A Better Rifle at Halloween

Does anyone know when the French invented the super quick or instantaneous fuse. It was before the British but I am not sure how much earlier, the French had the same obsession with the 75 and the British did with the 18 pounder but I think they did have more high explosive. They struggled to get enough heavy guns and had to bring back museum pieces.
 
IIRC the French went so nuts with the 75 and fell in love with how mobile it was, that they quite deliberately ignored heavy artillery, thinking that the 75 would be enough because its light weight would allow the shorter ranged gun to keep up with their fast moving infantry and cavarly columns.
 
IIRC the French went so nuts with the 75 and fell in love with how mobile it was, that they quite deliberately ignored heavy artillery, thinking that the 75 would be enough because its light weight would allow the shorter ranged gun to keep up with their fast moving infantry and cavarly columns.
I think it was also because of how they interpreted their own experience of the Franco-Prussian War as well and went for a more aggressive doctrine.
 
Does anyone know when the French invented the super quick or instantaneous fuse. It was before the British but I am not sure how much earlier, the French had the same obsession with the 75 and the British did with the 18 pounder but I think they did have more high explosive. They struggled to get enough heavy guns and had to bring back museum pieces.
Hello,

This is all I could find...
 
Hello,

This is all I could find...
Thanks, I had found that site as well, I was sure that they had them earlier than the British, but as to when? I am not sure if any one had true instantaneous fuses in 1914, the germans had the greatest variety and made them single purpose which seems smart. They also recognised the value of heavy guns ahead of the allies as we have seen.
 
IIRC the French went so nuts with the 75 and fell in love with how mobile it was, that they quite deliberately ignored heavy artillery, thinking that the 75 would be enough because its light weight would allow the shorter ranged gun to keep up with their fast moving infantry and cavarly columns.
The 75 went with their approach valuing the morale over the material. The spirit of the bayonet, summed up in the 1914 manual "The will to eliminate the enemy in close combat with the bayonet."
I think it was also because of how they interpreted their own experience of the Franco-Prussian War as well and went for a more aggressive doctrine.
Yes, their doctrine was highly aggressive, also they learnt the Japanese lesson from the Russo-Japanese war, they knew they would take heavy casualties but that was the price of business. The French casualties were something like 300k dead in the first 5 months of the war, vastly worse than the Germans at this point or the British.
 
I don't think German casualties were much less than the French for 1914, as their officers tended to be extremely aggressive as well.
 
The 75 went with their approach valuing the morale over the material. The spirit of the bayonet, summed up in the 1914 manual "The will to eliminate the enemy in close combat with the bayonet."

Yes, their doctrine was highly aggressive, also they learnt the Japanese lesson from the Russo-Japanese war, they knew they would take heavy casualties but that was the price of business. The French casualties were something like 300k dead in the first 5 months of the war, vastly worse than the Germans at this point or the British.
On top of the 75 they also had an ancient selection of heavy artillery that they had no real clear doctrine in how to employ it as well. Heck I think if you asked a french officer at the start or the war or in the years before about their heavy gun doctrine you would get a blank stare back.
 
On top of the 75 they also had an ancient selection of heavy artillery that they had no real clear doctrine in how to employ it as well. Heck I think if you asked a french officer at the start or the war or in the years before about their heavy gun doctrine you would get a blank stare back.
On an interesting note they found some of the old mortars worked and put them into service.
 

Ramontxo

Donor
As I I remember it they got a lot of old fashioned heavy artillery from anywhere they could find. And as new (and quite good) models were fielded they were put back in reserve only to having to take the field again when the more modern ones werent able to cope.
PS
I had a wonderful book about this ,(bought in the best bookshop in Donosti "Ubiria"*) but it dident survive when I moved , shit
(In Arrasare street 48 near the beach now "Ubi liburdenda" it usually has english books it is a small business I support)
 
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Joffre
13th August 1914, Vitry-le-Francois.

The troop of Cuirassiers escorting the Staff Cars were gorgeously equipped and attired, their brass and steel equipment burnished to a gleam, the only note that they were at war was the dull brown covers worn over their breastplates.

The staff car was driven by a corporal of the Army Service Corps, in the rear of the vehicle were two men, Winston Churchill Secretary of State for War and First Lord of the Admiralty and his principal military adviser Sir John French.

They were met by General Joffre along with President Poincare at his headquarters, Churchill began by inquiring how the battle progressed, Joffre replied in French "I wanted more artillery and shells and the fools refused" and soon Churchill, Joffre and Poincare were in an involved discussion as Joffre spoke of the success then failure in the Alsace along with his removal of the General in Command and his appointment of General Pau to the Army of the Alsace.

Joffre then said that the attack into the Lorraine would commence the following day, whilst this conversation was going on Sir John French stood there, clearly only partially understanding and constantly asking Churchill what was being said, Churchill’s patience was being worn down by this and he snapped to one of the liaison officers, “Translate for Sir John,” his frustration evident.

Churchill spoke of his fear that the war would be long and only end in the exhaustion of the combatants. He ran through the planning and preparation which had been made and legislated through the Defence of the Realm Act, which empowered the Purchasing Commissioners. The Registration of Manpower Act which was being rushed through Westminster under the eye of Lloyd George to ensure that skilled personnel were not sucked out of industry into the Army and Navy, but which ensured that those who the Army needed would be made available.

He touched briefly on the planning going on to support the Belgians directly, two of the six regular divisions and a brigade of cavalry would be going directly to Ostend, they would be followed by 2 Territorial Division and a Yeomanry Division, hurriedly being embodied, and reinforced from those who had taken the Imperial Service Obligation.

Switching to English for Sir John, Churchill bade him to cover what support would be going direct to France, namely 4 Infantry Divisions and a Cavalry Division, with it to be reinforced by 4 Territorial Divisions and 2 Yeomanry Divisions as they became available.

The home army would be stripped to the bone for initial reinforcements, along with the special reserve. Many of the regulars would be returned to Britain as the Territorial Divisions became available. They would form training cadre, with their place taken by individual territorials transferring to regular regiments for the duration of the war. The territorial soldiers who had refused to take the Imperial Service Obligation would be transferred to training Battalions which would feed reinforcements to BEF. Training and recruitment was to be undertaken by the territorials, special reservists and other returned soldiers, however as many of those with front line experience as possible would be used for the final polish prior to deployment.

The numerous volunteers were registered and then released back to their civilian occupations, they would be called up for training and dispatched to France as individual reinforcements. The home establishment would only attempt to train as many men as could be practicably equipped and trained at any one time. Most volunteers would not expect to be called up for service for at least 3-6 months, whilst the training establishment was built up and the equipment to supply them was procured.

It was understood that the Territorials would have to stand in the line until more volunteers came on stream, they would also be re-equipped as a matter of priority, much of their equipment was obsolete and whilst it would be needed to begin with it would be first priority for replacement. The six initial territorial divisions planned for deployment were undergoing rapid training and hardening and already significant issues were being identified. The other divisions would be reinforced with new volunteers prior to deployment.

Joffre was unhappy with this, but somewhat mollified by Sir Johns passionate vow that Britain’s army would do all that could be done by mortal men. Both Churchill and Sir John French were adamant that untried divisions would not be thrown into the line. The British Army would grow but its growth would be managed whilst the vital resource that was its regular and territorial forces would have to be used as the nucleus of that growth was preserved as much as the hazards of war allowed.

The Indian Army would also be arriving with two Regular Divisions and one of Cavalry, they would supplement the Regular Army and the Territorial Force, likewise the dominions had already pledged forces and they would be available within six months.

Both Churchill and Poincare then resumed their discussions in French and touched on industrial preparations. They also agreed to form a pair of liaison committees which would facilitate sharing of resources as practical. It was at this point that Churchill informed Poincare, Joffre and Sir John French that Lieutenant General Girouard would be Quarter Master General and General Officer Commanding Lines of Communications for the BEF. Noting that he was already in discussions with General Smith Dorien as to how this role was to be carried out.

It was agreed that liaison officers would be supplied by both sides to the research committees, it was also agreed that for the duration of the war both parties would share such industrial and military technology as was available.
 
Hello,

This is all I could find...
I had another look, the French did have a super quick fuze in 1914, http://www.passioncompassion1418.com/decouvertes/english_fusees_collection_fr.html#Perc24311914
That is very handy, it's amazing what you find when you have a second look at a thing.
 
It astonished me to discover that the British developed instantaneous fuses separately to the French. They had them by 1916, so for loos aubers ridge etc they relied on very carefully fixed and aimed shrapnel fire.
 
The chief fault was it had too tight tolerances so it couldn't handle the Flanders mud or the variable quality of wartime service ammunition. These caused it to be very prone to jamming up. Also the heat treatment on the bolt head was faulty so the locking lugs were too brittle and could snap.

It was not a problem of tolerances, it was a problem of clearance.

A lot of people mix up the 2.

Tolerance is the difference between the maximum and minimum allowed dimension of a specific part. (example: "part #10 must be minimum 19.95 and maximum 20.05mm long")

Clearance is the space between 2 different adjaccent parts. (example : "there must be a space of 0.25mm between part #11 and part #12 to allow easy movement")


You do not increase reliability in the mud with loose tolerances.

You need to increase clearance between parts.

There were quite a few other problems with the Ross, such as
- the chambering being at the minimum allowed by the original British specifications, and the low quality British wartime ammo being out of specs and not fitting.

- the Ross rifle was too long and heavy for use in the trenches

- the Ross rifle was a nightmare to dissasemble and reassemble for complete maintenance

- ...

Take your pick

As a lot of people already said, the Ross was a slightly modified sporting rifle pressed into service without taking the time to adapt it properly to military use.

The main reason was that Ross and Hughes were of the opinion that the primary quality of a military rifle was high accuracy at very long range, and that reliability, ease of maintenance and ergonomy were irrelevant.
 
As a lot of people already said, the Ross was a slightly modified sporting rifle pressed into service without taking the time to adapt it properly to military use
Sort of. Technically Ross had built his rifle with Military contracts in mind from the beginning. Had he just built a sport rifle he could have probably made it even better at that goal. You do identify the problem though:

The main reason was that Ross and Hughes were of the opinion that the primary quality of a military rifle was high accuracy at very long range, and that reliability, ease of maintenance and ergonomy were irrelevant.
Yep, that is it in a nutshell. To be fair to Ross, in spite of his many and colourful flaws, he was a pretty good gun designer. When he had significant pushback on the rifle he did do a lot to fix it. Had the inmates not been running the asylum when it came to the small arms committee he may have made a good service rifle. He even offered a shorter, handier version pre-war but Hughes believed the longer gun was perfect. Ross was a problem in the equation but if you take Hughes out of it, it is likely possible to sort the rest out, should that be desired.

that the British developed instantaneous fuses separately to the French. They had them by 1916, so for loos aubers ridge etc they relied on very carefully fixed and aimed shrapnel fire.
Cooperation between members of the Entente was a slow process to learn and sort out. When entering the war everyone expected it to be short, and the British and French kind of expected to be rivals again at the end of it, so there was no real incentive to share, much less a streamlined process to do so.
 
HMS Vernon
13th August 1914, Portsmouth.

Admiral Percy Scott was back in Portsmouth, he had been summoned by the First Lord of the Admiralty for a meeting with Admirals Prince Louis of Battenberg and John Fisher. His role was to drive naval innovation, Churchill was unhappy with the slow progress of the fitting of director firing equipment on the Fleet’s dreadnoughts and battlecruisers. Prince Louis had looked uncomfortable when this slow progress was raised, and his unhappiness increased when the risks posed by the German submarines was mentioned. Scott’s second task was to take in hand antisubmarine warfare both against submarines on the surface and below.

Admiral Scott had spent the last 4 days dealing with director firing, he had instructed Sir John Jellicoe that he was to prepare a schedule for each ship to be equipped for director firing. This had been done with a considerable amount of complaint, he had pointed out that the First Lord had ordered it be done 2 years prior and so it would happen now, or men would be leaving their commands.

He had also managed to ensure that the building of the sixth Queen Elizabeth Class battleship continued, he pointed out that she would be finished in 1917 by which time the war would be won, in which case a fast battleship would be useful, especially one not worn down by wartime service. Or if the war continued the presence of an additional fast battle ship would strengthen the fleet, he had requested a design revision to look at modifying the bridge and the director positions to ensure that they were not blinded by smoke.

His current task however was to inspect HMS Vernon the School of Torpedo and Mine Warfare. As a gunnery expert Scott had a more than passing familiarity with HMS Vernon, his belief in the value of long range gunnery was driven in part by the need to kill torpedo carrying ships beyond the range of their weapons. His goal today was to familiarise himself with the School, the latest developments and to ensure that the right men were in the right jobs and the equipment being developed was useful.

He began with an interview with Captain Nicholson, commander of the School, asking “Captain, how do we stand for mine developments” Nicholson answered his questions promptly and clearly. He agreed that more work needed to be done on Mines especially on mines that could be tethered in deep water and to make them simpler to produce in large numbers. They then moved onto the subject of minelaying, discussing the need for fast minelayers to establish the minefields needed to hem in the Imperial German Navy and to assist with a distant blockade. The last part of the discussion related to antisubmarine warfare, Scott asked about the development of a high explosive dropping mine that could be used to attack a submarine, set to explode at a set depth by way of a pressure sensitive fuse. Captain Nicholson summoned the officer responsible for the ongoing development, Admiral Scott spoke to them both saying, “whatever support you need to develop the dropping mine you shall have, you can call my office directly and I will make sure that you get it. I want you to send me an update every fortnight on your progress, what is working in the design and what parts don’t. I am sure we will need this device soon and you must get it ready.”
 
Quick question isn't Room 40 kicking around right now if memory serves though the Intel they acquired wasn't communicated all that clearly initially in the war with other parts of the Navy that probably needs to change.
 
Room 40 was established very early on but was kind of amateur hour, they weren't able to do much till the Russians captured a German code book, it didn't get back to Britain till October. The French had the most sophisticated Sig Int at the start of the war obviously it was focussed on the Army. I will do a thing on code breaking as the story progresses, there is an issue I am going to flip, which relied on room 40.
 
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