Very realistic - wanted to come to the climax - please keep this up, Michele. Surprised no mention made of the Fougasse, a rather nasty flame weapon fired from a roadside drum. Also looking for action from the 'British Resistance' units, trained to attack logistical centres, command centres and supply dumps. Suggest you also look at the 'Stop Lines' - go to http://www.pillboxesuk.co.uk, Ian Saunders's excellent site.
A Better Show in 1940
- Thread starter Michele
- Start date
Hmm, doing a quick tot-up of the air losses, the Luftwaffe have lost 20% of their 110's and Stukas, and nearly 50 109's, for only around 50 RAF Hurricane/Spitfires.
I wonder how long some of the German squadrons can take this scale of loss before becoming unusable as an offensive force? Granted the RAF are suffering too, but given the circumstances they are going to fight down to the last fighter...
Goerings reaction when he sees the figures should be...interesting!
Of course, if the Germans have been oversetimating RAF losses (and production as well, as in OTL), they may think one more day will finally break Fighter Commans, so they can take one more day of this level of loss if it results in the desctruction of Fighter Command.
I wonder how long some of the German squadrons can take this scale of loss before becoming unusable as an offensive force? Granted the RAF are suffering too, but given the circumstances they are going to fight down to the last fighter...
Goerings reaction when he sees the figures should be...interesting!
Of course, if the Germans have been oversetimating RAF losses (and production as well, as in OTL), they may think one more day will finally break Fighter Commans, so they can take one more day of this level of loss if it results in the desctruction of Fighter Command.
Agreed, a map would be nice, thanks
No, sorry, I'm not very good at that. I suggest using Google maps. Of course the area is much more heavily built-up today; but you can imagine all medium to large centers as being smaller, and remove, in your mind, every area where the road grid is too regular. I think all the places I mention can be found.
Air supplies are already planned and even being carried out – to the Fallschirmjäger. They can't be used to supply the whole landing force.
Civilians on the run do not clog a road when a German unit advances onto it. If they can't outpace it, they disperse across the countryside and leave the road to the Germans. On the contrary, I wouldn't hold my breath waiting for a British or even foreign allied officer to fire on British civilians in order to get through. They'll rather accept the delay or, as was the case in some Sandhurst exercises and in the future of my TL, at least reduce the problem by using secondary roads. Note that will apply to the final movement to approach to contact, most of the rest will be done by rail. There aren't many roads, either main or secondary, in some of the areas close to the beaches (the Romney Marshes, some of the headlands), but then again those areas are not where the arriving british reinforcements will advance and deploy right now.
Yes.
Uhm. The Poles did try that.
Yes. The problem will be for the last 10 kms or so, however.
Yes. It seems you have thought about this stuff already!
Looking forward to the next part!
On the question of the Stuka/110 losses; thay have run to around 20% in one day..!! under normal circumstances, this would result in an immediate halt to operations while the Luftwaffe analysed what had hapenned. However its the invasion, they CAN'T just hold off and look at changes in tactics..they are locked in due to the need to support the army and hold off the RN.
I woudl guess they will (being human) rationalise this somewhat as the 'last gasp' of the RAF, and tell the troops that one more say will be it, that will destroy the RAF and losses will drop significantly each day.
However...that isnt the case! If the losses are as high on day 2 (and they will have to make just as many attacks, if anything the RN will be stronger on day2), I do wonder what will happen to the Luftwaffe's morale, both at squadron level and at command level.
Granted, the RAF are taking losses too, but their backs are to the wall, they have nowhere to go, and they are prepared to fight to the end (history shows that forces in this position are prepared to take far higher casualties than their attackers).
On the question of the Stuka/110 losses; thay have run to around 20% in one day..!! under normal circumstances, this would result in an immediate halt to operations while the Luftwaffe analysed what had hapenned. However its the invasion, they CAN'T just hold off and look at changes in tactics..they are locked in due to the need to support the army and hold off the RN.
I woudl guess they will (being human) rationalise this somewhat as the 'last gasp' of the RAF, and tell the troops that one more say will be it, that will destroy the RAF and losses will drop significantly each day.
However...that isnt the case! If the losses are as high on day 2 (and they will have to make just as many attacks, if anything the RN will be stronger on day2), I do wonder what will happen to the Luftwaffe's morale, both at squadron level and at command level.
Granted, the RAF are taking losses too, but their backs are to the wall, they have nowhere to go, and they are prepared to fight to the end (history shows that forces in this position are prepared to take far higher casualties than their attackers).
I know its going back a bit in the sequence of events, but I wonder - with the extra production losses inflicted on the Hurricane & Spitfire factories, would there be more interest in the proposal from Boulton Paul for the P.94 a single-seat version of the Defiant!? This could have been rapidly produced using the same jigs and tools that were already available for the two-seat Defiant. Such an aircraft would have been of more use to the RAF, in comparison to the performance thus far, of the turret fighter Defiant - even more so, in the circumstances that RAF Fighter Command finds itself in.
Looking forward to the next update - with I think the night action by the RN.
PS How do find the time to write it all up!??
Looking forward to the next update - with I think the night action by the RN.
PS How do find the time to write it all up!??
The Luftwaffe seems to have a LOT of medium sized level bombers.
Could these aircraft be used against shipping employing dive bombing tactics too?
I know that the Luftwaffe sucked in sinking ships, but if you actually throw 300 of those medium level bombers at the RN, they may indeed stand lucky and sink some.
Furthermore the Luftwaffe is currently operating from Norway too. Can they send those squadrons over to France, once the situation gets grim there?
Could these aircraft be used against shipping employing dive bombing tactics too?
I know that the Luftwaffe sucked in sinking ships, but if you actually throw 300 of those medium level bombers at the RN, they may indeed stand lucky and sink some.
Furthermore the Luftwaffe is currently operating from Norway too. Can they send those squadrons over to France, once the situation gets grim there?
More useful, yes. Significantly more useful, no.
Yes, and - it's not being written up now. I posted it elsewhere over several months. I'm just polishing it up and reposting.
Employing dive bombing tactics with a Heinkel 111 actually means employing kamikaze tactics with it. It might work – once. And before somebody jumps to the idea of actually suggesting the Germans to do that, it's worth remembering that the actual kamikazes achieved something like a 1-in-20 sinking rate, which means that in order to sink 10 British destroyers the Germans have to sacrifice 200 bombers.
There is a reason if dive bombers are expressly designed and built for that purpose. The Stuka had dive brakes and stabilizers and an automatic dive interrupt device and above all strengthened construction in order to resist the stress at pull out. The He 111 would reach terminal velocity during a dive, which would greatly reduce bombing accuracy for starters. It would probably lose stability and pass from a controlled dive into a spin plunge. Assuming that did not happen and the bomb was released in the general direction of the target, the wings would probably tear cleanly off when pulling out. If that did not happen, the pilot would probably be unable to pull out of the dive anyway in time to avoid that cold water below. If the wings did not break and the pilot managed to pull out, the wings would undergo such a material fatigue that assuming the He 111 managed to land, it would be a flying coffin afterwards, an accident waiting to happen.
If you read the early parts of this TL, you'll notice the Ju 88 in this TL is _not_ a dive bomber. That spares it a lot of dead weight and makes it way faster (as well as available earlier and in greater quantities); in other words, it makes it a much better level bomber. But you can't have your pie and also eat it.
So, no dive bombing tactics.
The level bombers could be used for level bombing of enemy warships. This is the tactics used by the Regia Aeronautica at the beginning of its war. It was an outrageously unsuccessful tactics. Using large numbers of level bombers over a thick enemy formation, they might achieve one lucky hit.
Meanwhile, of course, all those level bombers would not be interdicting the rail lines and roads, the marshalling yards and staging areas, the command centers and artillery deployments; all targets against which they could be successful.
We should finally take into account the issues of training and ammo. In this TL, the Stuka crews have got some training in anti-shipping missions, and they have a stock of AP anti-ship bombs that is way larger than in OTL (though far from infinite). The crews of level bombers still have problems in navigating over open waters, have never attacked a moving target, and their bombs are HE.
So my assessment is that it would probably not be a good idea. Therefore, "my" Kesselring doesn't try it.
As to Norway, the TL clearly states that by now the Luftwaffe is a skeleton crew out there.
What about the Miles M.20? I know this is a small detail that is not really a part of your ATL, Michele. This is a fantastic story and I sometimes forget that it isn't real.
19.3
A tense meeting took place in Berlin that evening. The Heer was reasonably satisfied of the progress achieved, and Halder stated that success would be possible if the flow of men and supplies continued. Nothing had gone as planned, but that was only to be expected; on the other hand the defences were weak. The officers were improvising and displaying initiative, the men were following them.
The admirals were much grimmer. Raeder gave some figures. The losses in barges and cargos equated to 27% of the total tonnage available. Over 18% of the escort vessels, minesweepers, armed fishing boats were gone. 40% of the destroyers had been sunk, together with a sizable number of T-Boote and a few submarines (more than he knew, actually). The screening force of S-Boote North-East of Dover had not been touched, but it was steaming into harm's way right then during the meeting, in order to try and stop the enemy destroyers coming South from Lowestoft.
Raeder, therefore, turned to Goering and asked where the Luftwaffe's superiority was. Another day like that one, and the Kriegsmarine would be unable to ferry anything across.
Goering argued and obfuscated and made wild promises. Wever guaranteed that the utmost effort would be made to stop the Royal Navy, but that this might well mean the Heer will get less direct support. Hitler highly disliked that remark and made no mystery about it; he seemed about to start with one of his tirades. Von Brauchitsch stopped this by reminding Wever that the RAF must be in its last throes; therefore, the huge bomber fleet should not have needed such a strong fighter escort. Goering confirmed this before Wever had time to say anything.
The operation would therefore continue as planned. Not all of the first wave troops had actually been landed; every stage had been delayed. Therefore, the units now across the Channel were going to be completed by the night's shipments. Supplies were needed, all kinds of them. An adjustment would be that the paratroopers, now better organized and in sizable strength notwithstanding the losses, were to shift their focus South-East, helping the vanguard of the 17. Infanteriedivision to finish the capture of Folkestone and then advance and take Dover.
The other adjustment regarded the Luftwaffe. All the Stukas were to be committed against naval targets; other aircraft could also be used against ships if this was deemed necessary. Goering stated he believed the Bf 110s could be useful against minor warships. The role of support to the ground units was to be taken up by the level bombers, chiefly. Fighters had primarily to protect the anti-naval raids.
Wever thought about putting forth the figures he had received from Kesselring just before the meeting. Then he decided it would be better not to do that. He would forward those to the HQs later in the night. Because those figures weren't encouraging. The Luftwaffe now had the following operational aircraft:
Bf 109s: 536 (-11%)
Bf 110s: 70 (-19%)
Stukas: 239 (-18%)
Level bombers: 808 (-9%)
They had also suffered substantial losses in the coastal aircraft and seaplanes, short-ranged recon aircraft, and Ju 52s. There would not be enough to go round, thought Wever with a shiver as he left the meeting.
The War Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff also convened, in London. Churchill had already spoken to the nation on the radio, and he believed that until the Germans could be prevented from achieving some major breakthrough, the will to fight would not wane. Brooke was cautiously optimistic; the enemy vanguard had gained ground, but they were clearly inferior under many respects. While the obvious reaction would be to try and throw the Germans back into the sea at the instant, Brooke patiently explained that, given that the enemy wasn't going anywhere, it would be better being cautious. Further landings elsewhere, albeit unlikely, might take place; rushing the armor assets to the fray now would mean having them thumped from the air in the marshalling yards, and then close to the beaches. If the Royal Navy did its job, there would be no need to be rash. On the contrary, Brooke hinted at the fact that letting more enemy troops come might even mean a greater victory, because the more they came, the more difficult it would be to supply them, which appealed to Churchill.
The Royal Navy would of course do its job – but mostly not in daylight. The Admiralty's proposal was to try and see what the flotillas could achieve that night. Then wait out the morning, and maybe send them in again in the afternoon, and the night after. They had taken more losses than comfortable that day, and they were confident that they could interdict the sealanes at night, without the nuisance of those dive bombers overhead.
And the RAF? Given that there would be less naval task forces out in daylight, Fighter Command could concentrate on fighting air raids over land, and on escorting bombers. Bomber Command would begin to really throw its weight around that same night, continuing into daylight with fighter escort.
While the leaders talked and planned in their war rooms, their subordinate kept dying in their engine rooms, and elsewhere. The first victims just after sunset were two cargos for a total of 12,000 tons, their silhouettes clear against the last light in the Western sky when seen from the Orion's periscope. The British had subs too, and this one (a former French unit now having a Royal Navy crew) had patiently waited off Le Havre for the right moment, when the quickly decreasing visibility would cover its disappearance. And it worked; the German patrol boats had only rudimentary ASW devices, and the Orion dived away. It would keep stalking in the area.
The surface units were on the move, too. At dusk, the Naiad with 11 destroyers was steaming South past Harwich. Even taking into account cautious zig-zagging, they would be able to be off Dover by midnight. At about 21:00, a force of 6 destroyers was already out of Portsmouth, heading for Newhaven and Cuckmere Haven, and other 6 destroyers with 4 torpedo boats were moving South-East, aiming at the German sealanes.
On land, most of the soldiers were resting, but the German logistical troops were still toiling in the dark. Actual unloading of barges and boats had stopped, it being impossible to carry that out without light. But the men were trying to send supplies inland. They had no beachmasters, no clear chain of command. They were few. They had few operational vehicles, and those had precious little fuel. They had few uninjured horses, and those didn't necessarily come with carts or limbers. And the ways out of the beaches mostly remained difficult, roads were cratered, mined, or littered with wrecks. The officers of the 28. Infanteriedivision were particularly unhappy at this time: most of the ammo intended for their units had been destroyed by the Revenge's salvos at Rottingdean. Darkness of course didn't help the logistical work, but these men would soon have more light that they could ever wish for.
By around 23:00, after having rested at least for a short while, the less lucky chosen ones of the combat units (especially the recon outfits) began making some further tactical movement. They tried to improve their starting positions for the morning or to link up. A short, confused night action erupted North of Woodingdean, as German patrols tried to find a weak spot in the 1st MMG Brigade's line defending Brighton. The attempt was stopped. On the other hand, the Germans were unopposed at Lydd on Sea, where they managed to finally establish a solid connection between landing zones B and C.
But that happened later. Before, at 22:20, there was the first night bombing by the RAF on British soil.
Of course nobody was happy in Bomber Command to be hitting there, but the operation was necessary. Precautions were been taken, which would limit the effectiveness of the raids; for instance, the area from Dymchurch to Hythe and to Folkestone would have been an important target, but it was too thickly built up. The Rottingdean beach was also close to populated areas, but luckily that was no longer a priority target, thanks to the Revenge's bombardment. Other beaches, however, were far enough from the villages to be hit almost safely (Bexhill actually took several bombs, nevertheless).
The first wave was made up of five raids by small numbers of old Hampdens and obsolete Harrows. They were still good enough to bomb the beaches at New Romney, Rye, Pevensey, Cuckmere Haven and Newhaven with loadouts completely consisting in incendiaries. The German AA guns fired – mostly wasting their scanty ammo. The open terrain was peppered with small fires, which lit up the area for the waves to come. There were no navigation mistakes: the distances were very short, the weather was fine, the targets were along the sea and close to distinctive features (rivers, headlands).
While the Germans were furiously trying to quell the fires with sand, the Wellingtons and Whitleys showed up, some 180 in total. Unlike for the raids on distant Germany, they were carrying even more than their specification bomb load. They flew much too low and slow for their own good: 2 were lost to the German AA, however weak and blind that was, and 5 damaged. But in these conditions, their average accuracy was good, as evidenced by the occasional secondary explosion as ammo crates were hit. The Germans were lucky in that some of their supplies had been moved inland, and they had not landed lots of them in the first place, which made the stacks of crates and the vehicle parks not a large target. The damage was somewhat less severe at Rye, where a slight delay had allowed a quick-witted German officer to react fast and put off most fires, and at Newhaven, probably due to a mistake by the leading aircraft. Some AA gunners and logistical troops were lost, too.
The final wave was made of small flights of Blenheims, which, in the light of the fires, focused on the boats and barges at anchor off the beaches. Many hits were achieved on these targets, too.
Of course night bombing is not a British exclusive. Kesselring had chosen to commit an unprecedented proportion of his level bomber force, some 650 of them, and over a longer time through the night. Using all those bombers had its drawbacks: lack of accuracy, and the fact that not all his crews were really well trained for this. But on the other hand, he knew that under the cover of darkness, they were almost invulnerable.
The list of targets was very long. Canterbury and the Ashford railway junction were hit first, with the intention of crippling these critical road and railway nodes. Similar raids struck farther inland: other rail network targets at Reigate, Sevenoaks and Rochester. These attacks employed about 250 bombers. They achieved varying degrees of success, because of the usual variables. "Pathfinder" fire-bombing Staffeln were used as a first wave at Canterbury and Reigate (just like over the beaches), for instance, and this resulted in serious damage at the marshalling yards. This was particularly bad at Reigate, because elements of the 42nd Infantry Division were passing by and suffered casualties, while the unit's subsequent echelons were delayed. On the contrary, the Sevenoaks attack was off target.
A very large Knickebein-led raid, with a full "pathfinder" Gruppe (KGr 100) for maximum accuracy, reached Portsmouth at about 00:30. The infrastructures suffered medium damage, and a torpedo boat undergoing repairs was sunk; but the port was basically empty at this time. There were more targets in Southampton, but this raid did not get high-precision attentions, and the bombs were dropped over a wide area (hitting the city rather than the naval base). A token bombing struck Plymouth, too, with just an understrength Gruppe; nothing to write home about. These three anti-naval raids accounted for some 300 bombers.
The remaining 100 were more of a shot in the dark, and a dangerous one, close to the German positions. The enemy was still resisting in places like Brighton and Hastings. Kesselring had a try to softening these targets while they could be hit with impunity. For once, the Germans were lucky, and no friendly-fire casualties took place. On the other hand, many bombs hit just empty civilian buildings rather than British positions. A battalion command post did get hit in Hastings, which would cause problems come morning.
But then, the battles at sea began. Shortly before 23:30, the Naiad flotilla was attacked off Ramsgate by four S-Boote. Their commodore achieved tactical surprise and displayed masterly tactics, placing two hits for no losses at his first attack. The Wild Swan was sunk and the Zulu severely damaged. The S-Boote were large for a torpedo boat, and indeed they carried a reload. But when they came back for their second and last torpedo launch, the surprise was over, the British fire starshells, and three of the German vessels were hit and sunk. The fourth fired its torps uselessly at extreme range, and turned tail.
The Naiad continues with 9 destroyers. A second torpedo boat flotilla, warned by the action but farther out at sea, made an attempt at tailing them, and given their high top speed they might have been successful, if they had had full tanks. The problem was that they were already almost out of fuel, and after a short-lived chase, they headed back for port.
Off Dover, at about 00:40 of S+1 (September 16), the Naiad's force split, sending four destroyers across the most obvious route to landing zone B, while the Naiad brought its guns and the other destroyers' right within shooting range of those beaches.
At roughly the same time, the first batch of destroyers from Portsmouth, led by the Saladin, were approaching the Newhaven area, while the flotilla of 6 destroyers and 4 TBs, led by the Sturdy, were coming astride the sealanes from Le Havre.
The sea was swarming with German convoys, heading in both directions. On top of that, the Sturdy's commander didn't know it, but his flotilla was within twenty miles from two of the few remaining German destroyers, accompanied by three torpedo boats.
In this situation, several engagements erupted between 01:00 and 02:00, often spilling out one into the next. The situation was confused and the enemy was shadows in the darkness, at times lighted up by illuminating rounds. The British flotillas had areas of free engagement, the German destroyers on the contrary had to be wary of hitting their own convoys. Describing in detail all exchanges would be too long, suffice it to say that the British had the upper hand in numbers, firepower and maneuver. One more German destroyer was lost and another would soon limp away, thus reducing the total available to two; the torpedo boats fell back onto their standard, saner hit-and-run tactics, rather than hopelessly trying to stop the enemy, so two of them survived. The British lost just one more destroyer.
But the real victims were, of course, the transports and their lightweight escorts. The latter made a valiant attempt at stopping the destroyers, damaging superficially three of them; and got slaughtered by the dozens, especially in the Eastern half of the theater. The narrowness of the Straits, which the Germans counted to be to their advantage, worked against them in this situation. About two thirds of what had left from Calais or any port to the East of it was either sunk or pushed back by a handful of enemy destroyers. The one third that made it through was mostly dispersed out and would have hours of delay, the ships finding themselves still far from the coast at daylight. Naturally, the worst losses were taken by the slower vessels, the barges. More than one tugboat or towing trawler cut the tow line to save itself, abandoning the barges.
At the other end of the area, the Le Havre route was interdicted, though not so effectively; some 50% of the convoys made it through by shifting their course away from the explosions and gunfire. This meant, however, that they mostly arrived late and on the wrong beaches.
The Boulogne run was unmolested by the Royal Navy, and some time later in the night, at about 04:00, the faster boats, those that hade started out first, would arrive safely. But the absence of the Andrew was not by chance, and slower convoys were not going to be so lucky. These were the hunting grounds of Coastal Command, whose older aircraft dropped starshells, while the Blenheims seconded to this command bombed the barges. Accuracy was low, but these aircraft were loaded on a shotgun principle: not a few large bombs, rather, a large number of small bombs. Only a couple of targets were sunk, several more were damaged; and once again, the convoys that were attacked all suffered disruptions, delays, navigation mistakes.
Meanwhile, the warships not tasked to intercept the traffic were bombarding the Newhaven and Dymchurch beaches. Boats at anchor were easy targets, and those which had the luck of having an engine tried to disengage in all directions. The logistical areas on the beaches were hit hard, too.
These Royal Navy flotillas began disengaging, towards Portsmouth and Harwich, respectively, at about 03:00. In three hours they were going to be either already in port, or close to it, making the threat of Stukas almost meaningless.
But the work was not over. The British still had many of their auxiliary boats. These had had to abandon some of their ports (such as Folkestone, Dover, Hastings, Brighton), but waited for the destroyers to do their job, and around 02:00 they left Portsmouth, Worthing, Hove in the West, Margate and Sheerness in the East, and countless minor leisure ports and coves where they had remained through the day, lying low. The enemy-held coast was a mess of burning hulks and navigation hazards, but the escort boats were now hardly able to oppose this final raid. Some German cargo crews that had counted themselves lucky for making it through the destroyer flotillas were now killed by these armed fishing boats, coast guard cutters, yachts, leisure motor boats, patrol boats, corvettes and so on. The British did take losses, but dished out more than they received, and gave a finishing touch to the inferno. They started withdrawing around 05:00; if a Stuka flight surprised them, they would be counted as expendable anyway.
It would take hours for the Kriegsmarine to do the aftermath of disaster. When they finished, they knew that roughly some 30% of all personnel, supplies, armaments and equipment that either was still on the beaches at sunset or had been shipped that night, was now there on English soil, though part of it had arrived late and in the wrong spot. The rest had been bombed, bombarded, destroyed, burned, sunk or, in the lucky case, pushed back to France. Several full battalions had been lost.
The German troops inland had very little coming up behind them.
Bomber Command had not engaged all its assets on the beaches. So, between 02:00 and 04:00 some 80 bombers hit the German shipping in their nests, at Dunkerque and Calais. The losses were light; even though these ports were crowded, the targets were no longer rows and rows of barges side by side as when they were being concentrated in Antwerp. But the erosion of the German sealift capability continued.
The minor details of the night fighting at sea were a handful of other losses on both sides. A British destroyer and a minesweeper were lost on mines, off Plymouth and Portland. The U-37 was sunk not far from the Isle of Wight by British ASW patrols, it was probably trying to ambush one of the enemy task forces. The British sub Ondine sank a cargo ship off Boulogne. Another S-Boote flotilla intercepted the Naiad's group as it was withdrawing, but this time there was no surprise and two German boats were sunk for no British loss.
On land, the British reinforcements made their limited movements. The first echelon of the 2nd Armoured Division had been stopped North of Canterbury, dispersed and camouflaged. Moving it past that point on trains would have been difficult and also unnecessary dangerous. A tank regiment might be thrown in the fray at Folkestone or Dover on the following day, but only if Brooke deemed it absolutely necessary; exactly in that area, between Canterbury and Dover, the Free French were already deployed and smarting for a fight. The first elements of the 20th Guards Infantry Brigade had an uneventful journey from London to Sevenoaks. The 131st Brigade advanced South from its positions West of Ashford, and contingency plans were being worked out for a counterattack towards Rye. The vanguard units of the New Zealand Division were joined by a second brigade, the 8th.
The maintenance and repair crews were at work everywhere, especially on the railway network; the police was trying to take control of the refugee flows, but Brooke was well aware that they would become a problem again come morning.
A Hauptmann of the 8. Infanteriedivision carried out his own bit of Auftragstaktik by launching a night attack around 04:00 against the part of the village of Newhaven that was still in British hands. The mixed defenders (the remains of some Home Guard platoons and some regulars) were taken by surprise; the fight was confused and costly for the Germans, but the British were pushed away in the night. Thus, the Germans cleared their second port. It was only a very small leisure port, and the infantry captain had seen the masts of a handful of ships sunk in the access canal. What he didn't realize – but some engineer officer would surely notice that in daylight – was that those boats were small, wooden-hull leisure yachts, not unwieldy all-metal cargo ships, harder to get rid of. No more than two transports at a time would be able to be unloaded here, once the obstruction was destroyed – but it was a start. The Germans needed every possibility to unload supplies directly from ships. Here, just like in most other places along the occupied coast: indeed, none of this captain's company's MGs had more than two magazines left by dawn.
A tense meeting took place in Berlin that evening. The Heer was reasonably satisfied of the progress achieved, and Halder stated that success would be possible if the flow of men and supplies continued. Nothing had gone as planned, but that was only to be expected; on the other hand the defences were weak. The officers were improvising and displaying initiative, the men were following them.
The admirals were much grimmer. Raeder gave some figures. The losses in barges and cargos equated to 27% of the total tonnage available. Over 18% of the escort vessels, minesweepers, armed fishing boats were gone. 40% of the destroyers had been sunk, together with a sizable number of T-Boote and a few submarines (more than he knew, actually). The screening force of S-Boote North-East of Dover had not been touched, but it was steaming into harm's way right then during the meeting, in order to try and stop the enemy destroyers coming South from Lowestoft.
Raeder, therefore, turned to Goering and asked where the Luftwaffe's superiority was. Another day like that one, and the Kriegsmarine would be unable to ferry anything across.
Goering argued and obfuscated and made wild promises. Wever guaranteed that the utmost effort would be made to stop the Royal Navy, but that this might well mean the Heer will get less direct support. Hitler highly disliked that remark and made no mystery about it; he seemed about to start with one of his tirades. Von Brauchitsch stopped this by reminding Wever that the RAF must be in its last throes; therefore, the huge bomber fleet should not have needed such a strong fighter escort. Goering confirmed this before Wever had time to say anything.
The operation would therefore continue as planned. Not all of the first wave troops had actually been landed; every stage had been delayed. Therefore, the units now across the Channel were going to be completed by the night's shipments. Supplies were needed, all kinds of them. An adjustment would be that the paratroopers, now better organized and in sizable strength notwithstanding the losses, were to shift their focus South-East, helping the vanguard of the 17. Infanteriedivision to finish the capture of Folkestone and then advance and take Dover.
The other adjustment regarded the Luftwaffe. All the Stukas were to be committed against naval targets; other aircraft could also be used against ships if this was deemed necessary. Goering stated he believed the Bf 110s could be useful against minor warships. The role of support to the ground units was to be taken up by the level bombers, chiefly. Fighters had primarily to protect the anti-naval raids.
Wever thought about putting forth the figures he had received from Kesselring just before the meeting. Then he decided it would be better not to do that. He would forward those to the HQs later in the night. Because those figures weren't encouraging. The Luftwaffe now had the following operational aircraft:
Bf 109s: 536 (-11%)
Bf 110s: 70 (-19%)
Stukas: 239 (-18%)
Level bombers: 808 (-9%)
They had also suffered substantial losses in the coastal aircraft and seaplanes, short-ranged recon aircraft, and Ju 52s. There would not be enough to go round, thought Wever with a shiver as he left the meeting.
The War Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff also convened, in London. Churchill had already spoken to the nation on the radio, and he believed that until the Germans could be prevented from achieving some major breakthrough, the will to fight would not wane. Brooke was cautiously optimistic; the enemy vanguard had gained ground, but they were clearly inferior under many respects. While the obvious reaction would be to try and throw the Germans back into the sea at the instant, Brooke patiently explained that, given that the enemy wasn't going anywhere, it would be better being cautious. Further landings elsewhere, albeit unlikely, might take place; rushing the armor assets to the fray now would mean having them thumped from the air in the marshalling yards, and then close to the beaches. If the Royal Navy did its job, there would be no need to be rash. On the contrary, Brooke hinted at the fact that letting more enemy troops come might even mean a greater victory, because the more they came, the more difficult it would be to supply them, which appealed to Churchill.
The Royal Navy would of course do its job – but mostly not in daylight. The Admiralty's proposal was to try and see what the flotillas could achieve that night. Then wait out the morning, and maybe send them in again in the afternoon, and the night after. They had taken more losses than comfortable that day, and they were confident that they could interdict the sealanes at night, without the nuisance of those dive bombers overhead.
And the RAF? Given that there would be less naval task forces out in daylight, Fighter Command could concentrate on fighting air raids over land, and on escorting bombers. Bomber Command would begin to really throw its weight around that same night, continuing into daylight with fighter escort.
While the leaders talked and planned in their war rooms, their subordinate kept dying in their engine rooms, and elsewhere. The first victims just after sunset were two cargos for a total of 12,000 tons, their silhouettes clear against the last light in the Western sky when seen from the Orion's periscope. The British had subs too, and this one (a former French unit now having a Royal Navy crew) had patiently waited off Le Havre for the right moment, when the quickly decreasing visibility would cover its disappearance. And it worked; the German patrol boats had only rudimentary ASW devices, and the Orion dived away. It would keep stalking in the area.
The surface units were on the move, too. At dusk, the Naiad with 11 destroyers was steaming South past Harwich. Even taking into account cautious zig-zagging, they would be able to be off Dover by midnight. At about 21:00, a force of 6 destroyers was already out of Portsmouth, heading for Newhaven and Cuckmere Haven, and other 6 destroyers with 4 torpedo boats were moving South-East, aiming at the German sealanes.
On land, most of the soldiers were resting, but the German logistical troops were still toiling in the dark. Actual unloading of barges and boats had stopped, it being impossible to carry that out without light. But the men were trying to send supplies inland. They had no beachmasters, no clear chain of command. They were few. They had few operational vehicles, and those had precious little fuel. They had few uninjured horses, and those didn't necessarily come with carts or limbers. And the ways out of the beaches mostly remained difficult, roads were cratered, mined, or littered with wrecks. The officers of the 28. Infanteriedivision were particularly unhappy at this time: most of the ammo intended for their units had been destroyed by the Revenge's salvos at Rottingdean. Darkness of course didn't help the logistical work, but these men would soon have more light that they could ever wish for.
By around 23:00, after having rested at least for a short while, the less lucky chosen ones of the combat units (especially the recon outfits) began making some further tactical movement. They tried to improve their starting positions for the morning or to link up. A short, confused night action erupted North of Woodingdean, as German patrols tried to find a weak spot in the 1st MMG Brigade's line defending Brighton. The attempt was stopped. On the other hand, the Germans were unopposed at Lydd on Sea, where they managed to finally establish a solid connection between landing zones B and C.
But that happened later. Before, at 22:20, there was the first night bombing by the RAF on British soil.
Of course nobody was happy in Bomber Command to be hitting there, but the operation was necessary. Precautions were been taken, which would limit the effectiveness of the raids; for instance, the area from Dymchurch to Hythe and to Folkestone would have been an important target, but it was too thickly built up. The Rottingdean beach was also close to populated areas, but luckily that was no longer a priority target, thanks to the Revenge's bombardment. Other beaches, however, were far enough from the villages to be hit almost safely (Bexhill actually took several bombs, nevertheless).
The first wave was made up of five raids by small numbers of old Hampdens and obsolete Harrows. They were still good enough to bomb the beaches at New Romney, Rye, Pevensey, Cuckmere Haven and Newhaven with loadouts completely consisting in incendiaries. The German AA guns fired – mostly wasting their scanty ammo. The open terrain was peppered with small fires, which lit up the area for the waves to come. There were no navigation mistakes: the distances were very short, the weather was fine, the targets were along the sea and close to distinctive features (rivers, headlands).
While the Germans were furiously trying to quell the fires with sand, the Wellingtons and Whitleys showed up, some 180 in total. Unlike for the raids on distant Germany, they were carrying even more than their specification bomb load. They flew much too low and slow for their own good: 2 were lost to the German AA, however weak and blind that was, and 5 damaged. But in these conditions, their average accuracy was good, as evidenced by the occasional secondary explosion as ammo crates were hit. The Germans were lucky in that some of their supplies had been moved inland, and they had not landed lots of them in the first place, which made the stacks of crates and the vehicle parks not a large target. The damage was somewhat less severe at Rye, where a slight delay had allowed a quick-witted German officer to react fast and put off most fires, and at Newhaven, probably due to a mistake by the leading aircraft. Some AA gunners and logistical troops were lost, too.
The final wave was made of small flights of Blenheims, which, in the light of the fires, focused on the boats and barges at anchor off the beaches. Many hits were achieved on these targets, too.
Of course night bombing is not a British exclusive. Kesselring had chosen to commit an unprecedented proportion of his level bomber force, some 650 of them, and over a longer time through the night. Using all those bombers had its drawbacks: lack of accuracy, and the fact that not all his crews were really well trained for this. But on the other hand, he knew that under the cover of darkness, they were almost invulnerable.
The list of targets was very long. Canterbury and the Ashford railway junction were hit first, with the intention of crippling these critical road and railway nodes. Similar raids struck farther inland: other rail network targets at Reigate, Sevenoaks and Rochester. These attacks employed about 250 bombers. They achieved varying degrees of success, because of the usual variables. "Pathfinder" fire-bombing Staffeln were used as a first wave at Canterbury and Reigate (just like over the beaches), for instance, and this resulted in serious damage at the marshalling yards. This was particularly bad at Reigate, because elements of the 42nd Infantry Division were passing by and suffered casualties, while the unit's subsequent echelons were delayed. On the contrary, the Sevenoaks attack was off target.
A very large Knickebein-led raid, with a full "pathfinder" Gruppe (KGr 100) for maximum accuracy, reached Portsmouth at about 00:30. The infrastructures suffered medium damage, and a torpedo boat undergoing repairs was sunk; but the port was basically empty at this time. There were more targets in Southampton, but this raid did not get high-precision attentions, and the bombs were dropped over a wide area (hitting the city rather than the naval base). A token bombing struck Plymouth, too, with just an understrength Gruppe; nothing to write home about. These three anti-naval raids accounted for some 300 bombers.
The remaining 100 were more of a shot in the dark, and a dangerous one, close to the German positions. The enemy was still resisting in places like Brighton and Hastings. Kesselring had a try to softening these targets while they could be hit with impunity. For once, the Germans were lucky, and no friendly-fire casualties took place. On the other hand, many bombs hit just empty civilian buildings rather than British positions. A battalion command post did get hit in Hastings, which would cause problems come morning.
But then, the battles at sea began. Shortly before 23:30, the Naiad flotilla was attacked off Ramsgate by four S-Boote. Their commodore achieved tactical surprise and displayed masterly tactics, placing two hits for no losses at his first attack. The Wild Swan was sunk and the Zulu severely damaged. The S-Boote were large for a torpedo boat, and indeed they carried a reload. But when they came back for their second and last torpedo launch, the surprise was over, the British fire starshells, and three of the German vessels were hit and sunk. The fourth fired its torps uselessly at extreme range, and turned tail.
The Naiad continues with 9 destroyers. A second torpedo boat flotilla, warned by the action but farther out at sea, made an attempt at tailing them, and given their high top speed they might have been successful, if they had had full tanks. The problem was that they were already almost out of fuel, and after a short-lived chase, they headed back for port.
Off Dover, at about 00:40 of S+1 (September 16), the Naiad's force split, sending four destroyers across the most obvious route to landing zone B, while the Naiad brought its guns and the other destroyers' right within shooting range of those beaches.
At roughly the same time, the first batch of destroyers from Portsmouth, led by the Saladin, were approaching the Newhaven area, while the flotilla of 6 destroyers and 4 TBs, led by the Sturdy, were coming astride the sealanes from Le Havre.
The sea was swarming with German convoys, heading in both directions. On top of that, the Sturdy's commander didn't know it, but his flotilla was within twenty miles from two of the few remaining German destroyers, accompanied by three torpedo boats.
In this situation, several engagements erupted between 01:00 and 02:00, often spilling out one into the next. The situation was confused and the enemy was shadows in the darkness, at times lighted up by illuminating rounds. The British flotillas had areas of free engagement, the German destroyers on the contrary had to be wary of hitting their own convoys. Describing in detail all exchanges would be too long, suffice it to say that the British had the upper hand in numbers, firepower and maneuver. One more German destroyer was lost and another would soon limp away, thus reducing the total available to two; the torpedo boats fell back onto their standard, saner hit-and-run tactics, rather than hopelessly trying to stop the enemy, so two of them survived. The British lost just one more destroyer.
But the real victims were, of course, the transports and their lightweight escorts. The latter made a valiant attempt at stopping the destroyers, damaging superficially three of them; and got slaughtered by the dozens, especially in the Eastern half of the theater. The narrowness of the Straits, which the Germans counted to be to their advantage, worked against them in this situation. About two thirds of what had left from Calais or any port to the East of it was either sunk or pushed back by a handful of enemy destroyers. The one third that made it through was mostly dispersed out and would have hours of delay, the ships finding themselves still far from the coast at daylight. Naturally, the worst losses were taken by the slower vessels, the barges. More than one tugboat or towing trawler cut the tow line to save itself, abandoning the barges.
At the other end of the area, the Le Havre route was interdicted, though not so effectively; some 50% of the convoys made it through by shifting their course away from the explosions and gunfire. This meant, however, that they mostly arrived late and on the wrong beaches.
The Boulogne run was unmolested by the Royal Navy, and some time later in the night, at about 04:00, the faster boats, those that hade started out first, would arrive safely. But the absence of the Andrew was not by chance, and slower convoys were not going to be so lucky. These were the hunting grounds of Coastal Command, whose older aircraft dropped starshells, while the Blenheims seconded to this command bombed the barges. Accuracy was low, but these aircraft were loaded on a shotgun principle: not a few large bombs, rather, a large number of small bombs. Only a couple of targets were sunk, several more were damaged; and once again, the convoys that were attacked all suffered disruptions, delays, navigation mistakes.
Meanwhile, the warships not tasked to intercept the traffic were bombarding the Newhaven and Dymchurch beaches. Boats at anchor were easy targets, and those which had the luck of having an engine tried to disengage in all directions. The logistical areas on the beaches were hit hard, too.
These Royal Navy flotillas began disengaging, towards Portsmouth and Harwich, respectively, at about 03:00. In three hours they were going to be either already in port, or close to it, making the threat of Stukas almost meaningless.
But the work was not over. The British still had many of their auxiliary boats. These had had to abandon some of their ports (such as Folkestone, Dover, Hastings, Brighton), but waited for the destroyers to do their job, and around 02:00 they left Portsmouth, Worthing, Hove in the West, Margate and Sheerness in the East, and countless minor leisure ports and coves where they had remained through the day, lying low. The enemy-held coast was a mess of burning hulks and navigation hazards, but the escort boats were now hardly able to oppose this final raid. Some German cargo crews that had counted themselves lucky for making it through the destroyer flotillas were now killed by these armed fishing boats, coast guard cutters, yachts, leisure motor boats, patrol boats, corvettes and so on. The British did take losses, but dished out more than they received, and gave a finishing touch to the inferno. They started withdrawing around 05:00; if a Stuka flight surprised them, they would be counted as expendable anyway.
It would take hours for the Kriegsmarine to do the aftermath of disaster. When they finished, they knew that roughly some 30% of all personnel, supplies, armaments and equipment that either was still on the beaches at sunset or had been shipped that night, was now there on English soil, though part of it had arrived late and in the wrong spot. The rest had been bombed, bombarded, destroyed, burned, sunk or, in the lucky case, pushed back to France. Several full battalions had been lost.
The German troops inland had very little coming up behind them.
Bomber Command had not engaged all its assets on the beaches. So, between 02:00 and 04:00 some 80 bombers hit the German shipping in their nests, at Dunkerque and Calais. The losses were light; even though these ports were crowded, the targets were no longer rows and rows of barges side by side as when they were being concentrated in Antwerp. But the erosion of the German sealift capability continued.
The minor details of the night fighting at sea were a handful of other losses on both sides. A British destroyer and a minesweeper were lost on mines, off Plymouth and Portland. The U-37 was sunk not far from the Isle of Wight by British ASW patrols, it was probably trying to ambush one of the enemy task forces. The British sub Ondine sank a cargo ship off Boulogne. Another S-Boote flotilla intercepted the Naiad's group as it was withdrawing, but this time there was no surprise and two German boats were sunk for no British loss.
On land, the British reinforcements made their limited movements. The first echelon of the 2nd Armoured Division had been stopped North of Canterbury, dispersed and camouflaged. Moving it past that point on trains would have been difficult and also unnecessary dangerous. A tank regiment might be thrown in the fray at Folkestone or Dover on the following day, but only if Brooke deemed it absolutely necessary; exactly in that area, between Canterbury and Dover, the Free French were already deployed and smarting for a fight. The first elements of the 20th Guards Infantry Brigade had an uneventful journey from London to Sevenoaks. The 131st Brigade advanced South from its positions West of Ashford, and contingency plans were being worked out for a counterattack towards Rye. The vanguard units of the New Zealand Division were joined by a second brigade, the 8th.
The maintenance and repair crews were at work everywhere, especially on the railway network; the police was trying to take control of the refugee flows, but Brooke was well aware that they would become a problem again come morning.
A Hauptmann of the 8. Infanteriedivision carried out his own bit of Auftragstaktik by launching a night attack around 04:00 against the part of the village of Newhaven that was still in British hands. The mixed defenders (the remains of some Home Guard platoons and some regulars) were taken by surprise; the fight was confused and costly for the Germans, but the British were pushed away in the night. Thus, the Germans cleared their second port. It was only a very small leisure port, and the infantry captain had seen the masts of a handful of ships sunk in the access canal. What he didn't realize – but some engineer officer would surely notice that in daylight – was that those boats were small, wooden-hull leisure yachts, not unwieldy all-metal cargo ships, harder to get rid of. No more than two transports at a time would be able to be unloaded here, once the obstruction was destroyed – but it was a start. The Germans needed every possibility to unload supplies directly from ships. Here, just like in most other places along the occupied coast: indeed, none of this captain's company's MGs had more than two magazines left by dawn.
The improvised weapons might deserve mention for color, especially if the focus was Seelöwe. The focus here is on the air forces' strategic thinking (especially the Luftwaffe's, to a lesser degree the RAF's) and how it could affect the campaign.
In today's post, you'll find an important contribution by a stay-behind British party, though it's not a direct attack by them.
And we won't need to come to the inner stop lines or the GHQ line, either.
Nice to see more..
BTW, whats happened to the Revenge?
...stay tuned... 20. begins with its fate.
Superbly written timeline Michele,
These losses are not making it look easy for the Germans. With their supply situation looking grim and Regular Army elements moving to contact the Germans in Britain are going to be in for a tough fight.
The losses the RN is inflicting are bad, but if there's a Channel storm then the KM is real big trouble. Most of the barges are riverine transport and like you briefed mentioned could capsize by the wake of a Destroyer. Those in a storm like the one post D-Day that wrecked one of the Mulberry's is not going to be pretty.
These losses are not making it look easy for the Germans. With their supply situation looking grim and Regular Army elements moving to contact the Germans in Britain are going to be in for a tough fight.
The losses the RN is inflicting are bad, but if there's a Channel storm then the KM is real big trouble. Most of the barges are riverine transport and like you briefed mentioned could capsize by the wake of a Destroyer. Those in a storm like the one post D-Day that wrecked one of the Mulberry's is not going to be pretty.
The losses inflicted by those destroyers during night combar, were quite shocking I must say. I didn't think it would be THAT bad for the Germans.
After all the Brits didn't have radar on the destroyers at this point yet.
I thought the barges and smaller transport vessels would be left unseen, since their silhouettes wouldn't be that big.
I guess the weather is helping the Royal Navy too.
Good weather without clouds and a bright moon are helpful in night combat.
I wouldn't be surprised if the Germans actually decide to quit and pull out after another massacre of such magnitude next night.
After all the Brits didn't have radar on the destroyers at this point yet.
I thought the barges and smaller transport vessels would be left unseen, since their silhouettes wouldn't be that big.
I guess the weather is helping the Royal Navy too.
Good weather without clouds and a bright moon are helpful in night combat.
I wouldn't be surprised if the Germans actually decide to quit and pull out after another massacre of such magnitude next night.
Actually, its not too difficult to spot a close ship at night with binoculars (actually, its the wake you usually spot).
And its not as if the Germans have much choice of route, the RN can pretty much work out what line they are on.
The Germans are screwed either way - if its dark, they are more difficult to spot, but then cant see where they are going either - if its lighter, they get sunk.
Radar wasn't the only way to spot targets at night and night combat was very SOP, as well as part of typical training, for the destroyers of the time. As you mentioned, good weather would help initial spotting by star light or moon light. Illuminating rounds (starshell) were normally used. The units also carried spotlights.
In addition to all of that, which would be ordinary fare in any WWI naval action at night, and in many radar-less WWII engagements too, there are several factors helping the British:
- the Channel is a big place, but still very small if compared to searching for a target in the Ocean,
- the British know exactly where the enemy units would go, and know a list of only a few possible starting points, and know the enemy has neither time nor space for evasive routes,
- the traffic is heavy, it's what's called "a target-rich environment" in air battles,
- as usual, the consequences of previous engagements help the following ones; if your boat is on fire at night, having escaped the enemy that lighted it up won't be very important when the next one shows up,
- the decision to fire or not is always more difficult to take when you're outgunned. Imagine being in a dark corridor. You think you've spotted something moving ahead, your opponent coming at you; it seems he has not seen you, but he's moving in your direction. You could fire first. Only, he's wearing a flak vest and carrying a .45 SMG, while you have a .22 revolver. If you fire, you'll probably just signal your presence and approximate position. OTOH, as soon as he thinks he's seen something, he'll fire, just to see if he can get you by any chance, and he'll be relatively less worried about your revolver.