread out compared to centralized tax systems. Basically, municipalities would regard those local branches/factories/offices as their own corporations, and probably wouldn‘t care about the overall corperation those branches belong to at all. In fact, a more radical proposal would be to break up large corperations entirely into their local parts, and to prevent the formation of such entities in the first place, thus creating an economy based on small and medium sized businesses - though something like this would probably be a bit too alienating for certain circles, and might be restricted to the ‚left‘ wing of the movement, similar to the Strasser wing of the NSDAP IOTL. Also, if cities and municipalities have total fiscal autonomy, then they would also be able to support/privilege their local economy to a certain extent - they could implement a sales tax from which the products of local businesses would be exempt, for example.

These are a lot of interesting ideas and are probably represented, at least in part, within the movement. I do think that the use of councils at various levels, electing figures upward from one level to the next, will probably fulfil some role in the ideological construct they come to develop. They are rather ardently decentralizing in outlook and hostile to what is characterised as the "Modern State" - there are enough comparisons to the various diets of the HRE for this to fit with their mania. I do think there is one thing you are missing in the tax scheme - namely that each stage would send finance upward in the system, but a strongly decentralized tax system also seems likely in their view. I do think that you might see supporters of German Liberty turn to the mass cartelization similarly to OTL under the Nazis under the idea of it fulfilling a similar function to the Hansa or a Guild system where different corporations are grouped together into massive conglomerates or alliances of industry. Bear in mind that another significant belief in this movement is corporatism, with each element of society having a role to fulfil. In that way, it really is a hardcore third positionist ideology, seeking to contrast itself from capitalism with its unfettered market and socialism with its planned economy - instead subscribing to a "controlled" economy in which various industries act in concert with each other, not part of the state but also not competing with each other. I do find the idea of abolishing civil marriages in this context rather fascinating, it would certainly fit.

But this economics talk reminds me: how exactly is the economy in Red Russia being run? Is it centrally planned, with five year plans similar to OTL? Or do different regions and localities have their own ‚plans‘? Or is it a kind of mixed economy?

Also, are there any major differences between the Russian and Italian regimes at this point? I‘m not sure why, but for some reason i‘m under the impression that the Italian communists are more comparable to OTL communists.

Red Russia is complicated. In the lands under Yekaterinburg rule it is very much a heavily planned economy run exclusively in the interests of the state while in Muscovite lands there are a couple different levels. At a local level, trade between soviets (village, factory, neighborhood and the like scale-wise) is legal and barely regulated (more due to a lack of government resources than anything else). However, once you get into district and corporate economies the state begins to take over, although here it remains primarily district-level nationalization of corporations and the like. The higher up you go the more controlled the economy is depending on factors such as how much of a national interest there is in the particular industry or region. The Central Committee is generally hands off, but are able to completely take control of anything they actually wish to. So it is a mixed economy, with only limited economic planning, but that balance is constantly shifting depending on CC interests.

That is an accurate read, while the Italian Communists did get an infusion of anarchists, they lean far more towards the socialist side and are increasingly moving towards something similar to OTL's communists with a strong central government. Actually dealing with this in the next update. I would compare it to post-Trotsky's expulsion Soviet governance in Italy at this point in time, with a strong core of leaders generally in alignment but without a single leading figure like Stalin having emerged yet. Oligarchical rule in effect.

 

[Nyvis]

(22) There shouldn't be too much new information in this section, it is largely a summary of pre-existing events. While I didn't get into it in the direct text, it should be mentioned that a key force in the Communist movement is its continued openness towards new ideological propositions and relatively weak censorship outside of outright calls for Tsarist restoration or the like. Communist Russia is not exactly an out-and-out democracy and particularly the opaque nature of how people rise to the Central Committee remains an issue, particularly in the international communist movement, but while the State Soviet is quite limited in power, the same cannot be said for the three lowest tiers of soviets. At that level, all local government is managed through the soviets with their regional chairmen elected from amongst their number and running most local affairs. The further you get from the State level, the more power the democratic institutions have.

How likely is it the state soviet could stage an opposition if it had the support of the smaller soviets and their local powers, in case the central committee do something dumb?

I feel like the focus on diplomatic and ideological support for revolution rather than armed struggle could pay off, even if it's just in getting progressive-communist popular fronts with a Moscow-friendly foreign policy in power. It's unlikely they can have outright wins for communist parties in most of the world, but courting more moderate parties by showing they're not all frothing at the mouth madmen could help.

The IWW taking a growing role in labour relations in the US is interesting.

(23) Alright, this is probably a bit hard to understand - I confused myself half the time with it, so I can't imagine how it read to everyone else. This is essentially a brand new ideology which I formulated based on some of the comments in the thread, research on some of the thought processes of the period and experimentation. At its most simple the National Liberty ideology can be described as an anti-statist right-wing ideology with strong neo-feudal overtones. In essence its supporters want to remove most of the modern state in favor of a system of lord-vassal relationships in which individuals pledge loyalty and fealty to others, forging overlapping sets of rights and responsibilities on the basis of these bonds in a complex web with the German Emperor at its center. It harkens back to the ancient principle of German Liberty, which effectively means that the authorities only have a right to intervene in inter-personal relationships when it directly threatens the another's inalienable rights. Please ask me to explain in greater detail or clarify if there is anything that doesn't make sense - it is an ideology I cooked and I want it to make as much sense as possible. And yes, I know how weird fanboying over the weak nature of state control in the HRE might seem, but considering the shit the Nazis were able to go for IOTL it shouldn't be too implausible.

Anarcho-feudalism, is that you? This sounds kinda dreadful an ideology, with the rejection of state power but embracing of even more retrograde hierarchies. It sounds a bit too esoteric to reach widespread acclaim outside old families though. It reminds me of anarcho capitalism, and that's not a good thing.

 

[Zulfurium]

How likely is it the state soviet could stage an opposition if it had the support of the smaller soviets and their local powers, in case the central committee do something dumb?

I feel like the focus on diplomatic and ideological support for revolution rather than armed struggle could pay off, even if it's just in getting progressive-communist popular fronts with a Moscow-friendly foreign policy in power. It's unlikely they can have outright wins for communist parties in most of the world, but courting more moderate parties by showing they're not all frothing at the mouth madmen could help.

The IWW taking a growing role in labour relations in the US is interesting.

It is highly unlikely given that the individual members on the Central Committee also have pretty significant followings in the State Soviet, with the Central Committee sort of serving as unelected representatives for the key factions in the soviet. Even if someone in the state soviet were able to build enough of a following to sway the soviet in their favor, they would be more likely to just get absorbed into the CC than use the soviet institution itself, and if that doesn't work it bears remininding that the CC control military, law enforcement and justice.

That was basically my thinking. As for the IWW, that is going to be a fun can of worms for whatever president ends up having to deal with things when something goes off the rails.

Anarcho-feudalism, is that you? This sounds kinda dreadful an ideology, with the rejection of state power but embracing of even more retrograde hierarchies. It sounds a bit too esoteric to reach widespread acclaim outside old families though. It reminds me of anarcho capitalism, and that's not a good thing.

I think the best description of what I am thinking is in the posts above your own where I was discussing this with @Rufus. I don't know if Anarchism is the right word for it - its supporters would certainly reject that label - and what they are opposed to is more the degree to which the modern state seeks to centralize power and authority while empowering the "bourgeois classes" to the detriment of those who would traditionally hold power. It is neo-feudalist, corporatist and anti-centralist - they don't want an absolute monarchy, which is where they believe the modern state originated, but rather something more similar to what preceded it - a central power reliant on the consent of its subjects to exercise its might. Its exact relationship to democracy is a bit iffy and one of the areas where there is considerable disagreement within the movement as a whole - some wanting to reestablish something like an Estates General and a series of diets, while others want a more autocratic model.

 

[Big Smoke]

Only thing I would request is returning to a regular update schedule, regardless of that may be, even if that just means giving a prospective next update date in each update.

 

[Zulfurium]

Only thing I would request is returning to a regular update schedule, regardless of that may be, even if that just means giving a prospective next update date in each update.

Thank you for the suggestion, I will try to return to the regular schedule of updating on Sundays then.

 

[Nyvis]

It is highly unlikely given that the individual members on the Central Committee also have pretty significant followings in the State Soviet, with the Central Committee sort of serving as unelected representatives for the key factions in the soviet. Even if someone in the state soviet were able to build enough of a following to sway the soviet in their favor, they would be more likely to just get absorbed into the CC than use the soviet institution itself, and if that doesn't work it bears remininding that the CC control military, law enforcement and justice.

Ah yes, so the central committee may not be democratic, but it does reflect the same trends. But that's exactly my point: if it stopped doing so, it would face a rebellion from the soviets, because it would mean a significant portion of the people in them aren't represented in it anymore.

I imagine if the fledgling communist state survives its early years without turning into a total dictatorship, this relationship will end up formalized in some way at some point. Kinda like governments started appointed by and answerable to the monarch despite parliament being a thing, and gradually drifted to existing by parliament's consent.

Of course, siege mentality and large personalities in the committee could lead to falling in the opposite direction towards central authoritarianism, but this would probably drive the factions that lost the power struggle over the committee into rebellion.

a central power reliant on the consent of its subjects to exercise its might.

You mean the consent of its powerful subjects, I imagine? Unless they have a completely delusional idea of feudalism.

 

[Zulfurium]

Ah yes, so the central committee may not be democratic, but it does reflect the same trends. But that's exactly my point: if it stopped doing so, it would face a rebellion from the soviets, because it would mean a significant portion of the people in them aren't represented in it anymore.

I imagine if the fledgling communist state survives its early years without turning into a total dictatorship, this relationship will end up formalized in some way at some point. Kinda like governments started appointed by and answerable to the monarch despite parliament being a thing, and gradually drifted to existing by parliament's consent.

Of course, siege mentality and large personalities in the committee could lead to falling in the opposite direction towards central authoritarianism, but this would probably drive the factions that lost the power struggle over the committee into rebellion.



You mean the consent of its powerful subjects, I imagine? Unless they have a completely delusional idea of feudalism.

I don't really think that the State Soviet would have the power to actually rebel against the CC, given that they have little control of any vehicles of state violence. I don't necessarily think that the relationship has to formalize, but rather that when appointing new figures to the CC their level of support in the Soviet, personal accomplishments and other sorts of ties would likely play into the decision.

Yes, I meant Powerful subjects, or perhaps Direct subjects is a better word for it.

 

[Nyvis]

I don't really think that the State Soviet would have the power to actually rebel against the CC, given that they have little control of any vehicles of state violence. I don't necessarily think that the relationship has to formalize, but rather that when appointing new figures to the CC their level of support in the Soviet, personal accomplishments and other sorts of ties would likely play into the decision.

The state soviet is composed of representatives from the local soviets right? And those have people on the ground, economic power, etc. Plus probably militias, ex soldiers... If the state soviet moves, it's probably that the soviets below that are moving, which is the real threat. I'm imagining the CC will do something dumb or authoritarian at some point in its history, and either it succeeds and centralizes power further, or it fails and the soviets bind it to them tighter. Trotsky could easily be the spark at some point. Or a war.

 

[Kibbutznik]

That brings up a point--what exactly does Moscow, and it's Yekaterinburg annex, call itself?

 

[Salvador79]

The state soviet is composed of representatives from the local soviets right? And those have people on the ground, economic power, etc. Plus probably militias, ex soldiers... If the state soviet moves, it's probably that the soviets below that are moving, which is the real threat. I'm imagining the CC will do something dumb or authoritarian at some point in its history, and either it succeeds and centralizes power further, or it fails and the soviets bind it to them tighter. Trotsky could easily be the spark at some point. Or a war.

Seconded.

 

[Zulfurium]

The state soviet is composed of representatives from the local soviets right? And those have people on the ground, economic power, etc. Plus probably militias, ex soldiers... If the state soviet moves, it's probably that the soviets below that are moving, which is the real threat. I'm imagining the CC will do something dumb or authoritarian at some point in its history, and either it succeeds and centralizes power further, or it fails and the soviets bind it to them tighter. Trotsky could easily be the spark at some point. Or a war.

Oh definitely, although the state soviet is also filled with representatives from department soviets, army unit soviets and the like. While the majority are village and neighborhood soviets, I probably should have clarified that alongside factory soviets there are vocational soviets as well - with particularly the individual ministries, which are under CC control, having a large number of soviet seats, to say nothing of military soviets, which effectively allow the CC to ensure a strong minority backing regardless of local soviet wishes (ratio is something like 5% of seats being from ministry soviets, 10-15% from military soviets, 20% from factory soviets, 25% from neighborhood (urban) soviets and 35-40% from village (rural) soviets. These are very rough numbers though and subject to change.). They are effectively packing the soviet with their own supporters, and the rural soviets follow on from the tradition of OTL of not really knowing what they actually support outside of vague pro-peasant policies. I think you are severely overestimating the power and influence of the State Soviet and severely underestimating the CC's power in this, as well as the level of cohesion between soviets at a local level - which is near inexistant outside of weak regional coalitions.

Keep in mind that, as mentioned, the CC is pretty representative of the State Soviet's major factions - largely divided between a decentralizing-Anarchists faction, a centralizing-Socialist governing faction and an expansionist-Military faction.

That brings up a point--what exactly does Moscow, and it's Yekaterinburg annex, call itself?

That is an issue that remains under discussion at the moment in Moscow. Leaning towards Federal Communist Soviet Republic of Russia - Socialist not quite having the same context ITTL - or dropping either the Federal or Russia section of that name.

As for Yekaterinburg, Trotsky has begun to refer to it as the Yekaterinburg Guberniya, or Governorate, with that name beginning to appear on state paperwork.