A competent Iraqi military

First thread so sorry if it isn’t too impressive :biggrin:

Anyways, one thing I’ve noticed, looking at the history of Saddams Iraq is the startling incompetence in its military, from the lowest level soldiers, to the generals, to Saddam himself. For example, in spite of amassing what was the fourth largest army in the world at the time of the Iraq Iran war, the Iraqi army followed a top heavy structure, with Saddam, a man with no military experience, ultimately making the military decisions. In fear of what Saddam would do, his generals would often be slow to report bad news on the front. Another problem is the fact that his generals were promoted for loyalty, not competence, and some were reported as being ‘semi literate’. The soldiers were also extremely poorly trained as well.

So let’s say that Baathist Iraq had built a competent military to field against Iran, and Saddam was rational enough to promote on performance and comptence, rather than loyalty and clan alliance. Would Iraq have been able to take their objective in Khuzestan? What would be the geopolitical implications of them winning against Iran, especially after the USSR fell? What would his relations be like with his neighbours, and the rest of the international community? Would this butterfly away the First gulf war, and the 2003 invasion? Would Baathist Iraq survive the arab spring, and what would Iraq be like today?
 
Iran had actually a large military with a lot of modern equipment in 1979. The Shah was western backed, and he had used his wealth to spend lavishly on the best army and equipment money could buy. Although the revolution caused disruption, Iran is much bigger and has a larger population than Iraq. Once the people rallied round to resist the Iraqi invasion, Saddam was always going to struggle.

The thing is the Iraqi regime was exactly as you described, built on loyalty not ability. Iraq was chronically unstable and always had been since the British created it after 1918. Saddam was representing a lower class Tikriti Sunni Arab support base, overthrowing the previous Sunni upper class who had ruled the country. Which itself had ruled over a restive Shia majority and Kurds who want their own country.

A "competent" Iraqi military was therefore not likely given the nature of Saddam's rule.
 

Anchises

Banned
First thread so sorry if it isn’t too impressive :biggrin:

Anyways, one thing I’ve noticed, looking at the history of Saddams Iraq is the startling incompetence in its military, from the lowest level soldiers, to the generals, to Saddam himself. For example, in spite of amassing what was the fourth largest army in the world at the time of the Iraq Iran war, the Iraqi army followed a top heavy structure, with Saddam, a man with no military experience, ultimately making the military decisions. In fear of what Saddam would do, his generals would often be slow to report bad news on the front. Another problem is the fact that his generals were promoted for loyalty, not competence, and some were reported as being ‘semi literate’. The soldiers were also extremely poorly trained as well.

So let’s say that Baathist Iraq had built a competent military to field against Iran, and Saddam was rational enough to promote on performance and comptence, rather than loyalty and clan alliance. Would Iraq have been able to take their objective in Khuzestan? What would be the geopolitical implications of them winning against Iran, especially after the USSR fell? What would his relations be like with his neighbours, and the rest of the international community? Would this butterfly away the First gulf war, and the 2003 invasion? Would Baathist Iraq survive the arab spring, and what would Iraq be like today?

The Iraqi army is plagued by several classical problems of Arab armies. Fixing these would mostly require sweeping social change that would take more than a generation. So the Baathists won't fix all of them.

A better performance is certainly possible however. Looking at the titanic efforts that Egypt undertook to compete militarily with Israel I don't think Saddam would have done that.

Iraq would have been forced to drag everyone with higher education into the army and spend ungodly ammounts of money and time on training and planning.

Given the population difference and the absolutely frightening fighting spirit of Shia Iran I don't think Saddam would have won even with a substantially better military.

Iran had some superior conventional military formations and a vast pool of fanatical militia formations. So even with a more successfull initial Iraqi offensive and strong defensive lines in Khuzestan Iran would have been fanatic enough to bleed Iraq white. They were driving children into minefields or against MG-positions IOTL.
 
The Iraqi army is plagued by several classical problems of Arab armies. Fixing these would mostly require sweeping social change that would take more than a generation. So the Baathists won't fix all of them.

A better performance is certainly possible however. Looking at the titanic efforts that Egypt undertook to compete militarily with Israel I don't think Saddam would have done that.

In fact, by 1988 the Iraqis were said to have learned from the Egyptians how to avoid the classical problems of arab armies--notably lack of initiative among lower ranking officers--by scripting operations. The highest ranking arab officers tended to be competent. Performance improved when they essentially made all the decisions in advance. They wrote highly detailed orders covering everything that needed to be done, thereby circumventing the lack of initiative issue.


Given the population difference and the absolutely frightening fighting spirit of Shia Iran I don't think Saddam would have won even with a substantially better military.

He ultimately won in '88 despite several years of attrition. The solution was to create effective fighting units--an expanded Republican Guard--by stripping other units of competent personnel, and then scripting operations.
 
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Iran had actually a large military with a lot of modern equipment in 1979. The Shah was western backed, and he had used his wealth to spend lavishly on the best army and equipment money could buy. Although the revolution caused disruption, Iran is much bigger and has a larger population than Iraq. Once the people rallied round to resist the Iraqi invasion, Saddam was always going to struggle.

The thing is the Iraqi regime was exactly as you described, built on loyalty not ability. Iraq was chronically unstable and always had been since the British created it after 1918. Saddam was representing a lower class Tikriti Sunni Arab support base, overthrowing the previous Sunni upper class who had ruled the country. Which itself had ruled over a restive Shia majority and Kurds who want their own country.

A "competent" Iraqi military was therefore not likely given the nature of Saddam's rule.

Saddam Hussein's Irq was a classic example of negative selection in action, especially in the military, anyone with any real ability was inherantly a threat becaause they could advance on their own
merit rather than Saddam's patronage and thus, owe him nothing. Unless this changes, the Iraqis or on a hiding to nothing in Iran. Not to mention population differences, and the fact that their opponents
are fighting to defend their country from invasion.
 

yourworstnightmare

Banned
Donor
Some in the Iranian disapora says Saddam was like a Christmas gift to Ayatollah Khomeini. The Iraqi invasion made both the military and the people to fall in line behind the supreme leader in a way they didn't before. And basically the religious leaders of Iran might have had to make more concessions to keep power if a foreign threat hadn't suddenly arrived.
 
First thread so sorry if it isn’t too impressive :biggrin:

Good thread, thanks and welcome. :)

So let’s say that Baathist Iraq had built a competent military to field against Iran, and Saddam was rational enough to promote on performance and comptence, rather than loyalty and clan alliance. Would Iraq have been able to take their objective in Khuzestan? What would be the geopolitical implications of them winning against Iran, especially after the USSR fell? What would his relations be like with his neighbours, and the rest of the international community? Would this butterfly away the First gulf war, and the 2003 invasion? Would Baathist Iraq survive the arab spring, and what would Iraq be like today?

I doubt Saddam could've been ready as early as 1980, when the war began. At least one of his generals recommended waiting a few years to get the army ready for conventional operations after years of fighting the Kurds. Assuming Sddam already knew what had to be done in advance, creating an expanded Republican Guard, and preparing scripted operations, including big rehearsals, might've taken until '84 or so. I think Saddam then could've taken what he wanted in Iran (which might've been weaker in some ways since its US made equipment would've been without spares longer than it was in the OTL start of hostilities, in '80).
If the Iran conflict was wrapped up in '86, Saddam then could've more effectively bullied the gulf monarchies since he still had the USSR to counter US support for them.
In fact, as I've blogged about, Saddam should've avoided war with Iran altogether and tried to take the gulf monarchies in the mid '80s, after extensive preparations.
With better planning, by the '90s Iraq could've become a veritable superpower.
 
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Some in the Iranian disapora says Saddam was like a Christmas gift to Ayatollah Khomeini. The Iraqi invasion made both the military and the people to fall in line behind the supreme leader in a way they didn't before. And basically the religious leaders of Iran might have had to make more concessions to keep power if a foreign threat hadn't suddenly arrived.

They started the hostage crisis in '79 for precisely this reason. What if Saddam had either waited until '84 or not attacked? Internal division could've weakened Iran even more than wearing out of US weapons.
 
Iran had actually a large military with a lot of modern equipment in 1979. The Shah was western backed, and he had used his wealth to spend lavishly on the best army and equipment money could buy.

Much of which was rendered inoperable by the ending of American assistance. In 1979, the Iranians were essentially a slow moving infantry army and throughout much of the war would be outnumbered by the Iraqis 2-1 in infantry and 20-1 or worse in armour.

In fact, by 1988 the Iraqis were said to have learned from the Egyptians how to avoid the classical problems of arab armies--notably lack of initiative among lower ranking officers--by scripting operations. The highest ranking arab officers tended to be competent. Performance improved when they essentially made all the decisions in advance. They wrote highly detailed orders covering everything that needed to be done, thereby circumventing the lack of initiative issue.




He ultimately won in '88 despite several years of attrition. The solution was to create effective fighting units--an expanded Republican Guard--by stripping other units of competent personnel, and then scripting operations.

This is true, but the catch was that it was never anything more then a stop-gap fix that mainly worked out due to the destitute state of the Iranian military. The American’s brutally exposed it’s limitations in 1991.
 

Anchises

Banned
In fact, by 1988 the Iraqis were said to have learned from the Egyptians how to avoid the classical problems of arab armies--notably lack of initiative among lower ranking officers--by scripting operations. The highest ranking arab officers tended to be competent. Performance improved when they essentially made all the decisions in advance. They wrote highly detailed orders covering everything that needed to be done, thereby circumventing the lack of initiative issue.

Well I wouldn't say avoid the classical problems, imho working with them is a better way of phrasing it. The problems still drastically limited the length of any operation. You can rehearse only so much, at some point there is nothing left of the original plan. Really effective armies need creative and independent NCOs and junior officer's.

And 1988 was to late. Iraq only could have reached its goals with a strong initial performance. Swoop into Kuzhestan, take all the territory Iraq want to claim and start digging trenches before Iran gets it shit together. Essentially relying on material superiority to bleed Iran white. And I only see that happening if Iraq attacks later than OTL and really starts a herculean national effort to strengthen the military.


He ultimately won in '88 despite several years of attrition. The solution was to create effective fighting units--an expanded Republican Guard--by stripping other units of competent personnel, and then scripting operations.

He wasn't able to reach his war goals though. So the war was pointless. And I doubt that Saddam could have reached his goals by 88. It was simply too late.

Much of which was rendered inoperable by the ending of American assistance. In 1979, the Iranians were essentially a slow moving infantry army and throughout much of the war would be outnumbered by the Iraqis 2-1 in infantry and 20-1 or worse in armour.

To me it is mind blowing that the Iranians managed to encircle (or nearly encircle not entirely sure, my knowledge has gotten a little rusty since reading Arabs at war) armed formations with Infantry. I think that shows why Iraq was never able to leverage its material superiority. Iran wasn't that impressive either though. Once Iraq switched to the defensive, mitigating their weaknesses and catering to their strengths, Iran still used Infantry charges trying to create a breach for the carefully husbanded armored formations. Against fortified positions created by the formidable Iraqi engineers, this wasn't working either. With more access to international markets Iran would have probably used other strategies though.
 
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