3rd Balkan War: Alternative Balkan Alignments in WWI

Then perhaps the hat trick is to see neutrality sweep the lower tier, Italy falls out of the Triple Alliance, Greece holds neutral and the OE is not goaded to join the CP. That puts the spotlight on Bulgaria and Romania who should be able to wait and see. The hard question is whether OE refuses to let munitions pass the Straights or merely warships. Frankly even if Russia can only export grain and import necessities that is a strategic victory, but alas I think that will provoke the Entente. And you may be correct, if OE lets more pass then the CP need to intervene. Here you get a slower drift to the CPs by both OE and Bulgaria with Romania only joining if they see weakness enough in the CP. To get Italy neutral I think you need the opening of the war more ambiguous so they can wiggle out of their Alliance and Britain must not be a belligerent. Otherwise Italy joins a side with dominos falling into the Balkans. To get OE neutrality you need a sweeter deal, more respect from Britain and likely the delivery of her two Battleships, again these seem to be premised on a neutral UK. Greece is easier, it has little to gain from joining any but the winning side, so if we let the war stay a toss-up then Greece sits it out so long as no neighbor or outsider threatens her. I think this tips things in favor of the CP. No Italy is a big plus, a non-belligerent UK is a winner, and having OE neutral also lets the CP trade with and through her. Here the Entente may attempt blockade but the CP now have many more open ports and borders to bring in what she needs and export what she can to earn money. If I were betting the odds for a stalemate are now better than even and a CP victory is far less a long shot bet.

That's kind of point on the OE: as much as they don't want to get involved, their position on the Bosporus makes their decisions impactful enough, and they're militarily weak enough, that whatever choices they make are bound to tick off somebody sufficiently that they're probably going to get dragged into the war sooner or later. You can certainly delay their entry, but you can't stop it unless they reach just that perfect balance of allowing enough shipping through to statisfy the Entente, but not so much the CP decides the Aegean is the perfect grounds of U-boat operations. While I'd like to avoid a neutral GB (On the simple calculus that "Great Powers always have to take action in a major international crisis), a slightly delayed British entry and or an OE that looks like its leaning less towards the CP might convince the Admiralty that its safe to release the ships... or at the very least offer to lease the hulls from the Turks. Irreguardless, the biggest winner in a Neutral OE scenario is the Ottomans... assuming they can still get away with their unilateral abolition of the Capitulations. The amount of manpower saved, the lack of Arab agitation, and growing export market alongside regaining some control over her gives the new government vital stability and "breathing space" to develop.

Continued Italian Neutrality is a pretty big advantage for the CP: not so much in military terms, but now the A-H navy has more room to play with and Italian agricultural exports will continue to them and Germany, meaning the impact of any blockade is going to be lesser. Italy is also arguably a net winner here... though she probably loses her position in the "Great Powers Club" for standing on the sidelines. She can always sweep in later to grab some of her claims when the winner is clear/somebody's domestic situation collapses. Even if Britain is still a belligerent, just a neutral Italy gives the CP a better shot; neutral Italy probably also means a neutral Romania, as A-H has a full front's worth of additional troops to play around with. Alot depends on just how much aid Russia can get though: does it help her armies on the Gallician front push through into the Hungarian plains? A neutral OE and Romania's effect on Bulgaria... well, their only viable gains at this point are in Macedonia.
 
While I'd like to avoid a neutral GB (On the simple calculus that "Great Powers always have to take action in a major international crisis), a slightly delayed British entry and or an OE that looks like its leaning less towards the CP might convince the Admiralty that its safe to release the ships... or at the very least offer to lease the hulls from the Turks. Irreguardless, the biggest winner in a Neutral OE scenario is the Ottomans... assuming they can still get away with their unilateral abolition of the Capitulations. The amount of manpower saved, the lack of Arab agitation, and growing export market alongside regaining some control over her gives the new government vital stability and "breathing space" to develop.

I was chided for suggesting the same in the British Neutrality thread, but I tend to agree, the British are in this war unless something quite significant draws them to opt-out. And I think a belligerent UK gets you a neutral Italy at minimum. Thus we have the same set up, the British Empire siding with the Franco-Russian alliance versus the joined German-A-H effort. Now I would like to use your neutral OE to change the narrative. As much as the Balkans are sort of glossed I think they have great importance in the war. And I think the real importance is more about logistics than divisions. And I agree, the winners are neutral OE and neutral Italy.

I know you do not favor the East first strategy but if that occurred to give us a mauled Russia on the defensive, a bleeding France and the UK rather stymied to fight save for the BEF and its blockade, one might see the stalemated war without it becoming anyone's wank. I would offer that the USA now might feel emboldened to take on its true nemesis, Wilson wants to be peer with Britain, Germany's defeat was just a way to get on the table, it took another war to give the USA its supremacy. Here the Germans are not the villains, merely warmongers like all the rest of dying Europe, the blockade is more hurtful to the USA and its "rights," the CPs are not simply going to be defeated and Russia still implodes. You get a new multi-lateral world with all the ingredients for
social change, similar economic turmoil, technology changes, the lot, in a world without the same paths laid out to our history. Maybe the OE goes on to dominate the oil rich middle east, the next war is likely there with Britain in the mix. Maybe Italy avoids the war but emerges as the regional power it dreamt of, it sits astride the CP and the Entente here, a sort of "third" power. France is a mess, so is Russia, Germany is consumed by rebuilding itself and just as contained. The big rivalry is the USA versus the British Empire, the great game moves East again, with Japan the pivot and China the field. A messy little world we get to imagine.
 
I was chided for suggesting the same in the British Neutrality thread, but I tend to agree, the British are in this war unless something quite significant draws them to opt-out. And I think a belligerent UK gets you a neutral Italy at minimum. Thus we have the same set up, the British Empire siding with the Franco-Russian alliance versus the joined German-A-H effort. Now I would like to use your neutral OE to change the narrative. As much as the Balkans are sort of glossed I think they have great importance in the war. And I think the real importance is more about logistics than divisions. And I agree, the winners are neutral OE and neutral Italy.

I know you do not favor the East first strategy but if that occurred to give us a mauled Russia on the defensive, a bleeding France and the UK rather stymied to fight save for the BEF and its blockade, one might see the stalemated war without it becoming anyone's wank. I would offer that the USA now might feel emboldened to take on its true nemesis, Wilson wants to be peer with Britain, Germany's defeat was just a way to get on the table, it took another war to give the USA its supremacy. Here the Germans are not the villains, merely warmongers like all the rest of dying Europe, the blockade is more hurtful to the USA and its "rights," the CPs are not simply going to be defeated and Russia still implodes. You get a new multi-lateral world with all the ingredients for
social change, similar economic turmoil, technology changes, the lot, in a world without the same paths laid out to our history. Maybe the OE goes on to dominate the oil rich middle east, the next war is likely there with Britain in the mix. Maybe Italy avoids the war but emerges as the regional power it dreamt of, it sits astride the CP and the Entente here, a sort of "third" power. France is a mess, so is Russia, Germany is consumed by rebuilding itself and just as contained. The big rivalry is the USA versus the British Empire, the great game moves East again, with Japan the pivot and China the field. A messy little world we get to imagine.

It's not that I'm not in favor of it, per say. If the shift in strategic focus takes place a decade or so prior to the war (For example, as part of issues relating to the Russo-Japanese War and the 1905 Russian Revolution: a Russia that trounces Japan like they planned to and keep the lid on domestic revolt is a Russia who appears to be growing 'scarier' faster than IOTL). Its just that its often treated like the Germans can just pivot East without fundimentally altering how they built their rail network, and the Russian and French are often not depicted as reacting to that change in Germany's military focus. This makes it a go-to for making a CP-curbstomp, so I somewhat resent the "Go East" option... but probably more for how its (mis)used than the idea in and of itself.

Britain certainly is certainly going to enter the war at some point: I think you might have misunderstood me in that regard on the Germany doesn't invade Belgium thread (Or I was unclear in my language. In that case, I apologize). She, like all other Great Powers, want to see the current crisis settled in line with her interests, and while we might be able to delay her entry somewhat until a sufficient casus belli shows up and/or the Home Rule crisis winds down (Either of which is likely on the scale of a few months) unless France is already in such a hopeless position that its not worth it. Unlike Italy and her "sacred egoism", Britian has a little more respect for international norms and is unlikely to declare war on Germany without a good reason attached to it.

I find your proposal...interesting. However, I do think it results in a Germany that acts as far more of a "pole" than Italy ever could: the level of difference in industrial development is just too great, particularly if A-H are in the German sphere alongside what she manages to carve out of Russia. Granted, its focus is going to be on Eastern Europe, but I imagine its also naturally going to suck in the Balkans and Nordic countries into his economic orbit. Italy, however, is far more of a "decisive weight" power than it was IOTL... though still hungry for an Empire. Maybe they pursue it in the collapsing ruins of France's (If the French domestic position goes belly up) or the Balkans, which now become a war of influence between them and Germany.

Alot depends on how walloped Russia is an just what situation it ends up in post-war though. What do you think the end result of an East First strategy is for Russia's domestic situation post-war?
 
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This makes it a go-to for making a CP-curbstomp, so I somewhat resent the "Go East" option... but probably more for how its (mis)used than the idea in and of itself.

Britain certainly is certainly going to enter the war at some point: I think you might have misunderstood me in that regard on the Germany doesn't invade Belgium thread (Or I was unclear in my language. In that case, I apologize).

I find your proposal...interesting. What do you think the end result of an East First strategy is for Russia's domestic situation post-war?

No worries, we are in an intellectual exercise with no certainty, there is no truly right or wrong so long as it is grounded in what we know. I agree that an East shift is easily hand waved as a POD in itself and I did so to lay out a broad divergence. I admit to being persuaded by Zuber that the "Schlieffen Plan" is more myth than reality and General Hermann von Staab, head of the German railway division, argues that he could have wheeled East if ordered. I would therefore disagree that it results in a CP defeat, if anything I think we assure Germany at minimum a stalemate. Victory is the murky den of speculation.

Again, I would agree with you, I am persuaded that Britain is in the war for good or bad. It is my belief that neutrality was her better course and I am open to those who argue that her entry is not inevitable but it takes something as significant as no invasion of Belgium with the underlying shift in Germany strategy to get us there. I simply argue that all this is not simply one POD.

As much as I would hope that Russia is simply defeated and affects a sensible change in government away from her absolutist Czar, I am not convinced Russia simply concedes once her defeats mount. As I have proffered, an Eastward drive might equal a neutral OE, it might alter the war in the Med, the Balkans, and so on, sufficient that Russia can sustain herself in spite of losses. The Czar was committed to victory because of the nature of his gamble, the war was a test of the people's loyalty to his infallibility, anything short of victory in my opinion doomed him to lose the throne. I seriously believe there was a good chance for post-war Russia to be TTL's Weimar Germany, a newly minted Republic under moderate Socialist rule bedeviled by Communists and Monarchists. I am not convinced that Germany could weigh in to crush a Communist revolution, it might spark one in Germany, so we still have the possibility that the Reds secure Russia. We can argue which is better or worse or most likely, but I think that is the outcomes. I do not see the Czar in power or the Whites succeeding aside from maybe breaking Russia up more into its pieces.

Now the Balkans do become a very interesting place. I am not persuaded that A-H was doomed to simply implode but it had to face the dangerous waters of reform. Bulgaria is our regional strongman and Greece a wildcard. How these two played out the war will have an outsized impact of European affairs. Romania likely ends up fully dominated by Germany here. In some future we might see a return of great power influence mongering and I do think the Italians are in that mix with perhaps a wealthier OE and a resurgent Russia. As much as things change they often remain the same.
 
No worries, we are in an intellectual exercise with no certainty, there is no truly right or wrong so long as it is grounded in what we know. I agree that an East shift is easily hand waved as a POD in itself and I did so to lay out a broad divergence. I admit to being persuaded by Zuber that the "Schlieffen Plan" is more myth than reality and General Hermann von Staab, head of the German railway division, argues that he could have wheeled East if ordered. I would therefore disagree that it results in a CP defeat, if anything I think we assure Germany at minimum a stalemate. Victory is the murky den of speculation.

Again, I would agree with you, I am persuaded that Britain is in the war for good or bad. It is my belief that neutrality was her better course and I am open to those who argue that her entry is not inevitable but it takes something as significant as no invasion of Belgium with the underlying shift in Germany strategy to get us there. I simply argue that all this is not simply one POD.

As much as I would hope that Russia is simply defeated and affects a sensible change in government away from her absolutist Czar, I am not convinced Russia simply concedes once her defeats mount. As I have proffered, an Eastward drive might equal a neutral OE, it might alter the war in the Med, the Balkans, and so on, sufficient that Russia can sustain herself in spite of losses. The Czar was committed to victory because of the nature of his gamble, the war was a test of the people's loyalty to his infallibility, anything short of victory in my opinion doomed him to lose the throne. I seriously believe there was a good chance for post-war Russia to be TTL's Weimar Germany, a newly minted Republic under moderate Socialist rule bedeviled by Communists and Monarchists. I am not convinced that Germany could weigh in to crush a Communist revolution, it might spark one in Germany, so we still have the possibility that the Reds secure Russia. We can argue which is better or worse or most likely, but I think that is the outcomes. I do not see the Czar in power or the Whites succeeding aside from maybe breaking Russia up more into its pieces.

Now the Balkans do become a very interesting place. I am not persuaded that A-H was doomed to simply implode but it had to face the dangerous waters of reform. Bulgaria is our regional strongman and Greece a wildcard. How these two played out the war will have an outsized impact of European affairs. Romania likely ends up fully dominated by Germany here. In some future we might see a return of great power influence mongering and I do think the Italians are in that mix with perhaps a wealthier OE and a resurgent Russia. As much as things change they often remain the same.

My apologies: by CP-curbstomp I meant a curbstomp by the CP, rather than of the CP is how its often used. And indeed, if Germany remains on the defensive in the West (And assuming the French: though not motivated by either the moral or economic cause of retaking the iron, coal, and refining-rich areas of France the German offensives lead them to occupying, follow a pattern of offensive strategy roughly similar to OTL) its certainly a huge credit in Germany's column in terms of efficient use of manpower. However, I subscribe to the fact that even if the Schlieffen Plan wasen't an actual completed memorandum left to Moltke (Which is certainly possible: Schlieffen was a quite the private man and especially secretive when it came to his military plans), its theoretical principals were certainly the backbone of German military planning during the decade leading up to the war and widely held by Germany's officer corp, and so pivoting east in an organized manner is going to require some pre-War changes. Changes France and Russia are bound to react to and alter their own preparations accordingly. I'll admit I'm much less well-read on the state of Germany's military rail network and contingency plans for providing supplies for a major push into Russia early in the war, but I'll concede that its possible. Push too hard and too fast, though, and you're likely to see German forces in Poland and Lithuania looking like they were at the end of the initial Western offensives before the "Marne" (By which I refer to the series of operations that blunted the German advance and forced them to retreat, not nessicerly the battle that came to symbolize them as a whole); exhausted, hungry, somewhat disorganized, and low on supplies. This limits what they can accomplish in the initial push, and once the Russians catch wind of the major eastern push they're likely to continue mobilization in safer parts of the country. Their operations would also likely be taking place internally in Congress Poland, so you're less likely to see the lack of communications/breakdown in co-ordination between units that made a victory like Tannenberg possible. Especially with a neutral OE to help them with the flow of supplies from their Western Allies (Though credit is still going to become an issue), I see a "Go East" strategy on Germany's part leading to a more grinding war in which the Russians have an advantage relative to their OTL situation, though likely at the cost of lightening up the pressure on Austria. Conrad is still Conrad though, and still has greater than even odds of making a series of stupid decisions that get his men killed in large numbers. Still, a later occupation of Galicia DOES mean Austria doesn't immediately lose her main source of petroleum and (For the Austrian half of the Empire at least), her breadbasket quite as quickly. A better accommodation with the Poles, perhaps an early agreement to combine Galicia and Congress Poland to form a "Third Kingdom" within the Hapsburg Empire, is perhaps more viable ITTL if Vienna decides to go that route, which could have some major effects on the campaigns in Poland and the post-war settlement.

I do agree, in the long run, its better for Britain if she stays out. However, as a Great Power international norms means as time goes on its going to get harder and harder to not weigh in on the issue, lest she miss the bus and be completely absent from the peace table where the new norms of continental Europe are being hammered out. In particular, London being the financial capital of the early 1900's is going to be seeing requests for credit and war supplies from all the belligerents alongside the US; given that the French alone can't enforce an effective blockade of German commerce. I imagine even a neutral Britain is liable to favor France and Russia in this regard though: if for no other reason than Britain's industrial leaders of the era have a rather intense fear of Germany's economic rise, but without having their terms eased for the sake of keeping them in the war the credit rating of the Czarist government is bound to start looking shakey by late 1915/early 1916: the flow of supplies is going to be even faster if they can buy from Britain through the Straits, after all. The US is bound to be more impartial, and will likely end up seeing more CP business if for no other reason than the Entente's pre-existing commercial relations with the British Empire and potential British hesitance to loan/supply their commercial/industrial rivals. By the war's end, she emerges as a still-strong creditor nation... though stuck holding the bag if the Russian government falls and the new one renegades on the loans.

As for the Reds in Russia, have you considered the Mensheviks as opposed to the Bolsheviks? In a Socialist democracy, they'd have a voice and be able to peacefully push towards move even further to the left, while the Bolsheviks, no longer able to leverage the war issue and the strain it was causing on the population, would be less likely to get a critical mass of militants. Monarchists/Greater Russian Revachists (Basically Arch-Conservatives at best, Proto-Facists at worst) would resemble the "Whites", but without the wider context of a radical Red regime seizing power by force I doubt they'd be able build the unity of purpose and alliances with other groups (The Cossaks, for instance) nessicery to try take control of the nation by force. As for the Russian break-up, I think you'd see it shatter a bit more than IRL: the Central Asians likely keep their freedom and the Cossaks may fight for greater autonomy within the Russian state structure, at least, but the biggest problem I see is capital drain. Britain is going to have sucked the country pretty dry of funds if the Czarist government insists on maintaining the war longer than it did IRL, and without a violent restructuring of the state and the breaking off from the global capitalist system I don't see them having alot of liquid funds to play around with. Germany is going to be demanding reparations, G.B is going to want the debt serviced (As will, I imagine, the French who now have debts of their own to pay), and Socalist policies are going to put a pretty big spending burden on the treasury, leaving little available for state-supported industrialization/modernization.
 
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