A Better Rifle at Halloween

The Kaiser Speaks
5th September 1914, Berlin.

The Kaiser was raving, frothing at the mouth, incoherent with rage, “Disaster, nothing but disaster, we are loosing Prussia to those Russian savages and our army does nothing but retreat. Konigsburg will fall to the Cossacks and into destruction and rapine. The Belgians delay us and shoot our soldiers from behind the hedgerows, you promised me victory, that our army would capture Liege in 2 days, that we would sweep into France and onto victory”.
The Kaiser paused, he looked around the room at von Falkenheim and von Moltke snarling “you have failed me, you have failed Germany, you have betrayed my men by your incompetence” his rage barely subsided and he turned to von Tirpitz “You are just as bad as the Generals, lets raid Ostend you said, we can be in and out before they even know we are there. Instead, what do we have 2 battlecruiser sunk and nothing to show for it, thousands of sailors dead or prisoner and the Dutch furious for our breach of their neutrality. Our navy looks weak and incompetent, I helped you build a navy, I struggled with the politicians who didn’t want to. I gave you my support and this is how you repay me, with destroyed ships, dead men and nothing but humiliation as our prize.
“This war will not end in Victory, come back with plans to win or do not come back at all.” With that Wilhelm dismissed his cabinet and sat down.
 
The difference is that Wilhelm allegedly opposed the war in general and the invasion of Belgium in particular but was ignored by the Government and Generals.
 
The difference is that Wilhelm allegedly opposed the war in general and the invasion of Belgium in particular but was ignored by the Government and Generals.
True, in this scenario he is irate because of the damage done to his army and navy. But Germany had waged 3 wars of aggression to forge his empire so something was a bit rotten there.
 
True, in this scenario he is irate because of the damage done to his army and navy. But Germany had waged 3 wars of aggression to forge his empire so something was a bit rotten there.

iOTL the Kaisers reaction to the much absolutely slighter losses at Heligoland (though the balance was even more one-sided)

To preserve his ships the Kaiser determined that the fleet should, "hold itself back and avoid actions which can lead to greater losses". Admiral Hugo von Pohl, Chief of the German Naval Staff, wired Ingenohl that, "in his anxiety to preserve the fleet [William] ... wished you to wire for his consent before entering a decisive action".

(summarised on Wiki from Massies epic Tome "Castles of Steel" )

So given the knocks ashore and afloat this level of angst is at least plausible

BTW: it seems the WW1 Prussian military/naval hierarchy had the same opinion as the WW2 Nazi Marshals (- if only we had been in charge itis)

Alfred von Tirpitz was outraged by this decision and wrote after the war,

The Emperor did not wish for losses of this sort ... Orders [were] issued by the Emperor ... after an audience with Pohl, to which I as usual was not summoned, to restrict the initiative of the Commander-in-Chief of the North Sea Fleet. The loss of ships was to be avoided; fleet sallies and any greater undertakings must be approved by His Majesty in advance. I took the first opportunity to explain to the Emperor the fundamental error of such a muzzling policy. This step had no success, but on the contrary, there sprang up from that day forth an estrangement between the Emperor and myself which steadily increased."


(quoted on Wiki from Tirpitzs 1919 memoir)
 
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One could easily view it as the Kaiser viewing the ships as his so now his toys have been broken and destroyed he's not happy.
 
One could easily view it as the Kaiser viewing the ships as his so now his toys have been broken and destroyed he's not happy.
Very expensive toys to loose at that if you consider the cost to both build and man a Dreadnaught, Battleship or Battlecruiser.
 
A Hasty Attack
5th September 1914, Hensies.

Lt General Byng could hear the shellfire from his command post in a farmhouse near the village of Hensies, he had just been appointed commander of VI Corps after its original commander, Lt General Rundle had been killed the previous day by German shell fire whilst he was inspecting forward positions, Rundle had been the Governor of Malta but had been recalled into command with the decision to deploy the additional Territorial Units.
Byng had arrived in France several days ago with troops of the British Army in Egypt. With the arrival of a brigade of the Indian Army, a British Regular Battalion had been deployed to France, the 1st Battalion of the Worcestershire Regiment had been chosen for that role.
The Worcester’s were currently being retained at Corps Headquarters as part of the reserve for VI Corps. The German attack had not been very stoutly pressed yet, but it was still very trying for the Territorials who made up the majority of VI Corps, in the privacy of his own mind Byng thought that the territorials needed to have regular troops attached to reinforce them. With only on battalion of regulars to hand, it was to use an American expression he had heard as a young man like trying to “stiffen a bucket of spit with a handful of buckshot.”
The BEF had the numbers to hold the line firmly as far as Condee, the Cavalry Corps were deployed from Condee towards Saint Amand les Eaux with their backs to the forest. Using them in this kind of defensive role also tied them down and removed the tactical mobility which was the major advantage of cavalry. In addition they were unable to perform the screening and patrolling roles that cavalry traditionally provided.
Byng was aware of the risk of the Germans getting between his forces and the channel ports. The French were forming an additional Army the 6th which would be used to reinforce towards Lille but nothing anchored the line beyond a few French territorials until they arrived. The Belgian fortresses at Namur were under sustained and continuous artillery attack from heavy guns and the view among the senior officers of the BEF was that Namur could well fall especially if the assault on it was conducted with real aggression. The Germans did not seem to be attacking heavily along the rest of the French lines nor much of the BEF lines they seemed content to mainly use artillery to dominate the battlefield and keep the existing troops stuck in place.
In Byng’s mind and that of General Smith-Dorien, the reckless advance of the German Army into Belgium was placing it at grave risk, even if they reached the channel ports. The British Third Army was holding Ghent and Ostend and so had a secure base on one flank, not even counting the Belgian defenders of Antwerp who were un-attacked behind the National Redoubt. They continued to improve the defences of the City in preparation for siege. Planning was ongoing for an attack by the Belgian Army to take place from Antwerp towards Leuven. This would be done to distract the Germans from their ongoing attack on Namur.
The British Third Army was also preparing to attack, the German units which were occupying the positions opposite them were all reservists and they seemed unwilling to attack the British forces. General Plumer was developing a plan in conjunction with the Belgians for an attack towards Dendermonde to directly tie the British forces into the defences of Antwerp. Currently a gap existed and the risk was that the Germans would be able to press into it to cut Antwerp off from the coast. This would also protect the railway line between Antwerp and Ghent which was crucial for supply of the city.
But for the current time it was the German Army which was on the offensive and his soldiers were bearing the brunt of the fighting. So far, his lines had held but the 2nd London Brigade on his left flank had taken heavy casualties. The commanding officer of the 8th Battalion The London Regiment had been killed this morning with his adjutant badly wounded by the same shell, the divisional commander had detached one of his staff officers to take command of the Battalion. The German units had been shelling his lines heavily but had not made any attacks with infantry yet, his men were returning fire at long range when the Germans exposed themselves but without achieving any success.
Of more concern were his guns, the 15 pounder guns which equipped his artillery batteries were obsolete, they were unable to effectively answer the German howitzers which seemed to fire from behind cover never exposing themselves to counter battery fire. The best his men could do was dig in and hope for the best, he did have one brigade of 5” howitzers with each of his divisions and a 4 gun battery of 4.7” guns with each division as well. His gunners would have to do their best with what they had, but he expected casualties to be high among their units.
The main threat to VI Corps and the BEF as a whole, was that if the 2nd London Brigade was pushed back off the canal line, the flank of the Cavalry Corps would then be open to turning and cut off from the rest of the British Expeditionary Force they would be at risk of piecemeal destruction.
Byng had one brigade of the East Lancashire division in reserve, the Manchester Brigade, he sent orders that it was to deploy to Thivancelle where it would reinforce the 2nd London Division, if the Slag heap and coal workings on the north side of the Mons Conde Canal were not strongly held the Brigade was to conduct a hasty attack to capture them and then dig in, establishing communications back to the Cavalry in Condee. The attack was risky but it would disrupt the German attempts to push his men off the canal line and give him control of the high slag heap from which artillery observers could spot shell fire.
Thinking about it he considered ordering another attack across the canal to capture the slag heap opposite his headquarters, he could not see any German troops on it and it would also dominate the surrounding terrain.
The opportunity was limited, the bridge across the canal to the village opposite was still standing, his engineers had not blown it.
He called his Artillery advisor and the battalion commander of the Worcesters, they could undertake the attack at short notice, the guns would fire on the village and the slag heap while the Worcesters crossed the canal. The attack would commence at the same time as the attack on the other slag heap, in 3 hours. He would let his guns fire for 10 minutes before the attack commenced so the Germans didn’t get any advance warning. Then the Infantry would advance, he sent word back to Army headquarters of his intention. But he felt that holding the high ground overlooking his position would improve his defences, it would also throw any German plans to attack his positions into disarray. These two attacks would strip his corps of all of its reserves, but the risk was worth the reward.
 
"Strip his corps of all of his reserve" sounds a tad ominous when they're being put on the defensive. I do hope that he's got units prepared to blow the bridges just in case it all goes wrong.
 
I am surprised to see a Corps commander ordering an attack independently at this stage of the war. British organization pre-war didn’t really make any allowance for Corps level
organization. Besides that, the massive expansion of the army experienced staff officers for Corps staff were hard to come by. This meant that Corps were generally used as a post box at this stage of the war, relaying orders from Army to Division and reports and requests from Division to Army. I don’t think Corps even had control of the Heavy artillery yet IOTL, with it still being with Army and field artillery with Division.
 
I am surprised to see a Corps commander ordering an attack independently at this stage of the war. British organization pre-war didn’t really make any allowance for Corps level
organization. Besides that, the massive expansion of the army experienced staff officers for Corps staff were hard to come by. This meant that Corps were generally used as a post box at this stage of the war, relaying orders from Army to Division and reports and requests from Division to Army. I don’t think Corps even had control of the Heavy artillery yet IOTL, with it still being with Army and field artillery with Division.
Upon review I realized I am thinking of later in the war. Until the OTL reorganization into multiple Armies in December Corps commanders did have fairly significant control.

So, nope, ignore me. Nothing to see here.....
 
Upon review I realized I am thinking of later in the war. Until the OTL reorganization into multiple Armies in December Corps commanders did have fairly significant control.

So, nope, ignore me. Nothing to see here.....
That’s ok, I was thinking about Haig and smith dorien at Le cateau. Also it’s a fairly minor realignment of the line to take away a threat. Unless it’s a disaster
 
The Manchesters Attack
5th September 1914, Hensies.

The attacks had gone in, the German shelling which had been striking along the canal edge and causing casualties amongst the Territorial Force 15 pounder gunners, lifted and crashed down on the attacking brigade. The attack they had attempted faltered, but then they rallied and rushed the bridges over the canal, crossing the canal at the bridge and over the locks they pushed onwards towards the slag heap. The Manchester Brigade had provided the attacking infantry, with 7th Battalion going into the attack first. The plan that the brigade commander had developed for the attack was simple, the 7th Battalion cross the canal and capture any German positions near the canal. The 6th and 8th Battalions would then cross the canal and push up onto the slag heaps, digging in and consolidating their position. The 5th Battalion would provide a reserve and reinforcement for the attacking battalions.
A battery of 15 pounders pushed forward with the 7th Battalion almost to the water’s edge, the German infantry, fired on the advancing British troops but the attack was so unexpected that they seemed paralysed into indecision. A single machine gun was emplaced in the upper floor of a farmhouse nearby, it extracted a tithe of the lead battalion, but the supporting gunners spotted the position and managed to suppress the gun before it completely blunted the attack. The German artillery was firing effectively but their focus had been on attacking the British defenders and not repelling an assault on their lines.
The British first wave albeit with heavy losses had managed to capture the German positions on the far side of the canal, this was the signal for the second part of the attack to go in. The two territorial units had already advanced almost to the canal edge, they used the shallow draining ditches which crisscrossed the flat farmland as cover whilst they waited for the first wave of the attack to go in.
The subalterns lead their men out of the ditches, they crowded the canal paths and crossed over the canal. As they advanced, they did not stop for the scattered bodies of the men of the 7th battalion, they pushed on, their discipline held. The stretcher bearers of both the attacking Manchester Brigade and the London Brigade holding the canal line would deal with the wounded.
They reached the limit of the advance of the 7th from here on it would be they who faced the foe, their courage would determine the success or failure of the attack. The few older officers and NCOs who had fought in South Africa gave steadying advice and then the order came. “Battalion will Fix Bayonets” “Fix Bayonets” with that order a glimmering line of sword bayonets sprouted atop the Magazine Lee Enfield rifles which equipped the battalion, nearly a foot of double-edged steel glinting in the sun. The whistles blew and subalterns, men who a short month ago had been solicitors and management trainees, schoolteachers and the like gripped their swords and lead their men into the storm of steel. Their training on drill evenings and annual camps had been limited, but their orders were simple advance to the top of the slag heaps and dig in, hold until relieved.
The German defenders had responded quickly to the British attack, but they German infantry units had been expecting to go on the attack. They had not expected the British to attempt to storm the high ground north of the canal, the area was a wilderness of slag heaps, coal mounds and mine workings. Only a small number of German troops were occupying it, mainly artillery observers and signallers. Most of the German soldiers were not positioned along the canal line but rather were occupying a number of farmhouses and a light skirmishing line in the ditches behind the canal out of observation of the British frontline. The small number of Machine guns were positioned to attack the British line and support their own offensive, they were not so well placed to defend.
The British Infantry stormed forward, remembering annual camps and led by their Officers and NCO’s they kept moving forward, seeking the cover of any dead ground and fire and movement they advanced rapidly on the slag heaps, gaining the tops of the heaps, they used the advantage of being in enfilade of the German lines.
The next hour was one of carnage, the attacking British battalions had managed to do two things, bring up all eight of the maxim guns attached to the brigade and bring up a unit of signallers, who had managed to rig a field telegraph line but who had also brought semaphore flags.
The Maxim guns were able to fire down onto the German infantry, their hasty cover which had provided adequate protection from observers on the other side of the canal provided no such protection from machine guns placed above them and in line or even rearward of their positions. In addition to the machine gun fire, which was ripping out, the British Territorials were demonstrating the value of the Magazine Lee Enfield Riffle, firing upwards of 10 aimed shots per minute into the disintegrating lines of German infantry. The signallers were attempting to establish communications with the artillery of the London Division, in an attempt to get them into action, but it was proving to be slower than planned for, the combination of signalling errors and the lack of forward observers was hampering effective fire. Eventually a number of enterprising gunner officers made their way forward to direct the heavy battery and the 5” howitzers but by the time they had done this the opportunity for really effective execution had been lost.
The 15 pounder guns had contributed somewhat mainly by firing shrapnel which hampered the attempts of the Germans to withdraw from the beaten zone of the maxim guns and the rifles.
The attempt by the Worcester’s was much less successful, they had been held up by more machine guns who had caused severe casualties as soon as the attack commenced. They managed to storm across the canal, but the local German regimental commander responded with a near instantaneous counter attack forcing the battered remnants back over the canal. They withdrew back through the British lines in some disorder, leaving many men dead around the locks and bridges they had attempted to use. More men had retreated as darkness had fallen, with many wounded recovered by searching stretcher bearers, the battalion had lost many of its officers and NCO's.
Reviewing the reports and his own observations, Byng was surprised by the success of the Manchester Brigade, the men of that brigade had managed to capture their objective and cause a significant disruption to the German attack. On the other hand a near identical objective which was to be attacked by a single battalion of regulars turned into a bloodbath. Losses where higher for the Worcester’s than for the entirety of the Manchester Brigade, 200 dead and 300 wounded, whilst the butchers bill for the Manchester’s in the initial attack was 180 dead, mainly from the 7th battalion, the 6th and 8thbattalions had not suffered as badly in their attack on the slag heap. Although now that they were holding it, they were coming under sustained artillery fire as the Germans would attempt to push them off the position prior to attacking the canal line defences.
 
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