A Blunted Sickle - Thread II

So the downfall begins. Is there any chance of the Western European snow getting deep enough to cause trouble this winter?
Very likely deep. In January and February 1942 even UK was hit by lot of snowstorms and accumulation of snow. Some areas got in January foor of snow. Temperatures around 7 F.

I didn’t find data for Germany regarding snow but it was -30 C in Munich in January.

I didn’t find exact records for Slovakia but January and February 1942 is recorded in local chroniclas as winter with unusually high amount of snow.
 
So what is the legal and institutional framework for war crimes trials ITTL going to be?

More broadly, I wonder what will be the future of internationalism. I have the feeling that OTL, the whole UN system, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, stemmed from WWII and from US involvement.

Without this, will we see a League of Nations 2.0, a different United Nations through other channels, or something different?
 
More broadly, I wonder what will be the future of internationalism. I have the feeling that OTL, the whole UN system, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, stemmed from WWII and from US involvement.

Without this, will we see a League of Nations 2.0, a different United Nations through other channels, or something different?
The league of Nations is too discredited to be the basis of a new institution and with an isolationist US the OTL United Nations will not form. So you are looking at an Entente led structure that will be more favorable to empires than OTL ( although the writing will have been seen on the walls ) and less reaching in scope ( only touching on Entente interests rather than the whole world ). Key change is that America will have nothing to do with it short of reiterating the Monroe doctrine.
 
I have the feeling that OTL, the whole UN system, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, stemmed from WWII and from US involvement.
The UN system, definitely from US involvement, and it was both ambitious and cynical enough to work. The OTL's UDHR has strong influence from René Cassin's team, though (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Drafting_of_the_Universal_Declaration_of_Human_Rights), and without a) the US involvement and b) the Occupation experience - all the war crimes, the full-fledged Holocaust, etc. - it doesn't seem likely that such an universalist endeavour would be undertaken. One of the big causes of it was the growing realization that it was not a "German issue" but something bigger, much bigger, that had to be deal with before it took root elsewhere. In this TL? It's a German issue, the old values are preserved, etc., etc.
 

Decius00009

Banned
Some Germans will.come out of this shitshow far better than OTL - Doenitz, for example, probably won't even face a trial, nor most likely would Raeder. Speer might, but he hadn't been up to a hell of a lot at this stage and the Todt organisation has hardly had a chance to ramp up. Hess - probably. He's as guilty of whatever it was of which he was guilty here as OTL but, as PDF pointed out, conspiracy to wage aggressive war will probably not even be considered; historically, France waged a metric fucktonne of aggressive wars, far more than any other European nation. Though I would argue Bonaparte was more defensive than aggressive; the Bourbons were the real aggressors. Interestingly, also, the French judge at Nuremberg didn't like hanging some of those sentenced to death, he wanted some of them shot as soldiers instead.
 
There is also that accusing a military officer of “planning to wage war” in any way is ridiculous. Keitl & Jodl has a huge amount of blood on their hands (Commissar order, mistreatment of Soviet POWs and civilians leading to millions of deaths, Wehrmacht involvement in the holocaust, etc.) but that charge has always struck me as particularly ridiculous.
 
It's been a commonplace here that ITTL the breakup of the great colonial empires will slow down relative to OTL because the Entente nations will be less exhausted after the war and under less pressure from the U.S. to decolonize.

It occurred to me this morning that there is direct evidence for this proposition: the Portuguese Empire. The Portuguese weren't belligerents in WWII, never came under serious American pressure, and their colonial period didn't end until 1975. This suggests that larger, wealthier colonial powers such as ITTL England and France could, if the will were present, hold on to their Imperial systems even longer than that.

But thinking about it further I now consider 30-40 more years before imperialism becomes unviable to be an underestimate. Why? Because there was another major factor in OTL imperial crackups - Communist agitprop and Soviet material support. The OTL Soviets expended substantial effort over generations (Patrice Lumumba University, anyone?) to train anti-colonial revolutionaries and terrorists, many of whom became leading figures in pro-Soviet post-Colonial governments. And all those AK-47s did not spontaneously generate in the local soil.

For several reasons already discussed here, the ITTL post-war Soviets will have less prestige and less ability to influence the world outside their borders than in OTL. There will have been no "Uncle Joe" propaganda to soften Western opposition to communism. Communist movements are unlikely to ever successfully position themselves as "anti-fascists". The Cold War will be harder, with Western governments making more effort to root out not only Soviet spies but Soviet agents of influence. As a consequence of the latter, there will be a lot fewer apologias for Communist insurgencies uttered.

In this political environment, I think decolonization will slow down substantially even relative to the OTL Portuguese example. Not everywhere - I can't see the timetable for Canadian and Australian independence changing by much because those were already mature civil societies at PoD; correspondingly, Communist influence on their exit from the British imperial system was nil. Nor were the Communists much of a factor in the Indian independence movement.

But elsewhere? If think the postwar history of Africa and Indochina in particular will look very, very different. I can easily see direct imperial rule by the British, French, Dutch, and Portuguese persisting into the 1990s, perhaps even past century's end. Yes, eventually peaceful pressure from nascent civil societies in the colonies will tell (likely sooner in Asia than in Africa). But it could be a long time coming.

And maybe that'd be a good thing. I suspect that with more time to build institutions and a larger middle class, we'd see fewer post-colonial regimes collapsing into tribalism and thug politics. The association from "third world" to "shithole" might not become so automatic. Or, at least, that we might have fewer Zimbabwes and more Mexicos.
 
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Probably not that bad - take their weapons of them, put them on a road and drive a tank over them, then tell them to behave themselves or you'll be back.


  1. 1st and 4th Armies are the main offensive units, 2nd and 3rd are less so (geography, mostly). Between them they should be more than capable of flank defence and line of communications duties.
  2. British are moving a hell of a lot faster than everyone else in the battle so far - on the French are capable of keeping up. Benefits of being 100% motorised...
  3. Taking it, not a problem. What they do with it afterwards, that <<might>> be a problem.
  4. Knowing that come Boxing Day it's their turn, and by the way they're tasked with the encirclement and destruction of two army groups, while the British and Dutch together are only taking on one?
  5. Only in Goering's mind. Privately, policy has been Finis Germaniae without the Morgenthau plan for some time now.
  6. They do, but they aren't as big - it's more about making a point and perhaps throwing a spanner in the works of Soviet preparations than any real expectation that they can succeed. As soon as the Red Army gets involved it's game over and they'll try to get away.

Misread the first, thought that the second them was also referring to the surrendering soldiers, and that the tanks were driving over the soldiers and then telling the soldiers to behave. :)

The Dutch will *try* to keep up, but I expect them to eventually fail, the question in my mind is are the Dutch able to get to Hamburg before the British have to be the driver on the coastline. I expect that the Dutch will end up taking the Frisians, it is finally time for them to do so. Not sure who ends up attacking Helgoland.

As you said, the Hungarians want to have Vienna so they can trade for better borders, the question is with who? Yugoslavia or Romania?

Well, it won't be boxing day for the French. :) The question is whether the French efforts would be viewed as a failure if the Germans manage to extract/retreat half of their forces entirely behind the Rhine.

Looking forward in this TL, I think we have a better feeling for when the British can reach Berlin than we do as to when the Soviets can put together an attack into Poland.
 
The question is whether the French efforts would be viewed as a failure if the Germans manage to extract/retreat half of their forces entirely behind the Rhine.

I don't see how the Germans can do that well. How are you gonna outrun a DLM on foot and tied to horse transport?

As hollowed out as those formations have to be by now I'm expecting them to pretty much disintegrate when the French hit.
 
1) We appear to have something *approaching* a line without salients for the first time in quite a few weeks.
2) The Germans have *got* to shift troops north. With current British plans, the Entente is going to outnumber the Germans in the Netherlands north of the Rhine by 5 to 1 or better. If they don't, they are going to have the Australians call in from Hamburg bars asking whether they should stop or keep going.
3) In regards to Polish/Czech revolts this winter, I'm quite sure the Entente have identified the bribable Hungarian and Slovak border guards. And in addition to revolts Polish and Czech revolts, the Slovak Republic needs to be watched as well, I'm quite sure that Hitler will put the squeeze in for food on the Slovaks. I doubt that Tiso will end up looking much better iTTL than @.
4) Admiral Horthy, will have a lot more leverage than he did iTTL...
I'd just like to say that I posted this just after the German surrender of Brussels.

#4 has definitely been shown to be true,
#3 is currently in the process of happening (and we'll see for the Slovaks)
#2 would only be true if the Australians are in the farthest north of the British Armies. (I don't expect the Dutch to take Hamburg by themselves, the northernmost British Army is almost certainly going to be involved.) The only inaccuracy is that the Australians would have already been told to keep going, so I expect a joint Dutch Army British Army attack would take the city, but the Dutch would be responsible for Occupation troops (with the northernmost British Army heading for the Kiel Canal and Denmark.
and
#1 and now the British are going for the ultimate Salient...

(and yes, I have sprained by shoulder patting myself on the back. :) )
 
As you said, the Hungarians want to have Vienna so they can trade for better borders, the question is with who? Yugoslavia or Romania?.
IMHO neither. Romanian and Yugoslavian borders are as they were before Sperember 1939. No 2nd Vienna award (or was there in TTL) and no attack on Yugoslavia.

IMHO Hungarians want to have something to be able negotiate post war Czechoslovak border.

In Vienna award 1938 they gained also territory with clearly Slovak majority and in March they first occupied Ruthenia - territory with Ruthenian majority and afterwards started military campaign in Eastern Slovakia where they gained territory with population 20000. Basically non of them Hungarian.

Czechoslovakia is on winning side and may have promise from Paris and London to restore its 1938 borders.
Budapest would clearly want to keep all their gains but if not all at least areas with Hungarian majority. Which, IMHO they may even be able to.

Kind of shame. Probably I wouldn’t be born in TTL as my father was from Slovak/Ruthenian family which lived in Kosice at that time after 1938 Hungarian Kassa and mother was from Slovak territory in the east which was fought over in March war 1939 with Hungary but stayed Slovak. Little chance they will meet. ;)
 
I don't see how the Germans can do that well. How are you gonna outrun a DLM on foot and tied to horse transport?

As hollowed out as those formations have to be by now I'm expecting them to pretty much disintegrate when the French hit.
Eh, the Germans managed it in september 1944 OTL on the Western Front, simply running faster than the fuel supplies.

It's just that it required the running units to desintegrate to accomplish it.
 
It's been a commonplace here that ITTL the breakup of the great colonial empires will slow down relative to OTL because the Entente nations will be less exhausted after the war and under less pressure from the U.S. to decolonize.

It occurred to me this morning that there is direct evidence for this proposition: the Portuguese Empire. The Portuguese weren't belligerents in WWII, never came under serious American pressure, and their colonial period didn't end until 1975. This suggests that larger, wealthier colonial powers such as ITTL England and France could, if the will were present, hold on to their Imperial systems even longer than that.

But thinking about it further I now consider 30-40 more years before imperialism becomes unviable to be an underestimate. Why? Because there was another major factor in OTL imperial crackups - Communist agitprop and Soviet material support. The OTL Soviets expended substantial effort over generations (Patrice Lumumba University, anyone?) to train anti-colonial revolutionaries and terrorists, many of whom became leading figures in pro-Soviet post-Colonial governments.

For several reasons already discussed here, the ITTL post-war Soviets will have less prestige and less ability to influence the world outside their borders than in OTL. There will have been no "Uncle Joe" propaganda to soften Western opposition to communism. Communist movements are unlikely to ever successfully position themselves as "anti-fascists". The Cold War will be harder, with Western governments making more effort to root out not only Soviet spies but Soviet agents of influence. As a consequence of the latter, there will be a lot fewer apologias for Communist insurgencies uttered.

In this political environment, I think decolonization will slow down substantially even relative to the OTL Portuguese example. Not everywhere - I can't see the timetable for Canadian and Australian independence changing by much because those were already mature civil societies at PoD; correspondingly, Communist influence on their exit from the British imperial system was nil. Nor were the Communists much of a factor in the Indian independence movement.

But elsewhere? If think the postwar history of Africa and Indochina in particular will look very, very different. I can easily see direct imperial rule by the British, French, Dutch, and Portuguese persisting into the 1990s, perhaps even past century's end. Yes, eventually peaceful pressure from nascent civil societies in the colonies will tell (likely sooner in Asia than in Africa). But it could be a long time coming.

And maybe that'd be a good thing. I suspect that with more time to build institutions and a larger middle class, we'd see fewer post-colonial regimes collapsing into tribalism and thug politics. The association from "third world" to "shithole" might not become so automatic. Or, at least, that we might have fewer Zimbabwes and more Mexicos.

Viewing the race from Empire as being primarily about Communist agitprop and American pressure is a bit of a misunderstanding.

As you brush against in passing, India's independence is a done deal before the PoD. The exact form of it, and the detailed timing, are going to be active points of debate both in India and in London, but within a few years India will be independent.
The white Dominions are already - though closely linked to the UK - officially able to legislate for themselves, with the exception of NZ which has not accepted the Statute of Westminster.
Don't expect Sri Lanka or Burma to stay in the Empire much longer than India.
Malaya and Singapore may be more interesting cases, at least for a while, but this will be partly due to the Japanese threat - how that is resolved will affect their feelings about independence, I think.

As for the vast swathe of African territories of Empire - assuming that Britain hangs onto them for much longer than OTL, why would the UK invest significantly more into the development of institutions and civil society in those colonial territories? Not something imperial powers typically do, especially when they're actively occupying Germany and staring down the Bear (without US help, this time!) as well as facing off against Japan and trying to develop the home country.

As for your comparison with the Portuguese - in order to hang on until the 1970s, they were paying a heavy price in military crackdowns on insurgent movements. Not something for which there will be a huge amount of appetite (or scope!) in the UK TTL. This has been a shorter, sharper war than OTL, so while there are likely to be fewer war casualties over all it's still going to be a shock to the system which will affect willingness to engage in military interventions, especially if National Service lasts longer (though it may not as UK anti-Soviet defence policy cycles into being primarily nuclear)
 
Viewing the race from Empire as being primarily about Communist agitprop and American pressure is a bit of a misunderstanding.

That's not my contention, but I think does almost simplify to colonial-power exhaustion plus those two factors in places where there's little middle class, no well-developed civil society, and European institutions have not really rooted (all three of these being strongly correlated).

why would the UK invest significantly more into the development of institutions and civil society in those colonial territories?

For the same reasons they did it everywhere else, whatever those were. Really it seems to have become rather a habit with the Brits.
 
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I doubt that Tiso will end up looking much better iTTL than @.

#3 is currently in the process of happening (and we'll see for the Slovaks)
Funny yesterday I was reading article about Salzburg agreement (Germany-Slovakia) from summer 1940. After Fall of France Germany started to put pressure on Slovakia as well as Tiso - which was in their eyes not to radical, not wnough pro Nazi. They were thinking even get rid of him but eventually pushed for change in Ministry of Foreign affairs as well as some other ministries. Tuka’s pro Nazi wing gained more power on another side Tiso lost some. Also anti Jewish laws were tightened at that time. Germany thought Slovakia and Tiso are doing independent foreign policy and they were saying Slovak are acting as Great Power. :D
It is possible with Germans doing much much worst in TTL they just do not have time to deal with Slovaks and with internal political chaos in Germany Tiso just may get through to December 1941. As a POD it is as good as any other if not better.

But really this decision is on author.
 
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