2004 Equatorial Guinea coup d'état attempt succeeds

What would the implications in West Africa be of a government formed and sustained by mercenary power?
 

stalkere

Banned
more details needed

This is one scenario where you could go two very divergent paths, depending on what you want to believe (OR what you want to write)

On one hand, Executive Outcomes is a bunch of racist white mercenaries trying to implement a neo-colonial white supremacist state, lording it over the kaffir.

At the other extreme, you have Executive Outcomes as a bunch of African natives- who just mainly happen to be white descendants of European colonials, who want to liberate their fellow Africans from the oppressive kleptocracies of the thugs that have taken over this country. Their ultimate goal is to create a successful multiracial society that ensure that the enables all Africans to live in peace and prosperity.

I've heard both stories, and, given my experiences, I'll bet the answer is somewhere between those two polar opposites. Which one I lean toward depends on how depressed and cynical I am.

I spent awhile on Relief Operations in Africa, met some of the Executive Outcomes people. Most of them seemed to be in Option two, but I've been fooled before.
 
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Paths based on view of mercenaries

I think somewhere between is fair - but there is also the economic motive, consider the alleged promises of oil concessions from Moto, or for that matter the Sandline affair in Sierra Leone.

Then there are some more "Option 1 " types around: Fred Rindle and Johan Niemoller in Sierra Leone/ CDI.
 
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Yes, I thought good old standard human greed was the main driving force behind the attempt. If the Coup does succeed then it would be interesting to see the international reaction. Supposedly both British and US governments had been made aware on some level decided to ignore it.
 
If the Coup does succeed then it would be interesting to see the international reaction.
Quite. I think reaction initially would be (quietly) positive, but (a) how long would that last and (b) would Thatcher et al. be satisfied with E Guinea or look for further opportunities...
 
Point of departure

Point of Departure

Report 200403PVKH
Mission Report, National Intelligence Agency, South Africa, declassified under Section 34(b) Act 145 of 2014 "declassified with ministerial concurrence"[1]

Persuant to instructions met DAGOBERT [2] at bar in HATFIELD, 5 March 2004. Advised him our information received re mercenary attempt on EQUATORIAL GUINEA and asked him to pass on Minister's request that they be detained on arrival in HARARE and charged under Zimbabwean law. He affirmed.[3]

With Thatcher in the Bight of Benin
Edwin Summers, 2031, No Exit Press

The day before our departure, Joshua [van Staden] called me in a panic. He had been approached by a Zimbabwean intelligence officer, one Harold Dube, whom he knew from his days in Harare. Apparently South African intelligence had somehow gained knowledge of our plans and wanted the Zimbabwean authorities to arrest the advance team when they stopped in Harare to collect weapons. I'd never been in favour of this Zimbabwean weapons business and this just confirmed my worst fears.

"What does he want?", I asked Joshua, "Do you trust him?"

"He's been good in the past", he replied, "He's just hard up." Of course he's hard up, he's a Zimbabwean civil servant. Do the math as the Americans say.

I called Simon [Mann] and Mark [Thatcher] and we met at the usual place in Parktown. Mark finally agreed to go back to Nick's [du Toit] plan of sourcing the weapons locally, which I had always preferred. We would naturally lose our deposit paid to Zimbabwe Defence Industries, but that beat telling Mutize [4] we were abandoning the deal. I called Nick and he confirmed he could set up the deal in time and take delivery later the same day. Simon called Joshua for him to pay off Dube, and the last threat to our plan was stopped. No-one would pass through Zimbabwe but hopefully the South Africans still thought our men would be arrested there and take no further action.

Nick said later that he thought that Kasrils [5] wanted the team arrested in Zimbabwe as they would face much stiffer charges than could be brought in Johannesburg under the Foreign Military Assistance Act - not to mention stiffer sentences and the truely horrendous conditions of Zimbabwean jails and prisons.

[1] Known colloquially as the "five year rule", providing for bulk declassification of government documents, five years after their classification, with exemptions at the discretion of the Minister for Intelligence.

[2] Code name referring to Harold Dube, a Zimbabwean central intelligence officer.

[3] Thus far consistent with one interpretation of what took place OTL. POD follows immediately.

[4] Zimbabwe Defence Industries managing director, who received a deposit of £100,000 via Simon Mann before the POD.

[5] Ronnie Kasrils, then South African Minister for Intelligence.
 
How long would the mercenaries stick around?

I thought the plan was to:

A. Overthrow Obiang and install his chief political opponent in power
B. Get a better oil concession out of his chief opponent

Once that's done, do they need to stay? Obiang is a rather vile fellow (eating his opponents' testicles), so I would imagine most of the public would be glad he's gone.

Of course, if the "better oil concession" is a total sellout, that could annoy the public. I would imagine the mercs, their backers, and the Guinean opposition would need to reach a deal that benefits the backers more than the status quo, enough to maek the expedition profitable, but at the same time, benefit the new government and public enough so it becomes stable and won't need any "outside assistance."
 
I imagine that the mercs themselves would be looking to get a nice contract with their employers for company security or the like once they've got the man they want in power and nice oil concessions. So I think they would probably stay in the country in some capacity but not to prop the new government up.
 
I imagine that the mercs themselves would be looking to get a nice contract with their employers ...
Perhaps then the more interesting question would be what the medium term plans of the employers (the financiers of the coup ) rather than the mercs would be. Thus Thatcher and conceivably Du Toit rather than Mann or Summers from my POD post. The question is whether they would be satisfied with E Guinea alone, or look further afield for new projects, new adventures, new oil fields...
 
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