A Better Rifle at Halloween

Some of problems with WW1 stories are ;
The Western front is years of attrition via trench warfare unless you change the tech tree, no sweeping moves just hard slog,
The Naval side is pretty fixed unless ASB's change things ( the RN has numbers, production, training and tech over the HSF )
The air war is not going to be decisive without ASB's.
Russia in any long war will collapse in on itself, AH is in not much of a better state and the Ottoman's possibly worse ( the OTL fate of Armenians does not endear readers to them in any case also)

So you need to focus on a small aspect or change things almost to the point of ASB to get a decent story.
I think there is actually a lot more potential for POD's in WW1 than we give credit for. The problem is, I think, that it is as much an exercise in accounting as it is storytelling. Changes are more likely to add up to the final total than majorly change the map in the course of weeks or months.
 
So instead of building a mixed Royal Naval Division and sending it to the Antwerp like OTL, reduce the size of the Grand Fleets' Royal Marine detachments and field a purely Royal Marine Division and equip them with the Farquhar-Hill rifle instead.

I expect that Churchill will get a bee in his bonnet about Gallipoli, so they'd end up there instead of the OTL formation.
 
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Some of problems with WW1 stories are ;
The Western front is years of attrition via trench warfare unless you change the tech tree, no sweeping moves just hard slog,
The Naval side is pretty fixed unless ASB's change things ( the RN has numbers, production, training and tech over the HSF )
The air war is not going to be decisive without ASB's.
Russia in any long war will collapse in on itself, AH is in not much of a better state and the Ottoman's possibly worse ( the OTL fate of Armenians does not endear readers to them in any case also)

So you need to focus on a small aspect or change things almost to the point of ASB to get a decent story.
The Western Front is really only about 2 years of trench warfare. In the first 12 months, WWI was a war of maneuver, as it was basically for the last 12 months. The idea that the Western Front was a war of attrition, fought out in the trenches is one that has come to predominate in the media, mainly through the endless recycling of the same film stock, time after time. In the East, the war was primarily one of maneuver, interspaced with periods of positional warfare. In Palestine it was primarily a war of maneuver as it was in Mesopotamia with, again periods of positional warfare.
 
So instead of building a mixed Royal Naval Division and sending it to the Antwerp like OTL, reduce the size of the Grand Fleets' Royal Marine detachments and field a purely Royal Marine Division and equip them with the Farquhar-Hill rifle instead.
Bit like in WW2 , the British never had a problem with BESA machine guns using different ammunition since they were4 only used in tanks and the Tank Corps had a separate logistical set up. So any separate force could be given them ( not a wild thought that Churchill is introduced to the idea of Commandos early on. The need for firepower to make up for numbers would fit )
 
The Western Front is really only about 2 years of trench warfare. In the first 12 months, WWI was a war of maneuver, as it was basically for the last 12 months. The idea that the Western Front was a war of attrition, fought out in the trenches is one that has come to predominate in the media, mainly through the endless recycling of the same film stock, time after time. In the East, the war was primarily one of maneuver, interspaced with periods of positional warfare. In Palestine it was primarily a war of maneuver as it was in Mesopotamia with, again periods of positional warfare.
Western front was trench warfare from late 1914 ( when the Germans pulled back to a defensible line after failing at the Marne ) to the Ludendorff Offensive in March 1918 , more than 3 years not 2. Breach's were made during a few offensives but these were limited , at staggering cost and no manoeuvre warfare resulted. Never mentioned the other areas since logistics played a big role ( very limited railway or even road ) , the Eastern Front was decided by the October Revolution and , to be frank, the Middle East is not going to be decisive.
 
Western front was trench warfare from late 1914 ( when the Germans pulled back to a defensible line after failing at the Marne ) to the Ludendorff Offensive in March 1918 , more than 3 years not 2. Breach's were made during a few offensives but these were limited , at staggering cost and no manoeuvre warfare resulted. Never mentioned the other areas since logistics played a big role ( very limited railway or even road ) , the Eastern Front was decided by the October Revolution and , to be frank, the Middle East is not going to be decisive.
I think the "Middle-East" (actually, South-West Asia) was decisive for the Ottoman Empire.
 
So instead of building a mixed Royal Naval Division and sending it to the Antwerp like OTL, reduce the size of the Grand Fleets' Royal Marine detachments and field a purely Royal Marine Division and equip them with the Farquhar-Hill rifle instead.

I expect that Churchill will get a bee in his bonnet about Gallipoli, so they'd end up there instead of the OTL formation.
Bit like in WW2 , the British never had a problem with BESA machine guns using different ammunition since they were4 only used in tanks and the Tank Corps had a separate logistical set up. So any separate force could be given them ( not a wild thought that Churchill is introduced to the idea of Commandos early on. The need for firepower to make up for numbers would fit )
Churchill doesn't actually need to introduce it. He just has to not fitter it away on garrison duties. Battenburg had begun the process in 1912 that would lead to the creation of the "Special Service Squadron" of the Royal Marines. The idea was that since the infamous 1911 meeting of the CID made it clear that the Army would not be available for use in amphibious landings, the Royal Navy should develop this capability on its own. This was put in place and the best place at the time to test the idea was the new base at Scapa Flow. They needed more troops to garrison it to plug the holes in the defense. The problem was this then muddied the idea of what the squadron was for, amphibious assault or garrison duty. When war broke out, since the defenses at Scapa had not been adequately built up, Churchill put most of the Special Service Squadron (which represented a significant part of those RM not deployed on ships) into garrison duty at Scapa again. But the force had been envisioned, and largely trained for expeditionary warfare.

It was only about 800 men, as planned, but that it still could be the start of a significant expansion of the RM role.
 
The RN does have a history of going its own way with small arms, a later OTL example was the 9mm Lanchester SMG in 1940, and yes that was a Churchill sponsored gun.
 
On logistics

In WW1 smalls arms ammo was a very small part of a given units logistical burden - the majority of a Divisions daily logistics would be food, water, horse fodder (and later fuel for some), artillery shells, mail, with bullets for smalls arms probably the smallest part of that burden and machine gun ammunition probably the lions share of that small slice.

It only really becomes an issue at the small unit end where Section and platoon ends up with multiple calibres - which we do not really see until weapons like the M1 carbine and SMGs are introduced within a section/squad in the next war.

It is here that the 'problem' of multiple ammunition types that needs to be carried by the squad/section that cannot be shared between weapons becomes a potential issue.

I note that it does not appear to have been that big of an issue as most of the principle combatants ended up with 2 or 3 calibres at section level and seemed to manage.

So I do not think that having a Brigade with its own proprietary ammunition is going to be an issue unless its an incredibly bad day/week at the office
 
The RN does have a history of going its own way with small arms, a later OTL example was the 9mm Lanchester SMG in 1940, and yes that was a Churchill sponsored gun.
No just that, but they adopted the Webley Self Loading Pistol in 1912.




I wonder how the stuffed shirts in the War Office would react to a Royal Marine Division equipped with both S.L.R's and Semi Automatic pistols showing up in France?
 
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On logistics

In WW1 smalls arms ammo was a very small part of a given units logistical burden - the majority of a Divisions daily logistics would be food, water, horse fodder (and later fuel for some), artillery shells, mail, with bullets for smalls arms probably the smallest part of that burden and machine gun ammunition probably the lions share of that small slice.

It only really becomes an issue at the small unit end where Section and platoon ends up with multiple calibres - which we do not really see until weapons like the M1 carbine and SMGs are introduced within a section/squad in the next war.

It is here that the 'problem' of multiple ammunition types that needs to be carried by the squad/section that cannot be shared between weapons becomes a potential issue.
The danger when it comes to supplying this small amount of proprietary ammunition is not that the logistic system will break down entire, but that those specific, very important, supplies of ammunition will not make it to that specific formation, which I would argue is a very real possibility. In such a situation the effectiveness of that formation is significantly degraded.

If an entire Army Group, Army, Corps or even Division was going to a new round it might actually be easier as certain segment of the logistics system can then be dedicated to the new round. Though this is also the type of situation where broader breakdowns are possible.

I note that it does not appear to have been that big of an issue as most of the principle combatants ended up with 2 or 3 calibres at section level and seemed to manage.
Usually not is frontline service if they could help it. The British had the .303 in the front and the .30-06 and 6.5 Arisaka in rear echelons. The French had the 8 mm Lebel in the Front Line and the 11 mm Gras in some rear echelon and gendarme roles. The Germans had the 7.92 Mauser in the front and maybe some 11 mm Mauser in the rear. Austria Hungary and Russia are maybe the best examples of your point but my understanding is that they had so many calibres in front line service more due to desperation than choice, and I don't think anyone thought it improved their performance.

So I do not think that having a Brigade with its own proprietary ammunition is going to be an issue unless its an incredibly bad day/week at the office
To sum up, I have to disagree with you here. IMO this would represent a non-negligible, and more importantly, unnecessary burden on the logistical system. Especially when the same company can make the same rifle in your standard calibre. I can't say for sure that Churchill would not do it, though I don't think he will. I know I wouldn't do it were I in his position. Even if I were the brigade or Divisional commander I think I would tell the London Scottish that they can draw SMLE's when they are under my command, and send the .280's back to help train the other battalions in their regiment. But that is me, and I am thankfully not Churchill (for one thing I have a hard time picturing him typing on a computer)
 
The danger when it comes to supplying this small amount of proprietary ammunition is not that the logistic system will break down entire, but that those specific, very important, supplies of ammunition will not make it to that specific formation, which I would argue is a very real possibility. In such a situation the effectiveness of that formation is significantly degraded.

If an entire Army Group, Army, Corps or even Division was going to a new round it might actually be easier as certain segment of the logistics system can then be dedicated to the new round. Though this is also the type of situation where broader breakdowns are possible.


Usually not is frontline service if they could help it. The British had the .303 in the front and the .30-06 and 6.5 Arisaka in rear echelons. The French had the 8 mm Lebel in the Front Line and the 11 mm Gras in some rear echelon and gendarme roles. The Germans had the 7.92 Mauser in the front and maybe some 11 mm Mauser in the rear. Austria Hungary and Russia are maybe the best examples of your point but my understanding is that they had so many calibres in front line service more due to desperation than choice, and I don't think anyone thought it improved their performance.


To sum up, I have to disagree with you here. IMO this would represent a non-negligible, and more importantly, unnecessary burden on the logistical system. Especially when the same company can make the same rifle in your standard calibre. I can't say for sure that Churchill would not do it, though I don't think he will. I know I wouldn't do it were I in his position. Even if I were the brigade or Divisional commander I think I would tell the London Scottish that they can draw SMLE's when they are under my command, and send the .280's back to help train the other battalions in their regiment. But that is me, and I am thankfully not Churchill (for one thing I have a hard time picturing him typing on a computer)
Firstly Winston is likely to have a secretary...... ;)

I think moving the ammunition from the UK to Belgium is not a very difficult issue for the British armed forces of the day

If it was the armpit of the world somewhere requiring weeks on a metal boat then yes I could see it being an issue - but not for units based a days travel from the UK

In the context of ammunition resupply being such an issue that it prevents unit armed with the FH rifle running out then as I said - particularly bad week at the office and I suspect that a Brigade being out of supply would be very low down on the list of immediate issues.

Happy to disagree - I just don't think its a major concern.
 
What is most likely to happen if the F-H proves itself in limited combat and is chosen for more widespread service is that the British will order it in .303.
 
What is most likely to happen if the F-H proves itself in limited combat and is chosen for more widespread service is that the British will order it in .303.



I'd guess it wouldn't be 'forgotten' but would probably become more common as the war went on, sure by 1914 its rare but if its a success and the UK and Army and brass latch onto it, then by the time of the great offensives of 1916, well it could be a lot more common. And by 1918, its actually looking at displacing and entirely replacing the SMLE.

Maybe its first big deployment would be a Somme offensive analogue, some of the Pal's Battalions are issued them instead of SMLE's and it marks the first large scale deployment of the gun?

I think we'd also see wartime changes, the magazine might evolve into a simpler and easier to load box type magazine instead of the somewhat cumbersome one it initially had.
 
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To change the magazine feed system would mean a fairly major change to the rifle in that the inbuilt feed lips that are an integral part of the bottom of the receiver would need to be removed and a new magazine well designed and fitted. It may be possible to design a Madsen style box magazine that would work with the existing feed lips, just requiring a suitable magazine well.
I like the Idea of giving this rifle to the Marines and the Naval Brigade (separate logistics tail not so much of a problem) and attach the Scottish regiment to give them some experienced infantry as mentors!!!!
 
I like the Idea of giving this rifle to the Marines and the Naval Brigade (separate logistics tail not so much of a problem) and attach the Scottish regiment to give them some experienced infantry as mentors!!!!

Same, for smaller numbers of troops who need a lot of firepower basically.
 
Yeah the gun being the gun for the marines seems to be rather realistic since they are a diffrent service so they can avoid the caliber issues. Altough if your going for the idea of adopting the 280 at the end of ww1 for some reason as one of the points of the timeline. Even if they arent that many and that would also involve creating the industry. It isnt possible for the guns to be a main infantry weapon for ww1 to be honest.

And i think people have simplified ww1 abit too much .It is done here already - just kill off someone important enough or get them be injured enough that they resign the job and watch the butterflys fly . The bef already has a diffrent commander wich is honestly rather massive especially for ww1 wich is very rarely explored. I mainly have read central powers stories about ww1 and naval stories only . Im pretty sure there havent been ww1 stories from the entente side or atleast big and popular ones was my point.
 
After the war's over, you could sell some to the Dutch and they could equip the KNIL with them for when the Japanese come acalling in '42...
 
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