No worries, we are in an intellectual exercise with no certainty, there is no truly right or wrong so long as it is grounded in what we know. I agree that an East shift is easily hand waved as a POD in itself and I did so to lay out a broad divergence. I admit to being persuaded by Zuber that the "Schlieffen Plan" is more myth than reality and General Hermann von Staab, head of the German railway division, argues that he could have wheeled East if ordered. I would therefore disagree that it results in a CP defeat, if anything I think we assure Germany at minimum a stalemate. Victory is the murky den of speculation.
Again, I would agree with you, I am persuaded that Britain is in the war for good or bad. It is my belief that neutrality was her better course and I am open to those who argue that her entry is not inevitable but it takes something as significant as no invasion of Belgium with the underlying shift in Germany strategy to get us there. I simply argue that all this is not simply one POD.
As much as I would hope that Russia is simply defeated and affects a sensible change in government away from her absolutist Czar, I am not convinced Russia simply concedes once her defeats mount. As I have proffered, an Eastward drive might equal a neutral OE, it might alter the war in the Med, the Balkans, and so on, sufficient that Russia can sustain herself in spite of losses. The Czar was committed to victory because of the nature of his gamble, the war was a test of the people's loyalty to his infallibility, anything short of victory in my opinion doomed him to lose the throne. I seriously believe there was a good chance for post-war Russia to be TTL's Weimar Germany, a newly minted Republic under moderate Socialist rule bedeviled by Communists and Monarchists. I am not convinced that Germany could weigh in to crush a Communist revolution, it might spark one in Germany, so we still have the possibility that the Reds secure Russia. We can argue which is better or worse or most likely, but I think that is the outcomes. I do not see the Czar in power or the Whites succeeding aside from maybe breaking Russia up more into its pieces.
Now the Balkans do become a very interesting place. I am not persuaded that A-H was doomed to simply implode but it had to face the dangerous waters of reform. Bulgaria is our regional strongman and Greece a wildcard. How these two played out the war will have an outsized impact of European affairs. Romania likely ends up fully dominated by Germany here. In some future we might see a return of great power influence mongering and I do think the Italians are in that mix with perhaps a wealthier OE and a resurgent Russia. As much as things change they often remain the same.
My apologies: by CP-curbstomp I meant a curbstomp
by the CP, rather than
of the CP is how its often used. And indeed, if Germany remains on the defensive in the West (And assuming the French: though not motivated by either the moral or economic cause of retaking the iron, coal, and refining-rich areas of France the German offensives lead them to occupying, follow a pattern of offensive strategy roughly similar to OTL) its certainly a huge credit in Germany's column in terms of efficient use of manpower. However, I subscribe to the fact that even if the Schlieffen Plan wasen't an actual completed memorandum left to Moltke (Which is certainly possible: Schlieffen was a quite the private man and especially secretive when it came to his military plans), its theoretical principals were certainly the backbone of German military planning during the decade leading up to the war and widely held by Germany's officer corp, and so pivoting east in an organized manner is going to require some pre-War changes. Changes France and Russia are bound to react to and alter their own preparations accordingly. I'll admit I'm much less well-read on the state of Germany's military rail network and contingency plans for providing supplies for a major push into Russia early in the war, but I'll concede that its possible. Push too hard and too fast, though, and you're likely to see German forces in Poland and Lithuania looking like they were at the end of the initial Western offensives before the "Marne" (By which I refer to the series of operations that blunted the German advance and forced them to retreat, not nessicerly the battle that came to symbolize them as a whole); exhausted, hungry, somewhat disorganized, and low on supplies. This limits what they can accomplish in the initial push, and once the Russians catch wind of the major eastern push they're likely to continue mobilization in safer parts of the country. Their operations would also likely be taking place internally in Congress Poland, so you're less likely to see the lack of communications/breakdown in co-ordination between units that made a victory like Tannenberg possible. Especially with a neutral OE to help them with the flow of supplies from their Western Allies (Though credit is still going to become an issue), I see a "Go East" strategy on Germany's part leading to a more grinding war in which the Russians have an advantage relative to their OTL situation, though likely at the cost of lightening up the pressure on Austria. Conrad is still Conrad though, and still has greater than even odds of making a series of stupid decisions that get his men killed in large numbers. Still, a later occupation of Galicia DOES mean Austria doesn't immediately lose her main source of petroleum and (For the Austrian half of the Empire at least), her breadbasket quite as quickly. A better accommodation with the Poles, perhaps an early agreement to combine Galicia and Congress Poland to form a "Third Kingdom" within the Hapsburg Empire, is perhaps more viable ITTL if Vienna decides to go that route, which could have some major effects on the campaigns in Poland and the post-war settlement.
I do agree, in the long run, its better for Britain if she stays out. However, as a Great Power international norms means as time goes on its going to get harder and harder to not weigh in on the issue, lest she miss the bus and be completely absent from the peace table where the new norms of continental Europe are being hammered out. In particular, London being the financial capital of the early 1900's is going to be seeing requests for credit and war supplies from all the belligerents alongside the US; given that the French alone can't enforce an effective blockade of German commerce. I imagine even a neutral Britain is liable to favor France and Russia in this regard though: if for no other reason than Britain's industrial leaders of the era have a rather intense fear of Germany's economic rise, but without having their terms eased for the sake of keeping them in the war the credit rating of the Czarist government is bound to start looking shakey by late 1915/early 1916: the flow of supplies is going to be even faster if they can buy from Britain through the Straits, after all. The US is bound to be more impartial, and will likely end up seeing more CP business if for no other reason than the Entente's pre-existing commercial relations with the British Empire and potential British hesitance to loan/supply their commercial/industrial rivals. By the war's end, she emerges as a still-strong creditor nation... though stuck holding the bag if the Russian government falls and the new one renegades on the loans.
As for the Reds in Russia, have you considered the Mensheviks as opposed to the Bolsheviks? In a Socialist democracy, they'd have a voice and be able to peacefully push towards move even further to the left, while the Bolsheviks, no longer able to leverage the war issue and the strain it was causing on the population, would be less likely to get a critical mass of militants. Monarchists/Greater Russian Revachists (Basically Arch-Conservatives at best, Proto-Facists at worst) would resemble the "Whites", but without the wider context of a radical Red regime seizing power by force I doubt they'd be able build the unity of purpose and alliances with other groups (The Cossaks, for instance) nessicery to try take control of the nation by force. As for the Russian break-up, I think you'd see it shatter a bit more than IRL: the Central Asians likely keep their freedom and the Cossaks may fight for greater autonomy within the Russian state structure, at least, but the biggest problem I see is capital drain. Britain is going to have sucked the country pretty dry of funds if the Czarist government insists on maintaining the war longer than it did IRL, and without a violent restructuring of the state and the breaking off from the global capitalist system I don't see them having alot of liquid funds to play around with. Germany is going to be demanding reparations, G.B is going to want the debt serviced (As will, I imagine, the French who now have debts of their own to pay), and Socalist policies are going to put a pretty big spending burden on the treasury, leaving little available for state-supported industrialization/modernization.