Anti semitism was fairly common, but the willingness to act on it to that level was all nazi. And definitely not something Strasser differed on significantly. Also, the fact the most significant leftist and socialist movements so far have been from slavic nations with a heavy jewish participation isn't going to endear them to the ethno-populist ideologues.

Right wing """syndicalism""" was a fairly common view in fascistic circles before they embraced the elites that lifted them to power fully and purged the more populist and economically divergent people. National syndicalism.

In practice, those ideas are more corporatist than anything, and seek to create a harmony between the private sector, workers (of the right ethnicity) and the very much anti democratic state, with the third arbitrating and controlling the first two to meet its goals. This syndicalism has very little to do with unions and a lot with micromanaging workers and putting the state's ideology in every workplace.

I think it's a terrible fit for the SPD, which was often the party of extending democracy, and still very much a boogeyman to elites despite being fairly moderate and willing to compromise by comparison to the communists. Jews were also fairly common and important to the party's development. And even if they didn't stop the war the way they did OTL, the SPD was still less nationalistic than the other German parties.

Honestly, Strasser and co are much more likely to found their own party and try to mooch from the leftist vote with populist rhetoric while attracting elites disabused with increasingly ineffective traditional right parties. And even then, without the trauma of military defeat and weimar's issues, I don't see it working nearly as well as the nazis.

It's also worth remembering that with the different Russian revolution, threats of a SPD-KPD alliance would loom much larger since the red factions did end up making up and the social democrats didn't sit out this revolution. Even if it isn't true, the red/not red polarization is probably prevalent.

I think the SPD without the stab in the back myth would be a massively threatening beast to the whole conservative order, especially since they still have the managed democracy as a target to rail against. I don't think they would welcome shady figures driving them closer to the right in terms of nationalism when there is no large national malaise to justify it as a good strategy and they've been arrayed against the parties adhering to it the hardest in their drive to get a fairer democratic system. In fact they're probably more likely to drift to the left with the communists being less scary. Maybe use the fairly good situation to argue what the communists want can be done through reform if people back them instead.

A somewhat nice democratic and reformist Germany would be able to balance between the liberal whites and the communist reds and play both to get trading advantages too, while condemning the Americans for supporting the backward reactionary whites in their backyard.

I don't think you are wrong in the medium to long term, but for the time being Strasser is viewed as part of the wider national socialist movement. The interesting point in time will be when the current leadership of the SPD begins to hand off power to the next generation of leaders, at which point some of the clashes between Strasser and other figures in the SPD will prove increasingly problematic and might result in a rift. Keep in mind that this is Imperial Germany so focusing on the neofeudalistic aspects of his beliefs don't really make sense for him at this point in time. He does tend in that direction, but at this point ITTL he is just a young leadership figure in the nationalist wing of the SPD.

So are all the Russian states mostly just dictatorships or collective dictatorships

The Siberian Whites are an absolutist monarchy, the Don Whites are going to lose Brusilov soon at which point there will be a clash between military and civilian leadership. The Reds are complicated. The Soviet is democratically elected and does a good deal of legislative work, but the Central Committee holds an inordinate amount of power and can effectively function as a collective dictatorship if it should wish to. Trotsky controls a large swathe of territory essentially as a military dictator but finds himself constrained by Moscow. I will get into this in an update pretty soon.
 
I don't think you are wrong in the medium to long term, but for the time being Strasser is viewed as part of the wider national socialist movement. The interesting point in time will be when the current leadership of the SPD begins to hand off power to the next generation of leaders, at which point some of the clashes between Strasser and other figures in the SPD will prove increasingly problematic and might result in a rift. Keep in mind that this is Imperial Germany so focusing on the neofeudalistic aspects of his beliefs don't really make sense for him at this point in time. He does tend in that direction, but at this point ITTL he is just a young leadership figure in the nationalist wing of the SPD.

Having a somewhat patriotic wing of the SPD, why not. An outright nationalistic one make little sense. Why would they swerve right on that, when the people this resonates best with will prefer the original? They're not the party of government like in Weimar. It's not their republic. They're the guys fighting the nation for more representation in government. Also, without the defeat of WW1 making national honor a priority, I don't see that being as much of a focus in Germany.
 
The thing to note is that Celtic Communism isn't really surging, it is more of a small ideological movement which is playing around with some nationalist and communist ideas. They are not unionists - hell, in Scotland they are actually pretty vocally anti-English, but given circumstances in Ireland it isn't exactly something anyone actually mentions. The move towards Labour is more of a f* you to the Conservatives and Liberals than anything and while the original Irish Labour Party is caught up in the anti-nationalist edicts and policies, the British Labour Party is able to step in in their place pushing for policies which would alleviate the strain on Ireland, reduce the power of the military there and return some domestic power to the island.

At this point the only parties actually running in Ireland are the Unionists (who are essentially part of the Conservative Party at this point) and the British Labour and Liberal parties. All those attempts at establishing anything that seems remotely nationalist like what you are mentioning is explicitly prevented by the Conservative government. The only reason Celtic Communism is making any inroads is because it is essentially a minority "sect" of the larger British Labour Party, which shields them because of their growing importance in Scotland.

Just to be clear, there is no Celtic Communist Party - they are a small faction and ideological clique of the Labour Party.



At this point a political party in Ireland is forced to take an officially unionist stance, but that does still leave some room to maneuver. While ordinarily the Liberals might serve as a possible better solution than Labour, keep in mind that for much of the Great War and the violence in Ireland the Liberals were at the helm and as such receive a great deal of blame for the course of events in Ireland. Labour support is more a matter of being the least odious political party for them - and the fact that it pisses of the Conservatives and Liberals is just another boon.

Thank you for pointing out the issue, I hope that the answer is satisfactory - I really enjoy getting these sorts of comments, they help me clarify things for the reader and improves my own thought process on the matter.

Thanks for the reply. :) I'm mainly worried about this being another timeline where Ireland goes red and unionist almost overnight.

Two aspect I'm still not sure about are about seats and about the Dominions.

Ireland is represented by 103 (or 105 depending on boundary changes ITTL) MPs. Of those two represent Dublin University (and are thus solidly Unionist), about twenty are from either Ulster Unionist dominated or at least 'in-play' in normal electoral terms and two are from normal Dublin seats that would be Nationalist leaning but with a strong Unionist vote (Rathmines and St. Stephen's Green.) That still leaves more than seventy seats were the number of Unionist voters is going to be incredibly low - so low that for all intents and purposes they would be considered outright rotten boroughs.

Even in our time line there was constant agitation to reduce the number of MPs coming from Ireland because in pure population terms they were over represented. In this scenario, and with no prospect of Home Rule in the near or even far future the Liberals will have been screaming blue murder over the Unionists rigging the election by picking up dozens of seats with electorates in the hundreds, and I'm not convinced Labour would stay silent on the issue - forcing the Unionists to cut the number of seats in half would be much better for Labour in the short term than cherry picking a seat or two.

The other aspect is the Dominions. You've noted the Irish-Americans but how do the big Irish communities in Canada and (especially) Australia feel?
 
Having a somewhat patriotic wing of the SPD, why not. An outright nationalistic one make little sense. Why would they swerve right on that, when the people this resonates best with will prefer the original? They're not the party of government like in Weimar. It's not their republic. They're the guys fighting the nation for more representation in government. Also, without the defeat of WW1 making national honor a priority, I don't see that being as much of a focus in Germany.

They aren't the party of government, but their experience as a pro-government party during the Great War has an immense impact on the SPD. I think the issue/miscommunication we are experiencing has to do with differentiating between patriotic and nationalistic ideological forces. I know that people like making a distinction between the two, but in my eyes they are part of a continuum and when I was using nationalistic it was with that understanding.

There are a number of ethnic/nationality based socialistic ideologies out there - most prominently in a lot of the developing world during the Cold War - but it was most definitely present in Germany as well. The idea of international solidarity in the socialist movement was a powerful factor, but there were strong nationalistic and ethno-centric undercurrents in many national movements of a socialistic bent. The idea that the German socialist is the best socialist was pretty predominant at the time and the connection between many of the founders of socialism (Marx most prominently) and Germany was a point of immense pride. It isn't too great of a leap from there to think that German Socialism is the best sort of socialism. The developments occuring in the SPD are mostly a matter of SPD politicians witnessing the ideological power of a nation state and running with it. It is about a weakening of international solidarity in the socialist movements - which is in part occurring because international solidarity is increasingly associated with Communism ITTL.

Thanks for the reply. :) I'm mainly worried about this being another timeline where Ireland goes red and unionist almost overnight.

Two aspect I'm still not sure about are about seats and about the Dominions.

Ireland is represented by 103 (or 105 depending on boundary changes ITTL) MPs. Of those two represent Dublin University (and are thus solidly Unionist), about twenty are from either Ulster Unionist dominated or at least 'in-play' in normal electoral terms and two are from normal Dublin seats that would be Nationalist leaning but with a strong Unionist vote (Rathmines and St. Stephen's Green.) That still leaves more than seventy seats were the number of Unionist voters is going to be incredibly low - so low that for all intents and purposes they would be considered outright rotten boroughs.

Even in our time line there was constant agitation to reduce the number of MPs coming from Ireland because in pure population terms they were over represented. In this scenario, and with no prospect of Home Rule in the near or even far future the Liberals will have been screaming blue murder over the Unionists rigging the election by picking up dozens of seats with electorates in the hundreds, and I'm not convinced Labour would stay silent on the issue - forcing the Unionists to cut the number of seats in half would be much better for Labour in the short term than cherry picking a seat or two.

The other aspect is the Dominions. You've noted the Irish-Americans but how do the big Irish communities in Canada and (especially) Australia feel?

Not a problem, happy to get the question. I understand why that might be a worry. All I will say is that while Ireland has been under English rule for centuries, that hold on power has never been particularly popular or stable - and that isn't likely to change any time soon. The Plantation period, Cromwell's war on the Irish, the Jacobite revolts, the republican rising during the Age of Revolutions and the Famine. Each of time these occurred the Irish were put down only to get up again, dust themselves off, and prepare for the next time. ITTL the Irish Rising at the tail end of the Great War is just another of these national disasters and a setback for the independence movement.

That is a really good point about the issue of rotten boroughs and the repercussions thereof. I hope you don't mind if I steal it for use at some point. You are right that the Liberals and Labour would be pissed about this situation and would be pushing for some sort of resolution to the issue. I have an idea of how and when I want to play it out. Thanks for bringing it to my attention, should make for an interesting point of development.

Irish-Canadians and Australians are pissed, but are more limited in their ability to do anything about it given they remain part of the British Empire. They are firmly in the anti-British camp and make up an important constituency in the push for a Dominion navy in the Indian Ocean. Most Irish refugees and exiles are going to the United States to avoid British authorities as far as possible.
 
There are a number of ethnic/nationality based socialistic ideologies out there - most prominently in a lot of the developing world during the Cold War - but it was most definitely present in Germany as well. The idea of international solidarity in the socialist movement was a powerful factor, but there were strong nationalistic and ethno-centric undercurrents in many national movements of a socialistic bent. The idea that the German socialist is the best socialist was pretty predominant at the time and the connection between many of the founders of socialism (Marx most prominently) and Germany was a point of immense pride. It isn't too great of a leap from there to think that German Socialism is the best sort of socialism. The developments occuring in the SPD are mostly a matter of SPD politicians witnessing the ideological power of a nation state and running with it. It is about a weakening of international solidarity in the socialist movements - which is in part occurring because international solidarity is increasingly associated with Communism ITTL.

There's a big gap between saying "our ideas of socialism are the best in Germany", which is just pride and a big head, and saying "socialism, but just for us", which is usually what people mean by trying to mix socialism and nationalism. And it's usually completely contrary to advancing the interests of the working class because nationalism is a construct reinforcing loyalty to the bourgeois state keeping it down.

I could see them bleeding out their democratic socialists in favour of a form of national social democracy if that's how they shape themselves. I don't see anyone with understanding and following of Marxist theory buying what they're selling, but the social democrats in the party could see it as a way to distinguish themselves from the communists and get a few concessions from the state. And you're right, supporting the war probably shaped them in that direction. The consequence is probably bleeding off from the left, though, as they become see more and more as willing to concede to the established order, and the communists are less strict about doctrine, so probably more welcoming to dissidents.

On an unrelated note, I wonder if Gramsci will write as much and in the same direction, since he isn't in prison this time. His ideas about civil society should probably influence how communist parties shape themselves a lot when they reach them, since they're really good at explaining why people end up supporting capitalism even though they're part of the working class, and how to counter the state controlled civil society leading to that. It probably depends on how the Italian revolution end up though.
 
I agree with those who've stated that the alignment of SPD members and nationalists together should be short lived at best - I just can't see it lasting, unless it either assimilates the nationalists or they break away. Which is not to say that there can't be hardline nationalists in the SPD - I just don't expect the party as a whole to accommodate them at a leadership level. The SPD is a party with goals that just don't align well with a syndicalist/nationalist message, imo.

Looking forward as ever to seeing where this goes. Some very intriguing hints about the future of Eastern Europe.
 
Great update.

Regarding the whole nationalism debate, i think we should remember that nationalism itself is very much a left-wing ideology, or at least it was during the 19th century. I don’t think ‘nationalism’ and ‘internationalism’ are opposites, i think they are part of a continuum.

I see it like this: A German nationalist in the 19th century wanted to unify the different German states into one nation. An internationalist in the 20th/21st century wants to unify the world’s different nations under one world government/worker’s republic or whatever. Internationalism is basically nationalism on a global scale. In some ways, internationalism is the next step, and the logical conclusion, of nationalism. Would it be wrong for example to call someone who advocates for a unified European state an European nationalists? I don’t think so. I personally dislike both ideals, but that’s beside the point.

Today ‘nationalism’ is seen as a right-wing ideology, but if we take a step back and look at the larger picture, it becomes clear that nationalism is very much part of the leftist/progressive tradition. Which means that, yes, nationalism and socialism are very much compatible. Just because Marx and Lenin were internationalists doesn’t mean every socialist has to be. It’s also important that we don’t confuse terms: Nationalism is not necessarily the same as chauvinism, or jingoism.

So, yes, i don’t see any reason why someone like Strasser wouldn’t be able to rise to prominence within the SPD ITTL, as long as he is more moderate than his OTL counterpart. I mean, look at all those socialist countries in the third world that sprung up during the cold war. Is anyone seriously going to pretend that those weren’t also nationalist movements? Today’s China shows that it’s perfectly possible for even a hardcore (formerly) communist regime to adopt nationalist rhetoric/policies.

If we look into the future, then i could see the SPD in this TL eventually become a kind of German ‘Gaullist’ party, for lack of a better word.



No onto something different: I’m a bit surprised that Bohemia is independent entirely. Did the Sudetenland remain part of this new Kingdom? If so, I’m surprised that the question regarding the German speaking areas didn’t come up. I would have expected the Germans to offer the Czechs a choice: either Bohemia remains whole, but joins the German Empire as a Kingdom, or it gains independence, but without the Sudetenland and the other German areas. In both cases Bohemia would be dominated by Germany. But the deal here is surprisingly... generous, i would almost say. Any particular reason?

Btw, it’s Franz von Papen - only one ‘P’ required (unless it’s spelled with two ‘P’ in Danish or something). Where is the next update going to take us?
 
Today ‘nationalism’ is seen as a right-wing ideology, but if we take a step back and look at the larger picture, it becomes clear that nationalism is very much part of the leftist/progressive tradition. Which means that, yes, nationalism and socialism are very much compatible. Just because Marx and Lenin were internationalists doesn’t mean every socialist has to be. It’s also important that we don’t confuse terms: Nationalism is not necessarily the same as chauvinism, or jingoism.

Except this is 1920+, not the 19th century. The cause isn't unifying Germany anymore, and nationalism is all about loyalty to the existing nation and sacrifice in its name. WW1, and to a lesser extent, the end of the Franco-Prussian war, did a number on nationalism as a progressive idea. The idea that nationalism and internationalism are a spectrum is clearly false, because nationalism put clear boundaries on who should be part of the nation. When it was just an idea struggling against aristocratic principalities, they could fight side by side, but more or less realizing the national boundaries has changed nationalism deeply, since it's now on the side of the establishment while internationalism is still the opposition. In places where nationalism has yet to win a nation, it will remain somewhat progressive of an idea, but as soon as it gets its own state, it becomes a tool to perpetuate its power.

Also, no, socialism is internationalist by nature, because it stresses unity of the working class against the oppressor very much, and nationalism run counter to that. Social democracy, on the other hand, could easily be paired with nationalism, yes. But I don't think Strasser is too hot on the democracy part of it, something the SPD has been extremely focused on as their biggest plank against the ruling right parties. Frankly, he doesn't look too good on the working class part either. He's just a random nazi schmuck who thought the populist rhetoric was a bit more valuable than Hitler did. He's a wildly overblown figure.

No onto something different: I’m a bit surprised that Bohemia is independent entirely. Did the Sudetenland remain part of this new Kingdom? If so, I’m surprised that the question regarding the German speaking areas didn’t come up. I would have expected the Germans to offer the Czechs a choice: either Bohemia remains whole, but joins the German Empire as a Kingdom, or it gains independence, but without the Sudetenland and the other German areas. In both cases Bohemia would be dominated by Germany. But the deal here is surprisingly... generous, i would almost say. Any particular reason?

The fact it's still called Bohemia and wasn't paired with Slovakia should tell us a lot compared to OTL. It's not a Czech ethnic state by any means. The Sudetenland isn't the only part of Bohemia with large amounts of Germans. It's just the only place where they get close to a majority and could be connected to the German mainland. In fact, Bohemia is probably economically dominated by German-Bohemian elites.

Until the Czech start getting all ethnonationalist on their German population, Germany isn't going to grumble too much if they can keep them in their sphere anyway. And they're definitely in said sphere.
 

Bison

Banned
Nationalism is totally a form of socialism, group identity, and, while the rhetoric is somewhat different, the policies of heavy handed interventipn in the economy and state capitalism can be seen in some of the nationalist stated of the 20th century.
 
Also, no, socialism is internationalist by nature, because it stresses unity of the working class against the oppressor very much, and nationalism run counter to that.

That’s true - if you’re talking about Marxism, which is a certain brand of socialism, but not the only one. Socialism is older than Marxism, though the two terms are often confused. While every Marxist is a socialist, not every socialist is a Marxist. It just happened that Marxism is the brand of socialism that came to dominate the radical left in the 20th century. But since this is alternate history, there’s no reason why other flavors of socialism couldn’t become popular ITTL.
 
No onto something different: I’m a bit surprised that Bohemia is independent entirely. Did the Sudetenland remain part of this new Kingdom? If so, I’m surprised that the question regarding the German speaking areas didn’t come up. I would have expected the Germans to offer the Czechs a choice: either Bohemia remains whole, but joins the German Empire as a Kingdom, or it gains independence, but without the Sudetenland and the other German areas. In both cases Bohemia would be dominated by Germany. But the deal here is surprisingly... generous, i would almost say. Any particular reason?

Where is the next update going to take us?

I want to move on from discussing the whole socialism/nationalism/internationalism for the time being, I have a good deal to think about for it. You have some interesting points but I think I have to agree with Nyvis that characterizing nationalism and internationalism as being on the same end of a spectrum doesn't really fit my understanding of the issue.

As for Bohemia, it is worth mentioning that their autonomy is severely compromised and that the administration is filled with a significant number of Sudeten Germans. They fulfill the same role as Germans in the Baltic, Poland and Don Russia - a major source of influence on the national governments. They are elites in many of these places and have significant authority and historic legitimacy which the Germans are swift to exploit. The reason they don't incorporate Sudentenland is because they are already going to be busy incorporating Austria, don't want to set the precedent of breaking up the Bohemian Crown and they don't want the hassle of pissing off Bohemian nationalists. Much easier to have it as an effective dependent state than the bloody struggle which incorporation might set off.

The next update deals with Japan, China, the Balkans, Persia, Italy and Mexico. It is far ranging and covers a significant period of time, as well as having a ton of major events.

Except this is 1920+, not the 19th century. The cause isn't unifying Germany anymore, and nationalism is all about loyalty to the existing nation and sacrifice in its name. WW1, and to a lesser extent, the end of the Franco-Prussian war, did a number on nationalism as a progressive idea. The idea that nationalism and internationalism are a spectrum is clearly false, because nationalism put clear boundaries on who should be part of the nation. When it was just an idea struggling against aristocratic principalities, they could fight side by side, but more or less realizing the national boundaries has changed nationalism deeply, since it's now on the side of the establishment while internationalism is still the opposition. In places where nationalism has yet to win a nation, it will remain somewhat progressive of an idea, but as soon as it gets its own state, it becomes a tool to perpetuate its power.

Also, no, socialism is internationalist by nature, because it stresses unity of the working class against the oppressor very much, and nationalism run counter to that. Social democracy, on the other hand, could easily be paired with nationalism, yes. But I don't think Strasser is too hot on the democracy part of it, something the SPD has been extremely focused on as their biggest plank against the ruling right parties. Frankly, he doesn't look too good on the working class part either. He's just a random nazi schmuck who thought the populist rhetoric was a bit more valuable than Hitler did. He's a wildly overblown figure.

The fact it's still called Bohemia and wasn't paired with Slovakia should tell us a lot compared to OTL. It's not a Czech ethnic state by any means. The Sudetenland isn't the only part of Bohemia with large amounts of Germans. It's just the only place where they get close to a majority and could be connected to the German mainland. In fact, Bohemia is probably economically dominated by German-Bohemian elites.

Until the Czech start getting all ethnonationalist on their German population, Germany isn't going to grumble too much if they can keep them in their sphere anyway. And they're definitely in said sphere.

I am not completely sure I agree with the your statements completely, but in general I think you are in the right direction as regards Socialism and Internationalism - although your rather hard cut between socialism and social democracy is something I have difficulty agreeing with.

I also think that you are being rather dismissive of Strasser considering he was a significant challenger to Hilter's power within the Nazi party for most of the 1920s. He isn't some random schmuck, he was a major nazi leader whose ideological and personal differences with the more nationalist wing of the party and Hitler himself led to the destruction of his own supporters. Hell, for much of the 1920s Strasser was a good deal more popular and successful than Hitler. I will agree that he doesn't seem to fit that well within the category of Socialist, but he does seem to have fit in rather well as a Third Positionist ideologue, marrying socialist, syndicalist and nationalist ideas together.

Regarding Bohemia, you are right on the money.
 
That’s true - if you’re talking about Marxism, which is a certain brand of socialism, but not the only one. Socialism is older than Marxism, though the two terms are often confused. While every Marxist is a socialist, not every socialist is a Marxist. It just happened that Marxism is the brand of socialism that came to dominate the radical left in the 20th century. But since this is alternate history, there’s no reason why other flavors of socialism couldn’t become popular ITTL.

I think the pod is too late for that to change significantly. I definitely agree a 1848 revolution with a socialist tint could have had a more national tint for example. But again, it fits with my previous explanation. They would have been predating the non socialist nationalist success of German unification. If you look at the Paris commune, for example, they weren't outright Marxist since it didn't fully take over the far left sphere yet at that point. But they were fighting against the nationally defined French republic. If you stay in France but look further back, the revolution had some early socialist tinges during its more radical moments, and they didn't necessarily clash with the nationalist element, because they were both on the side of opposing the established monarchical order. Once nationalism become a core pillar of the very much capitalist state, it is lost to the socialists.

One place we could have seen nationalism and socialism working hand in hand is Austria-Hungary. You need to find a situation where the elites have reasons to support a non-nationalist state, so that the national self determination movement can work with the socialist one. This is why the third world had movements that appear both nationalist and socialist. They had a common enemy and capitalism was very much in the pocket of the imperialists at odd with national liberation. But in modern nations, nationalism is the opiate of the masses.

I am not completely sure I agree with the your statements completely, but in general I think you are in the right direction as regards Socialism and Internationalism - although your rather hard cut between socialism and social democracy is something I have difficulty agreeing with.

You're right that the cut is not necessarily always this clear. In fact you could make a three parts cut. Revolutionary socialism (colloquially, communism), Reformist socialism (democratic socialism) and Reformist capitalism (modern social democracy). The big difference is that the first two definitely want to do away with capitalism. They just disagree on methods. The last one want to soften the blow on the working class, but not really give it economic power. It is the line of compassionate capitalists and people wanting to preempt upheaval with concessions. It often eschew outright socialist theory.

The line between reformist socialism and reformist capitalism is often blurry though, especially if you look further back in history. Historical social democratic parties like the German SPD and Russian RSDLP were an alliance between both, and even revolutionaries, because they were so far away from power their differences were meaningless. But by that time in the TL, they were splintering around the above lines and other ideological disagreements. WW1 and the SPD support for it did a number on the unity between people with an internationalist socialist analysis and people without it, leading to the USPD and bleed out to other left parties. The repression of working class activism at the close of the war didn't help. As for Russia, it just imploded completely.

But here, the result of the Russian revolution isn't one of orthodox revolutionary Marxism victory. So the door is open for the increasingly marginalized democratic socialists in the SPD and USPD to realize they can work with outright communists... And will have to, if they don't want to end like Russia. On the other hand, the non socialist parts of the SPD is getting closer to the circles of power and may be tempted to ditch the outright socialist ideas to work with liberal democrats and at least achieve full democratic representation.

I also think that you are being rather dismissive of Strasser considering he was a significant challenger to Hilter's power within the Nazi party for most of the 1920s. He isn't some random schmuck, he was a major nazi leader whose ideological and personal differences with the more nationalist wing of the party and Hitler himself led to the destruction of his own supporters. Hell, for much of the 1920s Strasser was a good deal more popular and successful than Hitler. I will agree that he doesn't seem to fit that well within the category of Socialist, but he does seem to have fit in rather well as a Third Positionist ideologue, marrying socialist, syndicalist and nationalist ideas together.

You're right I may have dismissed his contribution a bit too much, because I thought about later nazis rather than the 20s. I don't think Strasser's differences were with the more nationalist parts of the party though. He was just as nationalist and racist as the rest of the crowd. No, his differences were on the cooperation with old school nationalist and conservative elites who had quite a bit of the economic power. In a way, he is someone who wanted to extend nationalist totalitarian control to even the economy, using right wing syndicalist ideas, whereas Hitler was totally willing to sacrifice that plank to get the rest of the program going.

Third positionism is overwhelmingly just a talking point though. All fascists pretended to it. Even the modern far right still claim to be beyond left and right, beyond parties. That's just wind though.

What I really object to is the idea that national-syndicalist entryism into a socialist or social democrat party would work. If you look at historical examples, fascists usually went the other way, starting from a socialist party because of the far reaching message and growing unsatisfied with the lack of nationalist rhetoric, leaving it to form their own party and claim to still hold those left wing views, synthesizing them with nationalism. Sort of the Mussolini path.

But the take from that is that those people are so anti democratic and control obsessed so much that they cannot live within a party where they aren't absolutely dominant. Even those who genuinely had attachment to pro worker policies drifted towards forming their own party where their totalitarian nationalist message could reign supreme.

I also have strong doubts about that message getting anywhere in a victorious and assured country. There is no gaping hole of wounded national honor for nationalism to exploit. Instead, there is a gaping hole of dead young men and a bruising war that delivered little for the people despite its colossal toll.

The OTL German fascism rise was extremely contingent on the stupid plans the old right did to make things as bad as possible for Weimar and heap everything on the SPD's back so that they could come back as heroes to restore the monarchy, with making the SPD government responsible for the peace, creating the stab in the back myth, and provoking critical inflation to screw with reparation repayments. The nazi just waltzed in and delivered a more punchy message using the same drive to take their work for themselves. There is none of that here.
 
Update Twenty-Three: A World Under Pressure
A World Under Pressure

454px-Emperor_Taisho%27s_sons_1921.jpg

The Four Princes of Japan: Hirohito, Takahito, Nobuhito and Yasuhito

Japan under the Taisho Democracy and the Chinese Civil War

The two-party political system that had been developing in Japan since the turn of the century came of age after World War I, giving rise to the nickname for the period, "Taishō Democracy". In 1918, Hara Takashi, a protégé of the former Prime Minister Saionji Kinmochi and a major influence in the prewar Seiyūkai cabinets, had become the first commoner to serve as prime minister. He took advantage of long-standing relationships he had throughout the government, won the support of the surviving genrō and the House of Peers, and brought into his cabinet as army minister Tanaka Giichi, who had a greater appreciation of favorable civil-military relations than his predecessors, who had struggled to manage that relationship. Nevertheless, major problems confronted Hara: inflation, the need to adjust the Japanese economy to postwar circumstances, an influx of foreign ideas, an intervention in Russia and an emerging labor movement however, they ended up applying prewar solutions to these postwar problems, and little was done to reform the government.

Hara worked to ensure a Seiyūkai majority through time-tested methods, such as new election laws and electoral redistricting, and embarked on major government-funded public works programs. The public grew disillusioned with the growing national debt and the new election laws, which retained the old minimum tax qualifications for voters. Calls were raised for universal suffrage and the dismantling of the old political party network. Students, university professors, and journalists, bolstered by labor unions and inspired by a variety of democratic, socialist, communist, anarchist, and other Western schools of thought, mounted large but orderly public demonstrations in favor of universal male suffrage in 1920 and 1921. New elections brought still another Seiyūkai majority, but barely so. In the political environment of the day, there was a proliferation of new parties, including socialist and communist parties.

In Korea, Japan found its power challenged by the Sam-il Rebellion, where public dissent and a declaration criticizing Japanese rule spun out of control and was put down violently by the Japanese military, leaving thousands dead. Particularly following the Sam-il Uprising, Hara pursued a conciliatory policy towards Japan's colonies, particularly Korea. He arranged for his political ally, Saitō Makoto, a political moderate, to take over as governor-general of Korea; instituted a colonial administration consisting mainly of civilians rather than military; and he permitted a degree of cultural freedom, including - for the first time - a school curriculum that featured Korean language and history. He also sought to encourage a limited amount of self-rule in the country - provided that, ultimately, Koreans remained under Japanese imperial control. His overtures, however, won few supporters either among Koreans or Japanese; the former considered them inadequate, the latter considered them excessive. In 1921, Hara was stabbed to death by a right-wing railroad switchman, Nakaoka Kon'ichi, at Tōkyō Station, throwing the political equilibrium into chaos.

After Hara was assassinated, Takahashi Korekiyo was appointed both Prime Minister and the Rikken Seiyūkai party president. Takahashi was the second Christian Prime Minister in Japanese history but his term lasted less than seven months and he was removed from power in June 1922, primarily due to his inability as an outsider to control the factions in his party, and his lack of a power base in the party. In Takahashi's place was appointed Uchida Kōsai, who served as Foreign Minister in the cabinet and had been used as interim Prime Minister between the death of Hara and appointment of Takahashi. Uchida's rule was characterized primarily by an investment in the continued Russian Civil War, in the victory of the Fengtian Clique in China and with projecting Japanese power internationally through various diplomatic and trade efforts. Uchida's reign would last until September 1923 when a series of major crises shook Japan to its core and swept aside the previous status quo (1).

On Saturday, the 1st of September 1923, the Kanto plain on the isle of Honshu was struck by an immensely destructive earthquake which left Tokyo, the port city of Yokohama, and the surrounding prefectures of Chiba, Kanagawa, and Shizuoka devastated, and caused widespread damage throughout the Kantō region. Because the earthquake struck at lunchtime when many people were cooking meals over fire, many people died as a result of the many large fires that broke out. Some fires developed into firestorms that swept across cities. Manymore people died when their feet became stuck on melting tarmac while the single greatest loss of life was caused by a fire tornado that engulfed the Rikugun Honjo Hifukusho in downtown Tokyo, where about 38,000 people were incinerated after taking shelter following the earthquake. The earthquake broke water mains all over the city, and putting out the fires took nearly two full days.

A strong typhoon centred off the coast of the Noto Peninsula in Ishikawa Prefecture brought high winds to Tokyo Bay at about the same time as the earthquake and caused the fires to spread rapidly. Many homes were buried or swept away by landslides in the mountainous and hilly coastal areas in western Kanagawa Prefecture and around 800 people died when a collapsing mountainside in the village of Nebukawa, west of Odawara, pushed the entire village and a passenger train carrying over 100 passengers, along with the railway station, into the sea. A tsunami with waves of up to 10 meters struck the coast of Sagami Bay, Bōsō Peninsula, Izu Islands, and the east coast of Izu Peninsula within minutes. The tsunami killed many, including about 100 people along Yui-ga-hama Beach in Kamakura and an some 50 people on the Enoshima causeway. Over 570,000 homes were destroyed, leaving an nearly 1.9 million homeless. There were an estimated 142,800 deaths, including around 40,000 who went missing and were presumed dead.


The Home Ministry declared martial law and ordered all sectional police chiefs to make maintenance of order and security a top priority. A false rumor was spread that Koreans were taking advantage of the disaster, committing arson and robbery, and were in possession of bombs. In the confusion after the quake, mass murder of Koreans by mobs occurred across urban Tokyo and Yokohama, fueled by rumors of rebellion and sabotage. The government reported 231 Koreans were killed by mobs in Tokyo and Yokohama in the first week of September but independent reports indicated that it was far higher, ranging from 6,000 to 10,000 murdered. Some newspapers reported the rumors as fact, including the allegation that Koreans were poisoning wells which the numerous fires and cloudy well water, a little-known effect of a large quake, all seemed to confirm. Vigilante groups set up roadblocks in cities, and tested residents with a shibboleth for supposedly Korean-accented Japanese: deporting, beating, or killing those who failed with the army and police personnel colluding in the vigilante killings in some areas. Moreover, anyone mistakenly identified as Korean, such as Chinese, Ryukyuans, and Japanese speakers of some regional dialects, suffered the same fate with around 700 Chinese, mostly from Wenzhou, killed in the chaos.

In response, the government called upon the Japanese Army and the police to protect Koreans; with 23,715 Koreans placed in protective custody across Japan, 12,000 in Tokyo alone. In some towns, even police stations to which Korean people had sought escape were attacked by mobs, whereas in other neighbourhoods, residents took steps to protect them. The Army distributed flyers denying the rumors and warning civilians against attacking Koreans, but in many cases vigilante activity only ceased as a result of Army operations against it.

Amidst the mob violence against Koreans in the Kantō Region, regional police and the Imperial Army used the pretext of civil unrest to liquidate political dissidents. Socialists such as Hirasawa Keishichi, anarchists such as Sakae Ōsugi and Noe Itō, and the Chinese communal leader, Ō Kiten, were abducted and killed by local police and Imperial Army, who claimed the radicals intended to use the crisis as an opportunity to overthrow the Japanese government. In reconstructing the city, the nation, and the Japanese people, the earthquake fostered a culture of catastrophe and reconstruction that amplified discourses of moral degeneracy and national renovation in interwar Japan. After the earthquake, Gotō Shinpei, former Mayor of Tokyo and current Home Minister, organized a reconstruction plan of Tokyo with modern networks of roads, trains, and public services. Parks were placed all over Tokyo as refuge spots, and public buildings were constructed with stricter standards than private buildings to accommodate refugees (2).

The impact of the 1923 Kanto Earthquake was to place the Uchida government under extreme pressure and led to a significant drawdown in forces in Siberia and a general reduction in funds for the armed forces, provoking considerable anger, most significantly in the upper ranks of the military. The survival of Battlecruiser Amagi, which had just recently finished construction, left the navy content for the time from their own reduction in funds, particularly given the outsized impact of the budget cuts on the military. Uchida now found himself increasingly on the outs with the military and was being pressured to resign when the second major catastrophe of 1923 occurred.

On the 27th of December 1923, the Crown Prince and Regent Hirohito was on his way to the opening of the 48th Session of the Imperial Diet when the young son of a member of the Diet, Daisuke Namba, fired a small pistol at his carriage. The window of the carriage shattered and the Crown Prince was hit in the side of the head by the bullet, killing him instantly. The Crown Prince's guards were swift to act and Namba was taken into custody immediately, alive if heavily beaten. The shock of the Toranomon Incident, as it would come to be known for the street on which it occurred, could not have been greater had it been the Emperor himself killed. It sent shockwaves through Japan and led to the resignation of both the Prime Minister Uchida Kōsai and the Minster of War Tanaka Giichi in disgrace at the failure to protect the Crown Prince. This was yet another major blow to the military, which saw one of its most significant figures in Tanaka forced into retirement while Uchida, who had been relatively supportive of the military's activities up until the earthquake, departed as well. Nanba's attempt was motivated partly by his leftist ideology, and also by a strong desire to avenge the death of Shūsui Kōtoku, who had been executed for his alleged role in the High Treason Incident of 1910. Although Nanba claimed that he was rational, a view agreed upon in the court records, he would be proclaimed insane to the public, sentenced to death on 13 November 1924, and executed two days later.

The incoming government of Yamamoto Gonbee, an Admiral and former Prime Minister who was noted for his efforts to reduce the involvement of active armed forces figures in government and democratic tendencies, was a major change from the previous government of Uchida. Under Yamamoto a series of anti-leftist and democratic reforms were undertaken with the support of a coalition of minority parties, the Conservative Kenseikai, the Constitutionalist Kenseito and the Democratic Kokuminto, which saw the franchise extended universally to all men over 21 of age with the General Election Law, and the Peace Preservation Laws which outlawed Communist, Anarchist and Socialist parties passed. A "Thought Police" section, named the Tokkō, was formed within the Home Ministry, with branches all over Japan and in overseas locations with high concentrations of Japanese subjects to monitor activity by socialists and communists. A Student Section was also established under the Ministry of Education to monitor university professors and students. Within the Ministry of Justice, special "Thought Prosecutors" were appointed to suppress "thought criminals", either through punishment or through "conversion" back to orthodoxy via reeducation. The 1924 elections would see the formerly dominant Rikken Seiyukai fall from their previously dominant position, with the Kenseito, Kokuminto and Kenseikai all making major gains and governing as a coalition under the leadership of Yamamoto Gonbee (3).

In the years since he had returned to China from exile in 1917, Sun Yat-Sen had remained one of the most important ideological and political figures in China, re-establishing the Kuomintang in late 1919, exploiting the fury of the May 12th Movement to fuel support for his growing movement and establishing a military government in Southern China centred on Guangzhou in 1921. His plan focused on defeating the warlords who had taken power of the country before the party could guide China until the country was ready to move to democracy. This rival government led by Sun, however, was at a disadvantage against the warlords from a military point of view. Despite his requests for aid from the West, badly needed financial and arms support were hard to come by in the early 1920s whose proclaimed enemies were backed primarily by Japanese and Imperial Russian patrons. While Sun Yat-Sen allied with local warlords, turning one against the other, in a bid to secure better military forces, he focused immense resources on building international interest.

It was in this context that the Kuomintang was able to secure limited American backing, which soon provoked the Germans to enter into the game as well, offering cheap armaments, trainers and observer, followed by the Japanese, French, British and Communist Russians. The prospect of relying on foreign backing left a bad taste in the mouths of many, but at least for a few years Sun Yat-Sen was able to play the various factions off against each other with some success. While Sun Yat-Sen was able to secure the establishment of a Central Bank under his brother-in-law T.V. Soong, he found himself increasingly mired in both internal and external factional clashes. Key to the issue was the sudden strengthening of the Russian Communists after the negotiated end to the Russian Civil War and the resultant availability of resources on the part of various powers which had until recently been occupied in Russia and now sought to influence events in China. It was here that Germany, the United States and Japan emerged as the three most powerful external factions for the Kuomintang, while internally the divide between nationalist, socialist and liberal-democrats grew increasingly strained. In early 1924 Sun Yat-Sen decided to throw his lot in with the Americans, who under President Wood proved extremely interested in creating a counterweight to the Japanese-dominated Imperial China to the north under the Fengtian Clique.

This alliance with the Americans proved immediately beneficial, and Sun Yat-Sen was able to extend the KMT's power through much of southern China, defeating the Guangxi Clique and making swift work of the Yunnan Clique by mid-1924. At this time the internal divisions between the left and right-wings of the party were reaching a breaking point with the powerful leftist Wang Jingwei believing Sun Yat-Sen had decided to turn his back on the Chinese people in favour of foreign-controlled nationalist rule, specifically focused on the issue of who would inherit Sun Yat-Sen's mantle as leader, with the military man and prominent member of the nationalist faction Chiang Kai-Shek increasingly seen as a potential successor. These tensions boiled over in late-1924 when the Fengtian Clique, having spent the preceding four years crushing one warlord state after another with growing alacrity, finally turned its attentions southward.

It was at this moment, when the young Republic was at its most vulnerable, that Sun Yat-Sen's decision to throw in with the Americans proved itself a disaster. The election of President McAdoo, whose anti-interventionist agenda had included limiting American involvement to trade and economics in China, was a massive blow to Sun-Yat Sen's prestige and led to the sudden collapse of Republican fortunes as American investors and arms dealers abandoned the Kuomintang. The Fengtian onslaught proved impossible to stop with city after city falling to the rush of Imperial forces, with Zhang Zuolin leading the way. In the years since taking control of Beijing, the old Marshal had shaped an unparalleled Chinese military machine which chewed through warlord forces with surprising ease, having secured the most talented commanders, best weaponry on the open market and with the quantity needed to swamp any enemy.

Sun Yat-Sen would die in his sleep in early 1925, the stress of the situation proving too much for the sickly old man, which served to ignite an internal struggle which was resolved by the betrayal of Chiang Kai-Shek, who united with the right-wing of the KMT to declare themselves in support of the Fengtian Clique. Wang Jingwei and a number of other left-wing figures in the KMT were able to make their escape, but the Kuomintang was collapsing like a house of cards. Zhang Zuolin would accept Chiang Kai-Shek's surrender of Guangzhou with equanimity, taking a liking to the young and ambitious general. Thus, by March of 1925 Imperial China had been restored under the rule of Xuantong Emperor, although effective rule lay in the clique of military figures who had congregated around Zhang Zhuolin (4).

Footnotes:

(1) It bears mentioning that the vast majority of this is OTL. The divergences happen following the fall of Takahashi Korekiyo where instead of Katō Tomosaburō, it is Uchida Kōsai who is appointed Prime Minister. This is because Katō's appointment IOTL was a result of his performance at the OTL Washington Conference. Here the Washington Conference is replaced by the Amsterdam Conference which plays out two years later and very differently from the Washington Conference. Uchida was used generally as something of a placeholder PM and seems to have been trusted enough on the part of most factions that he would be a suitable replacement. This also means that the same impetuses which led to Japan's withdrawal from Russia and China do not occur, at least for the time being.

(2) This is all basically OTL, the 1923 earthquake is honestly like something out of a nightmare and had a profound impact on popular opinion.

(3) This is where this really start to move in a different direction for Japan ITTL. The assassination of Hirohito, which is based on an OTL attempt on his life, means that it is Yasuhito who becomes Crown Prince and Regent at the age of 21, and stands to succeed his father, the elderly and mentally challenged Showa, as Emperor. It also bears mentioning that the General Election Law is passed a year earlier than OTL, impacting the 1924 elections as a result, and that it lowers the election age to 21 rather than OTL's 25 years. Perhaps the most significant change is the explicit naming of Anarchists, Communists and Socialists as those targeted by the Peace Preservation Laws rather than the vague formulation of OTL which left the meaning of dissent (the focus of the laws) extremely vague and generally applicable to almost any political position.

(4) The lack of a unified and activist Soviet Union really ends up killing the Republic of China. IOTL the Soviets were instrumental in helping build up the KMT and their military forces as well as forcing their cooperation with the Communists. ITTL the Chinese Communists never ally with the KMT, instead remaining a strong and disruptive presence in many of the cities along the coast. There are some ties between the KMT leftists like Wang Jingwei and the Communists, but it isn't anything like an actual alliance. This leaves the KMT and Sun Yat-Sen forced to rely on imperialist powers for backing - the very thing they were railing against to begin with - which further weakens their position. While the Wood Presidency does allow the KMT to make some pretty significant gains, the election of McAdoo means all that is lost and the whole thing collapses around them. With Sun Yat-Sen dead and the Fengtian Clique bearing down, Chiang Kai-Shek jumps ship and the wholse thing collapses in on itself. I am sorry about not covering the doings of the Fengtian Clique more, but it mainly consists of beating down one warlord clique after another. How stable the Fengtian Clique is and whether it can hold onto power as things stand is very much in question, but for now China is finally reunited under its loving emperor.


336px-AhmadShahQajar2.jpg

Ahmad Shah Qajar, Shah of Persia

The Persian Games

While Persia had been experiencing a steady decline since before the start of the Great War, the spill-over of the conflict in the form of the Persian Campaign during the Great War had severely weakened the Persian state. In fact, shortly after the Great War had officially come to an end, a series of socialist revolts in northern Persia, inspired by events in Russia, further degraded state authority and set the state on the path towards dissolution. Most significant of these revolts was the Jangal Movement in Gilan. After the initial defeat of the Caucasian Clique by the Don Whites, they had initially departed for the southern coast of the Caspian Sea with significant forces in preparations for their later transfer further eastward to Khiva. However, in this short period in Persia the presence of the Caucasian Clique and its supporters proved successful in pushing the leadership of the Jangal movement into open revolutionary revolt, resulting in the declaration of independence of the Socialist Republic of Gilan under the leadership of the Persian revolutionary Mirza Kuchik Khan. The Republic did not redistribute land to poor peasants which was considered as a conservative position by the more radical forces of the Jangal movement. However, these more radical forces found themselves easily outmatched by the forces around Kuchik Khan and he was able to strengthen his own position over the course of several months while the Caucasian Clique moved on to Khiva. Kuchik Khan would borrow a great deal of inspiration from the Basmachi movement in his bid to create an Islamo-socialist state opposed to the powerful influence of the British and aiming to bring to an end the incompetent monarchical rule of the Qajar dynasty.

All of this came to a head just as the British were beginning to withdraw from their more exposed positions around the world in order to consolidate their hold on the most important elements of their empire. It was for this reason that the British influence in Persia entered into a severe decline over the course of the early 1920s, increasingly focused exclusively on a thin band along the coast where the majority of Persian oil extraction was located. the Qajar government's actual authority had already been limited by 1920 to the environs of the capital itself, which was further worsened when the deeply unpopular Anglo-Persian Agreement was signed, granting British access to Persian oil fields across Persia, including the five provinces previously held exclusively by Russians. Moderates and Democrats often clashed, particularly when it came to minority rights and secularism, while the debates between the two political parties often led to violence and even provoked assassinations.

The weak economic state of Persia put the Persian Shah, Ahmad Shah Qajar, and his government at the mercy of foreign influence; they had to obtain loans from the British-controlled Imperial Bank of Persia. Furthermore, under the Anglo-Persian Agreement, Persia received only a small fraction of the income generated by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Alongside the Republic of Gilan, the countryside was largely given over to warlords, bandits and rebels. In early 1921 there was an attempted coup against the Qajar government led by the self-made military man Reza Khan Pahlavi which failed due to his inability to turn the sole effective military formation, the Persian Cossack Brigade, in his favor. With the British distancing themselves from anything that might destabilize the region and with the commander of the Brigade, Ghassem Khan Vali, remaining loyal to his distant cousin the Shah. Reza Khan Pahlavi would be executed by firing squad in May of 1921 (5).

With British backing and under Ghassem Khan's relatively competent leadership, the Qajar government was able to slowly extend its power into the bordering province over the course of 1921, most significantly wresting back direct control of the cities of Qom, Kashan and Saveh south of Tehran and secured a swathe of territory south of the Alborz mountains in northern Persia. It was around this time that Mohammad Taqi Pessian, who had wrested control of the Autonomous Province of Khorasan from the central government in 1920, sought to extend his influence southward into Kerman province, using his control of the Gendarmerie in the region to strengthen his personal power. He would recruit forces for the Gendarmerie heavily and would over the course of 1921 and 1922 transform it into a personal army. This led the former governor of Khorasan, Ahmad Qavam, who Pessian had expelled, to beg for Ghassem Khan's aid against his ouster, which Ghassem Khan proved reluctant to give, fearing that abdicating any control of the Persian Cossacks would allow a potential rival like Ahmad Qavam to replace him. This power struggle between Qavam and Ghassem Khan would occupy a great deal of time and resources on both sides and by the time they had resolved their differences, there were far more pressing issues than the governor of Khorasan and, by 1923, governor of Khorasan.

This greater threat came in the form of the increasingly out-of-control Ottoman-backed Simko Shikak Revolt, a Kurdish seperatist uprising led by the Kurdish chieftain Simko Shikak which had been ongoing since 1918. Having allied with the Ottomans during the war and actively supported their efforts to eradicate the Kurds' Assyrian and Armenian neighbors, Simko had been able to build close ties to local Ottoman commanders during the war who proved instrumental in equipping and supporting his rebellion well into the post-war period. While the Ottoman central government focused its efforts in the Khivan-Bukharan war, its regional representatives would spend considerable resources aiding the Kurds in their fight against their Qajar overlords. While a large portion of Iranian Azerbaijan had already been transferred to Ottoman control at the Copenhagen Treaty, the Turks hoped to use the Kurds as a wedge with which to tear apart their erstwhile Persian neighbors and incorporate a few more morsels along their common border. Simko went on a rampage over the following years, capturing town after time and defeating one force of Gendarmiers after another sent to bring him to justice. In the Battle of Gulmakhana, Kurdish forces under the command of Simko Shikak took control of Gulmakhana and the Urmia-Tabriz road from Iranian forces while at the Battle of Shekar Yazi, the commander of the Iranian Army, General Amir Ershad, was killed. After the the Battle of Miandoab Ghassem Khan dispatched Khaloo Qurban to counter the Kurdish expansion, but he was defeated and killed by Simko's forces in 1922. By 1923 Simko was commanding a force numbering nearly 20,000 Kurdish rebels stretching across much of the Turko-Persian border and had nearly complete control of Kurdish regions while threatening to take Kermanshah itself.

It was these failures which ultimately ended Ghassem Khan's career and saw his rival Ahmad Qavam displace the commander of the Persian Cossacks. However, rather than turn west to deal with the Kurds, Qavam instead rushed eastward and launched an open attack on Pessian's Khorasani warlord statelet using the full might of the Persian Cossacks. The result was that the hard-won control of central Persia established under Ghassem Khan collapsed completely behind Qavam while the increasingly worried Shah, Ahmad Shah Qajar, began to consider how he might emerge from the crisis that now engulfed Persia (6).


While chaos gripped the Qajar government, the Gilani Socialist Republic had been swift to exploit the situation, creating a powerful administrative apparatus behind Kuchik Khan and allowing him time to stamp his leadership firmly on the Jangal movement, removing rivals and consolidating control of both the movement and province. Furthermore, he had extended an open hand towards the peoples of Mazaradan who were growing increasingly disillusioned with the inept Qajar regime and looked with great interest to the burgeoning economic prosperity of Gilan, as cross-Caspian trade and piracy brought a great deal of wealth to the Gilani. However, during the period between 1922 and 1924, the Gilani republic would find itself increasingly under threat from the Ottoman Empire, which looked upon its socialist ideology, support for the Khivans and promotion of piracy in the Caspian as a stain upon their imperial interests. While the Bukharans were crushed and the Ottomans lost their direct link to the Trans-Caspian region in the process during 1923, this did nothing to prevent their avaricious interest in securing the Ardabil region and possibly even Gilan itself.

However, before the Turks could make a move on Gilan, events in Tehran exploded with the fall of Ghassem Khan, rise of Ahmad Qavam, Qavam's abandonment of Tehran and the subsequent flight of the Shah for Britain. The departure of the Shah in late-1923 created a sudden vacuum which triggered a bitter and confused power struggle in Tehran itself, provoked the Kurds under Simko Shikak to press their advantage, pressured the Arabs of Khuzestan under Sheikh Khazal to erupt in separatist revolt and led to the complete collapse of Qavam's Khorastani thrust as the Persian Cossacks turned coat and declared themselves in support of Mohammad Taqi Pessian. The Gilani under Kuchik Khan immediately exploited the situation, rushing Red Guard militia forces trained by veterans of the Russian Black Army south towards Tehran. Tehran fell before any of the traditional powers knew what was happening and saw the Mazaradani declare themselves in support of the Gilanis under Kuchik Khan, who declared the establishment of a Persian Socialist Republic from the Golestan Palace.

In response to this event, the Ottomans under Kemal Pasha launched an invasion of Persia, ostensibly to end the threat of socialism to the Islamic world, but with the focus located on sweeping up Ardabil, Kurdistan and the stretches of borderland held by the Kurds under Simko Shikak's forces. This invasion, however, sat badly with Simko Shikak, who had begun to envision a Kurdistan independent of the Turks, and the Kurds were soon fighting as fiercely against the Turkish invaders as they were their Persian oppressors. Pessian was swift to exploit the situation and declared himself the rightful regent on behalf of Ahmad Shah Qajar, in effect claiming to rule on behalf of the dynasty. Pessian was able to swiftly extend his power southward, securing Kerman, Baluchistan, Hormuzgan and Fars without any real opposition before running into bitter Gilani resistance around the city of Semnan which forced him to a halt. In the south, the British reacted swiftly to the Sheikh Khazal Revolt, rushing forces from Basra into the region and cutting deals with the Sheikh and his people ensuring their autonomy at the cost of surrendering all resource extraction rights to the British and accepting incorporation into the Basra "Dominion". At the same time the fighting in western Persia grew to an incredible ferocity as the Kurdish struggle began to spill over the border into Turkey, causing considerable unrest and threatening to set off the entire region and threatening the security of the rapidly growing Turkish oil industry. It was this threat which in early 1924 led Kemal Pasha to contact Kuchik Khan to negotiate the Ottoman annexation of Ardabil in return for military aid against Pessian, the Kurds and the remaining warlords (7).

Kuchik Khan considered the proposed deal with the Ottomans carefully and consulted with his Khivan and Russian allies before accepting. The conflict which followed in western Persia was extremely bitter as the Kurds found themselves pressured on both sides, their own mountainous homes turned into military targets. Simko Shikak was finally killed after a bitter period of back and forth over the course of 1924, betrayed by one of his lieutenants in return for a pardon and an end to Kurdish persecutions. Relations between the Jangal government and the Kurds would remain extremely tense for years to come, but by mid-1925 the region would finally be pacified.

In the meantime, Pessian's regime faced stiff resistance from the Bakhtiari tribes which had so plagued the Qajar earlier in the century. Bitter skirmishes and battles were fought across the sands and deserts of southern Persia from control of the region while continuing clashes in the north left the situation stalemated. Ruling from Kerman, Pessian dedicated the majority of his forces to the region, securing control of Baluchistan against troublesome tribal forces and was slowly able to wear down the Bakhtiari. By late-1924 Pessian was finally able to come to an accord with the Bakhtiari, whereupon he rushed to recruit as many of the hardy tribesmen for his army. With British backing, Pessian was able to hold the line despite the significant population advantage held by the government in Tehran, having accepted the loss of Khuzestan to the British. While the south would be dominated by skirmishes and raids across the arid region, the focus of the fighting would be in the north where the city of Semnan traded hands several times over the course of 1924 and 1925. Finally, in early 1926, both sides found themselves fought to exhaustion and negotiations for an end to the conflict were begun. Bizarrely mirroring the division once established between British and Russian influence, the Treaty of Bahrain would split Persia in half, one section a republic and the other a Shahdom ruled from Tehran and Kerman respectively. With the border falling near the frontlines, the treaty also acknowledged the territorial concessions both sides had made to their backers and effectively divided Persia between them, or at least that was the understanding of both the British and Ottomans.


Over the coming years it would become increasingly clear that the Socialist Republic of Persia under Kuchik Khan was much more closely aligned with the Khanate of Khiva and Red Russia, trading and interacting with them on a constant basis. Over the course of the remainder of the 1920s, Socialist Persia would undergo an incredible transformation as efforts at secularisation, modernisation, socialisation and democratisation were undertaken on a broad basis. The Republic was able to hold its first democratic elections in 1928, which unsurprisingly returned the Jangal government to rule after defeating a disorganised but energetic field of upstart contenders. Land reforms would be undertaken at a slow but steady pace which satisfied no-one but kept both landlords and the peasantry in line.

The contrast to the increasingly British dominated Shahdom of Persia in the south could not have been clearer. In Kerman, Pessian initially ruled as regent on behalf of the Qajars but gave up that fiction in 1927 when he had himself crowned as Shah with British blessing. With the Reds making headway into the Middle East, the Austen Chamberlain government would prove open to investing quite heavily in the region, particularly in the form of the military which continued to expand from its origins as a Gendarmerie. In effect, Pessian Persia would grow increasingly to resemble a military dictatorship with a powerful and militant police force, secret police and complex internal intelligence gathering machine. The Pessian regime would find itself combatting seditionists, radicals, revolutionaries and ideologues on a constant basis while struggling to manage the complex relationship between the Pessian state and the religious leaders, most significantly in Mashad, often giving way on matters of religion when leading religious figures such as Mohammad Hossein Naini Gharavi and Abu l-Hasan al-Isfahani demanded it (8).

Footnotes:

(5) The main thing to note here is that in contrast to OTL, Edmund Ironside, the key figure in laying the groundwork for Pahlavi's coup IOTL, is not present in Persia and is instead in India at this point in time serving as a high-standing officer for the Indian Dominion Army. This, as well as the differing Russian and British positions, have critical consequences for events in Iran. With the Caucasian Clique being the instigating force ITTL, they don't press for the radicals to take power, as happened IOTL, and Kuchik Khan is thus able to strengthen his grip on the Jangal movement. Additionally, without Ironside, Pahlavi isn't made commander of the Persian Cossack Brigade and as such isn't in anywhere close to as strong a position when he launches his coup attempt. All of this combines to a failed coup and an extension of the Qajar regime, although for how long remains an important question.

(6) Simko and Pessian's revolts are based on OTL but ITTL have the opportunity to grow into actual threats to the Qajar regime because of the continued disfunction of the Qajar leadership and the greater damage done to the state's prestige from the Great War. While Ghassem does a pretty decent job, he is unable to accomplish anything close to what Reza Shah did IOTL because they lack both his talented leadership and direction. Ghassem also happens to find himself engulfed in conspiracies and intrigue which severely limit his capabilities. Pessian has been given time to transform his OTL control of the Gendarmerie in north-eastern Persia into an actual military force while Qavam's relatively limited command capabilities severely limit the capabilities of the Persian Cossacks.

(7) Yes, yes, I know I have a tendency to make things go completely batshit, but I am honestly drawing most of these factions from OTL. Persia in the early 1900s was an absolute shit show, with warlords, foreign exploiters, socialist rebels, separatist forces and an incompetent central government. The more I have read up on it, the more I am impressed by Reza Shah Pahlavi's ability to pull together a functional Shahdom from the absolute chaos it was in at the outset of the 1920s.


(8) I know that things really started going quickly in this section, but I hope you can forgive the rapid progress of this update. There is a rough map of the Treaty of Bahrain in the end notes for those who might be interested. The end result is the partitioning of Iran into two halfs, one monarchical and religious, the other socialist and atheistic, which develop in radically different directions. The fact that the Ottomans are unable to strengthen their grip on Socialist Persia is one of several major failures, the others being the fall of Bukhara and inability to establish a true Pan-Turkic empire, which finally weakens Pan-Turkic nationalism in the Ottoman Empire enough for Kemal Pasha to really press forward with his reforms. The Ottoman Empire is entering into a period of inward focus which should consume much of the rest of the 1920s, in which their oil industry grows rapidly and the money from it really starts to explode, leading to significant inward investment in modernisation efforts.

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Pope Gregory XVII (Rafael Merry del Val) in 1905

The Balkan Rumble

With Cisleithania carved out of the Habsburg Empire, the Hungarians were finally able to turn their attentions fully to their weaker, if rebellious, Slavic subjects. While clashes with the Croatians continued, it was widely believed in government ranks, with both Horthy and Nágy in agreement, that the focus should be on the Serbs as a greater direct threat to the Hungarian populace along the Danube. The result was that rather than press their forces fully against the Croatians, which might have been sufficient to overwhelm the equally distracted Croatians, who were themselves deeply enmeshed in the Bosnian bloodshed, they turned their fury firmly onto the Serbs. Having made their gains primarily on the basis of a weak defence using scavenged and captured military materials, the Serbs found themselves firmly outclassed by the heavily armed Hungarians who came rushing south. Having raided and pillaged large swathes of southern Hungary proper, the Serbian insurgents found little mercy at the hands of the onrushing Magyar forces, who crushed any and all opposition they faced.

By October 1923 the Serbian insurgents had been driven back over the Danube and Belgrade itself faced the full might of the Magyar. Pećanac and his supporters wavered on how to deal with this sudden threat and soon fell into infighting as many of those not personally loyal to the erstwhile Serbian leader began to desert the cause, hoping to either go to ground and bide their time or flee abroad to safety in France or Russia. The end result was that rather than present a staunch but futile defense of Belgrade, the city fell to a coup de main, with Hungarian troops catching the weakened and divided defenders completely unprepared - more worried over whether their neighbor would start firing on them than the Hungarians. The result was a complete and utter rout, with Pećanac himself caught up in the chaos and captured.

The Hungarian commander, Elemér Gorondy-Novák, a young up-and-coming Horthy supporter who had fought primarily against the Austrians during the Civil War, proved more than capable of mopping up the remaining resistance. However, it would be the aftermath of the Battle of Belgrade which would come to be remembered with horror in the history books, for Elemér ordered the mass execution of all captured combatants, some 12,000 in all, including Pećanac himself, which dealt a mortal blow to the Serbian insurgency, resulted in the death of a significant portion of the already deeply depopulated Serbian peoples, and earned Elemér the epithet Butcher of Belgrade. Over the course of the next year, the Serbian insurgency would find itself ground to dust by the bloody-handed Butcher of Belgrade, who continued his efforts to exterminate resistance wherever it was encountered to loud international protest, but resulted in little active aid for the Serbs themselves. A rapidly growing stream of Serbian refugees would flee across the border into Bulgaria as the situation grew more intolerable (9).

With the Hungarians focused firmly in the south up until the Battle of Belgrade, and committing significant resources even after that, the Croatians were given what amounted to free reign in Bosnia, overrunning Serb Bosnian militias one by one and subsuming them into a larger whole. Over the course of 1923 and early 1924, the Croats forged an alliance with the Muslim Bosniaks while seeking to remove any affiliation that their Serb Bosnian subjects had to their Serbian identity - in a manner similar to the treatment of Macedonian nationalists around the turn of the century. Bloody punishment was exacted on significant portions of the population while Orthodox churches were shuttered and their priests imprisoned as key figures in the insurgency. However, the Croats would never quite go to the same lengths as the Hungarians in Serbia proper, and refrained from murdering Serbs out of hand.

It was during this period that the French and British became involved in the conflict, alarmed at the expansion of the German Empire and the increasingly cruel and bitter actions of the Hungarians. With the Croats having been abandoned by their erstwhile backers in Vienna, they were on the lookout for potential patrons in the conflict and proved extremely welcoming of both French and British delegates to Zagreb with open arms. Stjepan Radić, who had recently been elected as Prime Minister of Croatia, looked upon these new arrivals as a solution to the significant resource and training shortages they had been experiencing in recent years while to the British and French the Croats presented a counterpoint to the ever-advancing Red forces in Italy and a check on German power in the Balkans. The resultant deal saw the Franco-British alliance pledge to provide arms and training, as well as dispatching advisors to aid in the fighting. In response to these developments, the Hungarians deepened their ties to the Germans and were able to secure their backing in the conflict. Thus, by early April 1925 the Anglo-French backed Croatians and German-backed Hungarians were ready to clash on a previously unmatched scale. The resultant conflict, stretching along much of the Hungaro-Croatian border, were relatively short lived but fantastically bloody. Over the course of barely two weeks an excess of 30,000 soldiers on either side were killed as the newest armored vehicles, small arms and artillery in the possession of the two backers were pitted against each other. These bloody clashes quickly proved too much for either side to press forward and both sides were swift to disengage. Over the course of May the Croats and Hungarians clashed in a series of smaller battles along the border, but neither side was willing to commit the necessary resources to force a breakthrough.

It was at around this time that Briand's successor as Foreign Minister, Édouard Herriot, met with Walther Rathenau in a secret meeting in Geneva aimed at bringing an end to the conflict in Austria-Hungary. Without Hungarian or Croatian input the two foreign ministers proceeded to hammer out a settlement which would see the Croats replace the Austrians as co-equal partners in the Habsburg Empire - their territory extending across Croatia proper, Slavonia, Dalmatia and Bosnia, while the Hungarian half would consist of the Kingdom of Hungary proper and Serbia proper, both sections to be ruled by Emperor Karl von Habsburg. It was these terms which the French and Germans presented to the Croats and Hungarians, threatening to cut their support should either refuse to accept these terms. While neither side proved particularly happy about it, the leadership in either state saw little option other than to accept - fearing that if they refused the deal while their opponent accepted, they would be left out to dry. The signing of the Treaty of Salzburg, as the concluding document came to be known, in July 1925 would unhappily marry the two halves of the Habsburg Empire back together and bring an end to the years-long civil war and left behind a fundamentally changed realm (10).

Just as with the rest of the Balkans, Bulgaria was in a state of considerable turmoil throughout the early post-war years. Even before the eruption of the Serbian Rising, the country had found itself deeply mired in political and economic turmoil. By the end of the Great War, Bulgaria had experienced near-constant warfare for almost a decade and had been at war with all of its neighbors at one point or another for control of territories across the Balkans in that period. A large section of the populace had been killed or been displaced in the bloody turmoil which left a good portion of the country in ruins. As a result, the end of the Great War inaugurated a period of hard-fought reconstruction as the immense costs of large-scale rebuilding proved too much for the Bulgarians to cope with. Large and important loans were taken from Habsburg and German banks to keep afloat while bitter divisions between the landed elites and a massive and militant peasant populace provoked major internal disturbances.

While the Radomir Rising and the death of Aleksandar Stambolisky had been a major blow to the powerful Bulgarian Agrarian National Union party, and the party splintered the peasant base when it was outlawed soon after the Treaty of Copenhagen, this simply had the effect of creating a many-headed hydra. Communist, Anarchist, Nationalist, Socialist and Separatist movements swept into the vacuum created by the outlawing of the BANU while over a dozen Peasant parties contested the one-time BANU monopoly on peasant backing. The result was that while dissatisfaction and anger at the autocratic government of Tsar Ferdinand, none of these factions were truly able to unite that opposition behind them and as such spent much of their time fighting each other rather than the government. However, it was becoming increasingly clear that the Tsar's unpopularity was putting an insurmountable degree of pressure on the government and as a result support for Ferdinand's abdication grew within government ranks.

It was at this point that the Serbian Rising occurred and effectively threw Bulgaria into chaos. With the fighting concentrated primarily in Macedonia, the Bulgarians were able to initially deal with the relatively limited numbers of insurgents. However, as the fighting north of the border grew ever fiercer and reprisals grew ever more violent on either side, Serbian refugees began to stream across the border, strengthening the insurgents and placing an immense burden on the already overstretched Bulgarian state. As the situation grew more dire and Tsar Ferdinand seemed unable to find any real solution to the issue, Serbian refugees increasingly found themselves the target of violent attacks by the Bulgarian populace. By early 1923 the situation had grown so dire that large swathes of western Bulgaria remained outside of effective government control, Serb insurgents and local strongmen having secured control in its place. The Tsar's personal extravagance and overt interest in young men, while neglecting rule of the state, ultimately proved too much for the Bulgarian government under the Andrey Lyapchev, who was able to secure Crown Prince Boris' support for the removal of his father. In coordination with General Ivan Valkov, Lyapchey launched a palace coup against the Tsar, placing him under house arrest and demanding his abdication. Occurring almost entirely in secrecy, the first the general public would learn of a change in government was the news that Tsar Ferdinand had abdicated in favor of his son Boris and that Ivan Valkov had been promoted to War Minister.

Tsar Boris, Prime Minister Lyapchev and Minister of War Valkov would form a powerful triumvirate which focused its efforts firmly on bringing to an end the violence in western Bulgaria. Conscripts were called up and massive troop numbers were ordered into the rebellious regions. With numbers, equipment and the support of local Macedonians, the Bulgarian government was able to crush the insurgency while corralling the Serbian refugees into massive camps wherefrom they would find themselves conscripted into Bulgarian reconstruction efforts across the country under something approaching forced labor. Across the border, in Serbia proper, the Hungarian government sponsored significant settlement efforts by Magyar men while promoting marriages between Serb women and Magyar men in an effort to extinguish the Serb populace (11).

The bitter fighting between Royalists and Fascists which erupted in Central Italy in late 1922 proved immediately disastrous in the war against the Reds in Milan. With Liguria falling to the Socialists and the Apennines under immense pressure, Naples erupted into bloody chaos as Starace and his followers secured control of the city and sent its Mayor Enrico Presutti fleeing north. Across the Peninsula, Fascists rose up and declared their support for Starace, with the key exception of Umbria where Mussolini and Balbo fumed at the recklessness of Starace. The Liberals were swift to ask for aid from the French ambassador in Rome, securing a promise of arms shipments and their support on the international stage. The British proved even more welcoming, landing forces in Ostia to help protect Rome from the growing menace to the south. In Naples, Starace rushed to call up all the men available to him and conscripted large sections of the city's populace into the rapidly forming force he was assembling.

The cold weather would do much to prevent major actions for the duration of the winter, most significantly allowing the Liberals to strip the Apennine garrisons of troops given the sluggish Socialist attacks to construct a defensive force to protect Rome from Fascist aggression. On the 8th of February, Starace finally felt ready to move and set out with a large and disorganized force of nearly 50,000 men, many of them little more than poorly armed militia soldiers, while loudly denouncing Mussolini and Balbo as cowards unwilling to fight for the Italian People. These jibes presented a significant threat to Mussolini and Balbo's position and they were soon calling up militia forces as well in Umbria and Tuscany. However, this would unleash bloody strife in Tuscany as the Liberals held control of the region. Bitter riots in San Gimignano and Siena left dozens dead before the Liberals cracked down, arresting and executing nearly a hundred key Fascist figures in Tuscany alone, while beefing up their defenses in preparation for the oncoming Fascist onslaught. The mass of peoples Starace had been able to martial crashed into the defensive positions south of Rome on the 22nd of February where they were met with a hail of machinegun fire and heavy artillery. The result was unsurprising. Nearly 5,000 were left dead in the field while the mob splintered, nearly half of it being corralled by Liberal cavalry forces.

Yet again, Starace was able to miraculously escape and pass on the blame to others. This time the target of his ire would be Mussolini and Balbo who he now claimed were agents of a zionist conspiracy who had betrayed the Fascist cause, pointing to their failure to support his March on Rome as proof. Returning to Naples, Starace soon found his position less than comfortable, with Enrico Presutti's supporters in the city of Naples launching a sudden assault on Starace's home which nearly caught him in bed. Leaving behind the two women occupying his bed, Starace jumped out of a second floor window stark naked, making his escape from the city. For the following months Starace's whereabout would remain unknown, and soon both the Fascists and Liberals soon had far more immediate issues to deal with (12).


When the Communists in Milan discovered that the Apennine garrisons had been stripped to deal with Fascist forces around Rome, they were swift to exploit the situation. Palmiro Togliatti unleashed his forces into the cold and wet of late-winter and swiftly overran the undermanned garrisons. From there the Communists rushed into Tuscany, sweeping the disorganised resistance before them while purging undesirables elements of society where they found them, primarily priests, nobles and politicians. Panic swept through both the Fascists and Liberals and entreaties from the Liberals were soon making their way into Umbria, reaching the ears of Mussolini. However, by this point the Fascists of Umbria were already beginning to fall apart, Starace's claims having deeply wounded his rivals' credibility with their followers. In Rome, Prime Minister Saverio Nitti met with the captive Dino Grandi who proposed an accommodation with the Liberals, in return for the release of falsely imprisoned fascists, the appointment of the recently recovered D'Annuzio as Minister of War and the revocation of the banning of the Fascist Party, he would support the Nitti government against the Communists. Nitti thought hard on the issue and consulted his supporters, but was ultimately forced to accept that he had no choice but to agree with the deal.

The release of Grandi, alongside a host of other Roman Fascists, did much to strengthen Grandi's power within the Fascist movement and sent him catapulting past the collapsing support of Mussolini and Balbo. Italo Balbo was able to see the writing on the wall, but Mussolini proved intransigent, leading Balbo to have a couple of his supporters knock out Mussolini long enough for him to surrender them into Royalist custody. With a magnanimous Grandi welcoming Balbo back, while Mussolini was imprisoned, the Fascists were suddenly well on their way to restoring coordination to their party. It could not have happened at a better time. With the Royalist army rushed back northward, Tuscany had been turned into a bloody battleground. However, the Royalists continued to steadily give ground, with Florence, Lucca, Pisa and Siena falling one after another. Perugia fell shortly after Balbo's departure and the Lazio was soon under direct threat. With trust in the government's ability to hold the line collapsing, the Vatican began to evacuate the city. Initially, the Pope and the wider court were given temporary permission to seek refuge in France. Over the course of March, April and May of 1923, the Vatican transferred its massive archives, treasury and much else by ship to southern France. The Pope himself remained in the city, urging on the government and giving daily public masses to urge on resistance to the Communists.

In mid-June the Communists broke through the Royalist lines and pounced for Rome. With Grandi supporting them, the Royalists were able to call up a massive militia force to hold the line and, with the aid of newly arrived French armored vehicles, drove back the Communist assault. However, the damage done in the fighting was significant and the northern outskirts of Rome were left in ruins. The decision was made by the government in the aftermath of the Battle of Bracciano, as the battle came to be known, that an evacuation come under way. Over the course of July and August, the Communists swept down the east coast of Italy while the King, his family and the Liberal government evacuated to Palermo on Sicily. The Pope would depart next, finding himself welcomed in Toulouse for the time being. Rome fell in September while Naples was turned over in early October, in both instances seeing mass casualties as enemies of the people were lined up against a wall and shot, with widespread vandalism and arson accompanying the takeover. As for Achille Starace, he would appear quite suddenly at a dinner with Nitti at the home of Calogero Vizzini, a powerful Mafia Don in western Sicily, in early 1924. Nitti would soon learn that Starace had gained the support of Don Calo and had been asked to represent him to the government in Palermo (13).

Footnotes:

(9) Things take a turn for the really dark with the Serbs. From the beginning this was shaping up to be a Serb Screw, just based on the implications of a CP survival/victory, but I can honestly say i didn't think it would get this bad before I really sat down and thought about it. I couldn't really see a way around it. Sure, the Hungarians didn't need to get this merciless about it, but I think that there would be sufficient factors in place for it to be plausible. The Serbs have already been absolutely impossible to deal with on the part of the Hungarians, and after ravaging a wide swathe of Hungary the Magyars finally had enough. It should be mentioned that Elemér didn't have specific orders for his actions at Belgrade, but no one in Budapest is shedding a tear about this course of events.

(10) With that we bring this chapter of the Austro-Hungarian saga to an end and inaugurate a new one. Rather than splinter completely, the Habsburg realm instead consolidates under two heads - one Hungarian and the other Croatian. How stable this will be in the long run is very much in question, but for the time being it brings to an end another of the few lingering maladies of the Great War. While the involvement of the French, British and Germans escalates the conflict, and creates a platform for the testing of military equipment on both sides, it also proves instrumental in forcing the conflict to a close. There is a map of the Treat of Salzburg in the endnotes, I should probably mention that the Hungaro-Croatian borders are placed on the Drava and Drina Rivers.

(11) Shit is dark, but by this point much of the Serbian male population is dead or in exile and the nationalist Hungarian government sees this as an opportunity to strengthen the Hungarian ethnic population. It is essentially ethnocide, the eradication of the Serbs as a distinct peoples while the Serbs in Bulgaria find themselves pressured to assimilate into the Bulgarian population. There is still a significant Serbian population in the Balkans, but it has been under concentrated attack from all sides for over a decade at this point. That isn't to take away anything from the fact that the Bulgarians have turned the Serbian refugees into something resembling slaves of the government. They are used as hard labor in mines, infrastructure construction, agriculture and much else. Hell, when Bulgaria starts electrification they will be a primary source of labor for that as well.

(12) I am not going to lie, I have no idea what the hell just happened with Starace. One minute I am writing up about him whipping people into a frenzy to capture Naples, the next he is escaping bare-ass naked through the streets of Naples, somehow having more lives than a cat. I don't even think it stretches credulity too greatly, there are numerous examples of people like Starace in history. He talks a big game and is second-to-none when it comes to getting people to support him, and escaping when everything collapses around him, but is a walking disaster for those who support him. Don't worry, there will be plenty of people more than happy to point out the fact that this is the second time Starace got a bunch of people killed in one of his mad jaunts into the guns of the enemy.

(13) So, the Italian Civil War nears its end as Rome falls to the Communists and the Vatican goes into exile. Mussolini was left in his cell when the government departed Rome, and he is among those executed by the Communists when they take the city. The situation in Sicily is pretty much a shit show, refugees from the mainland are rushing across the Messina Strait, getting fleeced by the Mafia in the process, while Fascist, Liberal and Conservative political forces are pressed into a marriage of inconvenience and the Communists run rampant in Italy proper. The British Navy is present in large numbers and patrol the straits while money streams into the island from the British and French, the former of whom cannot allow a Communist nation free access to the Mediterranean and the latter of whom see the Sicilian Royalist government as the best way of keeping the Communists focused away from their common border. With the government forced to Sicily, the Mafia suddenly finds itself with the opportunity of a lifetime - catapulted to a position of immense power in the politics of Italy.


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Peaceful Religious Protestors in Mexico Demonstrating Against Anti-Catholic Legislation

A Popular Crisis

The second decade of the 20th century had seen Mexico soaked in blood as revolution and civil war gripped the state. One government after another had seen itself toppled, first Porfirio Diaz, then Francisco Madero until he was toppled and replaced by Victoriano Huerta, only to see this new counter-revolutionary regime driven from power by a Constitutionalist alliance which allowed Venustiano Carranza to secure power. Under Carranza, the Constitutionalists had turned on each other as the central government sought to defeat figures such as Emilio Zapata and Pancho Villa. In 1919 Zapata was assassinated and Carranza's term neared an end. Since Porfirio Díaz's continuous re-election had been one of the major factors in his ouster, Carranza prudently decided against running for re-election in 1920. His natural successor was Álvaro Obregón, the powerful and well-loved Carrancista general who had won the Battle of Celaya against Villa, securing Carranza's regime in 1915. However, believing that Mexico should have a civilian president, Carranza instead endorsed Ignacio Bonillas, an obscure diplomat who had represented Mexico in Washington, for the presidency. As government supporters set about suppressing and killing those supportive of Obregón, the general decided that Carranza would never leave the office peacefully.

Obregón and allied Sonoran generals, including Plutarco Elías Calles and Adolfo de la Huerta, who were the strongest power bloc in Mexico, issued the Plan of Agua Prieta which repudiated Carranza's government and renewed the Revolution on their own. On the 8th of April 1920, a campaign aide to Obregón attempted to assassinate Carranza. After the failure, Obregón brought his army to Mexico City and drove Carranza out sending him fleeing for Veracruz, where he hoped to regroup. However, before he could do so, Carranza was betrayed and killed on the 21st May 1920 while sleeping in Tlaxcalantongo in the Sierra Norte de Puebla mountains, as his forces came under attack there by General Rodolfo Herrero, a local chieftain and supporter of Carranza's former allies, resulting in a complete collapse of the Carrancista position. Adolpho de la Huerta was appointed interim President while elections were undertaken which would lead to Obregón's victory and ascension as President of Mexico, although before this happened Pancho Villa surrendered to the federal government, was pardoned and allowed to retire to a massive hacienda in northern Mexico (14).

One of the major issues that faced Alvaro Obregón's government was stabilizing Mexico. Regional caciques, chiefs, were still fighting each other in small skirmishes. The populace demanded the implementation of reforms promised by the 1917 constitution while a host of issues faced the working poor, such as debt peonage and company stores that kept the populace poor. The military was dominated by ambitious generals who looked for an opportunity to overthrow the regime and take power for themselves while foreign governments, primarily the United States, feared Mexico would take a communist turn such as Russia had done. Obregón was in a difficult position; he had to appeal to both the left and the right to ensure Mexico would not fall back into civil war, without alienating either side. With regard to the masses, Obregón, who was conservative but still a reformer, started listening to demands to appease the populace and began to implement the ambitious plans previously laid out in the constitution.


Obregón's first focus, in 1920, was land reform. He had governors in various states push forward the reforms promised in the 1917 constitution. However, these reforms were to prove quite limited in most parts of the country while former Zapatistas, who still had strong influence in the post-revolutionary government, focused on implementing the reforms in Morelos, the birthplace of the Zapatista movement. Many leaders and members of the Roman Catholic Church in Mexico were highly critical of the 1917 constitution. They especially criticised Article 3, which forbade religious instruction in schools, and Article 130, which adopted an extreme form of separation of church and state, including a series of restrictions on priests and ministers of all religions to hold public office, canvass on behalf of political parties or candidates, or to inherit from persons other than close blood relatives.

In spite of Obregón's moderate approach, his presidency saw the beginnings of clashes between Catholics and supporters of the Mexican Revolution. Some bishops campaigned actively against land distribution and against the organization of workers into secular unions. Catholic Action movements were founded in Mexico and supporters of the Young Mexican Catholic Action soon found themselves in violent conflict with the powerful government-backed Union CROM. During this period, Obrégon opened up diplomatic relations with the Communist regime in Moscow and allowed the opening of the first Muscovite Embassy in Mexico City. Beyond that, communist and socialist rhetoric, supported by murals of Lenin, Bukharin, Makhno and Sverdlov served to invigorate the labor and farmer classes behind the government's reformist line (14).

By mid-1923 Pancho Villa was flirting with the idea of returning to politics, eyeing the 1924 election as a possible moment to springboard to the top. While the agreement leading to Villa's pardon had not included any explicit wording forbidding his participation in politics, amongst the Obrégonistas it was viewed as fact. Thus, when word began to spread of the initial feelers sent out by Villa, a number of Sonoran generals reacted rather poorly to this development. With Plutarco Elías Calles and Joaquín Amaro backing the conspiracy and with Obrégon's tacit support, the conspirators set about planning Villa's assassination. The attack occurred on the 20th of July 1923 as he was driving back to his hacienda from a bank visit in Parral, with a squad of seven lying in ambush and a spotter dressed as a pumpkinseed vendor. As Villa drove past the vendor, he shouted "Viva Villa!", which served as a signal to the assassins to rush onto the road and open fire. While the driver, Colonel Trillo, and a bodyguard, Ramon Contreras, were killed instantly and Villa himself was wounded, the assassins had not accounted for the car to continue forward - ramming through their formation, killing two and wounding a third. Villa's head bodyguard, Rafael Madreno, opened fire as the car slowed to a halt, soon joined by Villa's private secretary Danie Tamayo and Villa himself, killing the remainder while leaving Madreno wounded as well. Villa and Madreno were rushed to a nearby clinic where their wounds were seen to, even as word began to spread of the assassination attempt.

However, before anyone hotheaded could exploit the situation, Obrégon had men rushed to Villa's home town of Canutillo to prevent reprisals. In Parral large crowds took to the streets in protest at the treatment of Villa and wild stories that Obrégon was planning to make himself into another Porfirio Diaz became the talk of the town. Villa recovered from the assassination attempt over the course of the following month and was able to calm his supporters for the time being, although he now surrounded himself with a massive bodyguard and delegated trips to Parral to others as he began to plot his revenge. During this period the whispers that Villa was planning to run for president cooled considerably and a more immediate threat to the peace emerged as the fight over Obrégon's succession grew increasingly heated.


At the heart of the matter was the divide between Obrégon's favoured successor of Plutarco Elías Calles and the powerful Governor of Sonora and Minister of Finance, Adolfo de la Huerta. Key to the issue was Calles' radical political persuasions and wish to enforce the constitutional articles related to the Catholic Church as Catholics, conservatives and a considerable portion of the army officers, who felt Obregón had reversed Carranza's policy of favoring the army at the expense of the farmer-labor sector, supported de la Huerta. Over the course of 1923 it became increasingly clear that this would be no fair contest, as Obrégonistas mirrored the one-time tactics of the Carranzistas by closing down any opposition to Calles' nomination. To make matters worse, Obrégon had recently signed the Bucerali Treaty which restored Mexico's relationship to the United States in return for significant remuneration of expropriations during the revolution, while including limitations of which constitutional articles would be applied to US companies operating in Mexico. De la Huerta was a vocal opponent of the treaty and believed that the treaty violated national sovereignty and constituted a national humiliation. With the cry that Obrégon was selling Mexico to the Americans, de la Huerta hoped to martial support against the current regime and thereby take power for himself. He went so far as to resign in protest at the treaty, retreating to his native Sonora while he sought out support for a push for power (15).

The powder keg that was Mexico in late 1923 finally went off in early December when the Delaheurtista faction of the government accused Obrégon of dedazo, appointing his successor without popular backing, and demanded that he step aside while an interim government ensured free and fair elections. Obrégon's response was firmly in the negative, prompting Adolfo de la Huerta's supporters to take up arms and go into rebellion. Residing in Vera Cruz at the time of the Delahuertist Rising, de la Huerta fled south to the state of Tabasco where Fernando Segovia, José Lozano and Eustorgio Vidal, as well as General Carlos Greene, jointly rose up against the governor Tomas Garrido Canabal, catching him by surprise and forcing him to flee into the countryside where he was soon discovered and executed. In response to events in Tabasco, rebels in the state of Oaxaca rose up as well, declaring their support for de la Huerta and capturing the city of Oaxaca for the rebels. Obrégon responded by ordering the aerial bombardment of the city by the Durango pilot Ralph O'Neill, only to meet with disaster when O'Neill and his promising co-pilot Pablo Sidar, as well as the three other passengers, were all killed when the bombers machines failed. This was an early and important blow to Obrégon's prestige which saw the head of his vaunted Air Force and several important figures in the nascent organization killed. Nonetheless, Obrégon was swift to follow up this disaster with the dispatch of Generals Vicente González and Miguel Henríquez Guzmán, while calling on Calles to martial forces from the north to aid in the fighting.

However, it would be this weakening of the northern garrisons and siphoning of Obrégonists which created a sudden opportunity for Pancho Villa. Rallying his own supporters, Villa rose up in revolt against Obrégon as well with calls for free and fair elections, avoiding a direct alliance with de la Huerta in the process. Villa's call was met with immense enthusiasm, as was his promise of massively expanded land reform and in a surprising twist - protections for the Catholic Church which was experiencing a resurgence in popularity as word of Communist atrocities in Italy. With Calles explicitly in favor of enforcing the constitutional articles against the Church, Villa and de la Huerta was able to martial considerable support with these efforts. In addition, de la Huerta's call for rebellion met with considerable success amongst the ambitious military classes of Mexico and resulted in the desertion of significant sections of the Mexican Army to the Delahuertistas.

On the 20th of February 1924 de la Huerta declared Frontera in Tabasco the temporary Capital of Mexico and promised the abrogation of the key articles 3 and 130 of the constitution, in the process securing Church support. With the new Pope Gregory XVII expressing a willingness to fight to protect the church, the Mexican clergy proved open to preaching in support of the rebellion. The first explosion of violence would come in Guadalajara, Jalisco, when armed men locked themselves in the Church of Our Lady of Guadelupe and exchanged gunfire with federal troops, having previously arranged this through church message routes with Pancho Villa. This served as sufficient distraction for Villista forces to storm the city, capturing it in a coup de main, and catching the Obrégonists by complete surprise. In Morellos, so long the home of the Mexican Revolution, old Zapatistas and other peasants of the state rose in response to fiery sermons by the Catholic Priest José Reyes Vega, calling for them to free the Holy Church from the satanic clutches of the Communist Obrégon and Calles. By late spring of 1924, Obrégon found his own position of power crumbling in response to this reignition of the Mexican Revolution, the combined might of his own generals, the Catholic Church and his old enemy Pancho Villa all aiming to bring him down (16).

Footnotes:


(14) This is essentially a rehash of OTL events as we move towards our point of divergence in Mexico. The Mexican Revolution is an interesting moment in time and the way in which the country continued to experience violent tumult following the official end of the Revolution seems to present some interesting opportunities for further development. The different development of Soviet Russia results in support for the reforms implemented under the Communist regime in Moscow and a general idealisation of the Russian Revolution as a sister to that of Mexico.

(15) Pancho Villa survives his assassination and as a result is a political operative, with a powerful faction at his back, when things go south between Obrégon and de la Huerta. I realise that the OTL assassination attempt would be difficult to survive, but in this case Villa gets extraordinarily lucky and escapes wounded but alive. With Villa shutting up about his hopes for the presidency, the spotlight on him is temporarily reduced as the threat of de la Huerta looms larger.

(16) Oh. Oops, I think I broke somewhere again. I really hadn't meant to do this, but when I read about Mexico during the 1920s I simply couldn't resist. There were so many things that could, and did, go wrong IOTL and it could easily have been worse. ITTL Catholics across the globe are even more worried about the safety and security of the Holy Church, given events in Italy, and as such the threat of Calles, rather than the reality, proves sufficient to set off the Cristeros ITTL. The fact that you had the murder of Villa, followed barely half a year later by the failed delahuertista rebellion and a couple years after that the Cristero War is honestly mind-boggling. If just two of those went a bit differently, the Mexican Revolution easily sees itself extended well into the 1920s. It might be having just finished bingeing Narcos: Mexico, but I was really fascinated by the developments in Mexico and thought it would be mean to leave them out of the fun.

Summary:

The Kanto Earthquake is a disaster which is soon followed by the assassination of the Crown Prince of Japan, with recovery a long and hard battle which threatens nascent Japanese democracy. In China, the Fengtian Clique restores the Chinese Empire under the Qing Dynasty.

After a bitter civil war, Persia finds itself divided into a Socialist Republican and Imperial Persian state.

The Serbian peoples are driven to ruin while the Croats and Hungarians eventually set aside their differences. Bulgaria emerges from the crisis stronger than before while Royalist Italy collapses under the bloody infighting and sees the Vatican and the Royal family of Italy forced to flee Rome.

In Mexico Pancho Villa survives assassination and joins in a rising against Obrégon when de la Huerta makes his move. The Cristeros, fighting for the Holy Church, are swift to join them.

End Note:

This is a messy update with a ton of things happening all over the place. I am not going to be able to keep a consistent schedule with these updates, but I will try to keep them to around a week apart. There is just too much other stuff I have to deal with and a ton of research which goes into these updates to keep up the earlier pace. Now that we are into the 1920s I am also having to deal with the consequences of all the butterflies, which makes the whole endeavor a bit difficult to manage without more time to work on it. The aforementioned maps are below.

I didn't have a lot of time to read through the update for errors, since there was a bit of a mishap with the power and I am now stuck without being able to recharge my computer, and I am having some difficulty finding the time to write on the various updates. I am still going to be aiming for posting weekly on Sundays, but I just wanted to warn everyone that I don't think I will be able to keep to that schedule.

Map of Borders at The Treaty of Bahrain: Red - Britain, Green - Ottomans, Yellow - Socialist Republic of Persia, Blue - Shahdom of Persia
Persian Borders.png


Map of Border at The Treaty of Salzburg: Red is German, Green is Hungary, Tan is Croatian, Blue Bohemian and Yellow Polish. Reminder that Croatia and Hungary are a Dual-Kingdom under the Habsburgs.
A-H Borders.png
 
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Would have been funny to have the Pope returning to Avignon :p

I can't tell you how tempted I was to go with it, but I thought it would be too implausible particularly considering the already complex relationship between the French state and the Catholic Church. It would be signalling too many things. For now the Vatican is there on a short-term basis while they negotiate with various regimes - in Europe for the time being - in hopes of finding a home for the church until Rome can be reclaimed.

How is Argentina doing in this timeline?

Argentina is experiencing its OTL economic explosion under first Yriogen and currently Alvear. Things in Argentina are most proceeding similarly to the broad strokes of OTL.
 
Qing Dynasty restored? I don't particularly like the Qing but its probably better than the Republic. The KMT's abysmal policies and decisions throughout the 1930s and 40s made it very unpopular, ruining their initial popularity, and drove China further into the ground, something that didn't end until the post-Mao era. With that said though, with a unified China it probably means that Japan won't attack China in the 1930s, assuming that Japan still falls under a military government. It was the constant warfare from both the Warlord Era and the Chinese Civil War that gave Japan an opportunity to invade. Without that it is unlikely Japan would take such a risk. Hell, IIRC, the Japanese thought the Second Sino-Japanese War would be over in a matter of weeks to months with complete Japanese victory. I hope that the Xuantong Emperor or his government is able to make some kind of improvements to China. Its hard to have China in that period come out even worse than IOTL.
 

Bison

Banned
Damn, those Austria borders look nasty. Wasnt it that the Srijem area was quite heavily Magyar, so wouldnt it be annexed into Hungary instead? Wouldnt it be more sensible to annex Serbia into Croatia rather than Hungary, since the Serbs and Croats are same/very close ethnolinguistically, leading to a de facto Croatian led South Slavic kingdom, sans Montenegro and Slovenia. Speaking of which, I still dont quite undrstand why Montenegro was given to Albania.

Will we be getting an Eastern Europe update? How is the Germanization of the Baltic going?
 
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