A Cat of a Different Color: China After Mao

For the past few weeks the Chinese press has assailed an unnamed “traitor” accused of plotting a military coup following the death of Mao Zedong. On Tuesday, the identity of this person was at last revealed – in a manner so subtle it could have easily been missed by all but the most discerning ears. But Hong Kong’s China-watchers have spent decades scouring news coming out of the mainland, trained to pick up on the most obscure of clues, and so just hours after a brief three-sentence report on personnel changes was broadcast on Beijing Radio, the answer to the latest Chinese mystery was in the hands of each of the west’s major news services.

The routine broadcast began with the announcement that Guangzhou’s Third Ministry of Machine Building now had a new vice-director – hardly the stuff of front-page news. Going on, however, the report noted that a new commander had been appointed to head the Central Garrison Corps, replacing the previous incumbent Wang Dongxing, “the turncoat and double-dealer of the Lin Biao-type who conspired to usurp the power of the party and state.”

By the next morning, the name of Wang Dongxing graced headlines around the world, and on Thursday he was mentioned again in the Chinese media, this time on the front page of the Beijing newspaper People’s Daily. But beyond that one name, no further details of the alleged plot were revealed. All the same, the news represented a stunning fall from grace for Wang, who for years had served as Mao Zedong’s personal bodyguard and was famous for his unswerving loyalty to the chairman. Like Deng Xiaoping, his current whereabouts are unknown, but analysts here assume that he has been arrested and is most likely incarcerated in Beijing’s Qincheng Prison.

-- Time Magazine, Dec. 1, 1977



Beijing’s first substantial account of the alleged coup, appearing in the People’s Daily under the title “A Factual Report on the Smashing of the Deng Xiaoping-Wang Dongxing Anti-Party Clique,” raises more questions than it answers. If the article is to be believed, Deng and Wang met secretly at the former’s Beijing residence numerous times both before and after Mao’s death, eventually putting together a plan to have several top members of the Politburo arrested by members of Wang Dongxing’s elite guard unit. Exactly who was to be arrested, the article does not say, only mentioning “leading comrades in the party and state, as well as several veteran revolutionaries.”

Perhaps anticipating questions as to how the two men were able to meet so many times without being detected, the article explains that following his ouster in April 1976, Deng was placed under house arrest under Wang’s supervision. It is not surprising that these two men would maintain cordial relations after the former’s fall from power – they both were survivors of the Long March and had worked together for many years. But given this fact, it seems particularly unlikely that the two would include in their list of targets fellow members of the elder revolutionary generation, as the official Chinese account claims. Some China-watchers have speculated that the actual “hit list” – if indeed such a document existed in the first place – was most likely limited to younger, more radical leaders who had risen to power in the Cultural Revolution. This would likely include such figures as Mao Zedong’s widow Jiang Qing and the Shanghai polemicist Yao Wenyuan – and possibly even the current chairman, Wang Hongwen.

-- Washington Post, Dec. 3, 1977



-----------------
(The next update, by the way, will remove all ambigiuty about the POD and hopefully resolve the questions which have yet to be answered.)
 
Well, here, more than a little belatedly, is the POD, laid out in full, as it really happened (well, you know, in TTL). Departing from the usual “scrapbook” format, and also from our current point in the chronology, let’s go back to the beginning of the timeline, twenty-six days after the death of Chairman Mao.

---------------------


October 5, 1976

Hua Guofeng, as the senior vice-chairman of the CCP, calls a meeting of the Politburo members present in Beijing. The team of secretaries and attendants normally present at such meetings are on this occasion not permitted to attend. Jiang Qing is suspicious. She has already made several comments to members of her entourage suggesting that she is convinced that there are individuals in the top leadership plotting against her, and the secrecy of this meeting, as well as the unusual haste in which it was called, only heightens her suspicions. Feigning illness, she leaves the meeting early.

Her suspicions are all correct. The October 5 meeting has been prepared as a sort of practice run for a similar gathering planned for the next day, to which only Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen, and Yao Wenyuan will be invited, and then promptly placed under arrest. Hua Guofeng is convinced that it is Jiang Qing, together with the other three radicals, who is planning her own coup. Such fears are shared by others in the Politburo, and in particular by Wang Dongxing (the head of the Zhongnanhai security forces and Hua’s de facto chief of staff since Mao’s death) and defense minister Ye Jianying, who have joined together with Hua to overthrow the radicals before they themselves are overthrown. As a precaution, on October 4 the three secretly moved out of their Beijing homes and took up residence outside of the city in the Western Hills, arriving there after a long and circuitous trip designed to throw off anyone who might be trailing them.

And here is the exact Point of Divergence:

On the evening of October 5, Jiang Qing makes a phone call to Hua Guofeng, as she has done several times since Mao’s death, requesting access to the chairman’s papers, to which she has heretofore been denied. She is unable to reach him. Jiang Qing calls again later, but again, Hua is not there. Displeased and somewhat suspicious, she next calls Wang Dongxing, but he too does not answer. Unbeknownst to her, Hua and Wang are at that moment making their trip to the Western Hills. Never one to give up easily, nor to tolerate a perceived slight, she goes in person to confront Wang’s staff, but finds them evasive and on-edge, and notices that the bulk of Zhongnanhai service personnel has seemingly disappeared.

Jiang Qing is convinced that Hua and Wang are in the midst of springing a trap. She flees Zhongnanhai and takes temporary refuge in Beihai Park (located across the street from Zhongnanhai to the north, in the 1970s it was closed to the public but was one of Jiang Qing’s favorite haunts). From there she phones Wang Hongwen, of the four radicals the one most closely connected to the military (and in particular the militia). Wang Hongwen agrees that the story sounds suspicious, but privately reserves doubts: he is well-aware of Jiang Qing’s penchant for wild conspiracy theories and her tendency to overreact to trivial matters. But to placate an increasingly frantic Jiang, he promises to investigate.

After hanging up on a skeptical Wang Hongwen, Jiang Qing places her next call to Chi Qun, a member of Wang Dongxing’s guard unit, but also a devoted radical currently serving as head of Qinghua University. She then proceeds to the Beijing north train station and leaves the city headed for Shenyang, which is under the control of her ally (and Mao’s nephew) Mao Yuanxin. Chi Qun makes his own call to Wang Dongxing, but receives the same response as Jiang Qing had. More inclined than Wang Hongwen to believe her suspicions, he places the university guards on alert and reports this to Wang Hongwen.

Meanwhile, Wang Dongxing and Hua Guofeng have arrived in the Western Hills and are informed of the phone calls made in their absence. Convinced that the radicals have uncovered their plans and have in all likelihood already begun their moves to seize power, Hua immediately orders troops from the Zhongnanhai garrison to be sent to arrest the four radicals at their homes, as well as to Beijing and Qinghua Universities (both hotbeds of fervent radicalism) to prevent an uprising.

Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, both living in central Beijing, are the first to be arrested. Jiang Qing, of course, is not found.

Upon their arrival at Qinghua University, the soldiers of the Central Garrison corps are refused entry. Notified of their arrival, Chi Qun calls Zhang Chunqiao, but of course receives no answer. He next turns to Wang Hongwen, to whom it is now clear that a coup is indeed underway. Residing on the outskirts of Beijing, Wang is able to escape before the troops arrive, and proceeds to the nearest airfield, from which he flies to Shanghai. While in the air, Wang relays orders to his followers in Shanghai. The city’s militia is put on high alert, and a slew of false reports are issued to Beijing alleging that various PLA regiments stationed across the surrounding Hebei province are now moving towards the capital. In response, Hua Guofeng orders that martial law be declared in Beijing. The Beijing Garrison is sent into the streets, the army takes control of radio and newspaper offices, and defensive positions are hastily set up on the outskirts of the city.

It is now the early morning of October 6.

Hua summons the Politburo to the Western Hills. The members are taken by military escort, as a protection against possible reprisals by agents loyal to the radicals. With Wang Dongxing and Ye Jianying beside him, Hua announces to the Politburo that the radicals have launched a coup d’etat, and that while Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan are in custody, the whereabouts of Jiang Qing and Wang Hongwen are unknown.

The Politburo is stunned. To be sure, many of them had long distrusted the radicals, but it is understandably rather shocking to be given this news in the middle of the night after having been woken up by armed guards and secretly ferried to a bunker in the Western Hills. Zhang and Yao are brought in to explain themselves and to reveal the location of Jiang and Wang. The two protest that they know nothing about any plan for a coup, and have no idea where Jiang or Wang could be (although their claims of ignorance are met with a good deal of incredulity).

Hua calls upon Chen Xilian, who has been tasked with overseeing the defense of Beijing, to report on the status of the supposedly imminent arrival of the nearby regiments. Chen replies that he has contacted the regiments in question and followed up with reconnaissance, but that in fact there has been no movement whatsoever. Hua is stunned, and no one else quite knows what to make of it all.

With this news, the evidence for an actual coup attempt by the radicals is looking very thin indeed. It slowly becomes apparent that, on the basis of a few rumors, Hua Guofeng has:

- ordered the extra-legal arrest of four members of the Politburo (including a vice-chairman, a vice-premier, and the widow of the recently-deceased Chairman Mao)

- declared martial law in Beijing, sending soldiers into the streets of the capital, and stationing tanks and artillery in the city’s outskirts

Hua has, to put it mildly, overreacted. He has also grossly overstepped his authority.

To be sure, the overwhelming majority of the Politburo bear a great deal of hatred towards Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao, and don’t have much respect for Wang Hongwen or Yao Wenyuan either. But the radicals’ crime which earned them such antipathy was their disregard for legality, discipline, and order. Hua’s preemptive coup has only perpetuated that same Cultural Revolution modus operandi, but has brought in the added specter of military rule. The members of the Politburo likely recall a certain quote from Mao: “The Party must always control the gun. The gun must never be allowed to control the Party.” They think back just a few hours to when they were roused from their beds by soldiers, and they can easily see themselves in the shoes of Zhang and Yao, who by all legal rights should be attending that meeting, but are instead standing before it in handcuffs.

And furthermore, they now have a crisis on their hands. The disappearance of Jiang Qing and Wang Hongwen now means that two very dangerous individuals are on the loose and probably out for revenge. Ever since the April 5th Tiananmen Incident and the Tangshan earthquake, the primary goal of the leadership has been maintaining public order. But now, Hua’s rash actions have raised the likelihood of all-out civil war. No one doubts that if Jiang and Wang led armies against Beijing, they would be defeated, but the turmoil and destruction that would result…well, no one in the Politburo really wants to think about that.

Hua Guofeng also realizes the colossal mistake he has made. Hanging his head, he lets out a sigh, and orders that Zhang and Yao be released. Wang Dongxing protests, insisting that even without concrete evidence of a coup, it’s clear that the four are up to no good. “We all agreed,” he says, “that the problem of the radicals must be solved, didn’t we?” This is somewhat of an overstatement. It is true that even before Mao’s death, several members of the Politburo had spoken privately of a need to deal with the disruptive and antagonistic Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao, and most had agreed that to do so, Yao and Wang would have to go, too. But these conversations had mainly been limited to members of the elder generation of revolutionary veterans and military men. Even among their ranks, there had been disagreements as to how the four were to be removed, with some favoring a vote of censure or dismissal by the Politburo, or perhaps the entire Central Committee. And about half the Politburo had been entirely outside of these discussions. In any case, Hua silences Wang’s protests. Zhang and Yao are uncuffed and take their seats.

The Politburo sets about the task of finding Jiang and Wang, and getting them back to Beijing peacefully. They are easily found, and Zhang and Yao are sent to bring them back in person. The troops are sent back to their bases.

October 7, 1976

The Politburo is convened in Zhongnanhai. Hua Guofeng performs a self-criticism and offers to resign, but Wang Hongwen stands up to interrupt him. He insists that Hua retain his positions, stressing the importance of unity and continuity (it was Mao who had appointed Hua to his posts, after all, and it was Hua who gave the eulogy at Mao’s funeral). Nonetheless, Wang suggests that perhaps it would be best if Hua allowed some other comrades to assume some of his duties, as the events of the previous day have shown that the burden of his responsibilities has clearly placed him under a great deal of stress.

Wang Dongxing stands up next and delivers his own self-criticism. It is brief and vague, barely apologetic and full of none-too-veiled attacks on Jiang Qing and the radicals. This is too much for Jiang Qing. She bursts up from her seat, demanding that Wang be imprisoned, even executed, and calling down wrath upon Hua and the entire Politburo. Again, it is Wang Hongwen who rises to interrupt her, calling for restraint and calm, with Zhang Chunqiao meekly supporting him. Jiang Qing reluctantly sits back down.

With Wang Hongwen now taking the lead, Wang Dongxing is called to step down from his command, with Chen Xilian temporarily overseeing the Central Garrison Corps in his stead. The Politburo quickly warms to the idea of identifying Wang Dongxing as the main culprit in this affair; those who were involved in the coup hoping to deflect as much attention and blame as possible away from their own roles. Wang Dongxing, of course, resists, but as days go by and an investigation into the affair is launched, he willingly assumes responsibility in the hopes of protecting the remaining moderates on the Politburo. Hua Guofeng’s role is downplayed. No mention is made of Ye Jianying.

It is decided that the entire Politburo (as opposed to simply those in Beijing at the time) should be assembled and briefed on the incident. Wang Hongwen chairs this meeting, as while Hua Guofeng retains his seniority, a definite shadow has been cast over him, and his judgment and his leadership abilities are now in serious doubt. Wang Hongwen, of course, still bears the stigma of his previous failures and his general lack of distinction, but as the second-ranking vice-chairman he is next in line to lead the Politburo as first-among-equals.

Wang Hongwen, as can only be expected, has been profoundly influenced by the incident. Having narrowly escaped capture, sown confusion among his enemies, and then returned to Beijing in victory, as it were, he has emerged from the past few days firmly believing as never before in his own ability as a leader. He is calm, confident, and firm, yet deferential to the old guard and aware of the limitations of his position. Such qualities make his new role presiding over the Politburo considerably more palatable to the rest of the leadership, especially in light of their earlier fears that his return to Beijing would be at the head of a rebel army out for revenge.

At the full Politburo meeting, Hua Guofeng repeats his self-criticism, and Wang Hongwen surprisingly follows with a somewhat informal admission of his own mistakes and faults. The next to speak is Zhang Chunqiao, who makes a more formal self-criticism, followed by Yao Wenyuan. The two of them have been profoundly humiliated by the whole affair, and are aware as never before of the weakness of their position among the leaders.

Jiang Qing, intractable as always, does not perform a self-criticism. But her new status in a world without Mao is clear to all, including herself. As time goes by, she starts withdrawing more and more from public life. She is confident, however, that one day the tide will turn, and she will once again take her rightful place at the highest levels of the leadership.
 
Interesting stuff, the PoD is very similar to what I was thinking would be the case, and a world with the members of the Gang of Four still around and largely untainted in the public eye (well, the eyes of the CCP, which is pretty much the same thing) is going to be interesting indeed. With Jiang at large, the left-wing elements of the Party are going to be in a far stronger position in terms of leadership, I wonder how that is going to play out for the more radical cadres, you mentioned Shanghai, I can see Xi'an and the like going the same way now.

Also, many thanks for your kind words on my own timeline, when I see people making ones like this, it puts my own mediocre efforts into context, but any inspiration I can give is very rewarding in of itself.

:)
 
Now, back to our regularly-scheduled chronology:

-------------------------------


On December 1, the Central Committee released Zhongfa 491, declaring that the upcoming congress would begin in exactly fifteen days. The announcement set in motion a frantic scramble in Party committees across the country to finalize the list of delegates who would be sent to Beijing. Most had been engaged in the task for the past several weeks, but had been unable to reach a quick decision on what would otherwise be a swift and routine procedure thanks to the involvement of the mass organizations. Over the preceding months the Chinese had been subjected to an endless barrage of propaganda praising the mass organizations and stressing their “indispensible role” in the preparations for the congress, and most local Party committees read this as a none-too-subtle suggestion that the nomination of delegates could not proceed unless the candidates had been approved by the “worker-peasant masses.” But this proved to be a much more difficult task than anyone had anticipated. Aside from a great deal of hand-wringing over how this consultation could be reconciled with the strict requirements of Party discipline – and in particular, the secrecy of its proceedings – in many places, there was a great deal of ambiguity as to what the “mass organizations” were in the first place. Before the Cultural Revolution, this term had been very strictly defined as encompassing the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, the Women’s Federation, and the Youth League. But in the later months of 1977, the term was used considerably more loosely in the official press, at times including the workers’ militia, the Poor Peasants’ Association, and in some cases even the communes and work units to which every single one of China’s 800 million people belonged.

As a result, the process of naming delegates varied widely from one province to another. In Hubei, the provincial Party committee appointed a body of twenty “representatives of the masses” who were asked to give what amounted to no more than a rubber-stamp approval of a slate of delegates already chosen by the Party. In Gansu, the leading members of the provincial trade unions and the Women’s Federation were asked to recommend a list of candidates to the Party standing committee, who then chose from among them to form a delegation. But in most places, the procedure was nowhere as well-organized. Perhaps the most dysfunctional of all methods was that of Guangxi, where the Party secretaries in each work unit in the province – about two hundred in all – were each instructed to put together a list of twenty names based on the recommendations of the members of their unit. Thus armed with the choice of the people, the local secretaries met in the provincial capital to pool their lists and elect from these several hundred names the fourteen delegates who would represent them. As could be expected, a decision was never reached, and in the end, just two days before the opening of the congress, fourteen delegates were randomly selected by the provincial secretary and hastily packed off to Beijing.

-- Roderick MacFarquhar, China After Mao, Belknap Press, 1997.



In preparing for the congress, there had been some talk of including delegates representing the mass organizations in addition to the usual delegates representing the local Party committees. Zhang Chunqiao himself seemed to suggest that this idea was being given serious consideration in a talk with Beijing cadres in late November. Certainly such a move would be in keeping with the increased emphasis accorded to the mass organizations in the rhetoric of the state media since the beginning of the year. But in the end, the suggestion came to naught. Most likely it was deemed too dramatic of a departure from the precedent established by previous congresses, and indeed many must have noted that it would have been a direct violation of the rules governing Party congresses as laid out in the CCP constitution. In any case, Beijing’s position was made clear in a December 5th article in Renmin Ribao, which quoted from a speech which Wang Hongwen himself had given at the previous Party congress in 1973, stressing the subordination of the mass organizations to the leadership of the Party, and forbidding a “joint conference of several sectors” which would place the two on an equal footing. In this same spirit, the article also provided a considerably more narrow definition of “consultation with the masses” than that which was reportedly being carried out in the provinces. It is unlikely that this latter clarification had much effect, however, as evidence suggests that by then the majority of delegates had already been selected.

-- “The Eleventh Party Congress: Where Do We Go from Here?”, China Quarterly, April 1978



Ten days until the congress. Everybody here’s on pins and needles. No word yet on what kind of access we’ll be allowed, if any. I normally wouldn’t be too optimistic, but I don’t really know what to expect – none of us really do. After all, nobody would have thought that they’d let anybody in besides the delegates, but lo and behold, they announce that they’re letting in observers from the “fraternal Marxist-Leninist parties,” and then a couple days later, they say they’re going to let in observers from the embassies – who knows, maybe we’re next? But then again, knowing the Chinese, the big day might just roll around, and they’ll come out and say, “Sorry, change of plans, no laowai allowed!” [1] Or they just might not hold the party congress at all. If I’ve learned one thing here, it’s that you can never really be sure of anything.

-- diary of Richard Asper, correspondent, Globe and Mail, Dec. 5, 1977


With the Communist Party congress only days away, Beijing is in a flurry of activity. Red flags have sprouted up all across the city, and large banners have been hung up over the main thoroughfares exhorting citizens to “warmly welcome” the upcoming conclave, which will see the arrival of hundreds of local party officials in the Chinese capital. Already, a fleet of freshly-painted red and white buses has appeared in front of Beijing’s main train station, ready to meet the arriving delegates, and foreign visitors staying at the sprawling Minzu Hotel have been politely but firmly been asked to relocate to the Beijing Hotel several blocks away, suggesting that accommodations for the delegates are also being made ready in advance.

-- The Guardian, Dec. 6, 1977



In recent years, it has been common for the people of China to hear the news of a major meeting of the country’s top leaders only after it has already ended. But this year’s party congress will be different. The Xinhua News Agency announced that the opening session of the congress will be broadcast live on television. Indeed, Beijing seems adamant in ensuring that as many of its citizens as possible tune in to what it has billed as a “historic event of great importance.” Articles in the state-run press have trumpeted a recent drive to provide TV sets to far-flung villages in the countryside, and foreign residents in Beijing have reported that movie theaters in the city are also being equipped to show live coverage of the congress, making it available to the majority of residents who lack access to a television of their own.

This new emphasis on openness has astounded many in the West, but veteran China analysts see a very rational explanation. As they prepare to hold the first party congress without the presence of Chairman Mao Zedong, the Chinese Politburo seems anxious to project an image of confidence and strength. “When they lost Mao,” explains Professor Chuyuan Cheng of the University of Michigan, “they lost a major source of their legitimacy. They can no longer turn to the chairman to justify their rule, so now they’re turning to the people.” Others were more blunt in speculating on Beijing’s motives. Said an official at the US consulate in Hong Kong: “After the protests and the turmoil of last year, Beijing needs to create an illusion of popular support, to send a message to any aspiring dissidents that the current leadership and the current policies are here to stay, and there’s nothing anybody can do about it.”

-- Chicago Tribune, Dec. 9, 1977



Well I guess I won’t be getting into the congress after all. This morning they called together the whole press corps in the hotel lobby, and Mr. Yang came out and gave us a very stern little talking-to. On the 15th, they’re going to send out a bus, and we’re all going to hop on board and take a trip to the International Club, and then we’re going to watch the proceedings on TV in the theater. When the meeting is over, we’re going to get right back on that bus and go back to the hotel. Next day, same thing. Day after that… you get the picture. And it seems like we’re going to be basically quarantined indoors until the whole thing is over – and nobody has said a word about when that might be. On the off chance that we do somehow run into some delegates attending the congress, Mr. Yang stressed that we should stay the hell away from them, or else! Very strict about that last point. It was the whole, “do not interfere in the affairs of the Chinese people” deal. So I guess that’s what I’ll be doing for the next… well, for a while. Only three days left, so I better make the most of it. Maybe head over to the Sick Duck with Bill and some of the other guys. [2] I dunno, I’ll see how it goes.

-- diary of Richard Asper, correspondent, Globe and Mail, Dec. 11, 1977


-------------------------------

[1] Laowai is a colloquial Chinese term for foreigners.

[2] The “Sick Duck” refers to the Quanjude Roast Duck Restaurant; the nickname is derived from the restaurant’s location next-door to the Beijing Union Medical College.
 
Warmly Welcome the Convening of the Eleventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party!

-- Renmin Ribao headline, Dec. 15, 1977



The Party’s Eleventh National Congress is truly an historic congress for our great socialist motherland. It is the largest congress in the history of the Chinese Communist Party, attended by a total of 1,692 delegates hailing from every part of the country. The percentages of worker-peasant delegates, women delegates, and delegates from minority nationalities attending the congress are greater than in any previous national Party congress. Also among the delegates are compatriots from Taiwan Province, as well as representatives of Hong Kong and Macau.

More than 2,000 representatives of the broad masses of the people were present in the Great Hall to observe the opening session of the congress. They included representatives of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, the Women’s Federation, and the Communist Youth League; soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army; representative of the Poor Peasants’ Association; members of the Capital Worker’s Militia, middle- and elementary-school students from Beijing, and many other members of the worker-peasant masses from across the country.

Delegations from fraternal Marxist-Leninist parties and diplomatic envoys to China from various countries were also present.

-- Renmin Ribao, Dec. 16, 1977



In years past, we had watched newsreels showing scenes from the Party’s congresses, so the images were nothing new. But knowing that we were watching these events live, right as they happened, made everything seem more exciting and spectacular. The cameras showed the Great Hall of the People bathed in light, and every surface seemed to sparkle with energy. When the band began to play, a shiver of excitement ran though the audience, as we knew that the leaders were about to arrive. The delegates on the screen all stood up and applauded, and we in the movie theater did the same thing, as if we were right there with them. The first to appear was Wang Hongwen. Now, we had all seen many photographs of him before, but seeing him now, almost in person, was truly shocking. How young he was! I was probably twenty-four at the time, and he looked like he could have been my age. And yet this man was our chairman, the successor to the great leader Chairman Mao! And I was not the only one to react this way – all throughout the theater people murmured and whispered to one another, incredulous and scandalized.

Following close after Wang Hongwen was Ye Jianying, the old hero of the Long March. He walked slowly, almost shaking – clearly on his last legs. And then came the weasel-faced Zhang Chunqiao, who bowed and scraped before Wang Hongwen with a big filthy smile plastered across his face, like a eunuch kowtowing before a boy emperor.

At the start of the congress, there was a moment of silence to remember the many great revolutionaries who had left this earth in the time since the previous party congress. We all hung our heads and thought of all those who had died: Dong Biwu, Zhu De, beloved Premier Zhou Enlai, and of course Chairman Mao. And then we looked up at the movie screen, at the leaders standing there on the rostrum. What a difference there was, like night and day! At that moment I felt so alone, so lost, and I despaired for the future of my China. What would happen to us now?

-- Yao Rushi, quoted in Born Under the Red Flag



In his political report to the congress, party chairman Wang Hongwen emphasized the need for unity and discipline, and called upon the party to strengthen its leadership at all levels of society. His remarks stood in stark contrast to the speech that Mr. Wang had delivered at the previous party congress in 1973. At that time, when moderates led by premier Zhou Enlai had stressed pragmatism and economic modernization, Mr. Wang surprised many observers with a speech full of the inflammatory rhetoric of the Cultural Revolution, exhorting the Chinese people to “go against the tide” and challenge the authority of party cadres. Such language was markedly absent in the speeches heard in Beijing yesterday, and denunciations of former vice-premier Deng Xiaoping were notably muted, often followed by assurances that the ouster of Deng’s ally Wang Dongxing would not lead to a wider purge in the Communist party.

The elderly defense minister Ye Jianying also spoke at the congress, seemingly putting to rest rumors that he would step down from his positions in the leadership for reasons of ill health. Mr. Ye is widely considered to be the number-two man in Beijing after Mr. Wang.

-- New York Times, Dec. 16, 1977



Meeting in small groups over a period of several days, the delegates earnestly discussed and vigorously debated the proposed drafts of the political report and the constitution of the Chinese Communist Party. Guided by the principles of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, elderly, middle-aged, and young delegates from all parts of the country and all walks of life came together in the spirit of extensive democracy, freely airing their views and exchanging ideas. After careful consideration and discussion, the delegates suggested several key amendments and revisions to the proposed drafts. These amended documents were then submitted to the presidium of the congress.

The delegates also discussed the candidates to be elected to the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

Today the congress met in full session in the Great Hall of the People. The congress unanimously adopted the amended drafts of the political report and the constitution of the Chinese Communist Party.

The congress voted by secret ballot to elect the members of the Eleventh Central Committee.

The congress also unanimously resolved the following:

The arch-unrepentant capitalist roader, bourgeois reactionary, counter-revolutionary conspirator and traitor Deng Xiaoping is to be forever expelled from the Party.

The militarist, renegade, double-dealer and running dog of the bourgeoisie Wang Dongxing is to be dismissed from all his posts and expelled from the Party.

-- Xinhua Press Bulletin, Dec. 24, 1977



But the expulsion of Deng Xiaoping and Wang Dongxing could not hide the fact that the Eleventh Congress marked significant gains for the moderate faction to which they had belonged. As could only be expected, the election of the new Central Committee saw a substantial increase in members aligned with the mass organizations, as well as a large number of new members from peasant backgrounds. However in spite of the brief return of the radical left – and Jiang Qing in particular – in the months leading up to the congress, the radicals ended up with fewer seats in the Eleventh CC than they had held in the Tenth.

The number of veteran cadres – including those who had been rehabilitated at the Tenth Congress – remained the same. Their influence is likely to grow, however, in light of the weakened radical opposition and the increased numbers of CC members with little or no political background (in particular those from rural areas) who will likely defer to their more experienced elders.

As is customary, the conclusion of the party congress was immediately followed by a plenum of the new Central Committee, at which a new Politburo was elected. While the existing members were all confirmed, three of the four alternate members were promoted to full membership. They are:

Su Zhenhua, political commissar of the navy

Ni Zhifu, head of the Beijing council of trade unions and commander of the Beijing workers’ militia

Wu Guixian, vice-premier of the State Council. Hers is one of the more unusual stories among Politburo members, similar to that of Wang Hongwen. Originally employed in a Xi’an textile mill, she caught the attention of Mao himself, who singled her out as a “model worker” and presumably orchestrated her speedy promotion to the State Council in 1975.

Saifudin, the Uighur first secretary of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region, retained his alternate membership. Two more alternate members were added to the Politburo. They are:

Deng Yingchao, wife of the late Premier Zhou Enlai

Hu Yaobang, first secretary of the Communist Youth League and erstwhile colleague of Deng Xiaoping. Hu was one of the key figures in Deng’s short-lived program of economic readjustment, and his promotion suggests that while Deng himself has been cast aside (most likely in symbolic deference to the late Chairman’s will) the ideas he espoused still remain potent in the minds of Beijing’s leaders.

-- “The Eleventh Party Congress: Where Do We Go from Here?”, China Quarterly, April 1978



The sudden and unexpected radical resurgence following the publication of Volume Five of Mao’s Selected Works had taken the old guard by surprise, and served as a powerful reminder that the “Shanghai gang” and their allies were still a potent and potentially dangerous force. To be sure, the tenor of the campaign to propagate Mao’s works had been decidedly low-key in comparison to the previous movements criticizing Confucius and “right deviationism,” but the experience had nonetheless shown that the radicals still retained the power to mobilize a small but vocal army of devoted supporters. Jiang Qing’s fiery orations before crowds of adoring students seemed to be a clear indication that the radicals would not be content with stopping the campaign against deviationism with the mere token ouster of Deng and Wang Dongxing, and were merely biding their time before they resumed the drumbeat of struggle and revolution.

Bound together by these fears, the civilian and military veterans of the pre-Cultural Revolution administration banded together at the Eleventh Party Congress to protect their seats in the Central Committee and the Politburo, and together emerged as the largest bloc in the Party’s ruling bodies. But in this partnership, it was the military which clearly had the upper hand. After the upheaval of the Cultural Revolution, the PLA was the best disciplined and widest-reaching organization in the country, and its many regional commanders were bound together by a network of close personal relationships dating back to the civil war. It was the military that was best placed to challenge the Shanghai gang. Just days after the end of the Party congress, the PLA made its first moves to weaken the radicals’ strongest bases of power.

-- Warren Sun, China, 1976-1986: A Decade of Change, University of California Press, 1987
 
So can we take this to mean China is to turn into a military dictatorship?

Thanks for your comment!

Given that PRC tradition – and recent events in this TL – has made the current oligarchs (including many members of the PLA itself) very wary of out-and-out military rule, I’d say that military influence is likely to be a bit more subtle, perhaps pulling strings behind the scenes rather than standing on a balcony waving its fist.

And even with all its strengths, the PLA has a steep hill to climb – once the radicals are neutralized, the military-civilian alliance might not last too long, and divisions within the PLA would likely arise, as well.
 
We all dreaded New Year’s. Sure, it was a holiday: we got a day off work and were given an extra ration of pork and cooking oil, but it was hard to feast and celebrate when you knew what was coming the next day. Early morning on January 2nd, we would all sit around the big conference table and listen to the chief read the New Year’s “joint editorial” published in all the central newspapers. The article itself went on forever, and then after it was done we would all go around the room expressing our support for the editorial and explaining how we would implement its directives in the coming year. We’d spend the whole day crammed together in that damn room, and then the next day we’d come back and do the same thing all over again!

Since in 1978 we had just finished the Eleventh Party Congress, the “study session” was extended through the entire week. We re-read all the documents from the congress and discussed them, and then re-read again and discussed some more. It wasn’t so bad for other work units, but we were a special case – as the editorial board for the Jilin Daily, we were the “advance soldiers on the propaganda front” and we had to be sure that our level of ideological consciousness was sufficiently high. Not that our own “consciousness” mattered much when it came to the paper. We didn’t actually write any of the articles, we mostly just copied them from People’s Daily and the other central newspapers, along with any directives or communiqués issued by the provincial committee.

We weren’t lazy, you understand, that’s how it was done everywhere. The job of a newspaper was to be the mouthpiece of the Party, and a mouthpiece doesn’t really do any of its own talking, now does it?

-- Weng Qiaolun, quoted in Behind the Bamboo Curtain, Random House, 1988



Nineteen seventy-eight began much the same as the years which had preceded it. Upon publication of the traditional New Year’s editorial, individuals and work units across China wrote testimonials pledging their utmost support for the Party and its policies in the coming year. Several such pledges from a handful of “model units” were selected by the authorities in Beijing and circulated nationwide in the pages of the People’s Daily and other central Party newspapers.

According to the Party’s regulations, this work was to be carried out by the Central Propaganda Department. But by 1978 the department had long existed in name only, and the majority of its staff could be found not in Beijing, but rather scattered throughout numerous “May Seventh Cadre Schools” where they had been engaged in “reeducation through labor” for the past several years. In their place, the work of overseeing China’s propaganda apparatus was in the hands of Yao Wenyuan and his coterie of several dozen loyal secretaries.

The military’s own propaganda unit, the General Political Department, was considerably better organized and better staffed. Just as crucially, it was not under the control of the radicals. While Zhang Chunqiao was the department’s nominal head, he exercised little real authority and lacked the both the resources and the clout to effectively police the unit, concerned as he was with his other duties as vice-chairman and vice-premier. Most day-to-day decisions of the GPD were made by Zhang’s second-in-command Liang Biye, who was less-than-amenable to the radical line.

-- Roderick MacFarquhar, China After Mao, Belknap Press, 1997



The workers, peasants, and soldiers of our great socialist motherland have greeted the victorious conclusion of the Eleventh Party Congress with boundless enthusiasm, resolutely support the People’s Daily-Liberation Army News-Red Flag New Year’s editorial, and are steadfastly resolved to uphold Chairman Mao’s proletarian revolutionary line!

Liberation Army News has been flooded with a great deluge of letters from soldiers all across our country expressing their support for the Party and for Chairman Mao’s line. In the past few weeks Liberation Army News has printed many of their letters, and has in turn received countless more from soldiers and officers who have been inspired by these testimonies. Chairman Mao taught us: the masses are the real heroes, while we ourselves are often ignorant and foolish. Therefore, Liberation Army News proudly announces the publication of Soldier’s Reference, aregular supplement to our daily publication containing articles written by ordinary soldiers from all across our country. It is the ardent desire of every member of the staff of Liberation Army News that our readers will derive tremendous inspiration from these articles and dedicate themselves anew to holding higher and higher the great red banner of Mao Zedong Thought.

-- Jiefangjun Bao [Liberation Army News], Feb. 4, 1978



The People’s Liberation Army is a great school of Mao Zedong Thought, and as such we should emulate their style of work in holding higher and higher the great red banner of Mao Zedong Thought. Many young friends all around the country have written excellent and inspiring pieces on the crucial tasks set by the Party Congress, and it is only fitting that these pieces should be given the widest possible readership so that we all can learn from their example.

-- Hu Yaobang, address to the staff of Zhongguo Qingnian Cankao [China Youth Reference] on the occasion of the newspaper’s founding, Mar. 11, 1978



The publication of Soldier’s Reference and China Youth Reference was followed in quick succession by similar newspapers printed by other national mass organizations, and even the publication of specialized, lower-level newspapers such as Air Force Reference and Sichuan Youth Reference. Yao Wenyuan and his team of censors struggled to monitor the ever increasing number of news outlets, but after having spent the previous ten years criticizing his fellow cadres for ignoring the voice of the masses, he found himself with little ideological basis for enforcing any kind of crackdown.

Some veteran leaders, perhaps unaware of the grand scheme which had set the phenomenon in motion, did protest against the apparent diluting of the Party’s centralized control over the news media. Li Xiannian complained that the voice of the Party was being drowned out by the mass organizations, but it would not be long before local CCP committees began printing their own “reference” periodicals. While papers such as Soldier’s Reference and China Youth Reference were only available to members of the PLA and the Youth League, respectively, these local Party publications were distributed among the general public, which eagerly devoured their contents. The articles themselves were often as dry and formulaic as the standard fare found in the People’s Daily, but readers were too caught up in the excitement and novelty of the new publications to give their content much thought.

-- Warren Sun, China, 1976-1986: A Decade of Change, University of California Press, 1987



As time wore on, several provinces took a step further and began to resurrect newspapers and magazines which had been forced to shut down at the start of the Cultural Revolution. The first to reappear was the Tianjin evening paper Jin Wan Bao, which resumed printing on April 12, 1978. Conscious of the potential risks they were taking, the staff of the Tianjin Daily, which supervised the city’s other newspapers, wrote a letter to Yao Wenyuan submitting the proposal for his approval. Included in the letter was a request for Yao to personally inscribe a new masthead for the paper.

Yao, who prided himself on his calligraphy, was quick to approve the rehabilitation of a newspaper that he himself had condemned in 1967 as “a nest of poisonous vipers,” and sent back his reply and the accompanying inscription within a week of receiving the request. A former journalist working for the newspaper recalled how many who saw Yao’s calligraphy judged it “sloppy and insipid”. “To be honest, it was a little embarrassing to see those characters on the front page of our newspaper every day,” remembered another Tianjin resident. “But in the end, it was a small price to pay to get our paper back.”

-- Anita Chan, China’s Second Chance, East Gate, 2001
 
Interesting. Looking at this update, it appears that China is on a long, painful, but largely moderate road to true modernisation. However, given your hits previously, I take it that that is somewhat of a forlorn hope. The PLA have been very silent so far, I would wager that this is going to be broken before too long, certainly if the disciples of Lin Biao have anything to do with it!
 
Figured I'd give this excellent TL a boost. And now a few thoughts...

Wang appears to be--though the hall of mirrors effect of Chinese Communist politics makes it hard to be sure--growing into his role of leader at the party level, shoring up his position with the moderates, while throwing the occasional sop to the radicals. Further the sops he's throwing the radicals are strengthening his hand--Deng going down means Wang is pretty much the moderate's only real choice, and Jiang Qin slipping her leash every now and then reminds people that the bad old days could come back if they aren't careful, and say, fail to back the present regime. The problem is figuring out how much is him, and how much is other power games going on is, once again, quite difficult.

On the national scene, however, Wang is stumbling. He and his regime know they have to increase his legitimacy--but the method they've chosen to do this isn't working. Constantly hearkening back to Mao and the Old Guard is reminding people that most of the Old Guard are dead or dying and that Wang isn't Mao. Wang needs a success to forge his own identity as a leader. If he gets that--then he may be secure.

If he doesn't...
 
Space Oddity

Many thanks for that. I'd forgotten about this thread as I haven't been active for a while but it was very interesting, although with the continued hint of becoming so in the Chinese sense.;) Thought I had subscribed but obviously not, a flaw now corrected.


Rediv

Hope you're well and everything's OK as it's a while since you last updated it. Pretty please?

Steve
 
Thanks guys! I don’t think there’s any other word which brings more joy in the AH universe than “subscribed.” :D

Sorry about my absence. I had gotten sidetracked for a bit, but I've got two more (brief) updates written, and in the next few days I should be able to finish a few more, so that hopefully there won't be any more long gaps like this in the future. I'll see if I can't speed things up though.

And don’t worry, SteveP, things may soon start to get a little more interesting (or should I say, "有意思"?) ;)
 
Today's update is rather short, but more will be coming soon, and on a more-or-less regular schedule.

-----------------------------------------------


But this gradual return to pre-Cultural Revolution norms did not always stay confined to the realm of journalism. In Sichuan, where rehabilitated Party chief Zhao Ziyang had long flouted central directives in order to pursue his own agricultural policies, the official CCP newspaper Sichuan Daily published a series of editorials calling for an expansion of private plots for farmers, and advocated for greater local control of production. Accordingly, by May 1978, over 60 percent of communes which had transferred to brigade-level accounting in the previous four years had returned to village-level accounting.

In Guangdong, where governor and Politburo member Wei Guoqing openly opined to his staff that Deng Xiaoping had “gotten a raw deal”, the revival of pre-Cultural Revolution newspapers was soon followed by a wide-scale rehabilitation of propaganda workers and journalists who had been persecuted for their affiliation with these “black tabloids”. Over a hundred individuals who had been imprisoned in the wake of the April 1976 Tiananmen Incident were similarly released and sent back to their work units with a clean record. After learning of developments in Sichuan, Wei Guoqing commissioned a special “leading small group” to carry out similar reforms in Guangdong, but by the time the group had submitted its first work report, the governor’s attention had shifted to the mounting troubles on the nearby southern border.

-- Anita Chan, China’s Second Chance, East Gate, 2001



A war of words has broken out between Beijing and Hanoi over the fate of a million and a half Chinese living in Vietnam, thousands of whom have returned to China. A radio broadcast from Beijing today claimed that a total of 72,000 Chinese have been “expelled” since the beginning of this year after a campaign of intimidation by Vietnamese authorities. Many Chinese still living in Vietnam are alleged to have lost their jobs and ration cards, and in Ho Chi Minh City (formerly Saigon) there have been cases of “mass arrest, beating, and killing.”

The Chinese complaint, which was broadcast by the New China News Agency and was promptly denied by Hanoi, is likely to bring many more simmering grievances into the open. China has frequently criticized what it calls Vietnam’s “unprovoked assaults” on Cambodia during the two countries’ long-simmering border dispute, and has shown increasing concern over Hanoi’s growing ties with Moscow.

-- The Guardian, May 26, 1978



The People’s Republic of China has sharply increased its purchases of foreign wheat in the past few months, apparently because of a hard winter and a shrinking stockpile of food grain, the Agriculture Department said yesterday.

Chinese grain imports have been steadily increasing over the past three years, from 2.7 million tons in 1975 to 4.5 million in 1977. But sources in Australia and Canada, China’s primary suppliers of grain, have reported that in the past five months alone, China’s total grain purchases have surpassed 3 million tons. a figure which analysts say could double by the end of the year.

-- Chicago Tribune, June 12, 1978
 
A war of words has broken out between Beijing and Hanoi over the fate of a million and a half Chinese living in Vietnam, thousands of whom have returned to China. A radio broadcast from Beijing today claimed that a total of 72,000 Chinese have been “expelled” since the beginning of this year after a campaign of intimidation by Vietnamese authorities. Many Chinese still living in Vietnam are alleged to have lost their jobs and ration cards, and in Ho Chi Minh City (formerly Saigon) there have been cases of “mass arrest, beating, and killing.”

The Chinese complaint, which was broadcast by the New China News Agency and was promptly denied by Hanoi, is likely to bring many more simmering grievances into the open. China has frequently criticized what it calls Vietnam’s “unprovoked assaults” on Cambodia during the two countries’ long-simmering border dispute, and has shown increasing concern over Hanoi’s growing ties with Moscow.

-- The Guardian, May 26, 1978

OTL this was I think sparked by Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia, ultimately overthrowing Pol Pot's murderous system. Presuming this is happening again TTL? Also the Chinese incursions into N Vietnam seem to have been handled pretty bloodily by veteran Vietnamese forces. May have been a factor in helping Deng in terms of emphasising the need for reforms. This time around with an on-going struggle about the way ahead [or at least that seems to still be occurring] it could pour petrol onto the fire of internal conflict.



The People’s Republic of China has sharply increased its purchases of foreign wheat in the past few months, apparently because of a hard winter and a shrinking stockpile of food grain, the Agriculture Department said yesterday.

Chinese grain imports have been steadily increasing over the past three years, from 2.7 million tons in 1975 to 4.5 million in 1977. But sources in Australia and Canada, China’s primary suppliers of grain, have reported that in the past five months alone, China’s total grain purchases have surpassed 3 million tons. a figure which analysts say could double by the end of the year.

-- Chicago Tribune, June 12, 1978

I can't remember if this was occurring OTL? Think the Chinese were having problems with food supply until Deng's economic reforms started to take effect. If still the situation TTL, with the lack of clear reforms and suggestions that the left is a lot more successful it could be a sign of serious problems. Especially since at the time I'm not sure how much foreign exchange China would have had to continue buying grain.

The other option that comes to mind, although less likely, is that the government is stockpiling because its expecting supply problems, which could be a bad harvest forecast, an expectation that something is going to disrupt supplies, or simple paranoia.

Steve
 
The Soviet Union and Vietnam signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation at a ceremony in Moscow last night, binding the two nations more closely together at a time when tensions are rising between Hanoi and Beijing.

Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev declared the treaty “holds special significance at this complicated moment when the policy of the Chinese leadership has created new, major difficulties for socialist construction on Vietnamese soil.” His comment came just hours after new accusations from Hanoi charging Chinese troops with border incursions. Beijing was quick to deny these claims, responding that it was Vietnamese border guards who had launched an “unprovoked attack” on Chinese soldiers, wounding three.

The Soviet Union and Vietnam yesterday also signed economic and technical agreements that will mean millions of additional rubles to aid Hanoi. Moscow specifically agreed to help improve vital strategic railroads linking Hanoi and the port of Haiphong, and Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City.

-- Washington Post, Nov. 5, 1978



The Chinese press lashed out at both Hanoi and Moscow today, issuing its strongest comments so far on the situation developing in Indochina. A front-page article in the newspaper Liberation Army Daily condemned Soviet and Vietnamese leaders as “social imperialists” seeking to “impose hegemony over all of Asia”.

The article singled out reports of recent Vietnamese incursions into Cambodia as evidence of Hanoi’s “mad ambition”, and pledged China’s support to the “heroic Cambodian people in their struggle against aggression” China has long been the Phnom Penh regime’s most fervent patron, but had until now refrained from taking a side in the growing conflict between Cambodia and Vietnam. But as Hanoi moves ever closer to China’s long-time Soviet adversary, Beijing may feel that it cannot stand on the sidelines much longer.

-- South China Morning Post, Dec. 12, 1978



Press reports yesterday, citing American and Thai intelligence sources, asserted that more than 60,000 Vietnamese soldiers, supported by artillery and warplanes, began a deep thrust into Cambodia during the past two weeks, apparently aimed at wiping out base camps used by the Cambodians to attack and infiltrate Vietnam.

But Hanoi radio declared tonight that these reports were fabricated, and asserted that “over the past few days, many regiments of the Cambodian armed forces have intruded into many districts” of Vietnam, and “have committed many crimes against the Vietnamese people.”

-- Globe and Mail, Dec. 26, 1978



Incursion by Vietnam Placed at 10 Miles After New Fighting: Cambodia Reports Towns Lost

-- New York Times headline, Dec. 28, 1978



Upon learning of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, Chen Xilian rushed to inform Ye Jianying. According to Ye’s private secretary, Chen arrived at the marshal’s home around midnight only to find that Ye was fast asleep, having taken his usual dose of sleeping pills, and his staff was reluctant to disturb him, even for an important guest such as Chen. Not to be deterred, Chen remained at Ye’s house throughout the night. Upon receiving the news the next morning, the old marshal, with Chen in tow, immediately boarded a plane to Guangzhou to consult with provincial first secretary Wei Guoqing and PLA general Xu Shiyou, who was responsible for military affairs in China’s southernmost provinces.

Ye Jianying asked to be briefed on the developing situation, and in light of the recent border clashes between Vietnamese and PLA troops, urged the utmost prudence, saying that China could not afford to be pulled into a wider conflict. At these words, Wei Guoqing appeared uncomfortable, murmuring a few words about the necessity for self-defense. He was interrupted by Xu Shiyou, who declared that they had been given an opportunity “from the hands of Old Grandfather Heaven himself” to eliminate “both our two enemies” in one fell swoop. Ye and Chen assumed that he was referring to the Vietnamese and the Soviets, but Xu quickly made clear that the second enemy he had in mind was the Politburo radicals.

At this, the famously stoic Ye Jianying reportedly blanched and was at a loss for words. Xu Shiyou continued, explaining that a quick, decisive victory abroad would provide the PLA with the prestige and the clout to push the radicals out of their already weakened positions and even marshal a majority vote in the Central Committee to dismiss them from their posts. Both Ye and Chen attempted to convince Xu of the risks of such a move, including the threat of Soviet retaliation, but the Guangdong general could not be swayed.

After several hours of heated discussion, Ye Jianying returned to Beijing, leaving Chen Xilian to keep an eye on Xu and Wei in Guangdong. Two days later on December 29, a meeting of the Military Affairs Commission was called in the capital.

-- Roderick MacFarquhar, China After Mao, Belknap Press, 1997.
 
Very little can be said with complete confidence concerning the events of the December 29 meeting of the Military Affairs Commission; the various accounts of the meeting which have emerged in the years since are riddled with gaps, contradictions, and blatant fabrications. On the most basic facts, the available documentation is generally in agreement: the meeting was held in Beijing, attended by ten of the commission’s eleven members – Wang Hongwen, Ye Jianying, Chen Xilian, Xu Shiyou, Li Desheng, Su Zhenhua, Zhang Chunqiao, and three unidentified others.

While the events of the meeting cannot be known with any certainty, most sources suggest a clear majority favoring military action against Vietnam, with at least Ye, Chen, and Zhang dissenting. Whatever the case, the next day the Central Committee issued Zhongfa Document 926, directing Xu Shiyou, as commander of the Guangzhou Military Region, to “employ all necessary means” to secure China’s southern border.

-- Fredrick Teiwes, “The Sino-Vietnamese War Revisited”, Pacific Affairs, 2001.



The long-simmering tension along the Sino-Vietnamese frontier escalated Wednesday amid intelligence reports that China now has elements of five armies totaling more than 100,000 men deployed within striking distance of Vietnam. Intelligence sources said that the Chinese were “spoiling for a fight,” indicating that the situation could not go on much longer without a major explosion.

The sources were quick to add, however, that they expected the action to be localized. “The Chinese are out to punish the Vietnamese, not get bogged down in an invasion of Vietnam,” one source said. He predicted that the Chinese attack, if and when it comes, will be “short, sharp, and brutal.”

-- Los Angeles Times, Dec. 31, 1978



That evening I was with the other comrades on the editorial board, making the last adjustments to the layout for tomorrow’s edition. We had already received a copy of the New Year’s editorial from Beijing a few days prior, and really everything was set to go to print. Around midnight, a messenger burst into the conference room, he was in an army uniform, and he handed me a large envelope with the seal of the local branch of the General Political Department. I passed it to the editor in chief, and we all crowded around to see what was inside. On top of the first page someone had scribbled “revised draft, New Year’s editorial” and below was typed in bold characters: “People of the Entire Country, Unite to Resist Social Imperialism and All Its Running Dogs!” We didn’t need to read any further. We all knew what was happening.

-- Weng Qiaolun, quoted in Behind the Bamboo Curtain, Random House, 1988



China Invades Vietnam Border Areas: Beijing Seeks to Punish Neighbor for Harassment

-- Toronto Star headline, Jan. 2, 1979



Continued fighting between China’s invading army and Vietnamese defenders was reported yesterday after earlier indications that the Chinese advance had halted six miles inside Vietnamese territory. Analysts in Hong Kong have said they believed that the Chinese had penetrated about twenty miles into Vietnam in two major advances along the railroad lines that run from the Chinese border province of Guangxi to Hanoi.

-- New York Times, Jan. 8, 1979



Tokyo’s Asahi Shimbun quoted Western military sources as saying the Chinese have stepped up their assault on the mountain highway north of Lang Son, a strategically located town ten miles south of the border. Foreign reporters who visited Lang Son Tuesday said Vietnam was rushing regular army reinforcements to the town, where local militias had so far borne the defensive burden of the invasion. Analysts believe a major battle is brewing around Lang Son. If the Chinese are able to deal a final blow to the Vietnamese, the analysts say, Beijing will likely withdraw most of its invasion force from Vietnam.

-- Chicago Tribune, Jan. 16, 1979



The Soviet Union pledged yesterday to “honor its obligations” under an eight-week-old treaty of friendship with Vietnam, warning China to stop its aggression against Hanoi “before it is too late.”

However, Western observers believe that Moscow is unlikely to introduce troops into the conflict unless Beijing presses its attack deeply into Vietnamese territory. “If the Chinese begin to threaten Hanoi, that might be a different story.” one diplomat commented.

-- Globe and Mail, Jan. 18, 1979
 
Top