A Better Paced German Rearmament

It's been said many times that the fast paced German rearmament essentially bankrupted Germany to the point that it had to live by plunder by the late 1930's.

Assuming an assertive but sane foreign policy. Leadership of most of the Balkans. Unification with Austria. Danzig with perhaps some kind of special privilige through the corridor. Maybe even the Sudetenland if it's not at the price of a crippling war. - What do you think this rearmament would have or should have looked like?

I certainly think there was potential for getting more economies of scale by working in a more equal way with countries like Romania, Hungary, Nationalist Spain and maybe Turkey.
 

Deleted member 1487

It's been said many times that the fast paced German rearmament essentially bankrupted Germany to the point that it had to live by plunder by the late 1930's.

Assuming an assertive but sane foreign policy. Leadership of most of the Balkans. Unification with Austria. Danzig with perhaps some kind of special privilige through the corridor. Maybe even the Sudetenland if it's not at the price of a crippling war. - What do you think this rearmament would have or should have looked like?

I certainly think there was potential for getting more economies of scale by working in a more equal way with countries like Romania, Hungary, Nationalist Spain and maybe Turkey.

It depends on what the regime's ultimate goal is. If it is a Nazi regime they are planning on war and gearing up for it while they have an advantage, so quickly and early is better.

If not a Nazi regime, then it isn't anti-semitic enough to drive out German and Austrian Jews and steal their money, which really provided large amounts of foreign exchange. Not annexing Bohemia would also mean forgoing all of that money AND weapons industry AND capturing enough weapons to equip or finish equipping 22 divisions AND 3 Panzer divisions. Germany was short on foreign exchange, not money per se.

So what you are proposing means that Germany runs out of foreign exchange quicker, but if war isn't the end goal, which it doesn't seem to be in your scenario a more balanced rearmament with a smaller military overall will probably be ready by 1941 without bankrupting the country. That would mean using more industry for trade, which the government would subsidize, preventing that money (Reichsmarks not foreign exchange) for domestic military spending. It also means more goods are available to raise foreign exchange for purchasing raw materials Germany didn't produce. Also there probably wouldn't be a full four year plan, which cost immense amounts and really helped suck up foreign exchange quickly with the end goal of reducing long term dependence on foreign materials. There is probably no Westwall in this scenario either, which also sucked up lots of money, labor, and materials. Frankly this all means less spending on lots of various projects and a smaller military, so even with less foreign exchange there is not as much of a need to spend what foreign exchange there was, nor the need to build up rapidly, so less need to do it very expensively by rushing things.
More foreign trade means less expansion for the military, but a more healthy economy, so purchasing abroad is possible too.

Overall we are talking about such a radically different scenario here that uses a balanced approach, but without war. If this Germany was focusing on war, then they wouldn't and couldn't have done what you are suggesting, because it made no sense. If there wasn't war planned, then rearmament can take a totally different approach that avoids watering down the Reichswehr's quality and boosts the economy. Also without war Germany doesn't need to ally with Japan and shut out the Chinese, who were a massive market for German war material and a wonderful source of rare, critical raw materials that the were willing to barter for so Germany didn't have to use up its stocks of limited foreign exchange.

German rearmament could be completed from 1933-1942 as planned with a balanced approach, but no major surface fleet, probably no Bismarck-class Battleships, no Plan Z, not economic Autarky, so no expensive capital projects like trying to use low quality iron ore or expensively manufacturing oil from coal. Also the army would be smaller, as would the Luftwaffe along with their supporting industries, but they would be highly trained, highly effective, and less expensive. They would have the highest quality equipment and be a perfect defensive force and plan for the long term, training up conscripts to rebuild the base of trained manpower, while also planning longer term expansion of both the military and the military-industrial production base.

Probably by 1950 Germany would have a comparatively large, world class military like prior to WW1. Except now it would have a powerful air force and small, though very highly trained and well equipped navy that doesn't frighten Britain.

The Soviets would not build up as quickly or massively as IOTL without warlike Germany on the warpath. Poland and Germany probably work out some security deal too if Germany doesn't plan on going to war. Czechoslovakia, potentially sans-Sudetenland, but not guaranteed, would be a threat to Germany, as it was really friendly with Stalin pre-war, which the Poles hated. Germany and Poland can bond over hating the Czechs and Soviets. Basically I'm saying there wouldn't be a Red Alert type scenario. Germany would just build up a first class military with better priorities than in 1914 (small navy, large army, and a proportional, balanced air force with strategic bombers). They would rebuild their economy under Hjalmar Schacht and pay down their debt and be a mighty economy by the 1940s-50s with a proportional military that will be highly trained and well led, as the Wehrmacht's (Reichswehr?) strategic war academy, which took the best students/officers from all three services and trained them in strategy and economics in all matters of warfare together so they built up staff relationships, would have taken effect without Goering around to kill it, so the Reichswehr/Wehrmacht would be as well trained in strategy as operations and tactics.
 
A much different niche for Germany

Even a somewhat less built up Soviet Russia was a big scary beast.

It sounds like it wouldn't take much for Germany to be seen as a critical asset for defending the West. It would be quite ironic in our eyes to see Germany armed in the 30's and 40's with the active help of the allied powers.
 

Cook

Banned
What you are proposing is essentially to remove the Nazi regime and continue the trend of conservative Weimar republic governments to steadily readjust the terms of the treaty of Versailles through negotiation with Britain, France and the League of Nations.

The most immediate result is that there is no rapprochement with Poland; the highly damaging (for Poland anyway) trade war continues just as it had almost from the rebirth Poland, there is no normalisation of relations and Pilsudski’s regime remains highly suspicious of Berlin, thoroughly opposed to any further leniency in the Versailles terms and fully aware that any German rearmament can only be directed towards Germany ‘recovering’ the territory of the Polish corridor, Danzig and Silesia. A pre-emptive attack by Poland before Germany can rearm sufficiently would be the most likely result. It was only the rise of Nazi regime and the Hitler’s ascension to the Chancellorship that had prevented this in OTL; Hitler’s very first foreign policy act was a complete about turn from the Weimer republic with regard to handling relations with Poland.

The chances of peaceful union with Austria are somewhere between slim and none; the terms of the Versailles and Saint Germain treaties are very clear on this, there could be no union without the unanimous approval of the Council of League of Nations – and this is something that France would never have agreed to even if the other members had. The League even rejected a proposal for a customs union between Germany and Austria in the late 1920s, so a full physical union is totally out of the question. Once you are into the 1930s, the chances of union with Austria do not improve even with disunity between the democracies and the weakening of French resolve; Austrian democracy had given way to Dollfuss’s dictatorship, heavily grounded in Austrian nationalism and under the protection of Mussolini.

Then there is ‘Nationalist’ Spain; Nazi Germany was fully involved with the Nationalists campaign right from the start; Kriegsmarine warships escorted the Army of Africa from Morocco to Spain, without which the rebellion would have been short lived. While Mussolini could provide some support, he would be unlikely to antagonise Britain by doing so on his own and a German government that had an essentially ‘sane’ foreign policy is very unlikely to gamble this way. Even if Mussolini did provide aid, what he could provide would not have swung the war the Nationalists way, and a ‘sane’ Conservative Germany would not have expanded the Wehrmacht to the extent that Hitler had and so could not have provided the same degree of aid; the result either way is that the Nationalists lose the civil war.

Relations with the Soviet Union in the 1930s would be better; Weimer Germany and the Soviets had been trade and military partners until Hitler broke off ties. Both nations were irredentist, frustrated by the League of Nations and wishing to recover territories lost at the end of the First World War, mainly to Poland and the Baltic States; another reason why a Polish pre-emptive attack would be likely before Germany and Russia were militarily strong and united enough to strike simultaneously.
 
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Smaller changes

You can change a lot without straying much from OTL politics.
Some programs were well thought out, like the 18 series of artillery equipment for the army. But the tank program allowed for a much larger number of light "training" tanks that was needed. Major savings can be made by drastically cutting Pz I and II production and introducing more useful heavier designs earlier. The airforce could also reduced the number of transitional aircraft (Ar65, He51, etc) training hours could have been kept up by wearing out this transitional aircraft faster.
Real large scale production should have started only with the definitive late 30s types, leading to Armed Forces in 1939 that would have less tanks and aircraft, but a higher number of useful designs for less spending.
This would not even require hindsight, sindpce both the army and the LW were aware that with the Pz I and II and with the biplane fighters they were essentially buying premature obsolescence in order to take a short cut to larger forces.
The naval rebuilt was also poorly led. German ships were very expensive compared to other countries ones, and some options were debatable. For example, rather then investing in complicated expensive large destroyers, an evolution of the Type 24 small destroyers might have provided more and more useful ships, for a smaller price.
 
Probably by 1950 Germany would have a comparatively large, world class military like prior to WW1. Except now it would have a powerful air force and small, though very highly trained and well equipped navy that doesn't frighten Britain.

By 1950 there's also two issues which would hurt the Western Allies: Block obsolescence of French Army and Royal Navy equipment. By 1950 the French artillery park etc. would be obsolete and it is not credible that France would be able to re-equip as large forces as OTL 1939 French Army. This might be beneficial for France, though.

The Royal Navy would have all the WW I era battleships and carriers either obsolete or simply on their last legs. How many battleships and carriers would Britain construct between, say, 1933 and 1945, without explicit German threat? Japanese threat would require construction but how much?

There's also issues with the colonies. Even without WWII India would be getting out of the Empire by 1950 with massive knock-on effects.
 

Deleted member 1487

What you are proposing is essentially to remove the Nazi regime and continue the trend of conservative Weimar republic governments to steadily readjust the terms of the treaty of Versailles through negotiation with Britain, France and the League of Nations.
I don't think that is necessary at all. Frankly Weimar was a dead letter by 1932, it was just a question of which dictator was going to take over. I think the scenario presented suggests one of the more mainstream non-Nazi candidates takes over instead. These, especially Schleicher, would take an aggressive, but measured policy of redressment of Versailles somewhat similar to what is presented here.


The most immediate result is that there is no rapprochement with Poland; the highly damaging (for Poland anyway) trade war continues just as it had almost from the rebirth Poland, there is no normalisation of relations and Pilsudski’s regime remains highly suspicious of Berlin, thoroughly opposed to any further leniency in the Versailles terms and fully aware that any German rearmament can only be directed towards Germany ‘recovering’ the territory of the Polish corridor, Danzig and Silesia. A pre-emptive attack by Poland before Germany can rearm sufficiently would be the most likely result.
This assumes that Hitler's regime was the only one capable of reacting to Poland potentially invading Germany and becoming more militarily aggressive with her. Also you are assuming too that Weimar is stuck on the path it was on, even as its leadership was changing and guaranteed to be someone that would be a 'strong man' that would need to safely rearm, which also meant reassessing relationships throughout Central Europe. I don't think whoever takes charge is going to be ignorant of the Poland diplomatic problem until its too late.

Edit:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German–Polish_Non-Aggression_Pact
One of the most widely remarked-on of Józef Piłsudski's foreign-policy moves was his rumored proposal to France to declare war on Germany after Hitler had come to power in January 1933. Some historians write that Piłsudski may have sounded out France regarding the possibility of joint military action against Germany, which had been openly rearming in violation of the Versailles Treaty. France's refusal might have been one of the reasons Poland signed the German–Polish Non-Aggression Pact in January 1934

Apparently the rumors of the Polish preventive attack were made up.
However, the argument that the German-Polish non-aggression pact had been forced on Piłsudski by French refusal to wage a "preventive war" has been disputed by historians who point out that there is no evidence in either the French or Polish diplomatic archives that such a proposal was ever advanced. They state that when in late October 1933 rumors of a Polish "preventive-war" proposal were reported in Paris, their source was the Polish Embassy, which had informed French reporters that Poland had proposed a "preventive war" to France and Belgium; but by this time Poland and Germany were already secretly negotiating their non-aggression pact. It has been argued that Piłsudski had had the Polish Embassy start rumors about a "preventive war" as a way of pressuring the Germans, who were demanding that Poland abrogate its 1921 Franco-Polish alliance. In the event, the Polish-German non-aggression pact specifically excluded that alliance.[6]

It has been said that Piłsudski's reason for seeking a non-aggression pact with Germany was his concern over France's Maginot Line. Until 1929, French plans in the event of war with Germany had called for a French offensive into the North German plain in conjunction with offensives from Poland and Czechoslovakia. The building of the Maginot Line, begun in 1929, indicated that henceforth, in the event of war with Germany, the French Army would maintain a strictly defensive stance, and that France’s eastern allies were going to be on their own. (If this is true, then Piłsudski had successfully predicted the future: that is exactly what happened in 1939 with the Phoney War.) Thus, from Piłsudski's viewpoint, in light of France's military plans, a non-aggression pact with Germany was the best choice for Poland.

Source:
6 ^ (Polish) Dariusz Baliszewski, Ostatnia wojna marszałka, Tygodnik "Wprost", Nr 1148 (28 November 2004), Polish, retrieved on 24 March 2005


It was only the rise of Nazi regime and the Hitler’s ascension to the Chancellorship that had prevented this in OTL; Hitler’s very first foreign policy act was a complete about turn from the Weimer republic with regard to handling relations with Poland.
And Weimar was ending in 1932, pretty much picking whoever was going to be the next dictator; policy was probably going to change regardless, as the status quo was ending in the '32 election no matter what.


The chances of peaceful union with Austria are somewhere between slim and none; the terms of the Versailles and Saint Germain treaties are very clear on this, there could be no union without the unanimous approval of the Council of League of Nations – and this is something that France would never have agreed to even if the other members had. The League even rejected a proposal for a customs union between Germany and Austria in the late 1920s, so a full physical union is totally out of the question. Once you are into the 1930s, the chances of union with Austria do not improve even with disunity between the democracies and the weakening of French resolve; Austrian democracy had given way to Dollfuss’s dictatorship, heavily grounded in Austrian nationalism and under the protection of Mussolini.
Hitler discovered that in 1934 he was too early. Mussolini changed his position when he discovered that the West was not tolerant of his behavior, so was looking for an ally after 1935. By the late 1930s the situation vis-a-vis Austria was changing dramatically, especially in the context of German rearmament and the threat they posed in 1938 via the 'Risiko Luftwaffe', which was a significant reason that no one was willing militarily opposed Anschluss. Of course there was significant diplomatic work that had gone into flipping Italy into Germany's camp and away from Austria, as had the death of Dollfuss changed the political dynamic in Austria itself, which could well happen here too if Germany makes an effort to unify with Austria. Remember it was Austrians that assassinated him in 1936, not Germany. Italy too needed Germany by 1938 and Mussolini dropped his opposition to German expansion, especially because Germany was willing to let the South Tyrol issue drop. There is no reason why Hitler would be the only one that could have made that happen, as any 'strong man' on the table in 1932 besides Hitler had Austria on his agenda, as well as rearmament, which gave Germany the muscle by the late 1930's that let Anschluss go forward.


Then there is ‘Nationalist’ Spain; Nazi Germany was fully involved with the Nationalists campaign right from the start; Kriegsmarine warships escorted the Army of Africa from Morocco to Spain, without which the rebellion would have been short lived. While Mussolini could provide some support, he would be unlikely to antagonise Britain by doing so on his own and a German government that had an essentially ‘sane’ foreign policy is very unlikely to gamble this way. Even if Mussolini did provide aid, what he could provide would not have swung the war the Nationalists way, and a ‘sane’ Conservative Germany would not have expanded the Wehrmacht to the extent that Hitler had and so could not have provided the same degree of aid; the result either way is that the Nationalists lose the civil war.
Agreed. Hitler ideologically had to support the Nationalists in Spain and wanted to set up an ally west of France to box her in.
I'm not sure about Mussolini though, he had some ideological and traditional reasons for getting involved, though likely without German support, which is going to make things pretty nasty for the Nationalists.


Relations with the Soviet Union in the 1930s would be better; Weimer Germany and the Soviets had been trade and military partners until Hitler broke off ties. Both nations were irredentist, frustrated by the League of Nations and wishing to recover territories lost at the end of the First World War, mainly to Poland and the Baltic States; another reason why a Polish pre-emptive attack would be likely before Germany and Russia were militarily strong and united enough to strike simultaneously.
German relations with the Soviets were worsening before Hitler became an issue. He cut things off suddenly with the military mission, but it was dying a slow death anyway, as both sides had been increasingly less trusting of the other and less willing to cooperate. I think it would have died a natural death in a few years anyway and there would be less antagonism afterward without a Nazi in power. Though there were some mutual interests both countries had their own agendas that opposed the other, even without the Nazis as a political factor. Plus the rightwing candidates in the 1932 elections were also ideologically opposed to the Soviets, though less strongly than the Nazis. Even Schleicher had issues with the Soviets, though he was willing to be more pragmatic in his dealings with them.
 
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