A bureaucratic reorganisation TL.

[Riain]

The mid-fifties was a time of tremendous upheaval for Australian defence, a quantum realignment of policy was begun. The Korean War aside the post war plan for Australia was more or less to repeat the pattern of both World Wars; send a large, mainly infantry, force to the Middle East to fight alongside the British. To this end the Citizen Militia Forces were kept up to strength with a short term conscription scheme and the Regular Army was fully integrated to create a large Army that would be available at short notice. Similarly the RAAF maintained a fighter wing in Malta to fulfil this obligation while the Citizen Air Force provided training for pilots and ground crew with its Reserve flying squadrons.

By 1955 this plan was changing, the Far East Strategic Reserve based in Malaya and Singapore was created and Australia pledged to commit forces from all three Services. The RAAF fighter wing in Malta was withdrawn and RAAF bolstered combat squadrons at Butterworth in Malaya. The same year a battalion of the Royal Australia Regiment was deployed to Malaya and the RAN stationed several warships at Singapore Naval Base. These forces contributed to the Counter Insurgency campaign known as the Malayan Emergency. With this orientation away from the Middle East and with Korea and now Malaya being fought with regular forces the Army decided to place more emphasis on quality rather than quantity and reduced the CMF intake to 12,000 personnel from 1957 and National Service with the RAAF and RAN was ended. In this general reorientation from the Middle East to the Near North and from mass mobilised Citizen Forces to smaller Regular Forces the appropriateness of the current Defence administrative structure set up in 1940 was questioned and Prime Minister Menzies commissioned distinguished army officer Lieutenant General Leslie Morshead to chair a committee tasked to investigate the Defence group of Departments in 1957.

 

[Riain]

The Report from what was known as the Morshead Committee was handed to Prime Minister Menzies on December 9th 1957 with the recommendation that the six Government Departments in the Defence group be merged into two. The Departments of Defence Production and Supply into one department and the Departments of Defence, Army Navy and Air into another, each with a single Minister and perhaps one or Assistant Ministers along functional rather than Service lines. Menzies’ Cabinet sought further clarification and Morshead delivered his report expanding on the roles of the Minister, Associate Ministers and Service Chiefs on February 3rd 1958. The report also made recommendations that the Military Command structure and the Service Boards should be reviewed and offered options on possible Service Board structure changes.

The Government enacted the major recommendations of the Morshead Committee on March 22nd 1958, creating the Department of Defence Supply under Minster Senator John Gorton and the Department of Defence under Minster Sir Phillip McBride MP with Assistant Minister for Defence – Personnel and Logistics John Cramer MP. The Chiefs of Staff went from being responsible to two Ministerial Heads - collectively to the Minister for Defence in the formulation of overall Defence Policy and individually to their respective Service Ministers for the execution of policy and the operational efficiency of their own Service. Under the new form of organisation the Chiefs of Staff became responsible individually and collectively to the Minister for Defence, both in policy and operations.* The Service Boards were unchanged but a review of their functions was planned.

*IOTL 22nd March 1958 Menzies amalgamated Production and Supply but not Defence and the 3 Service departments and created a permanent and separate Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee who was responsible to the Minister of Defence through the permanent Secretary of Defence. Initially the C-COSC did not outrank the other COSC members.

 

[Riain]

Once the initial administrative changes to realign responsibilities and authorities were undertaken and plans afoot to reorganise and rationalise staff working for the Department of Defence Sir Phillip to get an idea of the biggest problems with the new Department: Inter-service Rivalry. All three Service, having their own fiefdoms with their own Minister for twenty years had developed independently of and often in competition with one another, developing the capabilities they were most comfortable with. This was exacerbated by the nature of Australia’s contributions to conflicts for half a century, providing component forces to larger Allies to fight alongside them under their command. Being the biggest service the Army complained the loudest: the Navy had no sealift capability and had recently decided to re-role the carrier HMAS Melbourne into an ASW Helicopter carrier with no capability to strike target ashore to support troops. Similarly the RAAF didn’t provide enough air support to the Army from battlefield spotting and transport all the way up to attacking ground targets in support of the Army. The Army had successfully acquired Tank Landing Ships for sealift support and was agitating hard to gain control of Army support aircraft from the RAAF.

The RAN and RAAF hit back with legitimate claims that they had vital missions of their own that the Army wasn’t aware of and that the Army had no appreciation of what support they did provide. The RAAF pointed to the Army belief that flying was a part time activity and that they could conduct it more effectively than the RAAF and the RAN pointed out that the Army couldn’t make use of its own assets such as armour and medium artillery properly let alone take on roles of the other services.


Sir Phillip and Secretary Hicks initially attempted to sort out these complaints in a bureaucratic fashion using the newfound capability of the Department to control both Policy and Administration. In true Public Service style the complaints were collated, queries sent to stakeholders, responses sought and evaluated and advice given to the Secretary and Minister. This laborious process caused the leaders of the new Department to climb a steep learning curve extremely quickly and by the end of the year were starting to ask some pertinent questions of the Service Chiefs both on the decisions they were making for their own Service as well and the demands they were making on the other Services. Shorn of the automatic support of their own Service Minister defending his own patch the Service Chiefs quickly adjusted to the new reality that the single Minister could strip a role from the Service at the stroke of a pen by clearly articulating their core roles and compromising on some areas of contention.

 

[Riain]

After airing their dirty laundry in 1958 and being asked several awkward questions as a result the Service Chiefs approached 1959 somewhat differently. Careful not to give any excuse to have core responsibilities and capabilities removed the Army paid attention to utilising its armour, the Navy deferred an announcement about not replacing the fixed wing aircraft of the FAA and organised cross deck trials of the Skyhawk aircraft on HMAS Melbourne (1) and the RAAF ended its indifference bordering on outright neglect of of 16 Army Observation Post Flight and made plans to increase it to squadron strength and acquire helicopters(2).

Sir Phillip retired in December 1958 being replaced by Athol Townley who, with Department heads, considered the wider recommendations of the Morshead Committee, the future of the Service Boards and the appointment of a Chief of the Defence Staffs with command responsibilities. The in-fighting of the previous year had highlighted to Sir Phillip the lack of a professional military Officer able to decide on priorities between the Service and provide specific advice to the minister and began to look favourably on the recommendation of Morshead and particularly the member for Indi former Air Marshal Bostock MP for a Chief of Defence Staff and the broad support among military Chiefs for the abolition of the Service Boards(3). The final act of 1959 was the Cabinet decision on 24th November that National Service call-ups should be terminated and that arrangements for the January 1960 intake would be cancelled.

(1) IOTL occurred in 1963
(2) IOTL in Dec 1960 16 AOP Fligt merged with Army 1 Avn Coy to become 16 Army Light Aviation Squadron, with RAAF ground crew and Squadron executives but Army line pilots, the first step towards independent Army Aviation.
(3) IOTL recommended but Service Boards remained along with Service Ministries and Chairman - Chief Of Staff Committee with no Command authority created.

 

[Riain]

For the Army the end of National Service was the final break with the old Defence policy of planning to mobilise a large Army for major war in the Middle East alongside British forces. World events, including the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union, Britain and France and the rise of limited wars in the former European Empires had made this policy obsolete. The Army needed to adapt to the new paradigm, reorganise and make itself relevant in the new decade. It took stock of its assets: 143 Centurion tanks, 100/165 Ferret MI/II Scout Cars, 15 Saladin Armoured Cars, 20 Saracen Armoured Personnel Carriers, 20 5.5" howitzers and an assortment of field artillery including M2A2 and L5 105mm pieces as well as 25 pounders and 40mm Bofors AA guns. In line with the policy throughout the 1950s the only regular regiment the Royal Australian Armoured Corp had was the 1st Armoured Regiment with two squadrons of Centurion tanks and the only regular regiment in the Royal Australian Artillery was 1st Regiment with two 105mm gun batteries and a 4.2" mortar battery. The rest of the RAAC and RAA assets were spread throughout the Army with Regular squadrons and batteries being part of combined Regular-CMF Regiments, assigned in no particular order or organisation for training rather than assets for operational service.

After investigating a force structure based on the US 'Pentomic' structure and quietly rejecting it* due to the requirement for 'Tropical' battalions for deployment to the FESR alongside the British the Army announced a major restructure. The Regular Army RAAC and RAA units would be stripped out of the combined CMF-Regular units and 'Regimented' into Regular units to be permanently part of the Army's Order of Battle, further these units would be formed into Combined Arms Brigades with the existing RAR infantry Battalions, 1 AR and 1 Fld Rgt. In a major equipment reshuffle the Army 'combed out' all 15 Saladins, 20 Saracens, some 60 Ferret MkII, all 20 5.5" and sufficient 105mm guns, 4.2" mortars and 40mm Bofors to form two new RAAC and three RAA Regiments using Regular personnel stationed amongst these mixed units. Recognising that the number of Saladins, Saracens and 5.5" was insufficient CGS Reg Pollard took steps to obtain small numbers of these to cover the requirements. This equipment reshuffle also affected CMF units, CGS Pollard wished for the CMF to become a Reserve for the Regular Army and in order to achieve this shuffled equipment around so these units had either Ferret or Staghound scout cars or, in one unit Centurion tanks, rather than the hodgepodge of vehicles and weapons previously.

On the 1st of July 1960 the Army formed 2nd Cavalry Regiment RAAC with two squadrons of three troops each containing a pair of Ferrets, a pair of Saladin and a single Saracen APC (1) and a third squadron of three troops of four Saracen APC and a Ferret tasked with troop transport. The remaining three Saladin and two Saracen were allocated to the HQ Squadron, leaving no vehicles in reserve and making the acquisition of spares urgent. On the same day the 4th Field regiment with 105mm guns, the 8th Medium Regiment with 5.5" howitzers, 12th regiment with 4.2" mortars and the 13th AA Regiment with 40mm Bofors guns(2). 1st Brigade, based in Victoria and Southern NSW was allocated 1 AR, 1 RAR and the newly formed 3rd Cav, 8th Med Rgt and 12th Rgt, 3rd Brigade was stood up and allocated 2 and 3 RAR, 1 Fld Rgt and the newly formed 2nd Cav and 4 Fld Rgt. With two Regular Brigades now in existence 1st Deivision was stood up for the first time in 1948 to command these two Brigades(2). Lieutenant General Pollard began to discreetly acquire small numbers of 5.5" guns, Saracen APCs and, most importantly given the low number in service, Saladin Armoured cars to make these changes more sustainable if these units were to be deployed on operations.

* This is a second PoD, not really related to the first but included because the 'Pentropic' establishment was shit. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pentropic_organisation

(1) IOTL this was the troop structure of 4th/19th Prince of Wales Light Horse from 1965 – 1966 when the M113A1 entered service and the wheeled AFVs were passed to the CMF.
(2) IOTL these units or units like them were formed from 1965-67/68 as part of the end of the Pentropic experiment, commitment to Vietnam and the adoption of the M113 APC.
(3) IOTL 1st Division was reformed for the 1st Pentropic Division establishment in 1960 and has remained in various forms since then.

 

[igetowned]

Very Interesting hope you keep this tl going

 

[Simon]

After investigating a force structure based on the US 'Pentomic' structure and quietly rejecting it...

Thank fuck. I don't really know enough about the Australian armed forces comment, aside from some things I've picked like how awful the pentropic idea was and the destruction it caused, but I'm following the thread.

I'll be interested to see what you do with the CMF with regards to the in-timeline wish to turn them into 'a Reserve for the Regular Army'. Pentropic structure with the reductions and amalgamations, state centred regimentisation breaking local links, being able to join to avoid national service with resultant image and morale problems etc. all seem to have done a number on them in our timeline.

 

[Riain]

Thank fuck.

I know!

Had to change the 1959 entry because Townley took over from McBride as Minister in December 1958 and a couple of other little edits too.
IOTL Townley and Sherg wanted a Joint Services Staff College.

 

[Riain]

1960 saw big changes with the RAAF and RAN as well. Following the success of the cross decking trials with USN A4D Skyhawks the deliberations to make HMAS Melbourne an ASW Helicopter carrier ceased and orders placed for 14 Douglas A4D-2N and 10 Grumman S2F-3S aircraft(1) to compliment the 27 Wessex helicopters on order.

Ostensibly the big change for the RAAF was the cessation of Citizen Air Force flying squadrons, these units being converted into auxiliary squadrons in supporting roles much in the same way the Army was concentrating its resources into the Regulars. However in the longer term the decision to expand 16 AOP Flight to Squadron strength and acquire 11 Bell Sioux helicopters to supplement the 8 Cessna 180 acquired in the previous year may have been more important. Sensing the risk of losing a role to the Army with the formation of 1 Aviation Company flying chartered civilian aircraft and the 1957 decision to allow the Army to fly aircraft of less than 4000lbs weight the RAAF invited the Army pilots of 1 Avn Coy to fly with 16 AOP Sqn while simultaneously deferring plans to create an Army Light Aviation Squadron(2). The Army partly because of Doctrine and partly in response to the perceived arrogance of the RAAF viewed pilots as just another type of specialty that a rifleman could be trained for, unlike the RAAF who saw pilots as the elite of the force and highly trained and skilled specialists, and as such sent enlisted men of no particular aptitude to fly with 16 Sqn. The first Sioux helicopters entered service from October and all were delivered by Christmas 1960.

(1) IOTL It was decided to in November 1959 to cease fixed wing carrier flying from 1963, this decision was reversed in 1963/4 and 10 A 4G and 14 S 2E were ordered.
(2) See Post #4 for OTL 16 ALA Sqn.

 

[La Rouge Beret]

Good updates Riain, and it certainly appears as if the ADF in this tl might have a more coherent structure.

Has the Army implemented Plan Beersheeba half a century earlier? Btw good idea scratching the failed pentropic organisational nonsense!

 

[Riain]

Thanks.

I don't intend to go into great detail about stuff that is generally unchanged, I'm not going to type out what can be found in a Wiki page. Also any big changes will be for a good reason, justified by events rather than just because, for example there was significant opposition to the Pentropic re-org so IITL that came though because of the butterflies arising from the departmental re-org.

 

[Riain]

The RAN was somewhat slower than the RAAF to perceive the 'danger' in losing a role to the Army but by 1961 had become aware and intended to do something about it. For some time the Army had been attempting to get the RAN to recommission the laid-up aircraft carrier HMAS Sydney, but the RAN didn't want to pay to refit such a large ship that would primarily benefit the Army. Belatedly taking note of the accumulating fleet of Army Amphibious craft with the order of a pair of ALC 50 Landing Craft Medium to supplement the four Landing Ship Medium purchased used from the United States in 1959 the Navy agreed to refit and operate the HMAS Sydney as a fast troop ship on the condition that the 'seagoing' amphibious ships the Army was operating would be turned over to the RAN. The Army reluctantly agreed to this, the HMAS Sydney was taken in hand for a refit as a fast troop transport, the ALC 50s under construction were taken over by the Navy while under construction somewhat grandiosely naming them HMAS Balikpapan and HMAS Labuan(1) and the four LCMs would be transferred at a later date but would keep their Army names. In the back of the minds of several senior Navy officers was the possibility of large scale, long distance amphibious operations rather than the limited vision of the Army.

After more than three years of reviews and considerable wrangling between the Services and within the Department of Defence the final recommendations of the Morshead were implemented on May 22 1961 with the abolition of the Army, Navy and Air Boards and the creation of the position of Chief of Defence Force Staff as Australia's only 4 star appointment. On that day Chief of Air Staff Air Marshall Frederick Scherger was promoted to the rank of Air Chief Marshall, the first RAAF Officer and first Duntroon graduate to hold 4 star rank, and appointed to the position of CDFS responsible for Command of all three Services.(2) The CDFS was directly responsible to the Minister of Defence and equal to the Secretary of Defence making Defence the only Government Department with two equal heads, an arrangement that was quickly labelled the Diarchy.

(1) IOTL the RAN reluctantly refitted Sydney and the Army retained these small seagoing amphibious ships. HMAS Balikpapan and Labuan were names of vessels in a class of Heavy Landing Craft ordered by the Army and taken over by the Navy in 1974.
(2) IOTL Scherger was appointed C-CSOC in May 1961 and promoted to AVM in March 1965, C-COSC was not initially an automatic 4 star position. The position of CDFS and Diarchy arrangement was created in 1974 when the Defence and Service Departments were merged.

 

[Riain]

1962 opened with a bang with the Battle of the Arafura Sea on January 15. Three Indonesian MTBs attempting to infiltrate 150 troops into West Papua were detected by Dutch SIGINT unit Marid 6, a Dutch Neptune intercepted this force and directed the destroyer HMNLS Eversten to the scene which promptly sank the lead MTB killing the Commodore commanding the flotilla along with 20 others, capturing 53 men and driving off the other two MTBs. Despite this failure Indonesia kept up their Confrontation approach and inserted 562 troops by sea and 1154 in 17 air drops over the next eight months to conduct a largely unsuccessful guerrilla campaign. Australia supported the Dutch cause however with Indonesia receiving large arms supplies from the Soviet Union the US was concerned that Indonesia would turn communist and changed from the previous position of supporting to Dutch to supporting Indonesia. During secret negotiations in New York the US lobbied Australia to support them and thus Indonesia. The US change robbed Australia of its primary military-political option of supporting a powerful ally and while the Dutch had some military resources Australia lacked the doctrine and experience to join an alliance as an equal or even senior partner. Australia withdrew its support for the Dutch and an agreement to transfer West Papua to Indonesia was made on August 15, a mere two days before an invasion of some 13,00 Indonesian troops was about to begin.

Indonesian destroyer during that time, KRI Irian Jaya

The West Papua crisis had a significant effect on Australian Defence policy. Australia was put in the position to go against its interests because of an inability to act in any other fashion than as a junior partner of a powerful ally and largely supported by that ally. The opportunity existed for Australia to act in concert with the Dutch and Australia had the extant military resources to make a significant contribution that could have deterred Indonesia or caused the planned invasion to fail but no way of commanding these forces or integrating them with Dutch forces on an equal basis. In late 1962 CDFS Scherger renamed his Staff Headquarters Australian Defence Forces (1), created the first Joint Command, Northern Command (2) which was given responsibility to defending Papua New Guinea and Northern Australia.

(1) IOTL HQADF was created in 1984, the ADF was first named in 1976
(2) IOTL NORCOM was created in 1988, after Land and Air Command

 

[Riain]

Within two years of flying with 16 AOP Sqn the Army pilots had crashed 4 of the original 11 Sioux helicopters (1). While this was similar to the RAAF at the same point in its development it was horrific for the standards of Australian military aviation in the early 60s. In this environment it was easy to convince CAS and CDFS Scherger that the Army was not yet ready to operate its own aircraft and the handover of 16 AOP Sqn to become 16 ALA Sqn was further deferred by another 18 months to early 1964. While this was occurring the RAAF was trying to change the Army’s policy on pilots with the lure of more advanced aircraft. The RAN had a requirement for a pair of small helicopters for use with the Survey Ship HMAS Moresby, the RAAF had a requirement for three small helicopters for use with the Joint Trials Programme at Woomera as well as the requirement to replace the crashed Sioux and the Westland Scout appeared to satisfy all three requirements. The RAAF advised the Army that it could not sustain the crash rate of non-career pilots and would not replace the Sioux with Scouts unless flown by career pilots. The RAAF strengthened this argument by pointing out that career officer pilots were required for executive positions within the squadron and despite 16 Sqn having Army pilots RAAF officers monopolised the executive positions for this reason. The Army was coming to similar conclusions of its own accord and agreed to this condition in order to operate a more advanced and capable aircraft that the Sioux. The RAAF took up an option of 6 aircraft that it had taken out when the RAN had ordered their two.(2)

(1) ITOL Army pilots of 16 ALA Sqn had crashed 3 of the original 11 Sioux, 3 replacements arrived in October 1962 and one of these was crashed in November.
(2) IOTL the RAAF ordered 3 Sioux for 16 ALA which were delivered in October 1962, the RAN ordered 2 Scouts delivered in March 1963 and the RAAF ordered 3 Alouette III which were delivered in 1964.

 

[La Rouge Beret]

The West Papua crisis had a significant effect on Australian Defence policy. Australia was put in the position to go against its interests because of an inability to act in any other fashion than as a junior partner of a powerful ally and largely supported by that ally. The opportunity existed for Australia to act in concert with the Dutch and Australia had the extant military resources to make a significant contribution that could have deterred Indonesia or caused the planned invasion to fail but no way of commanding these forces or integrating them with Dutch forces on an equal basis. In late 1962 CDFS Scherger created the first Joint Command, Headquarters Australian Theatre and tasked the Headquarters of the Army's 1st Division with raising a deployable Joint Forces Headquarters tasked with commanding Army, RAAF and RAN forces during large scale operations.

A very plausible POD for the creation of an earlier JFHQ, and one wonders why it didn't occur earlier.

Keep it up Riain!

 

[Riain]

A very plausible POD for the creation of an earlier JFHQ, and one wonders why it didn't occur earlier.

Keep it up Riain!

Thanks mate. I'm going to rewrite the commands bit to make it more reflective of the 60s rather than the 80s. I'll use Wiltons 1967 proposal as a guide.

 

[Riain]

I've rejigged the Command parts of posts 12 and 13 a little bit.

....one wonders why it didn't occur earlier.

I think it was because of the 4 Defence Ministries plus the Defence Supply Ministry and the 3 Service Chiefs, 3 Service Boards as well as the Chairman who was really only empowered to advise the Minister on the consensus of the COS Committee, with no statutory power of Command. COMAFV was the first Joint Command.

 

[Riain]

The first batch of four Scouts arrived on the MV Auckland Star in April 1963, two each for the RAAF and RAN, upon acceptance into service with 16 AOP Sqn a unit standing order was promulgated that only Commissioned Officers could fly turbine powered aircraft in the squadron. Ostensibly this was a reflection of the deal with the Army that more advanced aircraft than the Sioux would be acquired if the Army pilots were Commissioned officers, however it set a precedent that would have enduring ramifications, particularly as when fully loaded the Scout easily exceeded the 4000lb weight limit on Army aircraft. Once the third Scout on order arrived in late 1963 the RAAF placed 16 AOP Sqn and 9 Sqn with its Iroquois helicopters into a Wing specifically tasked with Army cooperation, reviving 84 Wing which was an Army Cooperation unit in the Pacific Theatre of WW2 Army.

After a number of TEWOTs the new command arrangements were given their first workout in late 1963 in a major Joint exercise 'Carbine' in Tin Can Bay training area. This exercise was notable for a number of 'firsts', it was the first time the Centurion tanks had exercised away from Puckapunyal(1), the first exercise for the newly refitted HMAS Sydney operating in the troop carrier role, the first attempt to a helicopter assault using the newly arrived Wessex and UH1B Iroquois helicopters in the troop carrying role and the first attempt to exercise Joint command arrangements(2). This exercise tested an array of capabilities in particular the higher end Army combined arms and the Services ability to directly support each other, with the Army directing Naval gunfire and RAAF airstrikes as well as being transported directly into action by helicopter. This exercise identified a number of areas for improvement in the area of command arrangements and inter-service cooperation as well as illustrating the various capabilities and limitations of each service and how these impacted on a Joint operation. The urgency to get these arrangements working was highlighted during the year by requests by the British Government to deploy troops to Borneo to assist in the Confrontation with Indonesia, a situation Australia was all too familiar with in the previous year.

After Exercise Carbine the HMAS Melbourne was taken in hand for a refit to operate the new American aircraft about to be delivered and HMAS Sydney sailed to the USA to take delivery of these aircraft and transport them to Australia.(3)

(1) IOTL the Centurions deployed for an Army exercise to Tin Can Bay in 1964m the first time away from Puckapunyal.
(2) IOTL the first Joint Exercise was "Kangaroo One' in 1974.
(3) IOTL Sydney transported the second batch of 10 Skyhawks to Australia in 1971, Melbourne transported the first batch and the 14 Trackers in 1967 and was refitted for them Dec 67 to Feb 69.

 

[Riain]

If anyone is reading this, I know I'm jumping the gun since I have the whole Vietnam War to fight but I'm wondering about what to do with the Phantoms and Canberras. Given other stuff I have in mind I think its one or the other, the Phantom is pretty self explanatory, a single Sqn maybe 75-6-7-9 but the Canberra soldiered on as a survey aircraft until 1979 and then limped into 1982. I think that in addition to survey some of the 'Wet wing' Canberras could be fitted with the London-Christchurch air race bomb bay fuel tanks and a buddy pod on a wing and be buddy tankers throughout the 70s. This would also require the Mirages to be fitted with IFR probes, so would suck up some of the money required to buy the Phantom.

 

[Riain]

Using the increase in Army establishment from 21,000 to 22,500 for 1963 the 4th Battalion Royal Australia Regiment was stood up on February 1 at Woodside in South Australia,(1) the first RAR battalion raised in Australia and the first raised since the founding of the Regiment in Japan in 1949, and had its first parade on 23 March. The Army, struggling to recruit enough men to fill to increased establishment, expanded the 1st Armoured Regiment from two to three Sabre squadrons in order to squeeze as much firepower from the available manpower.

1963 was also a big year for procurement announcements, particularly in the lead up to the General election scheduled for late November. After trials against the British FV430 the American M113 Armoured Personnel Carrier was selected for use by the Army and after an extensive study of the French Mirage IV, British TSR2, American A5, F4 and TFX it was announced that the General Dynamics TFX design would be procured for the RAAF as a replacement for the Canberra. In addition the Government announced that it would not be proceeding with plans to refit the Daring class destroyers with the Tartar missile system and instead would order a third Perth class DDG from the United States as well as eight Barbel class submarines in two batches of four boats.(2) The acquisition of so much American equipment was assisted by generous and administratively useful financial terms* offered to smooth the political path with regards to the establishment of a Very Low Frequency communications station on Australia's North West Cape** for communication for USN SSBNs. The Menzies Coalition government was re-elected on November 30th with a substantially increased majority.

(1) IOTL 4 RAR was stood up a year later in 1964, but with the Pentropic establishment 1 and 2 RAR had 5 companies of 5 platoons equalling some 1300 men in 1962 so infantry manpower was increased without an increase in the number of Battalions.
(2) IOTL the RAN ordered British Oberon class submarines.
* Interest free Deferred payments meant that the first 2 DDGs delivered in 65 were paid for over 8 years until 69, this was new for Australia and we jumped at it.
** I've stayed at Harold E Holt VLF station, it was handed over to Australia in 1993 and the CPO quarters is now a hotel for people visiting the Ningaloo Reef so swim with the Whale Sharks. Very interesting, the whole place is built with solid concrete with withstand nearby nuclear blasts and its is powered by a self contained diesel generator from a submarine.