Introduction
[Revised 2022-04-17. Formerly titled "A Longer Night, a Brighter Sunrise"]
Here are some ideas for a proposed timeline that addresses the most commonly criticized aspects of Japanese society, making it more reconciled with its neighbors and a more attractive place to live in (it doesn't have to be perfect, though).
(For discussion about a Japan that avoids Nazi-like militarism in the first place, see this thread)
It starts with Nationalist China winning the civil war, or at least having a larger presence on a divided mainland with a Communist Manchuria (I don't know exactly how, maybe the Imperial Japanese Army isn't able to weaken the KMT as much? Mao dies in the 1930s?). There would still be a Korean War that stimulates Japan's economic recovery, but the south would win, resulting in a united capitalist Republic of Korea. With less communist presence in mainland East Asia, there would be less Red Scare-induced backing by the US government of pre-war Japanese nationalists (part of the "Reverse Course"). In OTL, Nobusuke Kishi was nicknamed "America's Favorite War Criminal" and became prime minister in the late 1950s, and General MacArthur pardoned members of Unit 731 in exchange for their "research" (read: torture) data, but note that you can't entirely blame the US for more recent statements of denialism from the Japanese government. Here, non-communist China and Korea would be in a stronger position to pressure Japanese politicians to make unequivocal apologies for WWII. A "de-imperialization" process would occur, similar to denazification in Germany.
In OTL,
But ITTL, instead of the Cold War discouraging reconcilation in Asia, the common threat of the Soviet Union and North China/Manchuria would give the US an incentive to help set up multilateral diplomatic relationships instead of the "hub-and-spokes" model, and give China, Korea, and Japan more motivation to settle grievances. There would be a larger reckoning and reflection in Japanese society about the atrocities committed by its government and military, such as the Nanking Massacre and the "comfort women" (sexual slavery) system. One of the prime ministers might make gestures similar to Kniefall, more efforts would be made to teach about Japan's crimes in schools, historical negationism and the rising sun flag would be banned, and war criminals would never be enshrined at Yasukuni Shrine by nationalist priests. With less backing from the CIA, there would be less dominance of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party for several decades, leaving room for more left-leaning workplace reforms (like reducing overwork and worker mistreatment), as well as more potentially successful protests or campaigns for gender and racial equality, or justice system reform. With more women's rights, they would not have to choose between having a career or having children, diminishing the phenomenon of a shrinking, aging population. Reforming overwork would also remove a major barrier in attracting foreign talent.
edit: The below paragraphs used to say that Japan wouldn't have an economic miracle in the 1950s, but would rapidly 'leapfrog' in the 21st century. However, @Erodian pointed out that a lot of social reforms only happen after a country's economy becomes prosperous.
Japan would still have a post-war economic miracle and be considered a developed country by the 1970s, but it wouldn't be as prominent or overwhelmingly successful due to the US also giving aid to China and Korea, and extra competition coming from their industries decades earlier. However, this competition would result in more incentives for innovation. With the right conditions over a longer period of time, it could develop an electronics industry that was more digital than analog, and famous for smartphones instead of cassette players. And/or have a major presence in the software/internet/AI industry. The issues of US-Japan trade friction in the 1970s and 1980s and the Plaza Accord (appreciating yen making exports too expensive) would be less significant due to Japan not being as reliant on exports to the US, but also trading with reconciled neighbors (like Germany, which also signed the Accord), mitigating the bubble economy and possibly averting Japan's Lost Decades.
With less complacency/resting on laurels/vested interests/inertia/innovator's dilemma in business and government policy, and without the economic crash, Japan would be able to invest more in the digital/software age and become the Silicon Valley of Asia (like Shenzhen in OTL China) with "Bit Valley" in Shibuya, Tokyo. This would be somewhat later than the US due to kanji issues with early computers, but the use of hanzi hasn't stopped China in OTL from developing a major IT industry.
It would never overtake the US or China economically, but be in a solid third place with a GDP of $7 trillion instead of $5 trillion in the early 2020s, and its businesses and industries would have reformed to be more competitive and nimble in the 21st century. Some ups and downs, but no unsustainable bubble followed by 30+ years of stagnation. The rise of Japanese pop culture would also co-exist with Korean and Chinese pop culture. And like Germany in Europe, Japan would have more genuine soft power and a better reputation in Asia with less resentment, as there were more sincere apologies. Of course, Japan's space program would be somewhat more advanced, and maybe even have a crewed spacecraft. Without the expectations of the bubble, it would be a pragmatic capsule design like Fuji instead of a mini-Space Shuttle like HOPE.
For more information and context:
"The Resistance to Change Is Rooted in Postwar Success" (1999)
"The Japanese Software Industry: What Went Wrong and What Can We Learn from it?" (2014) (I also mentioned it here)
u/AsiaExpert on r/AskHistorians:
Here are some ideas for a proposed timeline that addresses the most commonly criticized aspects of Japanese society, making it more reconciled with its neighbors and a more attractive place to live in (it doesn't have to be perfect, though).
(For discussion about a Japan that avoids Nazi-like militarism in the first place, see this thread)
It starts with Nationalist China winning the civil war, or at least having a larger presence on a divided mainland with a Communist Manchuria (I don't know exactly how, maybe the Imperial Japanese Army isn't able to weaken the KMT as much? Mao dies in the 1930s?). There would still be a Korean War that stimulates Japan's economic recovery, but the south would win, resulting in a united capitalist Republic of Korea. With less communist presence in mainland East Asia, there would be less Red Scare-induced backing by the US government of pre-war Japanese nationalists (part of the "Reverse Course"). In OTL, Nobusuke Kishi was nicknamed "America's Favorite War Criminal" and became prime minister in the late 1950s, and General MacArthur pardoned members of Unit 731 in exchange for their "research" (read: torture) data, but note that you can't entirely blame the US for more recent statements of denialism from the Japanese government. Here, non-communist China and Korea would be in a stronger position to pressure Japanese politicians to make unequivocal apologies for WWII. A "de-imperialization" process would occur, similar to denazification in Germany.
In OTL,
Germany confronted its wartime past so it could reassert German leadership in Europe at a time when a unified Cold War stand against the Soviet Union encouraged reconciliation.
On the other hand, Japan, at the urging of the United States, was positioned in a long-term Cold War confrontation with its principal victim in World War II, China. As a result, little motivation existed for Japan to look deeply at its atrocities against China, [Daniel] Sneider said.
But ITTL, instead of the Cold War discouraging reconcilation in Asia, the common threat of the Soviet Union and North China/Manchuria would give the US an incentive to help set up multilateral diplomatic relationships instead of the "hub-and-spokes" model, and give China, Korea, and Japan more motivation to settle grievances. There would be a larger reckoning and reflection in Japanese society about the atrocities committed by its government and military, such as the Nanking Massacre and the "comfort women" (sexual slavery) system. One of the prime ministers might make gestures similar to Kniefall, more efforts would be made to teach about Japan's crimes in schools, historical negationism and the rising sun flag would be banned, and war criminals would never be enshrined at Yasukuni Shrine by nationalist priests. With less backing from the CIA, there would be less dominance of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party for several decades, leaving room for more left-leaning workplace reforms (like reducing overwork and worker mistreatment), as well as more potentially successful protests or campaigns for gender and racial equality, or justice system reform. With more women's rights, they would not have to choose between having a career or having children, diminishing the phenomenon of a shrinking, aging population. Reforming overwork would also remove a major barrier in attracting foreign talent.
Regarding economic aid [in a KMT China timeline], it would be still coming, as getting Japan on its feet economically would be still important. After-all, Germany did also get massive amounts of aid too.
edit: The below paragraphs used to say that Japan wouldn't have an economic miracle in the 1950s, but would rapidly 'leapfrog' in the 21st century. However, @Erodian pointed out that a lot of social reforms only happen after a country's economy becomes prosperous.
Japan would still have a post-war economic miracle and be considered a developed country by the 1970s, but it wouldn't be as prominent or overwhelmingly successful due to the US also giving aid to China and Korea, and extra competition coming from their industries decades earlier. However, this competition would result in more incentives for innovation. With the right conditions over a longer period of time, it could develop an electronics industry that was more digital than analog, and famous for smartphones instead of cassette players. And/or have a major presence in the software/internet/AI industry. The issues of US-Japan trade friction in the 1970s and 1980s and the Plaza Accord (appreciating yen making exports too expensive) would be less significant due to Japan not being as reliant on exports to the US, but also trading with reconciled neighbors (like Germany, which also signed the Accord), mitigating the bubble economy and possibly averting Japan's Lost Decades.
You can also argue that the Biggest Japanese companies did TOO well. Around the 80s and 90s they didn't adapt to, or fund the invention of, new technology nearly as much as they could have or should have - because of complacency caused by their massive success building up to that time.
With less complacency/resting on laurels/vested interests/inertia/innovator's dilemma in business and government policy, and without the economic crash, Japan would be able to invest more in the digital/software age and become the Silicon Valley of Asia (like Shenzhen in OTL China) with "Bit Valley" in Shibuya, Tokyo. This would be somewhat later than the US due to kanji issues with early computers, but the use of hanzi hasn't stopped China in OTL from developing a major IT industry.
It would never overtake the US or China economically, but be in a solid third place with a GDP of $7 trillion instead of $5 trillion in the early 2020s, and its businesses and industries would have reformed to be more competitive and nimble in the 21st century. Some ups and downs, but no unsustainable bubble followed by 30+ years of stagnation. The rise of Japanese pop culture would also co-exist with Korean and Chinese pop culture. And like Germany in Europe, Japan would have more genuine soft power and a better reputation in Asia with less resentment, as there were more sincere apologies. Of course, Japan's space program would be somewhat more advanced, and maybe even have a crewed spacecraft. Without the expectations of the bubble, it would be a pragmatic capsule design like Fuji instead of a mini-Space Shuttle like HOPE.
...in the case of Japan, in particular, the fact that this state wouldn't be at the frontlines of the Cold War ITTL, as the main focus would be in China, would lead to a more thorough demilitarisation... There would also be a more thorough reorganisation of the Japanese economy, as there wouldn't be as much pressure as IOTL to prioritise the quick recovery of the latter... in general, economic recovery would be rather slower than OTL. However, the existence of China as a large market with great demands could compensate for these disadvantages, as there would be adequate demand to stimulate production in Japan in order to sell these products in China; if the Americans developed a coordinated plan to use the vast market in China to facilitate Korean and Japanese recovery and reconstruction through trade between these countries and supported it by offering funds, the resulting sustained increase in exports would benefit Japan.
Also, the need to compete with China could lead Japan and Korea to shift more quickly than OTL to new industries such as electronics and also, to enable the creation of larger business entities unofficially backed by the state and seek new markets.
...increased competition with China would prompt them to focus more an combination of very high quality and affordability for their products, as well as reforms in their corporate culture (more freedom for engineers, promotion by merit and not only by seniority etc) in order to enhance productivity and spur further innovation.
For more information and context:
"The Resistance to Change Is Rooted in Postwar Success" (1999)
Japan’s reluctance to make meaningful change is rooted in its success.
While Western nations have weathered economic ups and downs that forced them to restructure repeatedly, Japan’s steady growth and protected markets allowed it to preserve a 40-year-old system largely intact--a system that today almost qualifies as a fossil.
Thus Japan must alter not only its economy, but its four-decade-old ruling party, its deeply entrenched bureaucracy, labor unions, educational system, corporate community, even its family structure and social rules.
“Japan will hold on until it has no choice,” says Nobuhiro Hiwatari, professor of political science at Tokyo University. “Everything affects another thing. It’s really difficult to change one part of it now and leave the rest.”
"The Japanese Software Industry: What Went Wrong and What Can We Learn from it?" (2014) (I also mentioned it here)
Japanese leaders, with their strong success in manufacturing hardware, found it much more difficult to envision software as a full partner, much less alternative model. It is also a plausible hypothesis that the weakness of American manufacturing globally, relative to Japanese firms, gave American firms stronger incentives to search, sense, monitor, and respond to the new opportunities created by software. (pg 17)
u/AsiaExpert on r/AskHistorians:
[The lack of education in Japan about imperial war crimes] happened entirely because of Cold War adversarial politics.
With much of Asia seemingly falling to Communist forces, there was very little political value put in reconciliation. China was militant and aggressively pursuing a doctrine of violent Communist revolution in the region. Korea was war torn and half of it was controlled by an adversarial regime. South East Asia had swarms of Communist militias if not out right revolutions.
Japanese politicians simply didn't care. More importance was put in inspiring patriotism and convincing the people of the Communist threat while extolling the superior virtues of the capitalist system. Education was more about preparing the citizens for ideological warfare than critical thinking.
Speaking about the politicians that created this educational policy, many of these politicians were solidly right-wing and supportive of honoring if not glorifying the venerable statesmen and military leaders of Imperial Japan. Many of them had actually been purged by the American occupation but were reconciled and reintegrated because their staunch anti-Communist views made them desirable for American interests in the region.
Unfortunately, these politicians are the origins of political historical revisionism and academic repression. For example, in 1957 under the authorization system that was first installed during the US occupation, 8 middle school textbooks were banned. The contents of the books were fairly graphic and very anti-war, detailing the many atrocities and war crimes Japan had committed in the war.
They were labeled and politically dangerous and harboring Communist sentiments, and subsequently banned.
To get the Japanese economy to grow quickly in the 21st century, you need to solve of a series of social problems that (IOTL) do not seem to be going away anytime soon, including the declining birthrates, the sexism that is keeping women out of the workforce, the unwillingness to take in immigrants, static corporate culture and abysmal enforcement of worker's rights (which leads to a ridiculously overworked and unproductive workforce).
Perhaps the best way to get this would be to manufacture a lot of corruption scandals in the late 70s and early 80s (there were actually quite a few IOTL, we probably just need a little bit more) so that the LDP might become discredited in a way that allows the socialist party to come into power. Under a JSP government, the monetary and financial sectors would remain tightly regulated, organized labour and worker's rights would get a major boost, allowing the most exploitative aspects of Japanese work culture to be addressed, the keiretsus may get broken up and there's a possibility of social liberalization. The only problem is that such a massive shake up of Japanese society may lead to a lot of instability, which would obviously hurt the economy. But if the changes get done and endure, it will robably be worth it in the long run.
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