11.
August 16 saw unpredictable weather, and therefore some rest for the aircrews (not for the ground crews, though).
For August 17, Kesselring issued orders to use the renewed British radar capability against itself.
Around 10:00, many small-sized bomber formations were detected again well in advance, again over Luftflotte 2's area, and followed on their progress. When they were over the Pas de Calais, the trackings seemed to close in, and they crossed the Channel as one wide cloud. To the operators and officers observing it, it seemed headed straight towards the center of London. When over the coast, it split suddenly, taking the operators by surprise; the attack on Dover was not intercepted at all, the one on Rye was tackled belatedly, only the fight over Dunkirk began with a good British interception.
These were level bombers, flying high, without many chances of mowing down an antenna; but, apart from the off chance of a lucky hit, these attacks softened up the defenses around the real targets and distracted the crewmen – as yet another unannounced wave of low-flying Bf 110s swooped in.
The mission had become very difficult and dangerous; even though the defenders were a bit shaken by the high-level attack, and taken by surprise, the targets still bristled with guns, there were balloons to dodge, and the dust raised by the level bombers' payload didn't make things easier. Even so, at a high price, the Zerstörers were successful and downed two antennas at Dover, putting it out of action for three days. Rye took some damage, but it would be back on line by the evening.
The Germans pressed their advantage, attacking into the breach. Many small raids were sent against the airfields, to confuse the enemy and to do some damage on their own, while the Stukas reappeared again in numbers with the large one, against Dunkirk. Their accuracy was telling, and this time the radar station took very heavy damage.
The only problem for the Germans was that, in order to achieve this new hole, they had once again expended more aircraft than they could afford… 3 Stukas, 8 Bf 110s, 11 level bombers and 6 Bf 109s were downed on this day alone, for the loss of 10 enemy fighters. The toll was light for Stukas because of the damage to the radar network and since the defenders were already committed to fend off many other raids.
The Germans kept pushing for two more days; casualties mounted on both sides. The British were now operating almost entirely from second-line airfields. The alarms were already late and inaccurate to start with, because of the degraded radar system; and the scrambled Squadrons now tended to arrive late or too low. The Luftwaffe was now often using feints: raids started on a course, seemingly headed on a given target, then halfway through the Channel or on the coast veered off to the real one.
On the other hand, the Germans now had range problems for their fighters, which they tried to counter with the drop tanks. However, they were eating through these stores faster than they expected. The fighter/bombers had to keep returning over the radar bases and the forward airfields, to make sure these places remained out of service, and the Bf 110s' numbers were really dwindling.
A noticeable success was achieved on a diversionary raid by Luftflotte 3; a junior officer made a mistake at the peripheral base of Exeter (#10 Group), and 7 Hurricanes were destroyed on the ground by a Bf 110 raid. The attackers arrived undetected, skimming the sea, and strafed the dispersal area. A Bofors battery had just been transferred from that airfield to the Poling radar station.
Meanwhile, on August 18, back in Germany, Hitler met with Keitel, von Brauchitsch, Raeder and Goering, who was enthusiastically optimist. He believed the air offensive to be on the verge of destroying the RAF, and said so; he added that it was possible the air defeat alone would bring the British to the negotiation table. Once unable to defend London from bombing, they were likely to try and cut their losses. Raeder also hoped so, because he was still very much worried about the Royal Navy. He did everything he could to prevent any naval operation, lamenting the barge fleet was not going to be ready before September 15, and that the window of opportunity for the invasion would be very short.
However, given Goering's rosy report, Hitler decided to go ahead with the preparations for Unternehmen Seelöwe. If the British would sue for peace just thanks to the Luftwaffe, so much the better; otherwise, the air superiority over the Channel and the coast was going to allow the invasion to get through, on September 15. The planning and preparations kicked into the highest gear.
On the same date, another combined twilight/night bombing took place, this time against the Hawker plants in Kingston. This time the British expected the second punch and put out most of the fires timely, and the damage done was only moderate. But the deliveries of Hurricanes would be delayed for a day of two anyway.
On the following day, only a few raids were launched; Kesselring was redeploying his assets. Luftflotte 2 got reinforcements from the other two; Luftflotte 5, in particular, was left almost only with coastal and recon aircraft. Luftflotte 3, apart from the transfers to Stumpff's command, sent in three small high-altitude conventional attacks against mixed targets (Tangmere, the radars of Poling and naval objectives in Portsmouth). There were only enough bombers in it to force the British to engage, but few enough that there were about 3.5 fighters per bomber. Damage to the ground targets was minimal, but Fighter Command's reaction was weak, belated, and costly – to the British fighters.
Sperrle complained with Berlin for the transfers, but his complaints were intercepted by Wever.
Also on August 19, the Kriegsmarine carried out its one exercise off Boulogne. Fifty barges were used, half of which powered and the other half towed. When they made a 90° turn towards the coast, a barge capsized and another lost its tow. When reaching the beach, the masters of the powered barges opened the gaps amongst them, fearing collisions. About half of the troops were unloaded within an hour of the first man ashore, another barge capsized, two failed to reach the shore, several did land but far away from the planned landing zone. The masters of three barges lost control while running aground, and their vessels ended up parallel to the beach line, which prevented the ramps from being lowered. This exercise was carried out over a short distance, with perfect weather and in broad daylight, and of course with no opposition. This was officially classed as a success. Privately, Raeder's case of cold feet got way worse.
That evening, another meeting took place, in Bentley Priory. Dowding received the visit of Air Marshal Newall, Chief of Air Staff, and Sir Archibald Sinclair, Under Secretary of the Air Ministry. Both visitors were worried about what was going on; the evidence seemed to be that Fighter Command was losing the battle, and Newall, in particular, made no mystery of the fact that his confidence in Dowding was decreasing. Several options were discussed. Trying to keep all airfields open seemed either impossible or at least very difficult, even taking into account the emergency measures already adopted to intensify the repair works. Withdrawing from the battle, redeploying the fighters to the North, and letting the Germans do what they wanted along the coast, would be suicidal: the core of the British aircraft industry, and other key factories, would be destroyed in a relatively short time. Then there was the currently adopted solution: trying to fend off all the enemy attacks while keeping most of the fighter force more to the North. In that way, the fighter force wasless vulnerable, but also way less effective, and the result seemed to evolve towards a seriously contested air space along the coast. This might become unsustainable, especially if and when the Germans launched a final offensive to accompany their dreaded invasion attempt.
But Dowding had a fourth policy to propose... late that night, the visitors left, their faith in Fighter Command restored.
August 16 saw unpredictable weather, and therefore some rest for the aircrews (not for the ground crews, though).
For August 17, Kesselring issued orders to use the renewed British radar capability against itself.
Around 10:00, many small-sized bomber formations were detected again well in advance, again over Luftflotte 2's area, and followed on their progress. When they were over the Pas de Calais, the trackings seemed to close in, and they crossed the Channel as one wide cloud. To the operators and officers observing it, it seemed headed straight towards the center of London. When over the coast, it split suddenly, taking the operators by surprise; the attack on Dover was not intercepted at all, the one on Rye was tackled belatedly, only the fight over Dunkirk began with a good British interception.
These were level bombers, flying high, without many chances of mowing down an antenna; but, apart from the off chance of a lucky hit, these attacks softened up the defenses around the real targets and distracted the crewmen – as yet another unannounced wave of low-flying Bf 110s swooped in.
The mission had become very difficult and dangerous; even though the defenders were a bit shaken by the high-level attack, and taken by surprise, the targets still bristled with guns, there were balloons to dodge, and the dust raised by the level bombers' payload didn't make things easier. Even so, at a high price, the Zerstörers were successful and downed two antennas at Dover, putting it out of action for three days. Rye took some damage, but it would be back on line by the evening.
The Germans pressed their advantage, attacking into the breach. Many small raids were sent against the airfields, to confuse the enemy and to do some damage on their own, while the Stukas reappeared again in numbers with the large one, against Dunkirk. Their accuracy was telling, and this time the radar station took very heavy damage.
The only problem for the Germans was that, in order to achieve this new hole, they had once again expended more aircraft than they could afford… 3 Stukas, 8 Bf 110s, 11 level bombers and 6 Bf 109s were downed on this day alone, for the loss of 10 enemy fighters. The toll was light for Stukas because of the damage to the radar network and since the defenders were already committed to fend off many other raids.
The Germans kept pushing for two more days; casualties mounted on both sides. The British were now operating almost entirely from second-line airfields. The alarms were already late and inaccurate to start with, because of the degraded radar system; and the scrambled Squadrons now tended to arrive late or too low. The Luftwaffe was now often using feints: raids started on a course, seemingly headed on a given target, then halfway through the Channel or on the coast veered off to the real one.
On the other hand, the Germans now had range problems for their fighters, which they tried to counter with the drop tanks. However, they were eating through these stores faster than they expected. The fighter/bombers had to keep returning over the radar bases and the forward airfields, to make sure these places remained out of service, and the Bf 110s' numbers were really dwindling.
A noticeable success was achieved on a diversionary raid by Luftflotte 3; a junior officer made a mistake at the peripheral base of Exeter (#10 Group), and 7 Hurricanes were destroyed on the ground by a Bf 110 raid. The attackers arrived undetected, skimming the sea, and strafed the dispersal area. A Bofors battery had just been transferred from that airfield to the Poling radar station.
Meanwhile, on August 18, back in Germany, Hitler met with Keitel, von Brauchitsch, Raeder and Goering, who was enthusiastically optimist. He believed the air offensive to be on the verge of destroying the RAF, and said so; he added that it was possible the air defeat alone would bring the British to the negotiation table. Once unable to defend London from bombing, they were likely to try and cut their losses. Raeder also hoped so, because he was still very much worried about the Royal Navy. He did everything he could to prevent any naval operation, lamenting the barge fleet was not going to be ready before September 15, and that the window of opportunity for the invasion would be very short.
However, given Goering's rosy report, Hitler decided to go ahead with the preparations for Unternehmen Seelöwe. If the British would sue for peace just thanks to the Luftwaffe, so much the better; otherwise, the air superiority over the Channel and the coast was going to allow the invasion to get through, on September 15. The planning and preparations kicked into the highest gear.
On the same date, another combined twilight/night bombing took place, this time against the Hawker plants in Kingston. This time the British expected the second punch and put out most of the fires timely, and the damage done was only moderate. But the deliveries of Hurricanes would be delayed for a day of two anyway.
On the following day, only a few raids were launched; Kesselring was redeploying his assets. Luftflotte 2 got reinforcements from the other two; Luftflotte 5, in particular, was left almost only with coastal and recon aircraft. Luftflotte 3, apart from the transfers to Stumpff's command, sent in three small high-altitude conventional attacks against mixed targets (Tangmere, the radars of Poling and naval objectives in Portsmouth). There were only enough bombers in it to force the British to engage, but few enough that there were about 3.5 fighters per bomber. Damage to the ground targets was minimal, but Fighter Command's reaction was weak, belated, and costly – to the British fighters.
Sperrle complained with Berlin for the transfers, but his complaints were intercepted by Wever.
Also on August 19, the Kriegsmarine carried out its one exercise off Boulogne. Fifty barges were used, half of which powered and the other half towed. When they made a 90° turn towards the coast, a barge capsized and another lost its tow. When reaching the beach, the masters of the powered barges opened the gaps amongst them, fearing collisions. About half of the troops were unloaded within an hour of the first man ashore, another barge capsized, two failed to reach the shore, several did land but far away from the planned landing zone. The masters of three barges lost control while running aground, and their vessels ended up parallel to the beach line, which prevented the ramps from being lowered. This exercise was carried out over a short distance, with perfect weather and in broad daylight, and of course with no opposition. This was officially classed as a success. Privately, Raeder's case of cold feet got way worse.
That evening, another meeting took place, in Bentley Priory. Dowding received the visit of Air Marshal Newall, Chief of Air Staff, and Sir Archibald Sinclair, Under Secretary of the Air Ministry. Both visitors were worried about what was going on; the evidence seemed to be that Fighter Command was losing the battle, and Newall, in particular, made no mystery of the fact that his confidence in Dowding was decreasing. Several options were discussed. Trying to keep all airfields open seemed either impossible or at least very difficult, even taking into account the emergency measures already adopted to intensify the repair works. Withdrawing from the battle, redeploying the fighters to the North, and letting the Germans do what they wanted along the coast, would be suicidal: the core of the British aircraft industry, and other key factories, would be destroyed in a relatively short time. Then there was the currently adopted solution: trying to fend off all the enemy attacks while keeping most of the fighter force more to the North. In that way, the fighter force wasless vulnerable, but also way less effective, and the result seemed to evolve towards a seriously contested air space along the coast. This might become unsustainable, especially if and when the Germans launched a final offensive to accompany their dreaded invasion attempt.
But Dowding had a fourth policy to propose... late that night, the visitors left, their faith in Fighter Command restored.