A better prepared Japan.

With a PoD starting at 1930 how would the war change if Japan...

-Was more successful in China, was able to control more parts of China possibly even completely defeat nationalist and communist China.

-Went through a period of a mass industralization, giving it about a 30-40% parity with the US in industry.

-Had developed radar and naval fire control at around parity with the US before and during the war.

-Distanced itself from the decisive battle doctrine and was far more liberal with their battleships.

-Had a more efficient pilot training program that could produce around 500 pilots a year, ramped up to 2000 during war time.

-Due to more industry was able to build 4 Shokaku class carriers at once and has a total of 8 fleet carriers available for the Pearl Harbor attack.

-Had more success developing successor aircraft to replace their early war models, (a7m would be in production early 43 and possibly the G10N bomber in production in 44)

How would the war play out? How devastating would the attack on Pearl Harbor be with 2 extra carriers, and how would surface engagements change if Japan frequently used their heavier battleships instead of just the Kongo's for surface engagements? ( ie, The Nagato's and even the Yamato)

Japan just didn't have the right resources or industry to match against the United States. Realistically, Japan would have never been able to defeat America, as the latter had superior resources and industry to the drained Japanese empire. If Japan had fully conquered China, it would have been far too strained to successfully attack the Dutch and British, much less the Americans. If the Japanese really wanted to succeed, they should have considered attacking one enemy at a time and then wait a considerable time before launching another invasion. After the Japanese defeat the Chinese, they should wait at least 5 years before attacking another enemy, like the Soviet Union or the British and Dutch. America should be last priority for war, given its vast superiority in many categories.
 
The last post was from the USSBS history of the Japanese steel industry. The plan was completed in 1942 and there was further expansion afterwards. The big increase in the production of pig iron in comparison to ingot steel and finished steel was to eliminate the need to import scrap metal. This is the text it went with, which was from Pages 63 to 66.
3. Steel-making equipment

In the prewar period Japan had to rely heavily upon American, German, and British engineers and manufacturers of steel-making equipment if she wished to expand her industry. Coke ovens, blast furnaces, rolling mills and numerous important accessories were constructed or supplied, mainly by American concerns, right up to the embargo of 1940. Certain replacement parts, in turn, such as bearings and large rolls for rolling mills, had to be imported before the war from foreign sources. However, many Japanese engineers had journeyed to the United States and Germany ostensibly to purchase equipment, but at the same time to accumulate and absorb as much experience as possible. Thus by the time the war had started Japan had developed a capacity to supply much of her need in the field of heavy machinery and equipment.

4. Expansion plans for steel

As early as 1917, the Japanese government formulated far reaching policies aimed at creating a strong steel industry. Large scale expansion was encouraged through tax concessions, subsidies and tariff protection. Later the government promoted cartels and sponsored transportation important to the steel industry. These policies succeeded in increasing ingot steel production to 1,883,000 tons in 1931.

Following the 'Manchurian Incident' in 1931, Japan greatly accelerated the expansion of all heavy industry, admittedly to provide the backbone of national defense. All of the plans for expansion emphasized two goals: (1) over-all expansion of capacity and production and (2) self-sufficiency within the Japanese sphere of influence. First, specific action in the steel industry took place in the creation in 1934 by the government of the Japan Iron Manufacturing company by compelling the merger of the seven leading concerns. This new steel giant was originally 76 per cent owned by the government, and from its inception reflected the policy of the government and acted in its name.

Second, the Iron Manufacturing Industry Law (effective September 1937) provided for the licensing of iron and steel producers and for government direction of all expansion in the industry. Colonel SATO, H., of the Military Affairs Section of the War Ministry, has commented on that law as follows:

Whereas the purpose of steel controls had hitherto been the active fostering of the industrialists' interest, the newly enacted . . . law had as its primary object the rapid expansion of steel producing capacity and the creation of a self-sustaining steel industry . . . entering upon a period of military preparedness.

The primary production expansion plan, formally approved in January 1939, was the Cabinet Planning Board's embodiment of detailed plans for strengthening the critical industries. In it the expansion of steel capacity was given top priority. The period covered by the plan was five years, from 1938 through 1942. Its scope is shown in Table 4. Pig iron capacity was to be more than tripled, ingot-steel capacity was to be increased by 125 percent and finished-steel capacity by 85 percent in Japan proper, Korea, Manchukuo, and China.

The problem of establishing self-sufficiency within the Japanese sphere of influence with regard to essential raw materials was principally one of substituting pig iron for scrap. The established practice of using a high ratio of scrap to pig iron in the manufacture of steel had made Japan very dependent upon potential enemies such as the United States. This explains the great emphasis in their plans on increasing pig-iron capacity.

A corollary of that design was to accumulate stockpiles of iron ore, scrap, manganese, and other ferro-alloy ores. The venture into China resulted in giving the Japanese direct control over their major source of raw materials and thus neatly fitted into their program of self-sufficiency.

5. Success of expansion plans

Although the war commenced fully a year before the end of the five-year expansion period, a remarkable degree of success had been achieved by 1941. The over-all expansion is shown in Chart 1. The total metallurgical coke and pig-iron capacity in Japan, Korea, and Manchukuo had more than doubled from 1937 to 1941. Significant, but smaller, gains were made in ingot-steel and rolled-steel products capacity.1

' Data on forged and cast-steel capacity for these earlier years are not available.
 
The information in Chart 1 referred to above was originally in Post 16. Here it is again.
Production 1937, 1941 and 1944 Mk 2.jpg
 

CalBear

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Are there any markets or industries that Japan could have tapped into ATL if begun early on enough?
With the Depression it would be exceptionally difficult. Even before the Crash protectionism was a very real thing, with tariffs used to defend domestic producers, international aggression, and as a matter of public policy.

The "economic miracles" that are Japan and the Asian Tigers of today are exclusively the result of post WW II Free Trade policies. Imagine how many fewer cars Toyota or Hyundai would sell if their price suddenly jumped from $25k to $40K? The only reason those policies ever had a chance was post WW II there was, realistically ONE major trading partner left with money to spend and the U.S. chose to embrace free trade as part of the tool kit in containing Soviet expansion.

There is a legitimate chance that we will see what happens in a protectionist economy if Congress actually puts Trump's stated ideas of heavy tariffs (35% in the case of the PRC) and tearing up current multi-lateral trade agreements in favor of individual bi-lateral agreements.
 
With the Depression it would be exceptionally difficult. Even before the Crash protectionism was a very real thing, with tariffs used to defend domestic producers, international aggression, and as a matter of public policy.
How was growth in the Philippines during the time? By how I understand the Philippines had some autonomy but they were within America's fiscal system (and assumedly faced very little tariffs). Even if OTL Philippines didn't see much growth, could this mean that an ATL Philippines(where colonial gov't focuses on increasing economic strength via sweatshops, etc) see higher economic growth?
 
How was growth in the Philippines during the time? By how I understand the Philippines had some autonomy but they were within America's fiscal system (and assumedly faced very little tariffs). Even if OTL Philippines didn't see much growth, could this mean that an ATL Philippines(where colonial gov't focuses on increasing economic strength via sweatshops, etc) see higher economic growth?
The Encyclopaedia Britannica Book of the Year 1939 doesn't have a production table for the Philippines in 1937 in its article about the country.

But it does say that its exports for 1937 were valued at 304,634,562 Pesos against imports of 218,051,051,490 Pesos. The Peso was valued at 50 US Cents. The principal exports were sugar, acaba, coco-nut products, tobacco products, timber, iron ore and chrome ore. The article does not say so, but all the iron ore, which was of high quality, was bought by Japan.

The place was also a gold mine, literally. Monthly production of gold exceeded 5 million Pesos for the first time in March 1938 and in June 1938 was valued at 5,592,143 Pesos. Production for the first six months of 1938 was valued at 31,189,216 Pesos and 24,626,107 Pesos in the first six months of 1937.

At 01.01.38 it had a cash surplus of 90,000,000 Pesos. The estimated budget figures for 1938 were receipts of 80,445,700 Pesos and expenditure of 78,486,744 Pesos.

According to the USA Today article on the natural resources of the Philippines...
The Philippines is not a petroleum-rich country, but the land is still full of many valuable minerals. There are an estimated 21.5 billion metric tons of metal deposits in the Philippines and 19.3 billion metric tons of non-metal minerals in the ground. Nickel is the most abundant deposit in the Philippines, while iron and copper are also present in significant amounts.
The Encyclopaedia Britannica entry does not mention the nickel or copper, which I presume hadn't been discovered yet. IIRC from the research I have been doing on the Japanese economy, nickel and copper were two of the items that weren't available in the quantities Japan required from the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.
 
Are there any markets or industries that Japan could have tapped into ATL if begun early on enough?
It was probably doing so to its maximum ability anyway, but there are the countries of the Japanese Empire.

One of the things that gave the USA its economic advantage was its population estimated at 128,840,000 on 31st December 1936.

From the same source, Japan had a population of 70,500,000 at the end of 1936. Manchuko had a population of 33,836,898 at 30th June 1936. Unfortunately I have mislaid the photocopies with the parts on the Japanese Empire, so I don't have the populations of Formosa and Korea. I'm not sure that the Japanese exploited either of them as thoroughly as they could have as sources of raw materials.
 
On a war footing...for extended war with China, not western powers. There is a big difference. The impact of that war footing was to cause the decline in merchant shipping production from 1937 until 1942 because of the need to use metal for land warfare projects.
According to the British official history on the War Against Japan, the decline in merchant shipping production was due to the expansion of warship construction and repairing the ships the IJN already had.

This is the relevant passage...
During the 1930s Japan had improved and enlarged her merchant fleet by replacing slow and out-of-date vessels with fast new ones. By 1940 the merchant fleet consisted of over 700 ocean going freighters, 132 passenger-cargo vessels, off which forty-nine were capable of speeds of 15 knots or over, and forty-nine ocean-going tankers. The total tonnage of this fleet on the outbreak of war in December 1941 was approximately six million and the percentage of imports carried in her own vessels had risen from fifty-four in 1937 to sixty-five in 1941.

From 1937 onwards, having denounced the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty on Naval Limitation, Japan began to strengthen her naval forces at the expense of merchant shipbuilding output, since even in this period steel supply was limited and naval yards could cope with only some 40% of the naval requirements, the remainder having to be met by civilian shipyards. The following table illustrates the trend from 1937 to 1941.

img040.jpg


From 1936 to 1941 the modernisation and repair of existing naval units was undertaken, and by December 1941 only one destroyer was in need of repair.
 
Some very, very interesting statistics posted here by NOMISYRRUC and others too, which i'm sure will be helpful for future reference. If i'm to add just a small detail as to what could help improve Japan's situation, is if they "cheat" a bit more with warship constructions, especially after the London Treaty. In OTL trying to stay within the limits of the treaties caused many problems and what surely must have been a crippling amount of wasted labour and expense, as you know the DD, CA, CVs built in the early 1930s and some auxiliaries as well had serious faults especially because they tried to keep them as light as possible to comply with the treaty limitations while not sacrificing combat power, many had to be rebuilt, or delayed on the slips, thus eating up slip space and delaying subsequent ships etc.

So if they "cheat" a bit more, they save time, money and labour, and probably will be able to build the 2 extra carriers as the OP suggests, as well as some other valuable additions, like couple more cruisers, a few more DDs etc.

Anyway, i found this precisely because i was curious about Japan's merchant shipping and production, especially the REDUCED production before WW2. I was pondering that even if they'd just managed to keep the merchant building to about the same level as 1937 while increasing warship construction about as much as OTL, would have been an important improvement, another say 500k of merchant shipping by 1941 would have helped a bit no?
 
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