A Bigger B.E.F in 1914 what changes?

The British were a naval nation and big armies are just not cricket.
A large Army on the continental model would have meant peacetime conscription, an unprecedented step. The Germans and A-H were trying to provoke this in the RN by making the Conscript HSF large enough that the British would run out of volunteer naval personnel.
 
I think the lack of money was less an economy thing and more of a reflection of social and political ideas about the army. In its own way it might be like the German army staying small to keep the officer corps aristocratic and therefore politically sound. The British were a naval nation and big armies are just not cricket.

That's it in a nutshell basically, the only addition I would make is that Liberal's in particular were more concerned with social issues and wanted to push government spending in that direction.
 
That's it in a nutshell basically, the only addition I would make is that Liberal's in particular were more concerned with social issues and wanted to push government spending in that direction.

There is the possability that the Irish Crisis blows up earlier and ends up resulting in the build-up of a larger British home army, but that creates so many butterflies...
 
I think this talk of expanding the British Army, possibly with conscription or possibly with changing conditions of service for Regulars and obligations of Territorials is a touch premature when the British Government didn't send 2 of its 6 infantry divisions, 1 of its 5 cavalry Brigades and none of its 6 Siege artillery 6" howitzer batteries.

Leaving aside my thoughts that the Army should have formed Corps in peacetime and placed the RGA Heavy (60pdr) and Siege (6" Howizter) artillery batteries under Corps command, what PoD gets the 2 extra infantry divisions, 1 extra cavalry brigade and 6 seige artillery batteries deployed to France in the first wave and on the line in time for Mons?

If such a PoD can be found what happens at Mons and le Cateau?
 
The Expeditionary Force of our time line was, in 1909, provided with two "headquarters of an army (group of two or more divisions.)" Each "army" differed from French or German army corps in several ways.

  1. The composition of a French or German army corps was fixed. That of an "army" of the Expeditionary Force was flexible, and might even include a cavalry division or cavalry brigade.
  2. A German army corps possessed a battalion of heavy field howitzers (150mm.) An "army" of the Expeditionary Force had no heavy artillery other than the heavy batteries of any infantry division that might be assigned to it.
  3. A French or German army corps were very much involved in both logistics and administration. An "army" of the Expeditionary Force was chiefly concerned with the operational employment of formations assigned to it.
In our time line, the chief reason for the flexible structure of the "armies" of the Expeditionary Force seems to have been the possibility that the Expeditionary Force might be employed in South Africa, in India, or to reinforce the Belgian garrison of Antwerp. Thus, one point of departure for the creation of permanent army corps headquarters (on a Continental pattern) for the Expeditionary Force would be a finding that the definitive task of the Expeditionary Force was to be close cooperation with French Army.

In our time line, the mobilization plan in force in 1914 included a provision for the expansion of the three siege companies of the Royal Garrison Artillery then serving "at home" into six mobile siege batteries. (These were classified as "units which may be required with, but do not normally form part of, the Expeditionary Force.") Four of these units (classed as "medium siege batteries") were to be armed with 6-inch howitzers and two ("heavy siege batteries") with the 9.2-inch howitzers then being developed.

A decision to optimize the Expeditionary Force for close cooperation with the French Army might have led to a program to postpone development of the 9.2-inch howitzer and use the money saved to modernize (with an up-to-date on-carriage recoil system) two dozen or so 6-inch howitzers, which would be used to convert the six mobile siege batteries into an equal number of heavy field howitzer batteries. Thus, the corps artillery of each of the three army corps of the Expeditionary Force would consist of two batteries of heavy guns (new 60-pounder guns) and two batteries of heavy field howitzers (modernized 6-inch howitzers).

In our time line, the Master General of the Ordnance, Sir Stanley B. Von Donop, was an enthusiastic advocate of the use of 6-inch howitzers, which had been designed as "light siege howitzers", as "heavy field howitzers." Indeed, he succeed in convincing the relevant authorities to include two batteries of 6-inch howitzers, mounted on traveling carriages, in the army maneuvers of 1912. However, when setting priorities for development, he placed the building of new 9.2-inch howitzers ahead of the modernization of existing 6-inch howitzers.

At le Cateau, two batteries (for a total of eight pieces) of 6-inch howitzers would, in all likelihood, have provided sufficient counter-battery fire to mitigate the disaster that resulted from the decision to employ the field guns of the 5th Division in direct-fire mode.
 
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In our time line, the Army Council decided to delay the despatch of a significant portion of the Expeditionary Force because it lacked sufficient confidence in the ability of the Territorial Force to deal with German landing forces. Thus, the key to getting the entirety of the Expeditionary Force to France in time for the battle of Mons is a significant improvement in the capabilities of the Territorial Force.

One way to do this would be the designation of several formations of the Territorial Force (two or three divisions and an equal number of mounted brigades) as "fully ready upon mobilization" formations. To this end, they units in these formations would do much more in the way of training than ordinary Territorial Force units. This, in turn, would have required the finding of additional funds to pay for this training, as well as legislation to protect the jobs of men who would be called away from factories, shops, farms, and offices for these exercises.

Another, more radical, solution would have been the raising of experimental reaction units that would be equipped with motor vehicles, large numbers of machine guns, and automatic rifles (whether Lewis guns or Madsens.) Finding enthusiasts to raise these units would, in all likelihood, be relatively easy. (HG Wells could have taken the lead in publicizing the effort.) However, convincing the Army Council that such goggle-wearing amateurs were up to the task of dealing with German landing forces until the local Territorial Force formations could be organized, is another question.
 
The Expeditionary Force of our time line was, in 1909, provided with two "headquarters of an army (group of two or more divisions.)" Each "army" differed from French or German army corps in several ways.

  1. The composition of a French or German army corps was fixed. That of an "army" of the Expeditionary Force was flexible, and might even include a cavalry division or cavalry brigade.
  2. A German army corps possessed a battalion of heavy field howitzers (150mm.) An "army" of the Expeditionary Force had no heavy artillery other than the heavy batteries of any infantry division that might be assigned to it.
  3. A French or German army corps were very much involved in both logistics and administration. An "army" of the Expeditionary Force was chiefly concerned with the operational employment of formations assigned to it.
In our time line, the chief reason for the flexible structure of the "armies" of the Expeditionary Force seems to have been the possibility that the Expeditionary Force might be employed in South Africa, in India, or to reinforce the Belgian garrison of Antwerp. Thus, one point of departure for the creation of permanent army corps headquarters (on a Continental pattern) for the Expeditionary Force would be a finding that the definitive task of the Expeditionary Force was to be close cooperation with French Army.

In our time line, the mobilization plan in force in 1914 included a provision for the expansion of the three siege companies of the Royal Garrison Artillery then serving "at home" into six mobile siege batteries. (These were classified as "units which may be required with, but do not normally form part of, the Expeditionary Force.") Four of these units (classed as "medium siege batteries") were to be armed with 6-inch howitzers and two ("heavy siege batteries") with the 9.2-inch howitzers then being developed.

A decision to optimize the Expeditionary Force for close cooperation with the French Army might have led to a program to postpone development of the 9.2-inch howitzer and use the money saved to modernize (with an up-to-date on-carriage recoil system) two dozen or so 6-inch howitzers, which would be used to convert the six mobile siege batteries into an equal number of heavy field howitzer batteries. Thus, the corps artillery of each of the three army corps of the Expeditionary Force would consist of two batteries of heavy guns (new 60-pounder guns) and two batteries of heavy field howitzers (modernized 6-inch howitzers).

In our time line, the Master General of the Ordnance, Sir Stanley B. Von Donop, was an enthusiastic advocate of the use of 6-inch howitzers, which had been designed as "light siege howitzers", as "heavy field howitzers." Indeed, he succeed in convincing the relevant authorities to include two batteries of 6-inch howitzers, mounted on traveling carriages, in the army maneuvers of 1912. However, when setting priorities for development, he placed the building of new 9.2-inch howitzers ahead of the modernization of existing 6-inch howitzers.

At le Cateau, two batteries (for a total of eight pieces) of 6-inch howitzers would, in all likelihood, have provided sufficient counter-battery fire to mitigate the disaster that resulted from the decision to employ the field guns of the 5th Division in direct-fire mode.

How did the 2 HQs pan out when war started? I assume 1 was GHQ of the BEF, was the other a corps HQ or perhaps split to form 2 Corps HQ? Given the 2 HQs if the British did send all 6 infantry divisions they might keep 2 Corps each with 3 divisions.

6 batteries of 6" howitzers were sent to France in September and October, so they changed their minds about not sending them pretty quickly.
 
In our time line, the Army Council decided to delay the despatch of a significant portion of the Expeditionary Force because it lacked sufficient confidence in the ability of the Territorial Force to deal with German landing forces. Thus, the key to getting the entirety of the Expeditionary Force to France in time for the battle of Mons is a significant improvement in the capabilities of the Territorial Force.

One way to do this would be the designation of several formations of the Territorial Force (two or three divisions and an equal number of mounted brigades) as "fully ready upon mobilization" formations. To this end, they units in these formations would do much more in the way of training than ordinary Territorial Force units. This, in turn, would have required the finding of additional funds to pay for this training, as well as legislation to protect the jobs of men who would be called away from factories, shops, farms, and offices for these exercises.

Another, more radical, solution would have been the raising of experimental reaction units that would be equipped with motor vehicles, large numbers of machine guns, and automatic rifles (whether Lewis guns or Madsens.) Finding enthusiasts to raise these units would, in all likelihood, be relatively easy. (HG Wells could have taken the lead in publicizing the effort.) However, convincing the Army Council that such goggle-wearing amateurs were up to the task of dealing with German landing forces until the local Territorial Force formations could be organized, is another question.

They changed their minds about the priorities pretty quickly, they sent 4th division on August 30 and 6th division September 8.
 
The Expeditionary Force of our time line was, in 1909, provided with two "headquarters of an army (group of two or more divisions.)" Each "army" differed from French or German army corps in several ways.

  1. The composition of a French or German army corps was fixed. That of an "army" of the Expeditionary Force was flexible, and might even include a cavalry division or cavalry brigade.
  2. A German army corps possessed a battalion of heavy field howitzers (150mm.) An "army" of the Expeditionary Force had no heavy artillery other than the heavy batteries of any infantry division that might be assigned to it.
  3. A French or German army corps were very much involved in both logistics and administration. An "army" of the Expeditionary Force was chiefly concerned with the operational employment of formations assigned to it.
In our time line, the chief reason for the flexible structure of the "armies" of the Expeditionary Force seems to have been the possibility that the Expeditionary Force might be employed in South Africa, in India, or to reinforce the Belgian garrison of Antwerp. Thus, one point of departure for the creation of permanent army corps headquarters (on a Continental pattern) for the Expeditionary Force would be a finding that the definitive task of the Expeditionary Force was to be close cooperation with French Army.

In our time line, the mobilization plan in force in 1914 included a provision for the expansion of the three siege companies of the Royal Garrison Artillery then serving "at home" into six mobile siege batteries. (These were classified as "units which may be required with, but do not normally form part of, the Expeditionary Force.") Four of these units (classed as "medium siege batteries") were to be armed with 6-inch howitzers and two ("heavy siege batteries") with the 9.2-inch howitzers then being developed.

A decision to optimize the Expeditionary Force for close cooperation with the French Army might have led to a program to postpone development of the 9.2-inch howitzer and use the money saved to modernize (with an up-to-date on-carriage recoil system) two dozen or so 6-inch howitzers, which would be used to convert the six mobile siege batteries into an equal number of heavy field howitzer batteries. Thus, the corps artillery of each of the three army corps of the Expeditionary Force would consist of two batteries of heavy guns (new 60-pounder guns) and two batteries of heavy field howitzers (modernized 6-inch howitzers).

In our time line, the Master General of the Ordnance, Sir Stanley B. Von Donop, was an enthusiastic advocate of the use of 6-inch howitzers, which had been designed as "light siege howitzers", as "heavy field howitzers." Indeed, he succeed in convincing the relevant authorities to include two batteries of 6-inch howitzers, mounted on traveling carriages, in the army maneuvers of 1912. However, when setting priorities for development, he placed the building of new 9.2-inch howitzers ahead of the modernization of existing 6-inch howitzers.

At le Cateau, two batteries (for a total of eight pieces) of 6-inch howitzers would, in all likelihood, have provided sufficient counter-battery fire to mitigate the disaster that resulted from the decision to employ the field guns of the 5th Division in direct-fire mode.

One issue I see with this POD is the repercussions such a reform to the BEF would have geopolitically; namely in the perception of the German General Staff of British intentions and likely course of action in the event of a Continental war. If anything could put the final nail in the coffin on the plan to preemptive invade Belgium, it would be the existence of a militarily relevant, quickly deplorable BEF equip and organized for a large scale, conventional Continental war. Considering you'd need a POD a few years back at the very least in order to conduct the reorganization and expansion for material, training, and political palaitability purposes, you're also likely looking at a different initial German warplan that could make the immediate entering of the war problematic for the government involved (who, in pushing through the expansion, has likely spent a good deal of their political capital)
 
One issue I see with this POD is the repercussions such a reform to the BEF would have geopolitically; namely in the perception of the German General Staff of British intentions and likely course of action in the event of a Continental war. If anything could put the final nail in the coffin on the plan to preemptive invade Belgium, it would be the existence of a militarily relevant, quickly deplorable BEF equip and organized for a large scale, conventional Continental war. Considering you'd need a POD a few years back at the very least in order to conduct the reorganization and expansion for material, training, and political palaitability purposes, you're also likely looking at a different initial German warplan that could make the immediate entering of the war problematic for the government involved (who, in pushing through the expansion, has likely spent a good deal of their political capital)

I don't think it would have that much of an impact.

The Germans knew how big the British Regular Army was, and from 1912 when they expected British as a combatants would have planned on facing all 6 divisions plus the cavalry division and likely the 6" howitzers as well. The OP wanted 8 divisions, which is only 2 more than the Germans would have planned on meeting anyway.

If Britain doesn't change its recruitment policies then it will be stuck with the same manpower as it did IOTL, so to get the OPs 8 divisions it would have to use a couple of Territorial divisions, perhaps as @Hoplophile suggests a couple with more training and pre-volunteered to serve abroad. I doubt that if Germany wasn't deterred from attacking France through Belgium by 6 Regular Divisions adding a couple of Territorial divisions into the mix will change their minds.
 
How did the 2 HQs pan out when war started? I assume 1 was GHQ of the BEF, was the other a corps HQ or perhaps split to form 2 Corps HQ?

In our time line, the Expeditionary Force went to war with three headquarters for echelons above the level of divisions: a general headquarters for the Expeditionary Force as a whole and the two "army (group of two or more divisions)" headquarters. You can find a detailed description of these organizations here, in the on-line companion to Bruce Gudmundsson's British Expeditionary Force, 1914-1915. (Here is a direct link to the article in question.)


Given the 2 HQs if the British did send all 6 infantry divisions they might keep 2 Corps each with 3 divisions.

Early in 1914, a plan for the deployment of the Expeditionary Force to France placed the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Divisions under the 1st Army and the 4th, 5th, and 6th Divisions under the 2nd Army. (I presume that the cavalry formations would have been directly subordinated to the General Headquarters.) Please note, however, that this was an organization for deployment, not a plan for employment. Thus, once the Expeditionary Force was ashore in France, its general officer commanding would have been free to move divisions between the two army headquarters and, indeed, to keep one or more under his direct control.
 
In our time line, the Expeditionary Force went to war with three headquarters for echelons above the level of divisions: a general headquarters for the Expeditionary Force as a whole and the two "army (group of two or more divisions)" headquarters. You can find a detailed description of these organizations here, in the on-line companion to Bruce Gudmundsson's British Expeditionary Force, 1914-1915. (Here is a direct link to the article in question.)

Thanks for that, it will give me something to read.

Early in 1914, a plan for the deployment of the Expeditionary Force to France placed the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Divisions under the 1st Army and the 4th, 5th, and 6th Divisions under the 2nd Army. (I presume that the cavalry formations would have been directly subordinated to the General Headquarters.) Please note, however, that this was an organization for deployment, not a plan for employment. Thus, once the Expeditionary Force was ashore in France, its general officer commanding would have been free to move divisions between the two army headquarters and, indeed, to keep one or more under his direct control.

Although it's not strictly the OP's 8 divisions, but what would be the effect on the campaign with all 6 infantry divisions in 2 Army/Corps, 2 cavalry divisions and all 6 batteries of 6" 30cwt howitzers? You already mentioned how the field guns at Le Cateau were employed in direct fire mode and 6" howitzers could have mitigated against that, but what about if there were 3 divisions per Corps at Le Cateau and Mons? What other engagements would the 6" howitzers be useful? Would this larger force be pushed back quite so far and fast?
 
Here is a breakdown of the forces in both the actual battle of Mons and the one that, ceteris paribus, would have been fought with a "six and six" (all six divisions and six batteries of 6-inch howitzers) Expeditionary Force.

Formation: Battalions/Field Batteries/Heavy Batteries

German First Army: 168/132/64
Expeditionary Force (OTL): 48/48/4
Expeditionary Force (6x6): 72/72/12

In either scenario, the Expeditionary Force is overmatched by the German First Army. Thus, even if the Expeditionary Force is able to do greater damage to the German forces in contact, it would still be badly outnumbered once the second echelon of the First Army arrived on the battlefield.
 
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Here is a breakdown of the forces in both the actual battle of Mons and the one that, ceteris paribus, would have been fought with a "six and six" (all six divisions and six batteries of 6-inch howitzers) Expeditionary Force.

Formation: Battalions/Field Batteries/Heavy Batteries

German First Army: 168/132/64
Expeditionary Force (OTL): 48/48/4
Expeditionary Force (6x6): 72/72/12

In either scenario, the Expeditionary Force is overmatched by the German First Army. Thus, even if the Expeditionary Force is able to do greater damage to the German forces in contact, it would still be badly outnumbered once the second echelon of the First Army arrived on the battlefield.

No doubt the BEF is vastly overmatched by the 1st Army, but I'm thinking of the distance and time that the extra forces might gain/lose and the casualties that they might inflict/save, particularly by the Marne/Aisne. IOTL the 4 6" batteries were rushed to France to fight at the Aisne, but this expedient could be avoided if they were already in place for example.
 
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