1st Morocco Crisis what-ifs-

raharris1973

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Moroccan_Crisis

The idea of WWI starting in 1905 over the Morocco Crisis has been discussed several times, but I just read a few chapters of the book "The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War" by David G. Herrmann, that provide some details about the crisis both diplomatically and describes the military situation at the time, so I'm inspired to revisit the crisis for some potential PoDs.

1) A diplomatic what-if, not a military one.

What if there *is* no crisis?

What if when Delcasse puts forth his plan to assume greater control of Morocco and consult with friendly powers like Britain and Russia and Italy but not others like Germany, Prime Minister Rouvier insists on consultation with the Germans also?

The Germans before the crisis were not thinking in terms of making Morocco an exclusive interest of their own and were not actually interested in going to war with France at this time.

Basically, Delcasse was for colonial expansion and for isolating Germany. So he announced plans for Morocco as part of imperial expansion but also as a deliberate snub against the Germans. The Germans saw an opportunity to get some revenge for the snub and make the guy who established French Ententes fail. That's why they asserted themselves and eventually threatened war.

If instead of a snub the French rein in Delcasse and include some quiet diplomacy with the Germans, there could well be no crisis. Depending on the Germans react in private soundings the French and they can work something out where France gets to implement its Morocco plans but Germany gets some colonial adjustments in its favor (like the outcome of the 1911 Morocco Crisis) or if no compensation can be agreed to France makes it assertions over Morocco more incrementally and gradually.

In any case, there is no Morocco Crisis, and no threat of war it uttered. In OTL the crisis had the effect of strengthening the Entente Cordiale and increasing the salience of the comparative strengths of the European armies to a level that had not been highlighted since the Boulanger crisis of the 1880s.

So without the crisis how does European diplomacy go over the next ten years?

Might France move on to additional colonial ambitions rather than thinking in terms of continental war. Perhaps deepening their interests and claims in the Ottoman Levant with a view to eventually breaking it off from the OE?

2) Another diplomatic what-if: Long-story short Germany "won" the resignation of Delcasse under pressure and the holding of a conference on Morocco.

But Germany lost its leverage between the time of Delcasse's resignation and the actual holding of the Algeciras conference. An important part of this was the Kaiser openly saying to French interlocutors that now there was no reason for war. What if the Kaiser avoids saying anything of the sort and France and the other European powers are left with the impression Germany may actually go to war if the conference just sides in favor of the France? Might Germany have "won" a slowing of the French colonization of Morocco, or colonial compensation, or something like that at the Algeciras conference or even in a bilateral side agreement?

3) Another diplomatic PoD. Ultimately, the Ageciras conference on Morocco simply underscored France's diplomatic strength, with all the powers except Germany and Austria-Hungary voting to allow France to move forward. This included even Italy, the supposed ally of Germany and Austria-Hungary.

What if this outcome, which was a nasty diplomatic surprise to the Germans, caused Germany to panic more about its isolation and European unpopularity and seek additional allies? The biggest wake-up call should have been that Italy was unreliable. What if the Germans and Austrians in reaction sought to recruit the Ottomans into the Triple Alliance as a new musketeer? Would Germany, Austria and the Ottomans find enough mutuality of interest to make an alliance? On the one hand, each side may be reluctant to tie its fortunes to the other.

On the other hand, pros for Germans and Austrians are that they can secure an ally with decent territory and population that over time could be useful against Russia and Britain, but which Russia is, at this moment unable to do anything about if it gets angry. [So it's sort of like NATO expansion in the 1990s, getting into a blocking position when it's safe and easy to do so].

Abdul Hamid may have preferred a free hand and Germany is the leader of the weaker coalition. But, there's also some manifest benefit from having countries like Germany and Austria committed to an alliance and therefore your empire's survival. That's a better offer than they ever got from the Europeans.

Who else might Germany be able to invest in as an ally with a decent shot of it working?

So, imagine the OE, AH, Germany (and by extension, Italy) are allies from 1906 or so. This could make the Young Turk revolution alot less likely. And whether it happens or not, it makes annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina much less likely. Rather the status quo of the Austrian occupation of Bosnia and the Sanjak under formal Ottoman suzerainty can be taken as a visible symbol of Austria meeting its alliance commitments. The Italo-Ottoman and Balkan Wars, as they developed in OTL at least, become much less likely.

Thoughts?

4) Military scenario, war occurs and becomes a stalemate or French defensive victory: What if Germany's mindset shifts either before the crisis or during it so Berlin actually does start looking to have a war with France while the weakness of Russia makes the odds better than they have been for years?

A few factors to keep in mind: Britain and Russia are less capable of helping France here. The German forces are larger than the French. The Germans also have better and more mobile heavy artillery. However, the French have the rapid-firing 75mm field artillery, which the Germans have no match for at this time.

So, the Germans attack France. They do not have the classic "Schlieffen Plan" in mind yet, but part of their operational concept in their existing 1905 plan is to advance through Luxemburg and southeastern Belgium to flank the French fortresses.

Germany attacks France and Belgium. The French mount a stubborn but flexible defense and extend their lines to cover the approaches from Belgium. I presume the Belgians, who are weaker than in 1914, largely try to protect their property north and west of the Meuse only making protests and token resistance against the Germans in the southeast. Meanwhile, the British have little force to intervene with, but their Expeditionary plans at the time included landing in Antwerp, which the German incursion amply justifies and Belgium will not be inclined to resist.

However, quick firing French artillery results in much more favorable than expected exchange ratios, with the Germans paying dearly for any attack they amount and for any territory gained by fighting French forces. By about six weeks in and both sides have gotten their reserves into line and the front-line has barely moved on to French territory with the successful grabs of Belgian and Luxemburger territory the only unequivocal German successes. Plus Germany is now under blockade.

The results:

A) The German morale, especially leadership morale dips at the unexpectedly large losses and meager results. Germany agrees to a status quo antebellum peace within a few more weeks or months.

Postwar France is more confident, but it is also bloodied. It recognizes a need for better and more mobile heavy artillery. Postwar Germany fast tracks the design, manufacture, testing and fielding of its own quick firing artillery.

Germany is forced to recognize that prioritizing its naval buildup is an unaffordable luxury. The Navy gets a poor reputation for not doing anything challenge the British in the North Sea while blockade starts and the Army bleeds. Germany realizes it needs bigger and better ground forces. Technological catch-up can deal with the French, but a permanently larger as well as better equipped land force is needed to deal with the European situation as Russia gradually recovers and comes back into the balance.

...alternatively, with the Army being unsuccessful, the Russians still being weak for awhile, and German helplessness in the face of British blockade being demonstrated, Germany doubles-down on fleet construction. I think this is the less likely of the two choices.

B) The war is not settled quickly, and is a stalemated mess. Socialist and anarchist agitation against the war increases in *both* Germany and France at a similar rate. That this was all over a stupid piece of territory in Africa just isn't seen as worth it to the average Dieter or Pierre. The governments get increasingly worried about the domestic situation and make peace later to focus on it, or we get a European socialist revolution in both countries.

5) Military scenario: German victory, mass and maneuver beats firepower. While acknowledging the French superiority in rapid firing field artillery, the author of the book I'm reading estimates the Germans would win because of superior numbers and from comparing the operational plans. Basically, although the Germans attacking the common French frontier and fortress line get bloodied by better French field artillery, the Germans get their reserves into the fight faster and the French cannot move enough of their artillery north to match the German flanking maneuver through Belgium in time to stop it, and the Germans succeed in getting around the French left flank, cutting into the French mobilization and communication zone, outside the range of superior French field artillery.

So the Germans overwhelm or encircle the French.

What are the Germans dictating to France in the peace? An indemnity of course. But territorially speaking? Annexation of more French territory (Briey-Longwy district and its iron mines? All of Lorraine up to the Meuse river?)? Or occupied French territory is exchanged for French colonial territories? Would Britain let such a trade be implemented?

If the British sally forth from Antwerp they are unlikely to have any success against the Germans, and if they do not while the Germans finish defeating the French, the Germans can shift and focus on crushing them next.

In all these scenarios involving war, French loans to Russia will be interrupted. Will that be gravely harmful for Russian stability at this point in time?
 
You raise a whole bunch of interesting scenarios and I'd need to go back and check things before I speculate too much, especially about the diplomatic possibilities here.

As far as the military scenario, my unreliable memory says that while the French military was weaker, they were much stronger relative to Germany than they'd be 9 years later... And importantly, Germany hasn't had time to implement the lessons of the Russo-Japanese war. So I think there's some chance that the French could exhaust the Germans and basically win that way or that the Germans win, but at a staggering cost in blood and treasure.

Also, I'm not sure that the other great powers could stay out if Germany did go to war. So what happens may well turn on what Britain, Austria-Hungary, Italy and Russia choose.

fasquardon
 

raharris1973

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As far as the military scenario, my unreliable memory says that while the French military was weaker, they were much stronger relative to Germany than they'd be 9 years later... And importantly, Germany hasn't had time to implement the lessons of the Russo-Japanese war.

I'll use the author David G.Herrmann's appendices to compare the ratios in terms of manpower in both periods:

1904 Germany 606,866 effectives:France 575,000 effectives, net difference = 31,866 more for Germany, France 5.25% inferior to Germans
1905 Germany 609,552 effectives:France 595,000 effectives, net difference = 14,522 more for Germany, France 2.4% inferior to Germans
1913 Germany 782,344 effectives:France ~700,000 effectives, net difference = 82,344 more for Germany, France 10.5% inferior to Germans

So yes, in terms of bilateral Franco-German comparison, the gap between Germany and France grew between 1904-1905 and 1913 (the stats get too hazy to be comparable from 1914)
 
So yes, in terms of bilateral Franco-German comparison, the gap between Germany and France grew between 1904-1905 and 1913 (the stats get too hazy to be comparable from 1914)

And my hazy memory is that important factors in the German successes in OTL's 1914 had alot to do with the lessons they'd learned from the Russo-Japanese war.

Also, the German successes were close run things in at least a few of the battles.

What influence do you think the French border forts will have? I know Fort Douamont in the Verdun complex was modernized last in 1913, so it may be weaker in this scenario. But I suspect that an earlier war means most French forts perform better. Especially since the Germans won't have their 420mm seige guns - Krupp built those pieces between 1909 and 1912.

Do you know what the state of the rail network in the Franco-German boarder lands was? 'Cuz that will have a big influence on how a war unfolds.

My 2p is that the German assault slams into the French defence, stalls bloodily, and then the course of the war is decided by who can bring in allies better.

I've read that a key reason why WW1 was so intense is that everyone could legitimately see themselves as acting in self defence. So it may be that "bringing in allies" doesn't do much to spread this war over Morocco, but only leads to a brief period of jockeying before peace is agreed. Of course, with railroads and modern weapons, it may be that the cost of young men is too great to allow a limited peace, meaning we still get a WW1-like situation as neither France or Germany can negotiate before one or the other is brought to their knees and every ally they bring in is soon bled enough that they two must see it through to the bitter end.

fasquardon
 
Could Morocco pull a Thailand and balance the influence of France and Germany. OTL Morocco was one of the first countries to recognize the United States, so a POD involving the Moroccan crisis could be a good way to draw the US into European great power politics against the French.
 
So without the crisis how does European diplomacy go over the next ten years?

Might France move on to additional colonial ambitions rather than thinking in terms of continental war. Perhaps deepening their interests and claims in the Ottoman Levant with a view to eventually breaking it off from the OE?
I would say that it is unlikely that French diplomatic ambitions will seek the partition of the Ottoman Empire. The French conversely were opposed to that, and found it to be against their interests. Their position in the Empire was secure economically (where they had huge control over various aspects of the Ottoman revenue due to controlling the Ottoman debt), and culturally where French was the predominant foreign language in the Ottoman empire. According to The Climax of French Imperial Expansion 1914-1924 they were highly concerned that in the break up of the Ottoman Empire, they would get pittances like Syria and Lebanon, while Germany would escape with the prize of Anatolia. The French were an establishment power in the Ottoman Empire and wanted to work within, and profit from, the system where they had a strong position, not destroy it, especially when France isn't guaranteed to get a commensurate share of the proceeds.

There is the problem furthermore that around the world there is very little territory that really remains to be split up colonially or which can be done as such. East Asia is either unable to be conquered due to international pressure (China, Thailand), or unconquerable (Japan), Africa is partitioned, and Asia is outside of the French zone of influence. If their ambitions did go in a colonial direction, the only logical target is the one which it was for decades before the Entente Cordiale: an anti-British policy.

Could Morocco pull a Thailand and balance the influence of France and Germany. OTL Morocco was one of the first countries to recognize the United States, so a POD involving the Moroccan crisis could be a good way to draw the US into European great power politics against the French.
The US didn't have any interests of note in Morocco so far as I am aware. Recognition of US independence well over a century before doesn't mean anything in 1905.
 

Driftless

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The US did have some interest in Morocco - though the circumstances were very tangled....

Perdicaris Incident Not quite the entertaining, if inaccurate tale of the "Wind and the Lion". Basically, the US had some interest, but no policy to speak of
 
The US did have some interest in Morocco - though the circumstances were very tangled....

Perdicaris Incident Not quite the entertaining, if inaccurate tale of the "Wind and the Lion". Basically, the US had some interest, but no policy to speak of
A not-actually-American being kidnapped in a foreign country isn't really what I would define as US "interests", beyond the most broad and vast possible sense of the term. After all, the same story could have happened in say, Afghanistan, and the US clearly had no real interests in Afghanistan in 1905...
 

Driftless

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A not-actually-American being kidnapped in a foreign country isn't really what I would define as US "interests", beyond the most broad and vast possible sense of the term. After all, the same story could have happened in say, Afghanistan, and the US clearly had no real interests in Afghanistan in 1905...

As I noted, the details were a bit murky, but TR & John Hay got their underwear in a knot at the beginning and then as details emerged, the focus took off in a different direction. The only useful point for the conversation here, is that Morocco was in the American consciousness, even on a secondary or tertiary basis.
 
Russia was still weakened by the war with Japan. Even in 1908, during the Bosnia annexation crisis, they didn't want to risk war against Germany and A-H. OTOH, the Ottoman Empire wouldn't participate either for different reasons. But Italy wouldn't stay with the CPs - in this conference they already supported France - talk about foreshadowing.

Hence, maybe a more restricted World War? Germany + A-H vs. Britain, France, maybe Italy, and of course Belgium and Japan?
 

raharris1973

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Speaking of TR, what opinion will he have of the Franco-German war? And how will the American public and Congress see things?

How will Japan react? Once Russia peaces out with her, will Japan take r and r, or turn on the small, vulnerable German presence in Asia and the Pacific or turn on the more substantial French presence in Indochina?
 

raharris1973

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For reference, I will give you the shifting Franco-German troop strength balance for most of the years between 1904 and 1913 as recorded in Hermmann's "Arming Europe:
1904 Germany 606,866 effectives:France 575,000 effectives, net difference = 31,866 more for Germany, France 5.25% inferior to Germans
1905 Germany 609,552 effectives:France 595,000 effectives, net difference = 14,522 more for Germany, France 2.4% inferior to Germans
1906 Germany has 24,353 more effectives than France, France 4% inferior to Germany
1908 Germany has 8,083 more effectives than France, France 1.3% inferior to Germany
1909 Germany has 42,712 more effectives than France, France 7% inferior to Germany
1911 Germany has 19,001 more effectives than France, France is 3% inferior to Germany
1912 Germany has 34,612 more effectives than France, France is 5.4% inferior to Germany
1913 Germany 782,344 effectives:France ~700,000 effectives, net difference = 82,344 more for Germany, France 10.5% inferior to Germans
 
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