The Expeditionary Force of our time line was, in 1909, provided with two "headquarters of an army (group of two or more divisions.)" Each "army" differed from French or German army corps in several ways.
- The composition of a French or German army corps was fixed. That of an "army" of the Expeditionary Force was flexible, and might even include a cavalry division or cavalry brigade.
- A German army corps possessed a battalion of heavy field howitzers (150mm.) An "army" of the Expeditionary Force had no heavy artillery other than the heavy batteries of any infantry division that might be assigned to it.
- A French or German army corps were very much involved in both logistics and administration. An "army" of the Expeditionary Force was chiefly concerned with the operational employment of formations assigned to it.
In our time line, the chief reason for the flexible structure of the "armies" of the Expeditionary Force seems to have been the possibility that the Expeditionary Force might be employed in South Africa, in India, or to reinforce the Belgian garrison of Antwerp. Thus, one point of departure for the creation of permanent army corps headquarters (on a Continental pattern) for the Expeditionary Force would be a finding that the definitive task of the Expeditionary Force was to be close cooperation with French Army.
In our time line, the mobilization plan in force in 1914 included a provision for the expansion of the three siege companies of the Royal Garrison Artillery then serving "at home" into six mobile siege batteries. (These were classified as "units which may be required with, but do not normally form part of, the Expeditionary Force.") Four of these units (classed as "medium siege batteries") were to be armed with 6-inch howitzers and two ("heavy siege batteries") with the 9.2-inch howitzers then being developed.
A decision to optimize the Expeditionary Force for close cooperation with the French Army might have led to a program to postpone development of the 9.2-inch howitzer and use the money saved to modernize (with an up-to-date on-carriage recoil system) two dozen or so 6-inch howitzers, which would be used to convert the six mobile siege batteries into an equal number of heavy field howitzer batteries. Thus, the corps artillery of each of the three army corps of the Expeditionary Force would consist of two batteries of heavy guns (new 60-pounder guns) and two batteries of heavy field howitzers (modernized 6-inch howitzers).
In our time line, the Master General of the Ordnance, Sir Stanley B. Von Donop, was an enthusiastic advocate of the use of 6-inch howitzers, which had been designed as "light siege howitzers", as "heavy field howitzers." Indeed, he succeed in convincing the relevant authorities to include two batteries of 6-inch howitzers, mounted on traveling carriages, in the army maneuvers of 1912. However, when setting priorities for development, he placed the building of new 9.2-inch howitzers ahead of the modernization of existing 6-inch howitzers.
At le Cateau, two batteries (for a total of eight pieces) of 6-inch howitzers would, in all likelihood, have provided sufficient counter-battery fire to mitigate the disaster that resulted from the decision to employ the field guns of the 5th Division in direct-fire mode.