A better-prepared France in WW2
- Thread starter 9 Fanged Hummingbird
- Start date
True but they were killing more of the Enemy during this time also . I belive that if France had of had more Land to Trade like the USSR did she would of learned how to stop the Germans and pushed them back .
Have someone keep an eye on the Ardennes--they got snookered two wars in a row on that one.
Yeah, it's telling that the first major defeat of the Blitzkrieg came when the Germans invaded the USSR. Before they were stopped in front of Moscow, the Wehrmacht had gobbled up an area over twice the size of France. Of course Stalin's idiotic mistakes (like purging almost his whole high command) played a part in this but even so the Germans' advance was nothing short of impressive. So yes, what the French critically lacked in 1940 was strategic depth. It would have helped, of course, if they'd had better political and military leadership (and not guys who'd make Grandpa Simpson look coherent and sharp by comparison!) and if they hadn't been so ready to fight the last war.
BlairWitch749
Banned
the maginot line in particular wasn't a terrible idea given the vintage in which it was built (it was designed in 1925 when tanks and aircraft where not the sort of threat they would be in 1940)... France had more tanks and cannons (and better ones at that) and their airforce had competetive aircraft if you look at the kill ratios so they shouldn't have gotten steam rolled
it CANNOT be overstated what a bad idea the Dyle plan was... France had powerful armored or semi armored divisions that couldn't be brought to bear because they immediately rushed into Belgium and then cut their supply lines cut by Guderian's spearheads to the south.
You could almost get by with pod's during the phoney war by having someone actually study what the Germans did in Poland and decide that a forward defense is too dangerous (since it will get bombed from the air and from artillery during the initial opening of hostilities)
If France put 400 of their tanks in high command reserve (mix of H-39 and B1) and stationed them on the Somme ready for a major counter attack once the main German axis of advance was identified and detailed a suitable fighter escort group to work them they should be able to at least stall or stop Guderian, Hoth and Weitersheim enough that they can catch their breath and form a good defensive position
if the Germans stall out at that point it would be much longer conflict
Ah, but its always far far easier to defend than to attack. Standard theory says that you need at least two to one or even four to one military superiority to attack and win.
A more effective France might well have been able to defend itself successfully, despite being half Germany's size.
usertron2020
Donor
Remember your history...
The French did not. They were told by one of their own that the side who sits behind their
fortifications will lose. Anybody remember who that particular 5 ft. 7 in.
fellow happened to be?
The French did not. They were told by one of their own that the side who sits behind their
fortifications will lose. Anybody remember who that particular 5 ft. 7 in.
fellow happened to be?
Exactly. By concentrating most of their army in immobile defense works, the French just invited the Wehrmacht to cut the latter off from the center.
It was just a repeat of the Belfort defense of 1871 on a larger scale: the fortification was never taken by force, but the Germans didn't need to - they cut off the communication and supplies and let them fight on until an order of surrender came from Paris.
It was just a repeat of the Belfort defense of 1871 on a larger scale: the fortification was never taken by force, but the Germans didn't need to - they cut off the communication and supplies and let them fight on until an order of surrender came from Paris.
I have to say, I wish people would understand that the Maginot line worked exactly as intended. The goal was to channel the Germans into the Low Countries.
Markus
Banned
Which means the UK, Belgium and maybe even the Netherlands would be on the French side.
To address a few other incorrect views of the French I saw:
Their Army was better equipped and trained as the Germans one. The ratio of 1st to 2nd rate divisions was waaaay better in the French Army.
And its a myth that the French were not willing to fight. "Dying for Danzig?" is taken out of context. This rhetoric question was asked by a French right winger who was speaking for a small minority, several other politicians speaking for the vast majority torn his statement into shreds during the following days.
Nikephoros
Banned
Honestly, the amount of France-hatred in this thread is ridiculous.
That's coming from someone with a documented poor opinion of France.
That's coming from someone with a documented poor opinion of France.
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Bearcat
Banned
Yes, it did, except for their miscalculation about the Ardennes. The French, thinking defensively and considering the forest there bad terrain for an attack, put some fairly underperforming units right into the line of the Armored advance.
Bearcat
Banned
Some French units fought very well. Some of the colonial units really distinguished themselves. There were also units that really gave up and disintegrated after the disaster in the low countries.
Real problem is, the French won in WW1, and didn't internalize the need for change in the army. If they had a visionary commander who pushed them to have armored divisions, etc. the French could have stopped the Germans cold. Certainly tank for tank they had better equipment.
The Germans, with their doctrine and their radios and their air support, just got ahead of the curve on everyone. But only for a little while...
I love French bread, French fries and French whine.
The fact that the upper echelons of decision-making and order-giving didn't realize that the upper echelons were flawed caused them to act immediately with much indecision.
Your average French fighting man acted in many cased with incredible valour and spirit but only in small groups and not as part of a winning campaign. Brave men fighting without relief or reinforcement eventually failed.
The fact that the upper echelons of decision-making and order-giving didn't realize that the upper echelons were flawed caused them to act immediately with much indecision.
Your average French fighting man acted in many cased with incredible valour and spirit but only in small groups and not as part of a winning campaign. Brave men fighting without relief or reinforcement eventually failed.
mowque
Banned
Yes, because giving all the initiative to the enemy is such a great tactic...You can easily get those required odds' if you get to pick the exact tactical circumstances.
Nikephoros
Banned
The key is LOCAL military superiority. I think France invested more troops than Germany.
I'm also a bit of a believer in "Small force theory". Granted, it applies less in industrialized warfare, but I think it still holds true in many ways.
Markus
Banned
Another incorrect view of the French! The French did not expect this kind of attack but they made preparations for some kind of attack that would have worked just fine if the Belgians had not run away.
The defence plan was based on the German WW1 offensive and assumed the Germans would need 7 days to make it to the Meuse and another 7 to bring enough artillery forward to attempt a crossing. So the French made sure two or three A-divisions could reinforce the sector within 5 days max. To make sure the Germans would not be able to cross the Ardennes faster they kept a QRF of several so called "Light Cavalry" divisions(4) and brigades(3) ready to support the two crack divisions the Belgians had in the Ardennes.
The problem was the Belgians did not tell the French they didn´t intend to defend the Ardennes. When the offensive began the French actually raced east, the Germans advanced west and the Belgians left northward. They barely fought but they did blow all the bridges and roads on the French side too. As a result an easy to defend area was left virtually undefended and the French QRF was swept aside.
If the Belgians had fought, well one company did and stopped the best Panzerdivision of the WH for six hours. The flank of this division would have been threatened by one division and one brigade advancing north through Luxembourg, the rest of the QRF would have literally backed up the Belgians. That puts six divisions and three brigades against 8 divisions but no more than three could advance abreast. In the lead were three armour heavy Pz.Div. and the Großdeutschland Infantry regiment.
That would have stopped the German advance. At least long enough for the reserves to reach Sedan and to loose the element of surprise. In OTL the Germans beat the reserves by a mere 12 hours.
Redbeard
Banned
Well said!
But still the French operational plan IMHO was much too reliant on the enemy doing what they were expected to do - that is very rarely a good idea.
And next, also IMHO, the French rather were too offensive than too defensive! They were keen on avoiding having the battleground in France like in WWI and thus fell compelled to advance into Belgium and meet the Germans there.
The French/allied strategy was about buying time until they were strong enough to undertake major offensive operations - i.e. 1941. Had Gamelin made his operational plans in accordance with the strategy he should have taken a much more cautious stance towards the German assault in May 1940 - i.e. having kept back his strategic reserve until the German main assault is definately identified - instead of committing it to an advance into Belgium - which he not only really isn't strong enough for, but which also relies on the Germans doing as expected, and if they don't, loose France the war in a few weeks - baaad plan!
So, as we are on an alternate history board, I'll claim that a PoD only changing the French operational plan into a more defensive one leaving Belgium to her own fate would be enough - same doctrines, telegrams, generals etc.
I agree on most of what has been said here about the shortcomings in the 1940 French Army, but even with these, had there been a strategic reserve to deploy in front of the German spearheads - the Germans would have bogged down before the French Army disintegrates as it did in OTL June 1940. If the French are allowed to "stiffen up" their superior firepower will decide the matter. BTW the French Army in OTL 1940 showed remarkably fast learning skills. By late May/early June 1940 they already had left the continious frontline doctrine and deployed in 360 degree (company)positions in chequerboard formation and utilising the old 75mm field guns as excellent anti-tank guns. It had the German losses accelerate, but by that time too many units already had been lost to keep the Germans back. But deploying in "hedgehog" positions in chequerboard formation became the standard way to counter massive armoured assaults in later German, Soviet and allied(NATO) doctrine.
My next claim is that the French combat morale or "will to fight" wasn't any worse than everybody else's morale. But no army's morale can survive a total chaos like that the French went into after the grand plan went wrong. That the French doctrine relied more on meticulous planning than personal initiative of course only made this worse - if the grand plan goes wrong all other plans must follow - but again morale wasn't the cause but the victim.
The myth about bad morale etc. to a large degree was created after the war by the French military establishment to take blame off their own shoulders and was quite handy in blaming the communists. Not that the communists did anything good, but their influence on the 1940 events is highly exagerated.
Regards
Steffen Redbeard
Guys
If you want a simple one point solution that means the 1940 battle isn't a lot harder for Germany, if not a total disaster then just avoid a plane crashing. If the Germans don't lose their plans then they will be fighting the sort of battle that the French are expecting. The better German tactics and communications equipment will quite possibly mean the Germans win the battle for the Low Countries but much more slowly and at a markedly higher cost.
If that happens the French are likely to have the time to regroup and clear out some of the dead wood. Also its likely to give time for Britain to mobilise more and quite possibly deter Italy from doing anything rash.
Steve
If you want a simple one point solution that means the 1940 battle isn't a lot harder for Germany, if not a total disaster then just avoid a plane crashing. If the Germans don't lose their plans then they will be fighting the sort of battle that the French are expecting. The better German tactics and communications equipment will quite possibly mean the Germans win the battle for the Low Countries but much more slowly and at a markedly higher cost.
If that happens the French are likely to have the time to regroup and clear out some of the dead wood. Also its likely to give time for Britain to mobilise more and quite possibly deter Italy from doing anything rash.
Steve