A Blunted Sickle - Thread II

requiring icebreaker assistance.

In OTL Finnish fleet totalled c. 8 operational icebreaker ships, but I have no idea how many ships the Swedes had. Out of these at least the two most modern ones, Sisu and Jääkarhu, were capable of escorting merchant vessels through the icy Baltic from German ports all the way to Finnish coast.
 
In OTL Finnish fleet totalled c. 8 operational icebreaker ships, but I have no idea how many ships the Swedes had. Out of these at least the two most modern ones, Sisu and Jääkarhu, were capable of escorting merchant vessels through the icy Baltic from German ports all the way to Finnish coast.

This talk of sea trade made me check some sources. This is the narration of the first minute or so of "Defence Forces News Report 44" from early May 1942 (my translation):

Many people have been smiling in disbelief when transport difficulties have been discussed, for example to do with the dearth of food. These difficulties have been called as just flimsy excuses. This isn't, however, true. When at the turn of April and May ships could advance only with difficulty, and assisted with powerful icebreakers, it proves that these difficulties have existed. And when at that same time ice is still 50 centimeters thick, it shows that these difficulties have been exceptionally great. They have shackled our sea transport entirely, and absolutely vital cargoes of goods have not reached our country, not even if people would have been crying and lamenting about the situation. Now, though, winter's reign has been pushed aside and sea trade, called by the old Romans more necessary than life itself, has started again.

Now, half a meter of ice in late April may be a propaganda exaggeration, but apparently it truly was a very bad winter, cargo ships at worst being stuck at the level of Gotland until icebreakers were sent south to help them. This is the German cargo ship SS Pickhuben, in a photo taken from the deck of the icebreaker Sisu in the waters outside the Hanko Peninsula. The Defence Forces photo is dated April 29th 1942.

39399_r500.jpg


The ice map I posted on the last page is, I found, actually from a site that has a lot of good info about the wartime winters in the Baltic Sea and in Europe in general. See here for 41/42. It looks a bit suspect as websites go but as far as I can see, the information appears legit. A quote:

Gösta Liljequist wrote the official Swedish sea ice report for winter 1941/42 (Liljequist, 1942). He expressed his amazement about the winter 1941/42 as follows:

After the two hard winters of 1939/40 and 1940/41 and the difficulties they generated for the shipping and the fuel supply for the country, one has awaited and expected that the winter of 1941/42 would bring the return of mild winters, which had recently predominated. Instead this winter became one of the toughest, if not the severest of all winters during the last 200 years.

EDIT: Oh - naraht had already linked to this site above...
 
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Some areas of Poland & Norway may be able to supplement their heating & cooking fuel with wood, though that may have layers of risk too. Just acquiring firewood may be dangerous and green wood of any variety and resinous pine aren't the cleanest or safest for inside the house usage.
Not really a problem in the countryside, where most of the population probably already heat with wood anyway. The big issue is how you provide heating in the cities - this was pretty much exclusively by coal, either delivered by train direct to gasworks or by train and then distributed locally by cart for burning in the home. The Belgian, Ruhr and Saar coalfields are all deeply vulnerable to Entente attack right now - if they go, the Germans have to either stop deliveries to their own civilians, stop war production or stop deliveries to non-German civilians. No question: they're going to stop the deliveries to non-German civilians. Given that stocks are probably already quite low, then if the Entente launch a major offensive before the end of the year you will see a large number of Hypothermia-related deaths, particularly in Poland.

And as an additional thought, increased Swedish/Finnish Coal needs might lead to more of a lean for the Union back to the Nazis if they can't get the coal they need through Narvik and more of a lean toward the Entente if they *can*.
It's pretty clear that they can get it through Narvik - the infrastructure is more than capable of it, and the UK was a net coal exporter. This also has the advantage of being a warm-water port connected by an all weather route to the rest of the Union - meaning even if the Baltic were frozen solid they could still import enough. Interestingly, the complete upgrade of the Narvik railway by SJ (double tracked and electrified over the entire length) is due to be completed by the end of 1941 - so they'll have a vast amount of excess capacity on the track right before the bad weather hits.

With Entente airpower getting ever closer to Kiel plus the systemic attacks on German transport infrastructure plus multiple armies sitting on both banks of the Rhine, just how much can Germany actually export and have arrive in Swedish or Finnish ports?
Quite a bit, probably - even the Netherlands (which is very congested - anything much heavier than a Beaufighter will be based in East Anglia still) is a long way from the shipping lanes to say Helsinki. Much more interesting are the shipping lanes to Norway: they are vastly more exposed to attack from the UK and there are several choke points on the way there.

If German civilians are shivering as coal barges go up the Elbe or Oder to send to Sweden, hints of 1917 come into play
Which is why I don't think it will be German civilians who suffer from this, at least to start with...

Now, half a meter of ice in late April may be a propaganda exaggeration, but apparently it truly was a very bad winter, cargo ships at worst being stuck at the level of Gotland until icebreakers were sent south to help them. This is the German cargo ship SS Pickhuben, in a photo taken from the deck of the icebreaker Sisu in the waters outside the Hanko Peninsula. The Defence Forces photo is dated April 29th 1942.
Spring of 1942 does not sound like a nice time to be in Scandinavia unless you really like the cold...
 
Sorta-kinda: the issue is that the area they have to attack over is billiard-table flat, easily flooded and with a large number of moderately large water obstacles. That really slows things down, and gives the defenders a major advantage. If they can launch a simultaneous major assault down the Rhine then there is a good chance they can make it work by forcing the Germans to try and withdraw behind the Rhine, but doing so is NOT straightforward.

We shouldn't overstate the German use of inundations though. To use inundations in a militarily effective way requires a LOT of knowledge of the terrain in question and inundations as a whole. Something that was frankly in short supply outside of the Netherlands. There is a reason the Germans only used them as retaliation (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inundation_of_the_Wieringermeer) or followed the old Dutch lines (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grebbe_line#Pantherstellung). The whole system was build to defend the West from the East. From the West the Dutch army can empty the water bassins of the Waterline. After that the following obstacle would be the Grebbeline which the Germans can flood as well...while they are on the western side of it. Once they cross to the other side the faucet is closed and they are in the same position they were in when the Waterline was drained. After that their only option is to withdraw to the other side of the IJssel. The IJssel is a obstacle certainly but shouldn't be any trouble for a force that has probably spend the past year practicing to attack across canals and other waterobstacles. Any German inundation attempts are further hampered (if not made impossible) by the fact that they occupy the part of the Netherlands that is in fact above sealevel:

40.jpg
 
It's pretty clear that they can get it through Narvik - the infrastructure is more than capable of it, and the UK was a net coal exporter. This also has the advantage of being a warm-water port connected by an all weather route to the rest of the Union - meaning even if the Baltic were frozen solid they could still import enough. Interestingly, the complete upgrade of the Narvik railway by SJ (double tracked and electrified over the entire length) is due to be completed by the end of 1941 - so they'll have a vast amount of excess capacity on the track right before the bad weather hits.

Spring of 1942 does not sound like a nice time to be in Scandinavia unless you really like the cold...

While the Union is connected by Rail to Narvik, my question is whether the colder weather increased the Nordic Snowfall as well, leading to possible blockages.

Another concern is that the Union is still dealing with the Break of Gauge between Sweden and Finland and even with some of the track changed to multiple gauge, until they rip up every rail system in Finland, you still have to deal with change of bogie, which with Coal Cars are going to be pretty stressful. (simply due to weight).

Why else would anyone live in Scandanavia? :)
 
Could the Entente do the reverse of the flooding? Block the IJssel where it splits off from the Rhine Delta as a distributary? (Though the question is why didn't the *Germans* do it to make taking Amsterdam easier)
 
I think some people are greatly overestimating Germany’s powers of resistance.


Being conservative, take the Entente hardstanding airfields and Pick an aircraft type, Say Spit VB 400 mile range on internal fuel that’s the range of the FGA, or escorted bomber strike.


Say 60% Air superiority and 30% armed recce for the FGA how many sorties per day will be shooting up moving things deep into Germany. You can collect as much food as you like in Poland, how do you get it across the last 400 miles. The easiest target to hit from the air will be marshalling yards or bridge approaches, you can see them and every trainload you send has to make it back to be reloaded.


For the German troops its probably worse. 10km back from the lines it’s the beaten zone for entente arty, 4km say for mortars and MGs. Based on WW1 performance each german army will be losing a regiment a day just bringing up the rations. No AFV to run the last mile at speed. No air cover to keep the spotter planes away. Three rounds from you own guns and they know the CB fire is in the air. Worse for civilian populations if the entente deliberately interdict a particular zone.


Without transport all your ammunition has to come up by hand, and if you change positions it all has to be moved by hand. It take 10-12 hours to dig in a big gun so right now you are in the open during daylight or not moving. The Entente can read a map too they know where the AT guns should be.


The British ( certainly maybe French) practice was to put together a series of divisional and corps level attacks in quick succession to drag german reserves in to a killing zone ( this is 1918 and ww2 btw) unless they are positively ordered to cease all offensive action – which aint going to happen, this is what they wlll do naturally. But its going to be a reinforced mechanised unit with tanks in the lead hitting what is mostly paper this defences with an army of fast powerful mechanised units behind travelling across the the densest road network in the world. Unless a mobile reserve can come up the attack will be 5=10km behind the MLR before Brooke much less OKH understands what’s happening. And the mobile reserve, if it moves within 400mile of the front it’s the target for Entente air forces. By the time it limps its way to its jump off point it will be facing a gunline dug in bore sighted and with the main logistics problem being replacing the barrels after they have been fired smooth ( aka the story of the panzerwaffe in the west 1942-45)


The Allies don’t need to make a deep penetration, just a series of short ones that shatter the linear front, if the germans move from their current positions they do so at walking pace with what they can pull or carry on their backs, and lose their communication for the most part. The only way they can feed themselves is to take it from the local civilian population. At this point the army becomes a mob moving east into the guns of the allied armour already behind them.


The German Generals know this.
 
Could the Entente do the reverse of the flooding? Block the IJssel where it splits off from the Rhine Delta as a distributary? (Though the question is why didn't the *Germans* do it to make taking Amsterdam easier)

That would be pretty hard seeing as that you'd to have control of both sides to do that. Even then it would be pretty hard and have serious enviromental repercussions for the whole Gelderland region. It would also not be needed very much. The width of the IJsselriver is 70 meters. By comparison the river Rhine is 400 meters wide. There is a reason that the IJssel was never considered as more than just a temprorary defense line to give the Grebbeline and Waterline a chance to mobilise.
 
That would be pretty hard seeing as that you'd to have control of both sides to do that. Even then it would be pretty hard and have serious enviromental repercussions for the whole Gelderland region. It would also not be needed very much. The width of the IJsselriver is 70 meters. By comparison the river Rhine is 400 meters wide. There is a reason that the IJssel was never considered as more than just a temprorary defense line to give the Grebbeline and Waterline a chance to mobilise.

I was thinking of the Entente doing this with air dropped bombs, but I don't know how much explosive you'd have to drop east of Arnhem to accomplish this, probably not good with the accuracy of bombers in 1940. Not like there are any nice cliffs nearby to explode. (doing this in *Norway*, OTOH would be much more fun) :(

Did the Germans control both sides? (I've lost track of where the Front line is in this area of the Netherlands). I'm sure the Germans wouldn't have cared about the environmental results, Also, it wouldn't completely dry up for the entire range, the Old Ijssel would continue to feed it...
 
I was thinking of the Entente doing this with air dropped bombs, but I don't know how much explosive you'd have to drop east of Arnhem to accomplish this, probably not good with the accuracy of bombers in 1940. Not like there are any nice cliffs nearby to explode. (doing this in *Norway*, OTOH would be much more fun) :(

Did the Germans control both sides? (I've lost track of where the Front line is in this area of the Netherlands). I'm sure the Germans wouldn't have cared about the environmental results, Also, it wouldn't completely dry up for the entire range, the Old Ijssel would continue to feed it...

To divert the route of the IJssel you would need to dam it. I don't think air dropped bombs would be very usefull :)
 
We shouldn't overstate the German use of inundations though. To use inundations in a militarily effective way requires a LOT of knowledge of the terrain in question and inundations as a whole. Something that was frankly in short supply outside of the Netherlands. There is a reason the Germans only used them as retaliation (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inundation_of_the_Wieringermeer) or followed the old Dutch lines (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grebbe_line#Pantherstellung). The whole system was build to defend the West from the East. From the West the Dutch army can empty the water bassins of the Waterline. After that the following obstacle would be the Grebbeline which the Germans can flood as well...while they are on the western side of it. Once they cross to the other side the faucet is closed and they are in the same position they were in when the Waterline was drained. After that their only option is to withdraw to the other side of the IJssel. The IJssel is a obstacle certainly but shouldn't be any trouble for a force that has probably spend the past year practicing to attack across canals and other waterobstacles. Any German inundation attempts are further hampered (if not made impossible) by the fact that they occupy the part of the Netherlands that is in fact above sealevel
Agree, mostly - they're less a defensive barrier and more a way of limiting the mobility of the Entente forces. The defensive lines were built to take advantage of the terrain though, and that often works both ways (swamps, rivers, etc.).

Well bang goes one particular conspiracy theory. Literally in this case. ;)
Well, maybe the one about how he died in OTL. Doubtless ITTL there will be a whole pile of conspiracy theories about it however.

While the Union is connected by Rail to Narvik, my question is whether the colder weather increased the Nordic Snowfall as well, leading to possible blockages.
Unlikely - the reduced temperatures probably aren't going to lead to much more snow.

Another concern is that the Union is still dealing with the Break of Gauge between Sweden and Finland and even with some of the track changed to multiple gauge, until they rip up every rail system in Finland, you still have to deal with change of bogie, which with Coal Cars are going to be pretty stressful. (simply due to weight).
That isn't the reason for the dual tracking - it means you can cross-load between wagons at a large yard with lots of workers available, rather than being forced to change bogies or cross-load at a small town on the border. Given the way railway systems worked at the time, this isn't actually that big a problem, although in the longer run they'll want to go to a unified gauge.

Wait, which Conspiracy Theory?
The various ones to do with Rudolf Hess...

Could the Entente do the reverse of the flooding? Block the IJssel where it splits off from the Rhine Delta as a distributary? (Though the question is why didn't the *Germans* do it to make taking Amsterdam easier)
Realistically, no - it's a massive civil engineering job, and not one you'd want to do in a hurry and potentially under fire.

For the German troops its probably worse. 10km back from the lines it’s the beaten zone for entente arty, 4km say for mortars and MGs. Based on WW1 performance each german army will be losing a regiment a day just bringing up the rations. No AFV to run the last mile at speed. No air cover to keep the spotter planes away. Three rounds from you own guns and they know the CB fire is in the air. Worse for civilian populations if the entente deliberately interdict a particular zone.
Without transport all your ammunition has to come up by hand, and if you change positions it all has to be moved by hand. It take 10-12 hours to dig in a big gun so right now you are in the open during daylight or not moving. The Entente can read a map too they know where the AT guns should be.
I think you're a little pessimistic there - the Germans showed a remarkable ability in OTL to keep fighting under exceptionally difficult circumstances.

The British ( certainly maybe French) practice was to put together a series of divisional and corps level attacks in quick succession to drag german reserves in to a killing zone ( this is 1918 and ww2 btw) unless they are positively ordered to cease all offensive action – which aint going to happen, this is what they wlll do naturally. But its going to be a reinforced mechanised unit with tanks in the lead hitting what is mostly paper this defences with an army of fast powerful mechanised units behind travelling across the the densest road network in the world. Unless a mobile reserve can come up the attack will be 5=10km behind the MLR before Brooke much less OKH understands what’s happening. And the mobile reserve, if it moves within 400mile of the front it’s the target for Entente air forces. By the time it limps its way to its jump off point it will be facing a gunline dug in bore sighted and with the main logistics problem being replacing the barrels after they have been fired smooth ( aka the story of the panzerwaffe in the west 1942-45)
Problem is one of supplies - the road network may be good, but they're an awfully long way from their supply ports and their line of communications is over ground they've recently fought over. Much the same situation as the British and Americans were in late 1944 - they're really struggling to get the petrol and bullets up to the front line to keep attacking, so the orders will go out to hold in place. This is why shifting the BEF to the Netherlands is so critical - it gives them the ability to move another 100 miles or so forwards, but at the same time they're going to want to make sure they've got the manpower in place to shatter the German line rather than have a series of slow, bloody and inconclusive battles before they do anything.

The Allies don’t need to make a deep penetration, just a series of short ones that shatter the linear front, if the germans move from their current positions they do so at walking pace with what they can pull or carry on their backs, and lose their communication for the most part. The only way they can feed themselves is to take it from the local civilian population. At this point the army becomes a mob moving east into the guns of the allied armour already behind them.
Agreed - but if you can't bring up enough petrol for the tanks to drive forward, or enough shells for the counterbattery you need then the Germans have a soluble problem. Sort the logistics and it becomes an insoluble one.
 
Agree, mostly - they're less a defensive barrier and more a way of limiting the mobility of the Entente forces. The defensive lines were built to take advantage of the terrain though, and that often works both ways (swamps, rivers, etc.).

There are precious few advantages in the Dutch terrain though. What little there is only works to some extent in conjunction with inundations and only in a certain direction.

Grebbelinie_the_Netherlands.jpg


Here is the Grebbeline. The Grebbeberg is in the middle and is more like a hill. The Utrechtse Heuvelrug is a wooded and hilly area. Not much of a defensive position but helped by the inundations to the east. Now this provided the Germans with somewhat of a obstacle in OTL 1940. This time the Dutch/Allies will come from the west though. They will not be hampered much by the Utrechtse Heuvelrug or the Grebbeberg. Once they are past that there are the inundations. With the locks on the western side. It's like the Germans close the door with the key on the outside.
 
To divert the route of the IJssel you would need to dam it. I don't think air dropped bombs would be very usefull :)
As I said, they could be if you actually had a decent amount of rock in cliffs on each side of the river that could fall, I don't think that's true here...
 
Agree, mostly - they're less a defensive barrier and more a way of limiting the mobility of the Entente forces. The defensive lines were built to take advantage of the terrain though, and that often works both ways (swamps, rivers, etc.).

Unlikely - the reduced temperatures probably aren't going to lead to much more snow.


That isn't the reason for the dual tracking - it means you can cross-load between wagons at a large yard with lots of workers available, rather than being forced to change bogies or cross-load at a small town on the border. Given the way railway systems worked at the time, this isn't actually that big a problem, although in the longer run they'll want to go to a unified gauge.

Realistically, no - it's a massive civil engineering job, and not one you'd want to do in a hurry and potentially under fire.


I think you're a little pessimistic there - the Germans showed a remarkable ability in OTL to keep fighting under exceptionally difficult circumstances.


Problem is one of supplies - the road network may be good, but they're an awfully long way from their supply ports and their line of communications is over ground they've recently fought over. Much the same situation as the British and Americans were in late 1944 - they're really struggling to get the petrol and bullets up to the front line to keep attacking, so the orders will go out to hold in place. This is why shifting the BEF to the Netherlands is so critical - it gives them the ability to move another 100 miles or so forwards, but at the same time they're going to want to make sure they've got the manpower in place to shatter the German line rather than have a series of slow, bloody and inconclusive battles before they do anything.


Agreed - but if you can't bring up enough petrol for the tanks to drive forward, or enough shells for the counterbattery you need then the Germans have a soluble problem. Sort the logistics and it becomes an insoluble one.
The Netherlands aren't quite as easy to go through as Poland...

Still, Extreme Cold causes its own problems with rails.

Ah, So where in Finland is that large yard?

My guess is that the original connection from the Rhine Delta to the Ijssel was under fire when the Romans created it, but spear or arrow fire. :)

And at this point, the question is whether your average German will be in better shape on January 1, 1941 than he/she was on January 1, 1918...
 
Ah, So where in Finland is that large yard?

I understand the dual tracking on the Finnish side was built between Haaparanta and Oulu. Given that Oulu, a port town of decent size, is something of a hub where the western and the eastern rail lines going south meet, Oulu or the town's vicinity could the best place for such a large yard. Another one could be built in Kemi, also a port town, closer to the border. Oulu is 130 km from the border, Kemi 30 km.
 
That's more or less what I had in mind - not even building special yards, actually, but relying on the fact that towns of that size and on the railway network will have a decent sized marshalling yard anyway. If you really need to you can pull in a large number of civilian workers to carry out the stevedoring work at short notice and with little training. Same thing on the Swedish side, where I picked Boden for similar reasons.
 
I understand the dual tracking on the Finnish side was built between Haaparanta and Oulu. Given that Oulu, a port town of decent size, is something of a hub where the western and the eastern rail lines going south meet, Oulu or the town's vicinity could the best place for such a large yard. Another one could be built in Kemi, also a port town, closer to the border. Oulu is 130 km from the border, Kemi 30 km.
So this is basically an situation that was handled later iOTL, and likely to create the same results earlier...
 
So this is basically an situation that was handled later iOTL, and likely to create the same results earlier...

Could you clarify this? The situation ITTL is not comparable to the OTL because such a high-capacity trail link as ITTL was never built between Finland and Sweden, the OTL route across the border has been single track (and dual gauge only for 4 km or so) since it was first built. IOTL, cross-loading is done at Haaparanta/Haparanda at the border, and it is still considered an issue in 2016.
 
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